Y. B. BHATT, J. ( 1 ) * * * * ( 2 ) LEARNED Counsel for the appellant has sought to raise a question of law from the fact that the trial Court had examined the documents on which there were admitted signatures and documents which bore the disputed signature, and by comparing the two had formed an opinion as to the genuineness of the defendants signature on Exh. 24/2 and discarding Exh. 42 as not bearing the signature of the plaintiff. The main thrust of the contention was that the Court ought not to have examined these documents by itself for the purpose of forming its opinion, and not that the Court could not in law have done so. ( 3 ) IN this context, learned Counsel for the appellant sought to rely upon a number of decisions. 3. 1 He first sought to rely upon a decision of a Division Bench of this Court in the case of S. M. Sharma v. South Gujarat University, 1982 (1) GLR 233 . In my opinion, this decision would be of no assistance to the appellant inasmuch as the only relevant principle laid down, in the context of a domestic inquiry, is that although the law authorises a Court to compare hand-writing, it would be imprudent to base a conclusion of guilt solely on a bare comparison when it is made without the aid of evidence of expert opinion, and a decision based solely on such comparison evidence would be unsatisfactory and dangerous. This proposition has been laid down in para 39 of the said decision, which emphasises that there are catena of decisions (including those of Supreme Court) which leave no room for doubt that it would be imprudent to base the conclusion of guilt solely on a bare comparison of disputed and admitted writings, and that such a conclusion has been categorised as unsatisfactory and dangerous and inadvisable. There can be no controversy as regards the principle laid down herein. What requires to be noted is that the Court ought not to base its conclusion (as regards the genuineness or otherwise of the signature) solely on the basis of the comparison carried out by the Court, and to draw a conclusion only on the basis of such comparison. 3. What requires to be noted is that the Court ought not to base its conclusion (as regards the genuineness or otherwise of the signature) solely on the basis of the comparison carried out by the Court, and to draw a conclusion only on the basis of such comparison. 3. 2 The learned Counsel for the appellant also sought to rely upon a decision of the Supreme Court in the case of State (Delhi Administration) v. Pali Ram ( AIR 1979 SC 14 ). Para 29 of the said decision reads as under : "29. The matter can be viewed from another angle also. Although there is no legal bar to the Judge using his own eyes to compare the disputed writing with the admitted writing, even without the aid of the evidence of any hand-writing expert, the Judge should, as a matter of prudence and caution, hesitate to base his finding with regard to the identity of a handwriting which forms the sheet-anchor of the prosecution case against a person accused of an offence, solely on comparison made by himself. It is, therefore, not advisable that a Judge should take upon himself the task of comparing the admitted writing with the disputed one to find out whether the two agree with each other; and the prudent course is to obtain the opinion and assistance of an expert. " it may be noted that the observations of the Supreme Court clearly indicate that there is no legal bar to the Judge using his own eyes to compare the disputed writing with the admitted writing even without the aid of a hand-writing expert. The Judge should, as a matter of prudence and caution, hesitate to base his finding solely on a comparison made by himself. It may be noted that this decision of the Supreme court specifically pertains to a criminal trial where the burden of proving the guilt of the accused is entirely upon the prosecution. 3. 3 Learned Counsel for the appellant also places reliance upon the decision of the Guwahati High Court in the case of Ala Uddin v. Sishir Kumar Dutta, (AIR 1982 guwa. 42 ). 3. 3 Learned Counsel for the appellant also places reliance upon the decision of the Guwahati High Court in the case of Ala Uddin v. Sishir Kumar Dutta, (AIR 1982 guwa. 42 ). This decision also reiterates the broad principle that there is no legal bar to a Judge using his own eyes to compare the disputed writing with the admitted writing under Sec. 73 of the Evidence Act, but as a matter of prudence and caution, the Court should hesitate or be slow to base its finding solely on the comparison made by himself. Once again, the same principle has been reiterated with the emphasis on the fact that the opinion formed by the Court by carrying out its own comparison between the admitted and disputed signatures should not be the only basis for deciding the relevant issue. 3. 4 Learned Counsel for the appellant has also relied upon a decision of the delhi High Court in the case of Shanta Trivedi v. L. I. C. of India, (AIR 1988 Delhi 39 ). This decision of the Delhi High Court mainly follows the decision of the supreme Court in the case of State (Delhi Administration) (supra), and only reiterates the observations of the Supreme Court. 3. 5 So far as these decisions relied upon by the learned Counsel for the appellant are concerned, there can be no controversy as to the principles laid down therein. One cannot overlook the fact that Sec. 73 of the Evidence Act definitely permits the Court to apply its own judgment and perception, by a mutual comparison and application of its own mind to such comparison, for the purpose of arriving at an opinion as to whether a disputed signature has been executed by the same party which executed the admitted signature, or otherwise. Thus, there cannot be any controversy that such comparison when resorted to by a Court cannot be said to be illegal or outside its jurisdiction. The Court is merely required to be careful and cautious, not in the process of making the comparison, but in deciding the relevant issue solely upon its own comparison and conclusion therefrom. Thus, in sum and effect, these decisions merely establish a rule of caution and a rule of prudence, without in any manner curtailing the power of the Court to enter into such visual comparison. Thus, in sum and effect, these decisions merely establish a rule of caution and a rule of prudence, without in any manner curtailing the power of the Court to enter into such visual comparison. ( 4 ) IN this context, it is also relevant to note the submission made by the learned counsel for the appellant that the Court ought not to have compared the signatures. In this context, learned Counsel for the appellant submitted that since the plaintiff was the party who asserted the execution of the suit pronote by the defendant, it was for the plaintiff to examine a hand-writing expert so as to bring on record such expert evidence which could assist the Court in coming to a conslusion without the necessity of the Court forming any opinion by a personal comparison. 4. 1 This contention raised by the learned Counsel for the appellant is, in my opinion, fallacious. On the facts of this case, and even in general, where there is dispute as to the execution of a document, it follows that one party claims that it was executed by the person specified, whereas another party may be interested in denying such execution. Under such circumstances, it is open to either party to examine a handwriting expert to bring on record expert evidence, which is then to be evaluated by the Court. In this context, it is also required to be kept in mind that although the evidence of hand-writing expert is in the nature of expert evidence, the Court is not bound to accept the same merely because it is the evidence given by an expert and merely because the Court is not itself an expert in this field. The Court can certainly disregard or even discard the evidence of expert witness, provided good and sufficient reasons are available for taking such a view. Moreover, even when expert evidence is available on record, while evaluating the same, the Court is duty-bound to weigh such expert evidence with such other evidence as is available on the record of the case, whether such other evidence is intrinsic evidence, corroborative evidence or collateral in nature. In other words, even expert evidence is not infallible and the Court is not bound to accept the same. Obviously, both parties to the dispute are entitled to examine a hand-writing expert in support of their respective contentions. In other words, even expert evidence is not infallible and the Court is not bound to accept the same. Obviously, both parties to the dispute are entitled to examine a hand-writing expert in support of their respective contentions. However, where a party does not choose to bring expert evidence on record, it must be deemed to be aware of the consequences of the exercise of such a choice, and must be deemed to be aware that under such circumstances, the Court will necessarily look into the matter of the admitted and disputed signatures, compare the same, form its opinion, and then evaluate the said opinion in juxtaposition with such other intrinsic, corroborative or collateral evidence as is found on the record. It would be futile for the appellant to suggest that since no expert evidence has been brought on record, the defendants version that he had not signed the disputed pronote must be accepted, since the court ought not to have looked into the signatures personally with a view to form an opinion thereon. If this suggestion on the part of Counsel for the appellant is to be accepted, it could give rise only to an unwarranted assumption that unless there is expert evidence on record, the Court is helpless in the matter and since it is precluded from comparing the signature on its own in forming an opinion thereon, the Court can only choose between the oral assertions of the contesting parties. Obviously such a contention is unacceptable. Even in the absence of expert evidence, the Court is not helpless, the Court is duty-bound to give its decision on the relevant issues, and such decision would be based on the appreciation of the evidence on record. It must also be kept in mind that when the Court undertakes the exercise of comparing the disputed signature and the admitted signature, the court does not assume or undertake the role of an expert. When the Court undertakes such a comparison and as a result thereof it expresses an opinion, such an opinion does not assume the character of expert evidence, or even that of evidence. The formation and expression of such an opinion is merely a pointer or an indicator which would either support or contradict such other intrinsic, corroborative of collateral evidence which is on record. 4. The formation and expression of such an opinion is merely a pointer or an indicator which would either support or contradict such other intrinsic, corroborative of collateral evidence which is on record. 4. 2 Even when a handwriting expert is examined, the evidence of such a witness, though it is expert evidence, is nevertheless an opinion of such a witness. The Court may or may not accept such an opinion (for good reasons ). This power vests in the Court. If and when the Court refuses to accept such expert opinion (for good reasons), this is in itself an expression of judicial opinion, and it is this that results in the consequential finding of fact. 4. 3 Thus, when the Court has the power to express an opinion, contrary to expert opinion, there is no reason why the Court cannot express an opinion in the absence of expert opinion. (Rest of the Judgment is not material for the Reports.) .