Honble SHARMA, J. – The question for consideration in this appeal is as to whether the suit for partition and injunction with regard to an immovable property entered into revenue record as `Abadi & Banjad land, is maintainable in the civil court? (2). This question has arisen in the circumstance set out herein below. (3). A suit for partition and injunction was instituted by the plaintiff appellant (for short plaintiff) against the defendant respondents (for short defendants) in the Court of District Judge, Jaipur City Jaipur with regard to an immovable property bearing Khasra Nos. 225, 227 and 225/425 measuring 2 bigha 1 biswa situated in Village Madrampura near Commercial Complex Baldeo Plaza. In the plaint it has been averred by the plaintiff that the said property was jointly held by the parties and they have constructed their residential units over it. Alongwith the plaint a schedule describing the details of the property, has been appended. In the year 1968-69 proceedings of acquisition of said land were initiated by erstwhile Urban Improvement Board and in the year 1976 the said proceedings were completed and compensation was settled but subsequently an agreement had been entered into between the parties and the State Government under which a land measuring 330x9 ft. was agreed to be left for way at the disposal of UIT and the entire proceedings were dropped and for that a notification under section 48 of the Rajasthan Land Acquisition Act was issued and published in State gazette. In the award passed on conclusion of land acquisition proceedings the shares as settled by Collector was as under : Bherulal - 1/4th Sualal & Bansilal 1/4th Hiralal 1/4th Sri Moha 1/4th In the plaint it has been pleaded that parties and their predecessors have constructed their residential houses and started presiding. Open land describe din Schedule `ka has been partitioned. Residential buildings of the parties have been shown in different colours in the schedule. All the inhabitants have their own electricity and water connection and they have been assessed for the Land and Building Tax also. The dispute between the parties is in existence for the last many years. The defendant No.1 with the consent of the parties was authorised to solve dispute but was unsuccessful. The plaintiff had withdrawn his consent and took shelter of court for partition of the property. The dispute between the parties is in existence for the last many years. The defendant No.1 with the consent of the parties was authorised to solve dispute but was unsuccessful. The plaintiff had withdrawn his consent and took shelter of court for partition of the property. The suit was contested by the defendants by filing separate written statements. (4). In the written statement submitted by the defendant No.2 and No.3 a objection had been taken to the effect that since the suit related to agricultural land, it was not triable by the civil court but could only be tried by the revenue court. The land in dispute was described as `Banjad and as such could be referred as agricultural land as no order for its conversion was placed on record. The suit therefore was triable by the revenue court. (5). When the matter came up before the trial court for the arguments on the application for temporary injunction which was filed along with the plaint the trial court observed that since the dispute regarding the jurisdiction of the court was involved, it was necessary to decide the issue relating to jurisdiction prior to adjudicate the application for issuance of temporary injunction. Thereafter conferring jurisdiction under Order 39 rule 4 CPC the trial court granted permission to make construction with certain specific direction to defendant No.1 in his dwelling portion. Against the said order, a Misc. Appeal was preferred before this Court. Vide order dated 29.1.1996, this court in S.B. Civil Misc. Appeal No. 722 of 1995 directed the trial court to decide issue relating to jurisdiction within twenty days. (6). In pursuance to the said directions, the trial court framed following issue on 13.2.1996. ^^D;k orZeku okn dh lquokbZ dk {kS=kf/kdkj bl U;k;ky; dks izkIr gS\** (whether this court has jurisdiction to hear the present suit?) (7). The trial court vide impugned order dated 16.2.1996 decided the aforementioned issue against the plaintiff and directed that the plaint be returned to the plaintiff for filing it before the Assistant Collector, having jurisdiction to try the matter. Hence this appeal. (8). I have given my anxious and thoughtful consideration to the arguments advanced before me and perused the record. (9). Mr. R.K. Mathur, learned counsel for the plaintiff submitted that the suit is basically a suit for partition wherein supplementary relief of permanent injunction has been sought. Hence this appeal. (8). I have given my anxious and thoughtful consideration to the arguments advanced before me and perused the record. (9). Mr. R.K. Mathur, learned counsel for the plaintiff submitted that the suit is basically a suit for partition wherein supplementary relief of permanent injunction has been sought. The suit for partition is triable by the civil court and as per section 9 C.P.C. the civil courts can try all civil suits except those which are expressly barred. A perusal of schedule annexed with the plaint clearly shows that construction over the land were made and the parties to the suit have been in possession of their respective dwelling portions which were duly allotted to the parties in the suit by the then Municipal Council Jaipur and these Nos. are 703 to 705. These houses were duly registered with the Municipal Council way back in the year 1960 and for that house tax is being paid. The Land and Building Tax Department Jaipur had assessed these dwelling units way back in 1975. The said property was held to be residential and commercial by the Land and Building Tax Department. The record of the department was placed before the trial court but it was not properly appreciated. The land in question is within the municipal limits of Jaipur City. As per land use plan of Jaipur of the year 1991 the land in question has been described as the area of high density. This master plan was prepared in the year 1976. In the plan the land in question has been shown as residential property. In the State Gazette of October, 1995 a Notification had been published which reveals that en- tire Jaipur region comes within the development area i.e. with the jurisdiction of the Jaipur Development Authority. Once another notification was published in Rajasthan Patrika daily dated 6.2.96 which shows that land starting from Churu Road and Ajmer Road towards Amanishah Nala was being converted into residential to commercial. The trial court itself granted permission to defendant No.1 for making construction over the land and now observation that it had no jurisdiction to hear the case, is self contradictory. Major portion of the land in question has been entered as Abadi land and only 16 biswas of the land has been entered as `Banjad land. The land in question has never been used for agricultural purpose. Major portion of the land in question has been entered as Abadi land and only 16 biswas of the land has been entered as `Banjad land. The land in question has never been used for agricultural purpose. Houses constructed over the said land are having domestic and commercial electricity con- nections. Inadvertently in the interim application instead of `Bhoomi word `Krishi had been mentioned and for its correction amendment application under Order 7 Rule 17 CPC was moved by the plaintiff. The trial court has committed illegality in not considering the provisions of section 242 and 256 of the Rajasthan Tenancy Act, 1955 (for short the Act of 1955). (10). Mr. Mathur, the learned counsel for the plaintiff, has placed reliance on the following case Laws : Mohanlal vs. Smt. Rajvir Kaur and Ors. (1), Smt. Kaushlya Devi vs. State of Raj. (2), Bhanwaroo Khan and Ors. vs. Azim Khan & Ors. (3), R.S.E.B. Jaipur and Ors. vs. Ram Babu & State of Raj. (4), Amir Mohammed vs. Gafoor Khan & Ors. (5), Ram Swaroop Gupta (dead) through L.Rs. vs. Bishnu Narain Inter College & Ors. (6), Badrilal vs. Moda (7), Rattu vs. Mala (8), Shyam Kumar and Ors. vs. Budh Singh & Ors. (9), Abdulla Bin Ali & Ors. vs. Galappa & Ors. (10) and Smt. Sarijabibi vs. C.S. Commissioner of Income Tax Gujrat (11). (11). Mr. Suraj Narain Pareek, Mr. S.M. Mehta & Mr. J.P. Goyal, learned counsel for the respondents have vigorously canvassed that the civil court has no jurisdiction to try the suit of present nature. In the application filed under Order 39 Rules 1 and 2 CPC the plaintiff himself has given out that the property in question was agricultural property and amendment application was filed after about three years in order to fill up the lacuna. Construction of dwelling houses made over the land in question comes in the purview of section 5(19) of the Act of 1955. It can be termed as improvement. Section 90A of the Rajasthan Land Revenue Act 1956 (for short Act ,1956) permits such constructions and it can not be said that if construction work is made on some part of the land, the nature of the agricultural land is changed. The Jaipur Development Authority and Municipal Council Jaipur could not have changed the nature of the land. Section 90A of the Rajasthan Land Revenue Act 1956 (for short Act ,1956) permits such constructions and it can not be said that if construction work is made on some part of the land, the nature of the agricultural land is changed. The Jaipur Development Authority and Municipal Council Jaipur could not have changed the nature of the land. Suit for partition and injunction can be filed under Sections 53, 88, 92, 92A and 188 of the Act of 1955. In the third schedule of the Act, 1955, at No.3 8 and 8A respectively, suits for partition, declaration and injunction have been mentioned and in view of the provision contained in Section 207 of the Act 1955 only Revenue Court could hear the present suit and the trial court which is a civil court has no jurisdiction to hear and decide it. (12). Learned counsel, have placed reliance on the following decisions : The State of Raj. vs. Narain (12), Asala vs. Narain (13), Jaswant Singh vs. Board of Revenue (14), Mohan Singh vs. Wazir Chand (15), Gurucharan Singh & Ors. vs. Mst. Gurudayal Kaur (16), Ramchandra vs. Lakha (17), Babulal vs. Har Pyari & Ors. (18), Chanda Bai vs. Babul Lal (19), Kan Mal vs. The State of Raj. (20), Nizamuddin vs. The Board of Revenue of Ors. (21), Deokinandan and Ors. vs. Suraj Pal & Ors. (22), Faqir (Dead) through Shyam Deo vs. Kishorilal & Anr. (23), Kali Das Umed Ram vs. State of Gujrat and Anr. (24), The State of Karanataka and Ors. vs. Shankara Textiles Mills Ltd. (25), The State of Raj. vs. Bhawani Singh (26), Chandrika Singh & Ors. vs. Raja Vishwanath Pratap Singh and Anr. (27), Govind Murari vs. State (28), Mangya vs. Bhulli (29), Ram Dev vs. Kishori Lal (30), Lakha vs. Kalyan (31), Badri Lal vs. Moda (32) and Smt. Kaushalya Devi vs. State of Raj. (supra) (13). For the purpose of seeing whether the suit is exclusively triable by a revenue court and the civil court has no jurisdiction to try the same averments in the plaint are carefully to be looked into. All the allegations made in the plaint should be taken into consideration and not the reliefs alone claimed in the plaint for the purpose of determining the question of jurisdiction. All the allegations made in the plaint should be taken into consideration and not the reliefs alone claimed in the plaint for the purpose of determining the question of jurisdiction. The substance of the plaint provides a good guide to find out the true nature of the object of the suit. (14). In the case of Manohar Lal vs. Smt. Rajveer Kaur (supra) it was held by Honble I.S. Israni J. as he then was, that where land in question was `abadi land as defined in section 103(b) of the Land Revenue Act 1956 and main relief claimed in the suit was to declare the sale deed null and void, the suit was triable by civil court. (15). Where land belongs to the Revenue Department was placed at the disposal of any local authority vide Notification issued by the Government, it was held that provisions of Land Revenue Act will cease to have any value. This view was expressed by Honble A.K. Mathur J. as he then was, in Kaushlya Devi vs. State of Raj. (supra). (16). Honble B.R. Arora, J. in Bhanwaroo Khans case (supra) has observed that for determining whether the civil court has the jurisdiction or the Revenue Court has jurisdiction to try the suit, the frame of the suit, the allegation contained in the plaint the substance and main object of the suit, the pith and substance of the relief and not merely its form, are required to be looked into. (17). In R.S.E.B. vs. Ram Babu (supra) Honble J.S. Verma, J., as he then was, han occasion to decide such controversy. The defendant of the case had filed revision against the appellate order holding that the suit was cognizable by a civil court. The trial court had upheld the defendant objection that the suit could be tried only by a revenue court, but that view was reversed in appeal by the District Court. Dismissing the revision, it was held thus : ``Admittedly, the defendants objection to the cognizance of the suit by a civil court is to be decided at the stage only on the basis of the plaint averments since the trial has not proceeded further. Reading the plaint as a whole the appellate court has rightly reached the conclusion that the suit is cognizable by a civil court and is not barred by virtue of section 207 of the Rajasthan Tenancy Act. Reading the plaint as a whole the appellate court has rightly reached the conclusion that the suit is cognizable by a civil court and is not barred by virtue of section 207 of the Rajasthan Tenancy Act. It was further observed ``No doubt, it would be open to the defendants to show on merits du- ring the trial that the averments made in the plaint are not correct and that the real facts being otherwise the provisions of the Rajasthan Tenancy Act are attracted as claimed by the defendant. The question of jurisdiction at the end of the trial will therefore, depend on the facts found proved as a result of the trial on the pleadings of the parties. But at this stage when the question is to be decided only on the basis of pleadings, it cannot be said that there is any infirmity in the conclusion reached by the appellate Court. (18). Honble Sacchhar J., as he then was, in Shyam Kumar vs. Budh Singh (33) observed thus : ``It is well settled that the question of jurisdiction, namely, whether suit is exclusively triable by a revenue court or a civil court can take cognizance of it has to be decided on the allegations made in the plaint. (19). While dealing with the question of jurisdiction in Ratan Lal vs. Gram Panchayat Agolai (34), Honble D.P. Gupta, J. as he then was, observed that the court must be guided by the substance of the plaint and not merely by its form. Therefore in order to arrive at a correct conclusion on the question of jurisdiction, the substance of the plaint must be taken into consideration to find out the true nature or the object of the suit. (20). In Abdulla Bin Ali & Ors. Galappa & Ors. (supra) Honble Apex Court has held that allegations made in the plaint decide the forum. The jurisdiction does not depend upon the defence taken by the defendants in the written statement. (21). Honble Supreme Court in Sarifa Bibis case (supra) has held that ques- tion whether a land is an agricultural land is essentially a question of fact. Tests evolved by courts are more in the nature of guidelines. Question has to be answered in each case having regard to the facts and circumstance of that case. (22). In State of Raj. Honble Supreme Court in Sarifa Bibis case (supra) has held that ques- tion whether a land is an agricultural land is essentially a question of fact. Tests evolved by courts are more in the nature of guidelines. Question has to be answered in each case having regard to the facts and circumstance of that case. (22). In State of Raj. vs. Narain (supra) Honble Kan Singh J. as he then was, observed in para No.5, thus : ``I have carefully examined the plaint. The plaintiff has averred that the land in question was his Maurisi (ancestral) and he had been incultivating possession thereof since 1945. The relief asked for is one of possession and for compensation for use and occupation of the land. Therefore I am satisfied that in substance the case is covered by the Third Schedule of the Act and is consequently one exclusively triable by a revenue court as contemplated by section 207 of the Act. (23). It was held in Asala vs. Narain (supra) by Honble Modi J., as he then was, that not only suits and applications of the nature specified in the Third Schedule, but also those which may not so fall but which may partake of the nature thereof can be heard and determined by a revenue court only. (24). In Jaswant Singh vs. Board of Revenue (supra) the Division Bench of this Court has observed that ``it is well settled that the question of jurisdiction ought to be decided on the basis of allegations made in the plaint. (25). Where the plaintiff filed a suit in the civil court for declaration that he was the sole khatedar tenant of the land in suit and for injunction to restrain the defendants from interfering with his possession over the said land, it was held (Mohan Singh Wajir Chand (supra) that suit was triable by revenue court. (26). The Division Bench of this court in Gurucharan Singh vs. Gurudayal Kaur (supra) has observed that it is the substance of plaint and true nature of object of suit that has to be seen. (27). (26). The Division Bench of this court in Gurucharan Singh vs. Gurudayal Kaur (supra) has observed that it is the substance of plaint and true nature of object of suit that has to be seen. (27). In Mohan Lals case (35), Honble C.M. Lodha J. as he then was, considered the pleadings in the plaint and applied the doctrine of pith and substance of the pleadings and reached the conclusion that the relief claimed is that suit really amounted to a relief for a declaration that the plaintiff had half share in the land in question and that the suit was covered by item No.5 of the Third Schedule of the Act. (28). In Ram Chandra vs. Lakha (supra) it was held that suit to restrain defendant from taking water from agricultural well is triable by revenue court. (29). Dealing with the allegations made in the plaint that the plaintiffs were in continuous possession of some agricultural land, it was observed in Kan Mals case (supra) that suit for perpetual injunction on plea that Revenue Secretary had no jurisdiction to pass the impugned order, was triable by revenue court. (30). The D.B. of this court in Nizamuddins (supra) has held that law nowhere defines agricultural land or the land used for agricultural purposes but every land has to be presumed to be an agricultural land unless it is proved to be otherwise or has been recorded as such in the settlement records. (31). Discussing the special provisions of the U.P. Zamindari Abolition and Land Reforms Act 1951, which barred the jurisdiction of the ordinary civil courts to entertain the suit, the Honble Apex Court in Deoki Nandan vs. Surajpal (supra) observed that where lands purchased is covered by the provisions of the said Act the civil court had no jurisdiction to go into the question of title. (32). In Faqir vs. Kishori (supra) it was held by the Honble Supreme Court that the civil court had no jurisdiction to entertain the suit of the nature involved in respect of agricultural plots and such a suit could be filed only before the revenue court. (33). In Kalidas Umedram vs. State of Gujarat (supra) the Honble Supreme Court has observed thus : ``The State distribution under Article 39(b), its material resources to subserve the said purpose. (33). In Kalidas Umedram vs. State of Gujarat (supra) the Honble Supreme Court has observed thus : ``The State distribution under Article 39(b), its material resources to subserve the said purpose. Having obtained the grant or permission, appellants cannot convert the land into non agricultural use as well as for building house. (34). Dealing with section 95(2) of the Karnataka Land Revenue Act, 1964, the Honble Apex Court in State of Karanataka vs. Shanker Textile Mills Ltd. (supra) observed that the provision strengthens the presumption that agricultural land is not to be used as per the holders sweet will, for non-agricultural purposes. (35). In State of Raj. vs. Bhawani Singh (supra) the Division Bench of this court defined ``land with reference to the Rajasthan Land Reforms and Acquisition of Land Owners Estate Act, 1963 and the Rajasthan Urban Improvement Act, 1959, it was observed that word ``land should be given broad meaning. Land is presumed to be agricultural land unless the same has been put to non-agricultural use by construction of forts, palaces or has specifically been set apart as building plots and the same has been recognised as such by the Central Government. (36). Honble Apex Court on Chandrika Singh vs. Raja V.P. Singh (supra) with reference to section 331(1) of U.P. Zamindari Abolition and Land Reforms Act 1950, observed that under section 331(1) exclusive jurisdiction in respect of suits, applications and proceedings referred to in Schedule II of the Act has been conferred on the courts specified in the said schedule and the said proceedings, suit and application cannot be entertained by the civil courts. In Para No. 15 of the judgment it was further observed : ``In our opinion the question as to whether a particular land is ``land under Section 2(14) to which the provisions of the Act are applicable would require determination of the question whether the land is held or occupied for purposes connected with agricultural, horticulture or animal husbandry and that it is a matter which has to be determined either in accordance with the provisions of section 143 and 144 and if such a determination has not been made and such a question arises or is raised in a suit before a court, the procedure laid down in section 331-A must be followed by the court. This would be so even in a case where a building exists on the land and the land is claimed to be appurtenant to the building because in such a case it will be necessary to determine the extent of the land that is appurtenant to the bui- lding i.e. whether the entire land or only a part of it is so appurtenant to the building and for that reason is not held or occupied for purposes connected with agriculture horticulture of animal husbandry. (37). In Govind Murari vs. State (supra) this court has held that the agricultural land must be used only for agricultural purposes and not for any other purpose with- out the permission of the revenue authority. (38). Full Bench of the court in Badrilal vs. Moda (36), had occasion to deal with section 5(24), 51 and 242 of the Rajasthan Tenancy Act, 1955. It was observed thus :– ``Therefore, for the purpose of granting the relief on the basis of an easementary right, the proper forum was that of a civil court. Thus portion of claim made in the plaint was triable by a civil court and the other portion was triable by a revenue court. In these circumstances, the suit could rightly be taken cognizance of by a civil court and what would be necessary was to refer the issue regarding the claim to draw 1/6th water from the well which relates to the tenancy rights, to the revenue. (39). In the light of aforementioned legal principles laid down by the Apex Court and this Court, I proceed to examine as to what in substance is the case in the suit and the relief claimed. A perusal of plaint reveals following facts : (i) Plaintiff sought reliefs for partition and injunction with respect of property bearing khasra Nos. 225 and 227 (Gair Mumkin abadi) and 225/425 (Banjad) measuring 2 bighas and one biswa situated in Madrampura near Baldev Plaza Jaipur. (ii) Said property jointly held by plaintiff and defendants and they constructed their residential units over it and started residing in their respective dwelling units. (iii) Urban Improvement Board initiated acquisition proceedings in the year 1968-69 with respect, of said property. Compensation was settled but with the consent of the parties the proceedings were dropped and the land measuring 330x9 ft. (iii) Urban Improvement Board initiated acquisition proceedings in the year 1968-69 with respect, of said property. Compensation was settled but with the consent of the parties the proceedings were dropped and the land measuring 330x9 ft. was agreed to be left for way at the disposal of the Urban Improvement Trust. Notification under Section 48 of the Rajasthan Land Acquisition Act was published in State Gazette. One fourth share of each party was settled by the Collector. (iv) Buildings of the parties were assessed for the purposes of land and building tax also. (v) Major portion of land was entered as `abadi land only 16 biswas of land was entered as `Banjad. (40). It is not clear from the plaint as to whether entire suit land is occupied by residential houses of the parties or the houses were erected only on some part of it. Section 5(19) of the Act of 1955 defines `improvement with reference to a tenants holding. If only a part of land is covered by a house or other construction and a part is still subject to cultivation the building may be an improvement but if the entire land held by a tenant is occupied by a dwelling house or any other construction, it would be unreasonable to hold that it amounts to improvement because in that case, no holding would be left for whose improvement the house or other construction could be said to have been erected. (41). `Land as defined in section 5(24) of the Act of 1955, excludes `Abadi land. Section 5(24) reads as under : ``Land shall mean land which is let or held for agricultural purposes or for purposes subservient thereto or as grove land or pasture including land occupied by houses or enclosures situated on a holding or land covered with water which may be used for the purpose of irriga- tion or growing singhara or other similar produce but excluding abadi land; it shall include benefits to arise out of land and things attached to the earth or permanently fastened to anything attached to the earth. (42). Suit can be instituted for divisions of a holding under Section 53 of the Act of 1955 but when the definition of land or holding does not include ``abadi land, can a suit for partition pertaining to abadi land be filed in a revenue court? (42). Suit can be instituted for divisions of a holding under Section 53 of the Act of 1955 but when the definition of land or holding does not include ``abadi land, can a suit for partition pertaining to abadi land be filed in a revenue court? Similarly can a suit for injunction in connection with abadi land be instituted in revenue court? These questions are answered by the trial court in the impugned order. (43). If objection to the cognizance of the suit by a civil court is raised by the defendant at the threshold by moving an application under Order 7 Rule 11 CPC, it has to be decided only on the basis of the plaint averments but if trial is proceeded and issues are framed, it would be open to the defendant to show on merits during the trial that the averments made in the plaint are not correct and the real facts being otherwise, the provisions of the Act of 1955 are attracted as claimed by the defendants. The question of jurisdiction at the end of the trial will therefore, depend on the facts found proved as a result of the trial on the pleadings of the parties. (44). The question, whether a land is an `agricultural land, is essentially a question of fact which can only be adjudicated after recording the evidence of the parties. As is held in `Sarifa Bibis case (supra) by the Apex Court that tests evolved by courts are more in the nature of guidelines and questions have to be answered in each case having regard to the facts and circumstances of that case. (45). In the case before me the trial court though framed the issue with regard to jurisdiction of the court yet decided the issue without recording evidence of the parties. Since mixed questions of law and facts are involved in the said issue, it ought to have been decided after recording the evidence of the parties. (46). As a general rule civil courts are authorised to try all suits of civil nature unless their cognizance is barred expressly or by necessary implication. On the contrary revenue courts are courts with limited jurisdiction. (46). As a general rule civil courts are authorised to try all suits of civil nature unless their cognizance is barred expressly or by necessary implication. On the contrary revenue courts are courts with limited jurisdiction. When definition of `Land does not include `Abadi land, suit for partition and injunction under section 53 and 188 of the Act of 1955 specified in the Third Schedule of the said Act can not be ex facie, proceeded in a Revenue Court and section 207 of the Act of 1955 does not bar the jurisdiction of civil court. (46). With regard to Banjad land bearing Khasra No. 225/425 measuring 16 Bis- was, is concerned it has to be examined as to whether residential houses were constructed on the whole of land or over some part of it, in order to appreciate the definition of `improvement as defined under Section 5(19) of the Act of 1955. It has also to be examined as to what is the effect of Notifications published in the State Gazette of October, 1995 and in daily news paper dated 6.2.96 in connection to the said land. (48). As plea of tenancy rights has not been raised in this case, provisions of section 242 and 256 of the Act of 1956 are not applicable. Arguments of the learned counsel for the defendants that the plaintiff in the application for issuance of temporary injunction, has himself described the suit land as agricultural land as su- ch civil court had no jurisdiction, cannot be accepted. Suit land is admittedly an `Abadi and Banjad land and further the plaintiff had moved an application for amending the said description of the land which according to him was a result of an inadvertent mistake. (49). In my view therefore, the suit as framed is one which is triable by the ci- vil court and does not come within the purview of section 207 of the Rajasthan Tenancy Act, 1955. (50). As a result of the above, I allow this appeal, and set aside the impugned order. I direct the trial court to frame other issues arise from the pleadings and decide the issue of jurisdiction afresh after recording the evidence adduced by the parties. In view of the observations made in this judgment, the application for consolidation of suits and for joint trial submitted by the defendants, stands dismissed. No costs. (51). Learned Counsel Mr. I direct the trial court to frame other issues arise from the pleadings and decide the issue of jurisdiction afresh after recording the evidence adduced by the parties. In view of the observations made in this judgment, the application for consolidation of suits and for joint trial submitted by the defendants, stands dismissed. No costs. (51). Learned Counsel Mr. R.K. Mathur has filed an application with a prayer that the record of the tiral court be sent back and a date be fixed in the trial court for appearance of the parties. Therefore, I direct that the parties be appeared before the trial court on 6.1.97 and record be sent back immediately.