M. C. AGARWAL, J. By this revision petition under of the U. P. Sales Tax Act the revisionist challenges an order dated May 15, 1989 passed by the Sales Tax Tribunal, Kanpur, whereby, it dismissed the dealers appeal against an order passed by the Deputy Commissioner (Executive), Sales Tax, Kanpur, revising an order dated September 29, 1984 passed by the assessing officer under section 21 of the Act and after holding that the turnover of tyres and tubes of animal driven vehicles was taxable under the provisions of the Act remanding the matter to the assessing officer for determination of the quantum of turnover. 2. I have heard Sri Bharat Ji Agrawal, learned counsel for the revisionist, and Sri H. R. Mishra, learned Standing Counsel for the opposite party. 3. The proceedings relate to the assessment year 1979-80 for which the assessment order was passed by the assessing officer on March 25, 1984 in which the turnover of the tyres and tubes was treated as exempt. Subsequently on the basis of some information that some turnover of the dealer might have escaped assessment, proceedings under section 21 of the Act were initiated by the assessing officer and after verifying the same he passed an order dated September 29, 1984 holding that no turnover has escaped assessment. 4. It is this order dated September 29, 1984 passed by the assessing officer that was revised by the learned Deputy Commissioner (Executive), holding that exemption granted to the aforesaid turnover was wrong and directing the assessing officer to tax the same after determining its quantum. 5. The assessee preferred an appeal to the Tribunal challenging the order passed under section 10b on various grounds including (i) that the turnover of A. D. V. tyres and tubes was not the subject-matter of the orders under section 21 and hence that order could not be revised under section 10b, (ii) that the Deputy Commissioner (Executive) has no jurisdiction to initiate proceedings under section 10b and (iii) that the order directing the assessment of the said turnover was otherwise unjustified. The Tribunal noted that the appellant before it had paid only 15 per cent as court-fee and therefore it could not go into the merit of the case and could deal only with legality of the order of remand. The Tribunal examined the order under section 10b with this limited view and upheld the same. 6. The Tribunal noted that the appellant before it had paid only 15 per cent as court-fee and therefore it could not go into the merit of the case and could deal only with legality of the order of remand. The Tribunal examined the order under section 10b with this limited view and upheld the same. 6. As is evident, the Deputy Commissioner in his order under section 10b had not quantified the tax payable on the disputed turnover and therefore as held by this Court in Premier Venyl Flooring Ltd. v. Commissioner of Sales Tax 1993 UPTC 1078, the payment of the minimum court fees was sufficient and the appeal had to be decided on merits on all the points raised therein. The Tribunal has decided only one point on merit and that was about the revisability of the order dated September 29, 1984 by which the assessing officer had discharged the notice under section 21 of the Act. Relying upon a judgment of the honourable Supreme Court in Kundan Lal Srikisan v. Commissioner of Sales Tax [1987] 65 STC 62; 1987 UPTC 404, the Tribunal held that the order dated September 29, 1984 amounts to an order of assessment and therefore, that could be revised under section 10b. The honourable Supreme Court has held that once a notice under section 21 has been issued, the original order of assessment gets reopened and thereafter any order made under section 21 of the Act alone would be the order of assessment. In that case the assessing officer had after necessary enquiry under section 21 held that no turnover had escaped the assessment and had ordered that no tax would be levied now the business man is declared as free from paying any more tax under section 21. The honourable Supreme Court held that this subsequent order amounted to an assessment order reassessing turnover already assessed. 7. The honourable Supreme Court held that this subsequent order amounted to an assessment order reassessing turnover already assessed. 7. After the aforesaid judgment of the honourable Supreme Court, section 21 of the Act was amended by the U. P. Sales Tax (Amendment and Validation) Act, 1991 by adding Explanation III thereto stating that notwithstanding the issuance of notice under this sub-section, where an order of assessment or reassessment is in existence from before the issuance of such notice it shall continue to be effective as such, until varied by an order of assessment or the reassessment made under this section in pursuance of such notice. This amendment is effective from March 1, 1973 and thus the view taken by the honourable Supreme Court in the aforesaid case is no longer operative. The effect of the aforesaid explanation is that only an order of assessment reassessing the turnover by varying the same would bring about certain of the earlier order of assessment and bring into existence an order of reassessment under section 21 and orders discharging the notice under section 21 or in any other manner showing that no turnover has escaped assessment would not be orders of the assessment so as to wipe out the earlier order of assessment. There was already an order of assessment dated March 25, 1984 and the order dated September 29, 1984 sought to be revised by the Deputy Commissioner did not vary the turnover already assessed. On the other hand there was specific finding that no turnover had escaped assessment and therefore the notice was discharged. The result was that the earlier order did not cease to exist. 8. The Tribunals finding on this point is, therefore, reversed. Now it has to be seen whether there was any mistake in the order dated September 29, 1984 that was sought to be corrected by the impugned order passed under section 10b by the Deputy Commissioner. The Deputy Commissioner has dealt with the turnover of animal driven vehicles of tyres and tubes. The order dated September 29, 1984 does not disclose the taxability of any turnover of this commodity. The Deputy Commissioner has dealt with the turnover of animal driven vehicles of tyres and tubes. The order dated September 29, 1984 does not disclose the taxability of any turnover of this commodity. This turnover was the subject of specific discussions in the assessment order dated March 5, 1984 and if there was any illegality or impropriety it was in that order and the Deputy Commissioner in that event could have initiated action under section 10b to revise that order within the period of limitation prescribed under the Act which is four years from the date of order. Firstly, the Deputy Commissioner has not initiated any action to revise the order dated March 5, 1984 and secondly, the notice under section 10b was issued on July 27, 1988, i. e. , after the period of four years had already expired. In the said notice it was specifically stated that the mistake is in the assessment order dated March 5, 1984 passed under rule 41 (7) of the Rules treating the aforesaid turnover as exempted from tax. Therefore the period of limitation has expired. The Deputy Commissioner could not revise the said assessment order. In view of the above discussions, the order passed by the Deputy Commissioner was invalid and without jurisdiction and the dealers second appeal before the Tribunal deserved to have been allowed. 9. This revision petition is, therefore, allowed and setting aside the impugned order dated May 15, 1989. It is ordered that the dealers Second Appeal No. 539 of 1988 (1979-80) stands allowed. The revisionist will get his costs of this revision petition from the respondent. Petition allowed. .