Judgment :- Usha, J. The above three appeals are at the instance of State of Kerala. Challenge is against the judgment of Prl. Subordinate Court, Trivandrum and Addl. Subordinate Court, Trivandrum in L.A.R. Nos. 76,103 and 24 of 1985 respectively. The land acquisition reference arose out of acquisition proceedings for Vizhinj am Harbour Project. In L.A.R. No. 96/8710.60 Ares of land in Sy. No. 399/8-11 of Kottakkal Village belonging to the respondents were acquired as per notification dated 10-2-1979. In L.A.A. No. 93/87 105.62 Acres. of land in Sy. No. 399/8-9 belonging to the respondents were acquired under the same notification, whereas in L. A. A. No. 265/85 the area acquired would come to 45.93 Ares in Sy. No. 399/8-7. The award was passed 'in all the three cases on 27-3-1982 and possession was taken on 29-4-1982 in the case of L.A.A. Nos. 96 and 93/87 and on 29-3-1982 In L.A.A. No.265/87. 2. The Land Acquisition Officer Classified properties in L.A.A. Nos. 96 and 93 of 1987 and 265 of 1987 under category B,C and B respectively and granted land value at the rate of Rs. 3,038/- per Are for category B and 1915/- per Are for category C. Being not satisfied with the amounts thus granted the claimants sought reference and the reference court increased the land value as Rs. 4,000/- per Cent (Rs. 9,880/-per are) both in L.A.R. No. 76 and 103/85, whereas in L.A.R. No. 24/85 the land value was enhanced and fixed at Rs. 5,435/- per Are. It is seen that the reference court granted all the statutory benefits coming under the amended provisions contained in Sections 23(1A), 23(2) and 28 of the Land Acquisition Act, 1894. Aggrieved by the above enhancement State has come up in appeal. 3. It is contended by the learned Government Pleader who was appearing on behalf of the appellant that the reference court have committed a grave error in completely ignoring the categorisation made by the Land Acquisition Officer. It is submitted that since the properties are not having similar characteristics it cannot: be valued on same basis. According to the appellant, reliance placed on Exts. Al to A4 in the common judgment in L. A.R. Nos. 76 and 103 of 1985 by the reference court is unsustainable. The reference court should not have discarded Ext. R2 proceedings of the District Collector. According to the appellant, reliance placed on Exts. Al to A4 in the common judgment in L. A.R. Nos. 76 and 103 of 1985 by the reference court is unsustainable. The reference court should not have discarded Ext. R2 proceedings of the District Collector. According to the appellant, the properties coming under L.A.R. Nos. 76 and 103 of 1985 have no road frontage which is clear from Ext. R1 group sketch. The learned Government Pleader would further contend that the document relied on by the reference court in L.A.R. No. 24/85 viz. Ext. Al marked in that case which is the same document Ext. R2 marked and referred in the common judgment in L.A.R. Nos. 76 and 103 of 1985 takes in property which has no similarity with the acquired property. The claimant in L.A.R.24/85 as P.W.1 had admitted that the property acquired has no direct road access. Under these circumstances, the reference court should not have adopted the valuation in Ext. Al in L.A.R. No. 24/85 to fix the land value of the acquired property. In all the thee appeals petitions to amend the memorandum of appeal are filed raising an additional ground challenging the relief granted by the reference court under Sections 23(1A) of the Land Acquisition Act. The Learned counsel appearing on behalf of the different claimants in these appeals addressed elaborate arguments in support of the valuation made by the reference court. It was also submitted that no additional around can be permitted at this distance of time challenging the grant under Section 23(1A) of the Act. 4. First we will consider contentions i n respect of enhancement of land value granted by the reference court, in the judgment in L.A.R. No. 24/85 which is under challenge in L.A. A. No. 265/87 the reference court has relied on Ext. Al document dated 26-9-1979 which look in 10 Cents of land for a consideration of Rs. 22,000/-. This document even though referred to in the notes on award by the Land Acquisition Officer it was not relied on for the reason that the property covered by the document has road frontage whereas the acquired property has no road frontage. The references court took the view that there is nothing to show mat the property covered by Ext A1 was abutting to any road and therefore the valuation given in Ext. The references court took the view that there is nothing to show mat the property covered by Ext A1 was abutting to any road and therefore the valuation given in Ext. Al can safely be relied on for the purpose of fixing the land value in respect of the property acquired from Sy. No. 399/8-7. Land value was thus fixed at the rate of Rs. 5,435/- per Are, We are in full agreement with the above view taken by the reference court. We find no reason to interfere with the valuation of the land made by the reference court in L.A.R. No. 24/85. 5. As mentioned earlier, the property covered by L.A. A. No. 96/87 was classified into category B and property covered by L.A. A. No. 93/87 as category C. The reference court took the view that the classification was unsustainable as without any basis or rationale. We cannot fully agree with this view taken by the reference court. The categorisation is made on the basis of location of the property with reference to accessibility to road and also on the basis of the lie of the properly. R.W.1 in his evidence stated that property covered by L. A.R. No. 103/85 is situated in a less advantageous position than property covered by L.A.R. No. 76/85 and there fore it is treated as category C. He has also sworn to the fact that the property covered by L.A.R.103/85 was not having level ground. It was lying in a slopping position from east to west. It has no road frontage also. According to him, the property as such was not fit for construed ng buildings unlike the property covered by L.A.R. No. 76/85. We find no merit in the contention raised by the claimants before this court mat the evidence of RW.1 that the property is not fit for construction of buildings cannot be accepted since the acquisition itself is for the purpose of constructing houses. It may be that the land can be put to use of constructing houses after doing leveling process. As it. is acquired it was not fit for construction of buildings. We therefore find that inclusion of the property covered by L.A.R, No: 103/85 in an inferior category than the property covered by L. A. R. No. 76/85 is justified. 6. Ext Al is common judgment in L.A.R Nos. 99 and 101/83 dated 29-9-1984. As it. is acquired it was not fit for construction of buildings. We therefore find that inclusion of the property covered by L.A.R, No: 103/85 in an inferior category than the property covered by L. A. R. No. 76/85 is justified. 6. Ext Al is common judgment in L.A.R Nos. 99 and 101/83 dated 29-9-1984. Property covered by the above judgment was part of second phase of acquisition under notification dated 18-12-1979. In this judgment the reference court has granted land value at the rate of Rs. 5000/- per cent (Rs. 12370/- per arc) when the Land Acquisition Officer had granted value at the Rate of Rs. 5400/-per are. This judgment was affirmed by this court in L.A.A. Nos.76 and 77 of 1985. A reference to Ext. Al judgment would show that even though sale deed No. 2402/79 dated 26-9-1979, which is Ext. Al in L.A.R. No. 24/85, was sought to be relied on by the Slate. The court did not take into consideration the document on the ground that it was not properly proved. But subsequently in L.A.R. No.24/85 this document was proved by examining executing of the document and the reference court fixed the land value relying on the value shown in that document. It is under these circumstances in L.A.R. No. 24/85 the land value was fixed at the rate of Rs. 5435/- per are which valuation was affirmed by us in the earlier portion of this judgement. 7. Ext. A2 is judgment in L.A.R. No. 64/84 dated 18-12-1979. Land value was fixed in this case at rate of Rs. 5000/- per cent relying on Ext. Al judgment.L.A.A, No.324/86 which is an appeal tiled from Ext. A2 was dismissed following the judgment in L.A.A. No.76/85. There is no independent consideration of the land value in thus case. Exts. A3 and A4 sale deeds are dated 13-7-1984. That is five years after the notification for acquisition. We do not find any reason to rely on these document. Ext. R3 sale deed No. 2402/79 dated 26-9-1979, which is same as Ext. Al in L.A.R. No. 24 of 1985. This document was proved through Rw.l in this cross-examination at the instance of the claimant. 8. Taking into consideration the entire facts and circumstances of (he case we arc of the view that the land value granted in L.A.R. No.24/85 can be awarded for the property covered by L.A.R. No.76/85. Al in L.A.R. No. 24 of 1985. This document was proved through Rw.l in this cross-examination at the instance of the claimant. 8. Taking into consideration the entire facts and circumstances of (he case we arc of the view that the land value granted in L.A.R. No.24/85 can be awarded for the property covered by L.A.R. No.76/85. as far as the property covered by L.A.R. No. 103/85 is concerned, the same valuation cannot he granted in view of certain disadvantages which the property was having compared to the property covered by L.A.R. No.76/85. We therefore fix the land value of the property covered by L,A R. No. 103/85 at the rate of Rs. 2100/- per cent, which would be Rs. 5187/- per Arc. 9. As mentioned earlier, the reference court has granted all the statutory benefits to the claimants including the benefits under the amended provisions in section 23(1A) of the Land Acquisition Act. It is admitted by the respondents that, going by the decision of the Supreme Court in K.S. Paripooman v. State of Kerala, 1994(2) KLT 763 = [1994) 5 SCC 593, they are not entitled to the benefit under section 23(1A) as the awards were passed before 30-4-1982. But they raised' the objection to the application for the amendment of the appeal memorandum. It is submitted that any such application for amendment for taking an additional ground is bad for being hit by limitation. It was also submitted that the applicant has not paid any court fee on this part of the relief and on that ground also the amendment cannot he allowed. The learned counsel appearing on behalf of the respondent in L.A.R. No. 265/87 submitted that what has been granted by the Reference court under sec. 23(1A) is a several award and the degree that is passed is a composite decree. The additional ground sought to be taken against I he-decree in respect of sec. 23(1A) of the Act has to be considered as an independent appeal and not an addition to the grounds, it is on this basis the learned counsel put forward the contention that application for amendment has to be dismissed as barred by limitation. 10. The learned counsel appearing on behalf of [he clamant relied on a decision of (he Rajasthan High Court in Cliandwinial v. Phool Cfi and, AIR 1952 Raj. Page 181, in support of his contention. 10. The learned counsel appearing on behalf of [he clamant relied on a decision of (he Rajasthan High Court in Cliandwinial v. Phool Cfi and, AIR 1952 Raj. Page 181, in support of his contention. Since we found that in large number of appeals during the period 1987-88, no specific ground is taken by the appellant-state against the grant of benefit under Sec. 23(1A) of (he Land Acquisition Act, we heard Sri. Narayanan Potti; learned Advocate General, on this aspect. 11 The learned Advocate General pointed out that the provisions contained under Rule 2 Order XLI of CPC enables the court to permit additional ground to be taken. lie also submitted that under Order XLI Rule 33 of C.P.C. all comprehensive power is given to the appellate court to pass a judgment in accordance with law. Relying on Order XLI Rule 1 he submitted that the objection that has to be taken in memorandum of appeal is to the decree appealed from and not against any finding. Therefore-there is no merit in the contention of respondents that an additional ground cannot be taken at the later point of time challenging a finding under section 23(1A) of the Land Acquisition act. Referring to the decree the learned Advocate General submitted that mere are three different parts in the decree but that, does not mean that there should be three different appeals from the decree. 12. Relying on the decision of the Supreme Court in Chittoori Subbanna v. Kudappa Subbanna and others, AIR 1965 SC 1325, the learned Advocate General submitted that the question whether the claimants are entitled to the benefit of Sec. 23(1A) of the Land Acquisition act is a pure question of law and it can be taken even at the appellate stage In the above case the appellant applied before the High Court for permission to raise an additional ground of appeal to the effect that the trial court was not entitled to grant mesne profit for more than three years from the date of decree of the High Court. This prayer was disallowed by the high court for the reason that such a ground was not taken in the memorandum of appeal. This prayer was disallowed by the high court for the reason that such a ground was not taken in the memorandum of appeal. The Supreme Court took the view that the question sought to be raised being a pure question of law and was not independent on the determination of any question of fact the High Court should have allowed the appellant to take the additional ground. 13. In Giani Ram and others v. Ramji Lai and others, AIR 1969 SC 1144. even in appeal against part of a decree it was held that additional ground can raised. Interpreting the scope of Order XLI Rule 33 of C.P.C., the Apex Court observed as follows: "The expression "which ought to have been passed" means "which ought in law to have been passed". If the Appellate Court is of the view that any decree which ought in law to have been passed, but was in fact not passed by the subordinate court, it may pass or make such Further or other decree or order as the justice of the case may require." In Mahant Dhangir and another v. Shri Madan Mohan and others, AIR 1988 SC 54, also it was held that the power of Appellate Court under Order XLI Rule 33 is very wide. It was held that the Appellate Court could exercise the power under Rule 33 even if the appeal is only against a part of the decree of the lower court, The rule was found to be very liberal. It was then observed as follows: "...The only constraints that we could see may be these: That the parties before the lower Court should be there before the Appellate Court. The question raised must properly arise out of judgment of the lower court. If these two requirements are there, the Appellate Court could consider any objection against any part of the judgment or decree of the lower court. It may be urged by any party to the appeal. It is true that the power of the Appellate Court under R.33 is discretionary. But it is a proper exercise of judicial discretion to determine all questions urged in order to render complete justice between the parties. The court should not refuse to exercise-that discretion on mere technicalities". It may be urged by any party to the appeal. It is true that the power of the Appellate Court under R.33 is discretionary. But it is a proper exercise of judicial discretion to determine all questions urged in order to render complete justice between the parties. The court should not refuse to exercise-that discretion on mere technicalities". In Keshavlal Lallubhai Patel and others v. Lalbhai Trikumlal Mills Ltd., AIR 1958 SC 512, a plea was taken for the first time before the High Court that the agreement for extension of time was vague and uncertain. Such a ground was not taken even in the memorandum of appeal. High Court permitted to raise the plea by the appellants before it. The Supreme Court approved the action taken by the High Court holding that a fair construction of the document is not based on any other evidence and therefore the High Court was justified in permitting the plea to be taken for the first time before it. The learned Advocate General further submitted that in State of Kerala v. Rochilliamma,1994(2) KLT page 1-, this Court took the view that even if there is no appeal by (he claimant he can be granted benefit under Sec. 23(1A), if he is entitled to such benefit and was wrongly denied the same by the Subordinate Court. The 'learned Advocate General further contended that if the appeal had been filed in lime, any part of the decree can be challenged at a later stage. 14. We are inclined to accept the contention raised by the learned Advocate General that so long as three different appeals are not contemplated from the decree under challenge it is open to the appellant to raise an additional ground challenging the grant of benefit under Sec. 23(1A). Since the facts are not disputed, it is open to the appellant to raise the contention even at the time of hearing without a Janna amendment to the grounds of appeal. Since the benefit of Section 23(1A) is to be denied as the award was passed before 30-4-1982 and sinee the date of award is not i n dispute, the claimants who arc the respondents before this Court will not be prejudiced in the matter of giving evidence. 15. Since the benefit of Section 23(1A) is to be denied as the award was passed before 30-4-1982 and sinee the date of award is not i n dispute, the claimants who arc the respondents before this Court will not be prejudiced in the matter of giving evidence. 15. On the objection regarding the payment of court fee the learned Advocate General submitted that no court fee need be paid when challenge is against that part of the decree which related to the statutory .benefits. Reliance was placed in Kesireddi. Appala Swamyandolliers v. Special Tahsildar, Land Aquisition Officer. Central Rly., Vijayawada, AIR 1970 A.P. 139, DM. Jdwa.'.firUtl and others v. Spl. L.A.O., C1TB, Bangalore, AIR 1975 Karnataka 129, Varkey Kora v. State of Kerala, 1974 KLT 712 and Union of India v. Snit. Maria Olivia Carvallio, AIR 1986 Bombay i. 16. In Union of India v. Stm, Maria Olivia Carvalho. AIR 1986 Bombay 1, a similar question arose.. The contention was that the claimants had to pay court fee on the additional compensation as well as the increased solatium and interest as provided under Section 23(1A), 23(2) and 28 of the Act. Repelling the objection it was held since the additional compensation as well as increased solatium and interest were being awarded on account of statutory provisions of law, the claimant has no liability to pay court fee on these amounts. In AIR 1970 AP 139 (Supra) a Full Bench of the Andhra Pradesh High Court took the view that no court fee is payable on the difference of solatium as a result of increase in compensation awarded by the court, and that was granted in the award. 17. A different view taken by Madras High Court as well as Travancore-Cochin High Court in Brahmanandain v. Secy, of State,. 1930 Madras 46 and Mytiieen Kunju Ahdidrahiman Kunju v. Slate, AIR 1955 TC 110, were dissented from by a Division Bench of this Court in Manavallabhan Karanamulpad v. Sub Collector and Land-Acquisition Officer, Malappuram,1970 KLT 816. Reliance was placed by this Court on the above mentioned decision of the Andhra Pradesh High Court while holding that appellants are not bound to include in their valuation of the appeals the statutory solatium on market value which they are entitled to get under the Land Acquisition Act on the excess compensation claimed in the appeals and pay court fee thereon. 18. 18. In State of Maharashtra v. Mishrilal, AIR 1964 SC 457, the Apex Court had occasion to construe the expression 'amount or value of the subject matter in dispute in appeal' in Article 1, Schedule I of the Bombay Court-fees Act (36 of 1959). The question which arose was whether it was necessary for the defendant to include also the pendent lite interest decreed by the trial court in valuing the subject mailer of the appeal. It was held that the defendant need not pay court fee on the amount of interest he was made liable to pay for the period between the date of the suit and the date of decree. The principle was explained as follows : "14. On what principle are these amounts not treated as forming part of the value of the subject matter in dispute in appeal? Such value is to be determined on the substantial allegation in the plaint or from the pleas in the memorandum of appeal with respect to the point in dispute between the parties and sought to be determined by the Court. Such are necessarily the points affecting the rights of the parties sought to be adjudicated by the Court. Claims not based on any asserted rights but dependent on the decision of (lie disputed right and reliefs in regard to which arc in the discretion of the court do not conic within the purview of the expression 'subject matter in dispute in plaint or memo of appear." In 1970 KLT 816 (Supra) the Division Bench of this Court relied on the above principle laid down by the Supreme Court also. It was held that the right of the claimant to get 15% of the market value under Sec. 25(2) of the Land Acquisition Act was not a matter in dispute either before the Land Acquisition Court or i n the appeal filed against the award. The matter in dispute before the Laid Acquisition Court and in the appeal was only the quantum of compensation payable under Sec. 25(1) of the Land Acquisition Act. The amount payable under Section 25(2) is dependent on the compensation payable under section 25(1) and it must fall or stand with the amount to be fixed under Section 25(1). The matter in dispute before the Laid Acquisition Court and in the appeal was only the quantum of compensation payable under Sec. 25(1) of the Land Acquisition Act. The amount payable under Section 25(2) is dependent on the compensation payable under section 25(1) and it must fall or stand with the amount to be fixed under Section 25(1). It was on this basis the Division Bench took the view that the statutory solatium granted need not be taken into consideration for valuation of the appeal. 19. We arc Of the view that the above principles can be applied in the Matter of the statutory benefit granted under Sec. 23(1A) of the Land Acquisition Act, 1894. What is granted under Sec. 23(1A) is an amount at the rate of 12% p.a. on the market value fixed under sub-section (1) of Sec. 23. Court has to grant the above amount even if the party does not make a claim. In the light of the above discussion, we are of the view that there is no merit in the objection raised by the respondent that the additional ground taken by the appellant relating to claim under Section 23(1A) of the Act cannot be entertained for the reason that no court fee has been paid for that relief. In the result, the land value as assessed by the reference court in L.A.R.No. 24/85 stands affirmed. As far as L.A.R. No. 76/85"is concerned, we find that the claimants are entitled to land value at the rate of Rs. 5,435/- per Are. An amount of Rs. 4,4451- per Are has to be reduced for 10.60 Arcs from what has been granted by the reference court. In L.A.R. No. 103/85 is considered, we find that the claimants will be entitled to land value at the rate of Rs; 5,187 - per Are. Thus an amount at the rate of Rs. 4,693/- per Are has to be reduced for 105.62 Ares train what has been granted by the reference court. Statutory benefit under Section 23(1A) of the Land Acquisition Act granted by the reference court in all the cases is deleted. Appeals stand partly allowed as above. In the circumstances of the case. we do not pass any order as to costs.