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1996 DIGILAW 137 (PAT)

Ashok Kumar Singh v. State Of Bihar

1996-02-28

ASOK KUMAR GANGULY

body1996
Judgment A. K. Ganguly, J. 1. -this writ petition was filed by Ashok Kumar Singh and four others, challenging inter alia, the various actions taken by the respondent authorities about their services with Director, District Industries centre. 2. By an order dated 23rd february, 1996 this Court directed that this matter be taken up along with c. W. J. C. Np.3712 of 1994 but after hearing this matter for some time this court finds that this matter stands on a different footing and so this case is separately heard. 3. Petitioner Nos.1,2,3 and 5 have alleged that their services have been terminated by the respondent authorities without following the proper procedure and the principles of natural justice. In other words, it has been alleged that they have not been given adequate opportunity of defence in connection with the disciplinary proceedings which were held against them. 4. The case of the petitioner No.4 is that he has not as yet been dismissed but he has been put under suspension with effect from 27th august, 1992 and the said suspension order is still continuing. Counsel for respondents also submits that petitioner no.4 has not been dismissed and is still under suspension. 5. At the time of commencement of hearing learned counsel for the respondents just mentioned his preliminary objection that this writ petition is not maintainable as the respondent organization from which the petitioners were dismissed is not a State within the meaning of Article 12 of the Constitution. Apart from just mentioning this objection at the beginning of the hearing at the time of his argument the learned counsel for the respondent has not urged this contention nor did he try to support the said preliminary objection with reference to the facts of this case or on the basis of any decision. As a matter of fact at the time of argument he argued this writ-petition on merits and not on the point of his preliminary objection and the said objection was given up. Therefore, their Court proceeded to hear this writ-petition on merits. 6. From the facts of the case it appears that on suggestion given by the standing Committee of the Rural Industries Planning Commission, New delhi, presently under the Control of ministry of Industries, eight District industry Centres were established by the state of Bihar. Now the number has gone up 2 to 39. 6. From the facts of the case it appears that on suggestion given by the standing Committee of the Rural Industries Planning Commission, New delhi, presently under the Control of ministry of Industries, eight District industry Centres were established by the state of Bihar. Now the number has gone up 2 to 39. These District Industry centres (D. I. C.) were previously known as Rural Industries Projects. The entries execution of such Industries have been entrusted by the State government with the approval of the government of India to various non-official organizations. The cost of such projects is shared entirely by the government of India and the State of bihar on a fifty-fifty ratio. 7. It has been stated by the petitioner that the entire execution of the projects in this case has been left in the hands of Gram Nirman Mandal. The articles of Association of Gram Nirman Mandal provides for constitution of Niyamik Samiti known as governing body. The Niyamik Samiti is the chief executive body of the Mandal. The niyamik Samiti is authorised to frame its bye laws in consonance with the memorandum of Articles of Association. The clauses of such bye-laws deal with the appointment, dismissal, discharge and suspension of its employees. The aforesaid scheme of frame work of the respondent organization as submitted by the counsel for the petitioner has not been disputed by the counsel for the respondent. 8. It is no doubt true that these g. I. Cs. are fully financed from public exchequer and are carrying on governmental functions. Therefore they are instrumentalities of the Government and as such come within the definition of State under Article-12 of the Constitution. 9. The case of the petitioner is that, petitioner No.1 was appointed in the post of Functional Manager of d. I. C. , petitioner No.2 was appointed an Assistant Manager, Petitioner no.3 was appointed as Economic Investigator, petitioner No.4 was appointed a Steno-Typist and petitioner No.5 was appointed a Correspondence Clerk. The proceedings against them were initiated on the basis of various charges, mainly on the grounds of authorised absence and improper conduct and so on. 10. A notice was published in hindustan under the signature of the district Magistrate, Gaya, calling upon the petitioners to join the office immediately within five days failing which it was stated that they might be suspended and subjected to disciplinary proceeding. 10. A notice was published in hindustan under the signature of the district Magistrate, Gaya, calling upon the petitioners to join the office immediately within five days failing which it was stated that they might be suspended and subjected to disciplinary proceeding. Petitioner case is that they have shown cause to such charges. The further case of the petitioners is that criminal cases were lodged against them and they obtained anticipatory bail from this Court. Thereafter a proceeding under section 107 of the Cr. P. C. was also initiated against them. 11. This Court is not concerned with the correctness or legality of those proceedings. 12. The main question with which the Court is concerned is whether prior to the passing of the order of dismissal the petitioners were given adequate and reasonable opportunity to defend themselves. In support of the fact that the notice of enquiry was sent to the petitioner, the respondents are relying on a document which is at page-228 (Annexure-0) to the counter-affidavit filed by respondent nos.3, 4, 5 and 6 affirmed by one Ramdas Thakur describing himself as a General manager, District Industries Centre, gaya. The respondent Authorities have relied on the aforesaid document in order 10 show that they have given notice of enquiry to the writ petitioners. Counsel for the petitioners has submitted that his clients never received the said notice. The said case has been made out by the petitioner in paragraph-33 of the rejoinder filed by them to the said counter-affidavit. In the said paragraph-33 it has been stated that the claim of the respondents that prior to the termination of the services of the petitioners proceedings were drawn up and enquiries are held by Sri ram Chandra Choudhary is false. They have also stated that the said notice is without any number and without any date. From a perusal of the said notice it appears that there is no number given to the same but one Ram Chandra choudhary signed the same on 5-2-92. 13. Be that as it may, counsel for, respondents has stated that it was illegally served upon the petitioners under certificate of posting. Such assertion has been made in paragraph 10 of the supplementary counter-affidavit filed by the State respondents to the rejoinder of the petitioner. 14. This obviously raises a disputed questions of fact. 13. Be that as it may, counsel for, respondents has stated that it was illegally served upon the petitioners under certificate of posting. Such assertion has been made in paragraph 10 of the supplementary counter-affidavit filed by the State respondents to the rejoinder of the petitioner. 14. This obviously raises a disputed questions of fact. But claim of respondents that the notice of enquiry (Annexure-0) was served on the petitioner has been denied by them. 15. This Court may not come to any definite conclusion on this disputed question, but one thing is clear that in the matter of service of notice and holding the disciplinary enquiry the respondents must take almost care to serve such notice. A disciplinary enquiry may ultimately lead to dismissal of a person from his service which is the only source of his livelihood. When the spurce of livelihood is taken away by an authority it must be taken away on the basis of a procedure which is just, reasonable and fair. The Supreme Court has repeatedly emphasised this aspect of the matter in a number of decisions. (See the judgment in D. K. Jadav vs. J. M. A. Industries, reported in 1993 (3) S. C. C.259. The Hon ble Supreme Court has also stated that livelihood is the part of fundamental right under Article 21 of the Constitution. When such a right is effected it can be done only on the basis of a procedure which is just reasonable and fair. 16. Here admittedly the notice 1 which was sent to the petitioners about the enquiry was not sent under registered post nor was it a notice sent by personal service. No material has been produced by the respondents to show that the said notice sent by under certificate of posting has been actually served upon the petitioners. 17. The question of notice has come up for judicial consideration in many cases and mostly in tenancy matters, and sometimes also in matters relating to holding of meetings of various bodies. This Court is of the view that in a disciplinary proceeding the employees have much more at stake in the sense that a person may lose his job. Therefore, the importance of sending of a proper notice is all the more, necessary in such cases. This Court is of the view that in a disciplinary proceeding the employees have much more at stake in the sense that a person may lose his job. Therefore, the importance of sending of a proper notice is all the more, necessary in such cases. A notice which is sent under ordinary post or under certificate of posting merely raises a presumption of posting and does not raise any presumption of service. And the presumption which is available under section 27 of the General Clauses Act is not available when notice is sent under certificate of posting. The presumption under Sec.114 of the Evidence Act may be available in respect of such notice sent under certificate of posting, but such presumption is a rebuttable one. It is well known that presumption under Sec.114 of the Evidence Act is one of fact and not of law. When the petitioners in this case have pledged their oath in disputing the service of the said notice, the presumption of regularity in official business which is available in Sec.114 of the Evidence act cannot be treated to be conclusive. 18. Taking all these principles into consideration this Court is of the opinion that the livelihood of the petitioner is affected on the basis of such service of notice. Mere sending of notice under certificate of posting and without any materials or evidence that the said notice has actually been served upon the petitioner does not satisfy the conscience of this Court that the petitioner Nos.1,2,3,5 and 6 have got notice of such enquiry. Consequently the enquiry which was held on the basis of such alleged notice was held ex pane. As there was no notice the enquiry was therefore incurably vitiated and cannot be sustained. 19. There is another infirmity also. Petitioners, counsel has elaborately stated that the said enquiry has also been held in a very peculiar manner in the sense that against five persons, namely, petitioner Nos.1,2,3,5 and 6 such enquiries have been held by a particular Enquiry Officer in course of one day, i. e.24th October, 1992 and in course of one day the "enquiry officer perused the papers, documents produced by respondent No.6 and the said officer examined the witnesses. He also made inspection of the respective chamber and office premises of the petitioners". He also made inspection of the respective chamber and office premises of the petitioners". It is not in dispute that the enquiry officer submitted his enquiry report on the same day, i. e.24th October, 1992. This claim has been made in the counter-affidavit filed by respondent nos.3, 4, 5, 6 in this proceeding. Relying on the aforesaid statement in the counter-affidavit the counsel for the petitioner stated that within one day the enquiry officer held enquiry in respect of 48 charges against five petitioners and submitted order 5 enquiry reports running into about 50 pages. Apart from that, according to the respondents the enquiry officer also perused the documents, examined the witnesses and also visited the chambers and office premises of the petitioners. 20. This Court is very reluctant to accept the aforesaid claim of respondents that it is possible for one man to appeal his mind as an enquiry officer to all those charges and examine the witnesses and peruse the documents in respect of disciplinary proceeding against five petitioners and also submit his written report about all the petitioners in course of the same day. This claim of circumstances creates a serious doubt in the mind of the Court that a single person individually can perform all these functions in the course of a day. This Court, therefore, holds that there has not been a proper or valid enquiry. But the petitioners have been dismissed from the service on the basis of such alleged enquiry and the resultant enquiry report submitted by the enquiry officer. 21. Having regard to the aforesaid admitted factual position this court is of the opinion that the petitioner has not been given a proper notice of enquiry and there has not been a proper and valid enquiry and as such the order of dismissal which is passed on the basis of such alleged enquiry cannot be allowed to stand. Accordingly, the impugned orders of dismissal passed against petitioner nos.1,2, 3, 5 and 6 dated 23-11-1992 are all quashed. 22. So far petitioner No.4 is concerned it has been stated that he has not been dismissed and kept unde suspension since 27th August, 1992. This court cannot allow this prolonged suspension of the petitioner No.4 to be continued for such a long time. In that view of the matter suspension order against the petitioner No.4 is quashed. 23. 22. So far petitioner No.4 is concerned it has been stated that he has not been dismissed and kept unde suspension since 27th August, 1992. This court cannot allow this prolonged suspension of the petitioner No.4 to be continued for such a long time. In that view of the matter suspension order against the petitioner No.4 is quashed. 23. As a result of quashing the impugned order of dismissal and suspension against the petitioner Nos.1,2,3,4,5 and 6 they are entitled to put back in service within a period of ten days from the date of receipt/production of a copy of this order of the post from which they were dismissed. As the suspension order against the petitioner no.4 stands quashed, he must be allowed to work against the post from which he was suspended. It is further made clear that the petitioners will not be paid anything by way of back wages from the date of their dismissal till the date of their reinstatement. 24. This Court finds that several orders have been passed directing payment of salary and wages of the petitioner prior to the order of dismissal. If any salary or wages due to the petitioner prior to the dismissal has not been paid the same should be paid to them within a period of one month from today, if not already paid. 25. This Court does not quash the charge-sheet against the petitioners. If the respondents are so advised they may hold a proper enquiry upon notices to the petitioners. Such enquiry must be concluded within a period of six months from the date of receipt production of a copy of this order. If the enquiry proceedings are not concluded against the petitioners within the period as aforesaid the charge sheet against all the petitioner will stand quashed on and from 30th September, 1996. With the aforesaid direction this writ petition is allowed to the extent indicated above. There will no order as to cost. Petitioner Decided Accordingly.