Judgment : S. P. Srivastava, J. 1. Feeling aggrieved by an order allowing a revision under Section 115 of the C. P. C. filed by the judgment debtor against an order passed by the executing court rejecting his objections filed under Section 47 of the C. P. C. whereunder setting aside the order passed by the executing court, the consent decree sought to be executed was declared to be void and not executable, the petitioner-decree-holder has approached this Court seeking redress praying for the quashing of the revisional order. 2. I have heard the learned counsel for the parties and have carefully perused the record. The facts in brief shorn of details and necessary for the disposal of this case lie in a narrow compass. The petitioner had filed a suit seeking ejectment of the defendant respondent from the premises in dispute under his tenancy and for recovery of arrears of rent and damages pendente-lite and future. During the pendency of the suit the parties entered into a compromise which was duly verified and the suit was decided in terms of the same by the trial court indicating that the compromise shall form part of the decree. This decree was passed on 28-4-77. It may be noticed that the suit seeking a decree for the eviction of the tenant from the premises in dispute had been filed on the ground of default as contemplated under Section 20 (2) (a) of the U. P. Urban Build ings (Regulation of Letting, Rent and Eviction) Act, 1972 (U. P. Act No. 13 of 1972 ). Under the terms of the compromise it was settled that the plaintiff's suit for the eviction of the defendant from the premises in suit was to be decreed allowing the defendant-tenant to continue to occupy the same till 31-10-77 whereafter the same was to be vacated by the tenant on 1-1-78. It was specifically provided that in the event of default in vacating the premises it will be open to the decree holder to get the tenant evicted and recover possession of the premises in suit, through the process of the court. It was specifically provided that in the event of default in vacating the premises it will be open to the decree holder to get the tenant evicted and recover possession of the premises in suit, through the process of the court. It was also indicated that the arrears of rent and damages for use and occupation for the period ending 31-3-77 had been paid to the decree holder and with effect from 1-4-77 till the said premises was vacated, the defendant-tenant was to remain liable to pay an amount of Rs. 15/-per month. 3. WHEN the tenant did not vacate the premises in dispute as agreed upon the plaintiff-decree-holder started proceedings for getting the decree executed. In those proceedings the tenant judgment debtor filed an objection under Section 47 of the C. P. C. asserting that in the month of January 1978 in the presence of several persons the plaintiff-decree holder had orally agreed to continue the tenancy of the tenant as before and the decree for his eviction had become unenforceable. This objection was con tested by the petitioner asserting that no such agreement had taken place and the decree holder was throughout pressing the defendant-tenant to vacate the premises and on his failure had no option left except to get the decree executed. 4. THE executing court after considering the evidence and the materials on the record disbelieved the claim of the tenant-judgment debtor. THE executing court was further of the view that the claim of the judgment debtor tenant in effect was a claim in regard to the adjustment of the decree and taking into consideration the provisions contained in Order XXI, Rules 2-A and 3 of the Code of Civil Procedure, the requisite conditions contemplated wherein had not been satisfied no such adjustment could be taken notice of. On the aforesaid conclusion the objections filed by the tenant judgment debtor were dismissed. The revisional court vide the impugned order held that the oral agreement relating to the adjustment set up by the judgment debtor tenant could not be taken notice of in view of the statutory embargo contained in Order XXI, Rules 2-A and 3 of the Code of Civil Procedure. The revisional court vide the impugned order held that the oral agreement relating to the adjustment set up by the judgment debtor tenant could not be taken notice of in view of the statutory embargo contained in Order XXI, Rules 2-A and 3 of the Code of Civil Procedure. The revisional court also affirmed the finding recorded by the trial court that in fact no such adjustment as claimed by the defendant- tenant had been arrived at and the claim of the defendant was not proved at all. 5. HOWEVER, the revisional court proceeded further and held that the consent decree sought to be executed was void in law. In this connection the revisional court observed that the decree in question did not refer to any ground on which the ejectment could be granted as contemplated under Section 20 of the U. P. Act No. 13 of 1972. The revisional court was of the view that the compromise even if legally recorded in an ejectment suit the decree passed in terms thereof would stand invalidated if there was no recital therein of any ground upon which the ejectment could be had under the Act and such a consent decree was a nullity and was not as such executable and the execution was legally not maintainable. 6. LEARNED counsel for the petitioner has strenuously urged that the terms of the compromise made it abundantly clear that the suit of the plaintiff which was based on the ground of default contemplated under Section 20 (2) (a) of the U. P. Act No. 13 of 1972 was to stand decreed but the execution of this decree was to remain put-of till 31-12-77. The contention is that the terms of the compromise contained an unequivocal and categorical admission about the ground for eviction having been made out as claimed. What has been asserted is that when the defendant-tenant himself agreed to the grant of the decree as prayed for the claim of the plaintiff in regard to the default contemplated under Section 20 (2) (a) of the U. P. Act No. 13 of 1972 on the part of the defendant stood made out and proved and it was not necessary at all to recite the ground for eviction in the compromise itself separately. Learned counsel for the respondent, however, has tried to support the impugned order on the reasonings contained therein placing reliance upon the decisions referred to in the impugned order. 7. SUCH a matter had come up for consideration before the Apex Court in its decision in the case of Him Lal Moolchand Doshi v. Barot Raman Lal Ranchhoddas (dead) by L. R. s. reported in JT1993 (a) S. C. 97. The compromise arrived at in the suit in that case which was made part of the decree had the terms similar to the compromise arrived at between the parties in the present case. In that case also as the tenant failed to deliver possession of the premises by the due date as agreed upon, the landlord had filed an application for execution of the decree which was objected to by the tenant-judgment debtor challenging the executability of the decree inter-alia, contending that the eviction decree was not executable as it was a nullity on the ground that there was no material before the court which passed the decree to show the availability of the various grounds of eviction alleged against the tenant. In that case also the executing court had taken the view that the decree was not a nullity and was executable but this order had been set aside in revision holding that the decree was not executable as it was a nullity. 8. THE Apex Court in its aforesaid decision had observed that in dealing with such a question of nullity of a decree it should not be lost sight of that the executing court is bound to execute the decree and cannot go behind the same unless the decree passed by it is a nullity. In the context which was dealt with, the Apex Court emphasised that the decree can be said to be a nullity if it is passed by a court having no inherent jurisdiction explaining further that merely be cause a court erroneously passes a decree or there is an error while passing the decree, the decree cannot be called a nullity. THE decree to be called a nullity is to be understood in the sense that it is ultra-vires the powers of the court passing the decree and not merely a voidable decree. THE decree to be called a nullity is to be understood in the sense that it is ultra-vires the powers of the court passing the decree and not merely a voidable decree. After noticing its various earlier decisions, it was observed by the Apex Court that there is no doubt that if there is a context that court can pass a decree for eviction only if the court is satisfied about the existence of the ground mentioned in the Rent Control Act XL this satisfaction can also be inferred impliedly. From the terms of the compromise in the aforesaid case the Apex Court observed that it was clear that the tenant agreed about the claim of the arrears of rent. It was also noticed that whenever there was any lawful agreement the court was bound to record the agreement or compromise. In the aforesaid view of the matter, the Apex Court had allowed the appeal and the revisional order had been set aside. 9. IN the present case, the provisions contained in Rule 3 of Order XXIII of the Civil Procedure Code were clearly applicable. There being no evidence recorded on the merits before the compromise order was passed the Court had to consider the nature and extent of material on which the court could be said to have satisfied itself about the existence of the grounds. The terms of the compromise in question clearly indicate that there was implied admission therein in regard to the claim of the plaintiff and it provided for payment 'to arrears of rent by the tenant in respect of the default contemplated under Section 20 (2) (a) of the U. P. Act No. 13 of 1972. As the compromise contained the admission of the tenant it was not open to challenge its correctness as this admission had been made in a judicial proceeding, and such admissions are absolutely binding on the parties. I am clearly of the opinion that the terms of the com promise in the present case contained an implied admission by the tenant of the existence and availability of the ground contemplated under Section 20 (2) (a) of the Act having been made out. The consent decree, therefore, could not be called a nullity so as to enable the executing court to go behind it, and refuse its execution as sought for. 10. The consent decree, therefore, could not be called a nullity so as to enable the executing court to go behind it, and refuse its execution as sought for. 10. THERE is yet another aspect of the matter which cannot be lost sight of. It may be noticed that the bar contained under Section 20 (1) of the U. P. Act No. 13 of the 1972 which stands lifted on the fulfilment of the conditions stipulated under Section 20 (2) thereof has to be treated as subject to the provision contained in Section 20 (5) of the Act which is to the following effects: "section-20 (5): Nothing in this section shall affect the power of the court to pass a decree on the basis of an agreement, compromise or satis faction recorded under Rule 3 of Order XXIII of the first Schedule to the Civil Procedure Code, 1908. " In view of the aforesaid statutory provision, it seems to me, that it was open to the trial court to record the compromise and pass a decree on the basis of the agreement or satisfaction recorded in accordance with that provisions contained in order XXIII, Rule 3 of the Civil Procedure Code even though the conditions contemplated order Section 20 (2) could not be taken to have been satisfied. In view of the clear cut provisions contained in Section 20 (5) of the Act, therefore, it was not necessary for the trial court to insist for either the mentioning of the ground contemplated under Section 20 (2) of the Act in the compromise itself or in the intimate decree passed on its basis or to satisfy itself expressly that the ground specified in sub-section (2) of Section 20 did exist. In this view of the matter also giving full effect to the provisions contained in Section 20 sub-clause (5) of the Act once it was established that a lawful compromise had been arrived at between the parties which had been duly recorded and a decree had been passed on that basis in that case it was not open to the executing court to go behind the decree and declare it a nullity and unenforceable at law merely on the ground that the compromise or the decree based upon it did not disclose expressly the fact that the grounds contemplated under Section 20 (2) of the Act existed supporting the decree. I am clearly of the opinion that the compromise decree has passed in the present case, in the circumstances, could be executed and could not be taken to be suffering from any such jurisdictional defect as has been indicated by the revisional court in its impugned order. 11. IT may further be noticed that in its decision in the case of Madan Mohan and another v. Krishan Kumar Sood, reported in JT 1993 (1) SC 162, the Apex Court had observed that the Rent Control Acts no doubt are measures to protect tenants from eviction except on certain specified ground if found established, but once the grounds are made out and subject to any further condition which maybe provided in the Act, the tenant would suffer ejectment. IT was observed further that the protection given in the Rent Control Acts is not to give licence for continuous litigation and bad blood. 12. TAKING into consideration the facts and circumstances brought on record and the ratio of the decision of the Apex Court in its decision in the case of Madan Mohan and another v. Krishan Kumar Sood (supra) and my conclusions indicated hereinabove sufficient ground has been made out for the interference by this Court. In the result, this writ petition succeeds and the impugned order dated 5-12-80 passed by the respondent No. 1, a certified copy whereof has been filed as Annexure 3 to the writ petition is hereby, quashed. The trial court is directed to proceed with the execution of the decree expeditiously. 13. THE petitioner will be entitled to his costs. Petition allowed.