JUDGMENT Surinder Sarup, J.: The present suit has been filed by the Himachal Pradesh Financial Corporation, hereinafter referred to as Corporation, for recovery of Rs.57,19,487.06 P. with future interest from 10.12.1979 and miscellaneous expenses etc. 2. The facts as pleaded in the plaint are that M/s Hypine Carbons Limited, Nalagarh was first incorporated as a Private Limited Company under the Companies Act, 1956 by defendants Nos. 5 to 7 who were then its Directors. The Company was incorporated for establishing a factory at Nalagarh, District Solan for manufacturing and processing activated carbon and by-products thereof. The defendant No. l applied to the plaintiff-corporation for a loan for the construction of factory building, purchase of plant and machinery, laying of pipe lines, electric wire, purchase of truks etc. The Corporation agreed to lend to defendant No, I to the extent of Rs.6,44,700/-, with the rider that defendant No. l would mortgage its immovable property alongwith building, plant and machinery for securing the repayment of the loan, and also on the defendants Nos.5 to 7 furnishing their personal guarantees for repayment of the loan and interest etc. On these conditions being accepted by defendant No. l and its then Directors defendants No.5 to 7, they executed mortgage deed dated 10.4.1970 which was registered in the office of the Sub Registrar, Nalagarh for securing the repayment of Rs.6,44,700/- and interest thereon which amount was to be made available by the Corporation to defendant No. 1 for the aforesaid purpose. Further, defendants No. 5 to 7 guaranteed the repayment of that loan in their personal capacities vide deed of guarantee of even date i.e. 10.4.1970 which was also registered in the office of the Sub Registrar, Nalagarh. 3. Subsequently, defendant No. l converted itself from a Private Limited Company into a Public Limited Company under the Companies Act, 1956 and the Registrar of the Companies, Jullundur modified the original incorporation certificate of defendant No. l dated 9.12.1968 on 24.10.1970 under Section 23(3) of the Companies Act, 1956. On becoming a Private Limited Company, defendant No. l applied to the Corporation for raising the limit of the loan from Rs.6,44,700/- to Rs.17,00,000/-. At that time it had availed a sum of Rs.5,68,000/- out of the original loan. On becoming a Private Limited Company, defendant No. l applied to the Corporation for raising the limit of the loan from Rs.6,44,700/- to Rs.17,00,000/-. At that time it had availed a sum of Rs.5,68,000/- out of the original loan. The Corporation agreed to enhance the limit to Rs.17,00,000/- on defendant No. l executing the prescribed documents and the Directors of the Company giving their personal guarantee for repayment of the enhanced loan. On these conditions being agreed to, a second mortgage deed dated 2.8.1971 was executed by defendant No. l for securing the repayment of the enhanced loan of Rs.17,00,000/- and interest thereon. This second mortgage deed was registered by the Sub Registrar, Nalagarh on the same day, on which defendants No.5 to 7 also gave their personal guarantees for repaying the said amount plus interest as per guarantee deed. 4. Defendant No. 1 thereafter applied to the Corporation for enhancing the limit from Rs.17,00,000/- to Rs.30,00,000/- for its project, which the Corporation agreed to do, provided its the then Directors defendants No.2 to 4 also gave their personal guarantees for securing the repayment of the loan and interest thereon. This conditions was accepted by them. In consequence thereof the defendants No.2 to 4 executed documents dated 20.11.1974 at Shimla in respect of the said additional loan of Rs.13,00,000/- on behalf of defendant No. l, aggregating the entire loan amount to Rs.30,00,000/- comprised in an agreement containing all the terms of loan mode of repayment thereof and the security provided for repayment of the same, alongwith hypothecation agreement and other documents, mortgage by deposit of title deeds for securing the said additional loan. This was done through a letter dated 1.3.1975 written by Shri V.K. Gupta, the then Manager, (Accounts) of defendants No. l. 5. The case of the plaintiff-corporation is that defendant No. 1 had been committing defaults in repayment of the loan amount and interest due on it, as per the terms and conditions agreed to between the parties referred to above. The case of the plaintiff-corporation is that defendant No. 1 had been committing defaults in repayment of the loan amount and interest due on it, as per the terms and conditions agreed to between the parties referred to above. Consequently the Corporation decided to recall the entire loan in terms of the aforesaid documents executed by defendant No. 1 and in accordance with the provisions of the State Financial Corporations Act, 1951, the Corporation sent a notice to the defendants and the directors of the Company on 4-03-1977,call-ing upon them to repay the loan and interest which had accumulated to Rs.38,50,226.10 P. as on 7.1.1977 including interest worked out upto 9.12.1976. This notice also failed to have the desired effect. Meanwhile M/s Kuldip Industrial Corporation and Shri Kuldip Parkash, 41, industrial Area, Chandigarh, filed a petition under Section 433 of the Companies Act, 19S6 For winding up of defendant No. 1 - Company as it was unable to pay its debts. This petition was registered as Company Petition No. 1 of 1977 in this Court and the official liquidator was appointed as provisional liquidator by this Court at the time of admission of the said petition. In view of this development the Corporation filed a petition under Section 446 of the Companies Act, 1956 read with Rule 117 of the Companies (Court) Rules, 1959 seeking permission to file a suit for recovery of its dues against defendant No. l by enforcing the securities of the Directors who had guaranteed the repayment of the loan. This petition was registered as Company petition No.3 of 1977 and by its order dated 16.5.1978, this Court allowed the same and permitted the Corporation to initiate suitable proceedings for realisation of the dues Section 31 of the State Financial Corporations Act, 1951 as also to file suit for realisation of the personal guarantee of any person including the Directors, who had given guarantee to secure the repayment of the said loan. 6. 6. On permission being thus granted, the Corporation filed a petition under Section 31 ibid in the Court of District Judge, Solan, which allowed the petition by its order dated 6.8.1979, thereby determining the amount of Rs.35,28,923 as being due on 30.4.1976, according to the balance sheet of defendant No. l as admitted by the official liquidator plus interest and other charges from the aforesaid date upto the date of payment in accordance with the agreement between the parties. By that order, the Court also directed the sale of the mortgaged and hypothecated securities. An application for executing the said order was also filed by the Corporation before District Judge, Solan, which at the time of filing of this suit, was pending. 7. The particular of the mortgages for securing the repayment of the loan in question, are given in detail in para 19 of the plaint alongwith the name of the mortgagor/mortgagee, sum secured, rate of interest, properties mortgaged and hypothecated and the amount due as on 30.12.1979. The case of the plaintiff-corporation is that the entire suit amount became payable by the defendants one month after the service of the notice dated 4.3.1977, mentioned above, which had been issued to the defendants, whereby the entire loan was recalled and they were called upon the repay the same to the Corporation. Since this has not been done, hence this suit. 8. In the written statement filed on behalf of defendant No. l by the Official liquidator, a preliminary objection has been taken that the Company, defendant No. 1, is neither a necessary nor a proper party in the suit. This plea has been taken on the basis that Company Petition No.3 of 1977 was filed by the plaintiff- Corporation against defendant No. 1 and others for obtaining leave to start legal proceedings against the said Company for realisation of its dues under Section 446 of the Companies Act, 1956. The same was decided by this Court on 16.5.1978 and the plaintiff-Corporation was a permitted to lake suitable proceedings for realisation of its dues under Section 31 of the Stats Financial Corporation Act, 1951. The same was decided by this Court on 16.5.1978 and the plaintiff-Corporation was a permitted to lake suitable proceedings for realisation of its dues under Section 31 of the Stats Financial Corporation Act, 1951. Thereafter it preferred a petition under Section 31 ibid, which was allowed on 6.8.1979 by the Court of District Judge, Solan, thereby determining the dues at Rs.35,28,923/- as on 30.4.1976 plus interest, to which the plaintiff-corporation was entitled from defendant No. l, the company in liquidation, in accordance with the agreements between the parties. It was also ordered therein that the plaintiff will seek its remedy through execution for realisation of the awarded claim. In pursuance of this order, the plaintiff-corporation was to file an execution against the company in liquidation for the said amount in executing Court and consequently it could file a suit against the guarantor for the realisation of the balance amount, which could not be realised from the Company in liquidation through execution proceedings. According to the stand of defendant No. l taken in the written statement, the present suit is meant for recovery of the amount due from the guarantors, as it could proceed against them for the realisation of their personal guarantees in pursuance of the leave granted by this Court to it in Company Petition No.3 of 1977, to secure the repayment of the loan and interest. Since a company in liquidation is not a surety within the purview of the provisions of Section 145 C.P.C. (being the principal debtor), it cannot be proceeded against in the present suit. 9. On merits, it has been pleaded in the written statement filed on behalf of defendant No. l that the plaintiff-corporation is a secured creditor of the defendant -company to the extent of Rs.35,28,923/- plus interest at the rates mentioned in the respective agreements between the parties till the date of winding up of the defendant company, i.e. on 16.5.1978. It has also been pleaded that the plaintiff-corporation is entitled to realise the balance amount after sale of the property of the company, which is mortgaged or hypothecated with it, from the guarantors in accordance with their respective liabilities as incurred by them under the agreements signed by the plaintiff- corporation. It has also been pleaded that the plaintiff-corporation is entitled to realise the balance amount after sale of the property of the company, which is mortgaged or hypothecated with it, from the guarantors in accordance with their respective liabilities as incurred by them under the agreements signed by the plaintiff- corporation. It has been denied for want of knowledge in the written statement that any notice of the application for execution of the order dated 6.8.1979 of the Court of the District Judge, Solan was received by defendant No. l. Lastly, it has been prayed in the written statement that the name of defendant No. 1 may be deleted from the array of the defendants, as the suit is only for the realisation of the personal guarantees of the guarantors and the liability of defendant No. 1 towards the plaintiff-corporation is the subject matter of separate proceedings not connected with the present suit. 10. The suit has been mainly contested by defendants No.5 to 7on whose behalf a joint written statement has been filed. Preliminary objections have been raised therein to the effect that the suit is barred by time; that this Court has no jurisdiction to try the suit inasmuch as the jurisdiction of the civil Court is excluded by the provisions of the State Financial Corporations Act, 1951; that the documents referred to in the plaint, which form part and parcel of the same, have not been supplied to the said defendants and therefore they are not in a position to file a complete and effective written statement and lastly that the suit is barred on the principle of res judicata under the provisions of Order 2 Rule 2 and Section 11 C.P.C. It has also pleaded that the suit is barred by the principle of double vaxation. 11. On merits it has been pleaded in the joint written statement of defendants No.5 to 7 that they were not the only directors of defendant-company when it was originally incorporated as Private Limited Company, but there were other persons also connected with it, whose names have been intentionally omitted by the plaintiff. Their case further is that since defendant No. l never asked them to give their personal guarantee for the re-payment of the loan and interest thereon, as such, the same is without consideration and unenforceable in law. Hence the suit against them is not legally maintainable. Their case further is that since defendant No. l never asked them to give their personal guarantee for the re-payment of the loan and interest thereon, as such, the same is without consideration and unenforceable in law. Hence the suit against them is not legally maintainable. In the alternative it is pleaded that even if any valid guarantee is proved, then by the subsequent action of the plaintiff and the defendants No. 1 to 4, there has been variance in terms of the contract and as such their liability stood discharged. The factum of availing of the loan to the extent of Rs.5,68,000/- as pleaded in the plaintiffs suit, has been denied in the written statement of defendants No.5 to 7. It has further been pleaded that the effect of raising the limit of loan from Rs.17,00,000/- to 30,00,000/- is to absolve of any alleged notice dated 4.3.1977 on defendants No. 5 to 7 has been denied in their written statements. The cause of action, if any, accrued to the plaintiff to file a suit of the present nature in the year 1974, and its failure to do so makes the present suit time-barred. Any alleged liability to pay any amount to the plaintiff by defendants No. 5 to 7 has been repudiated in the written statement. 12. By way of additional plea, it has been stated in the written statement that in a Board Meeting held at Delhi, a written request was made by the defendants No. 5 to 7 asking the H.P. Financial Corporation to relieve them of their so-called guarantee, in view of the fact that they have been forced to leave the management. That request was accepted by the then Managing Director of the plaintiff-corporation, one Mr. Govind Sahai, as such there is no subsisting liability liability on them. 13. A replication to the joint written statement of defendants No.5 to 7 ibid has been filed by the plaintiff, in which it has been pleaded, inter alia, that the liability of the said defendants is a continuing one and unless the amount is repaid, they arc not exonerated of the same. Hence the suit is within limitation. 13. A replication to the joint written statement of defendants No.5 to 7 ibid has been filed by the plaintiff, in which it has been pleaded, inter alia, that the liability of the said defendants is a continuing one and unless the amount is repaid, they arc not exonerated of the same. Hence the suit is within limitation. It has been pleaded that the State Financial Corporations Act, 1951 does not apply to the present case and that the suit is neither hit by Order 2 Rule 2 and Section 11 C.P.C. On the other hand, the stand taken in the replication is that defendants No.5 to 7 are also estopped from raising this plea, which is frivolous, in view of the orders passed on 16.5.1978 in Company Petition No.3 of 1977 by this Court, in which proceedings the said defendants were also impleaded as party. 14. On merits, it has been pleaded in the replication that since defendant No. l-Company as well as its Directors had guaranteed repayment of the loan, they have been rightly and correctly impleaded as defendants. It has also been pleaded that the deed of guarantee, as is apparent from the said deed dated 2.8.1971 is for lawful valuable consideration. It has been averred that the defendant No. l didnt avail of the loan to the extent of Rs.5,68,000/-. It is further stated that the plea of defendants No.5 to 7 that the execution of guarantee deed by defendants No. l to 4 for securing repayment of Rs.30,00,000/- exonerates them from their obligation of guarantee to pay Rs.17,00,000/- and interest thereon is wholly unwarranted and misconceived. It has been pleaded that their liability to pay the guarantee amount subsists till the entire amount is repaid. I5. On the pleadings of the parties, the following issues have been framed: 1. Whether defendant No. 1 Company obtained a loan of Rs.17 lacs from the plaintiff Corporation vide mortgage deed dated 2.8.71 as referred to in para 9 of the plaint and whether the said mortgage deed was executed by duly authorised person on behalf of the Defendant Company? 2. Whether defendant Nos.5,6 and 7 furnished personal guarantees for repayment of the aforesaid amount of Rs.17 lacs and interest thereon as per guarantee deed dated 2.8.71 referred to in para No.10 of the plaint? 3. 2. Whether defendant Nos.5,6 and 7 furnished personal guarantees for repayment of the aforesaid amount of Rs.17 lacs and interest thereon as per guarantee deed dated 2.8.71 referred to in para No.10 of the plaint? 3. Whether the limit of loan of Rs.17 lacs sanctioned by the plaintiff Corporation in favour of the Defendant Company against mortgage deed referred to under issue No. l was subsequently raised to Rs.30 lacs at the request of the Defendant Company as alleged in para 11 of the plaint? 4. Whether defendants No.2, 3 and 4 furnished their personal guarantees for repayment of the aforesaid amount of Rs.30 lacs and interest thereon on 20/21-11-1974? 5. Whether the amount of Rs.57,19,487.06 was due to the plaintiff Corporation for the defendant Company as on date of suit on account of principal amount and interest etc. in the above amount? 6. Whether the suit as against defendants No.5 to 7 is within time? 7. Whether this Court has no jurisdiction to entertain this suit? 8. Whether the suit is barred under Order 2 Rule 2 and Section 11 C.P.C.? 9. If issue No.2 is found in the affirmative, whether the personal guarantees furnished by defendants No.5 to 7 were without consideration? 10. What is the effect of the fresh agreement entered into between the plaintiff and defendant No. l on 20/21-11-1974 vide which the limit of Rs.17 lacs was raised to Rs.30 Iacs on the personal guarantees furnished earlier by defendants No.5 to 7? 11. To what relief and against whom is the plaintiff entitled to? 16. In support of its case, the plaintiff has examined two witnesses, namely, N.N. Dewan and K.K. Joshi. Besides these two witnesses, documentary evidence in the shape of Exts.P-1 to P-8 has also been adduced on its behalf. These documents have been admitted as evidence in the course of the deposition of PW-1, N.N. Dewan, the then General Manager of the Plaintiff-Corporation (his statement having been recorded on 18.10.1984). A perusal of the record shows that though various opportunities were afforded to the defendants to lead their evidence but they failed to do so and ultimately their evidence was closed by an order dated 22.7.1985. Thereafter the plaintiff was afforded an opportunity to lead additional evidence vide orders dated 29.6.1987. In pursuance of the same K.K. Joshi PW-2 was examined on 28.7.1987. Thereafter the plaintiff was afforded an opportunity to lead additional evidence vide orders dated 29.6.1987. In pursuance of the same K.K. Joshi PW-2 was examined on 28.7.1987. During the course of the statement of the witness, documentary evidence in the shape of Ex.P-9 to P-19 has also been brought on record. The defendants were again afforded an opportunity to lead evidence in rebuttal to the additional evidence by way of statement of PW-2 and the said documents Exts.P-9 to P-19. Ultimately, their learned counsel made a statements on 28-10-1987 that no evidence was to be led on their behalf. In other words, there is no evidence, whatsoever, from the side of the defendants. 17. The learned counsel for the parties have been heard. In addition to their oral submissions, they have relied mainly on their respective written arguments, which are on record. Findings issue-wise are as under: Issues No. 1, 3 and 5 18. All the these three issues arc being taken up together as they are inter-connected. The plaintiffs have produced document Ex.P-1, the mortgage deed dated 2.8.1971 for securing repayment of loan of Rs.17 lacs. The said mortgage deed also contains the re- payment schedule beginning from 10.10.1972 and ending on 10.4.1980. This document Ex.P-1 has been executed by defendants No.5 to 7 for an on behalf of defendants No. l. Ex.P-3 is the agreement dated 21.11.1974 executed at the time when loan was enhanced from Rs.17.00 lacs to Rs.30.00 lacs. It contains admissions and acknowledgments by defendants regarding earlier loans taken by them. As per the re-payment schedule incorporated therein, the first instalment was repayable on 10.12.1976 and the last instalment on 10.12.1984. Then again there is a hypothecation deed dated 1.11.1974 Ex, P-4 for and on behalf of defendant No. l for securing the repayment of enhanced loan from Rs.17.00 lacs to Rs.30.00 lacs. This document also contains admission/acknowledgment regarding the earlier loans and undertaking the repay to same. 19. Ex.P-5 is the guarantee deed given by defendants No. 2 to 4 for securing repayment of Rs.30.00 lacs. Ex.P-6 is the entry regarding equitable mortgage made in the register of equitable mortgages kept by the H.P.F.C. This document proves that the Company -defendant No. l created equitable mortgage of the property mentioned therein for securing the repayment of additional loan of Rs.13 lacs. Ex.P-6 is the entry regarding equitable mortgage made in the register of equitable mortgages kept by the H.P.F.C. This document proves that the Company -defendant No. l created equitable mortgage of the property mentioned therein for securing the repayment of additional loan of Rs.13 lacs. Ex.P-7 is the certified copy of account statement showing a balance of Rs.57,19,487.06 P. due from the defendants upto 31.12.1979. Ex.P-8 is the re-call notice. Ex.P-8/1 to Ex.P-8/6 are postal receipts in respect to the said notice Ex.P-8 and P-9 to P-12 are the acknowledgment due receipts in respect of the said notice. Ex.P-13 is the original reply of defendants No. 5 to 7. PW-1, N. N. Dewan has proved the execution of the documents Ex.P-1 to Ex.P-7. His testimony as well as the said documents Exts.P-1 to P-7 have not been rebutted from the side of the defendants either in the shape of oral or documentary evidence. 20. PW-2 K. K. Joshi, the then Secretary of the plaintiff-corporation (his statement having been recorded on 28.7.1987) has deposed about the sending of the notice Ex.P-8 to the defendants through late Shri Kailash Chand, who at that time was the legal advisor of the plaintiff-corporation. He has also deposed with regard to the acknowledgment receipts regarding the delivery of notice Ex.P-8 to the defendants, which are Exts.P-9 to P-12. Ex.P-13 is the reply received from defendants No. 5 and 6 to the said notice through Shri A. Subarao, Advocate, Supreme Court of India. Ex.P-14 is the original envelop in which the said reply was received. Ex.P-15 is a note on the margin of the letter Ex.P-13, which is in the hand of Mr. Kailash Chand, Advocate, whose handwriting has been identified by PW-2, being familiar with the same, as the said Mr. Kailash Chand had been working as legal advisor of the plaintiff-corporation for a number of years. Ex.P-16 is the notice received from the said A. Subarao, Advocate on behalf of defendant No. 5 in a company petition matter. Ex.P-17 is the note on Ex.P-16 in the hand of late Mr. Kailash Chand, Advocate. Ex.P-18 is the note in the handwriting of PW-2 K. K. Joshi as identified by him. Ex.P-16 is the notice received from the said A. Subarao, Advocate on behalf of defendant No. 5 in a company petition matter. Ex.P-17 is the note on Ex.P-16 in the hand of late Mr. Kailash Chand, Advocate. Ex.P-18 is the note in the handwriting of PW-2 K. K. Joshi as identified by him. The said witness produced the original despatch register of the plaintiff - corporation, which is being maintained in the regular course of its official business, and on the basis of the same Ex.P-19 has been placed on record being a photostat copy of the entry regarding despatch of the notice Ex.P-8 to the defendants. 21. It is apparent from the above discussion of the evidence led by the plaintiff that it has conclusively proved that defendant No. l-company obtained a loan of Rs.17.00 lacs from the plaintiff- Corporation through defendants No.5 to 7. who had executed the mortgage deed Ex.P-1 and the Bond of guarantee Ex.P-2. It is also proved on record that the said loan was subsequently enhanced from Rs. 17.00 lacs to Rs.30.00 lacs vide Exts.P-3 and P-4 being agreement dated 20.11.1974 and hypothecation deed dated 1.11.1974, respectively. Finally, the plaintiff has succeeded in establishing that vide statement of account Ex.P-7, a sum of Rs,57,19,487.06 was due from the defendants to the plaintiff corporation. Resultantly, these three issues, i.e. Issues No. 1, 3 and 5 are decided in favour of the plaintiff on the basis of the above oral and documentary evidence, which remains un rebutted. Held accordingly. Issues No.2, 4 and 9 22. These issues are also inter-connected and are thus being taken up together. Document Ex.P-2 is the guarantee deed executed by defendants No.5 to 7 for repayment of the first loan of Rs.17.00 lacs and interest due thereon while Ex.P-5 is a similar document executed by defendants No. 2 to 4 for securing repayment of the enhanced loan of Rs.30.00 lacs. Both these documents stand proved by PW-1, N. N. Dewan and there is no rebuttal to his testimony and the said documents. None of the defendants has stepped up in the witness box to deny the execution of these documents. In fact, in their written statement, the defendants No.5 to 7 have not denied the execution of the guarantee deed, Ex.P-2 by them. It thus goes undisputed. 23. None of the defendants has stepped up in the witness box to deny the execution of these documents. In fact, in their written statement, the defendants No.5 to 7 have not denied the execution of the guarantee deed, Ex.P-2 by them. It thus goes undisputed. 23. The question which now arises for consideration is whether the personal guarantees furnished by defendants No.5 to 7 were without consideration. Under Section 126 of the Indian Contract Act, 1872, a contract of guarantee is a contract to perform a promise or discharge the liability of a third person in case of his default, which can be either oral or written. In this respect Exts.P-2 and P-5 are explicit and clear. In so far as consideration of guarantee is concerned, the same is implied from a bare reading of Section 127 ibid, according to which anything done or any promise made for the benefit of! principal debtor is a sufficient consideration to the surety giving guarantee. I Therefore, on the touchstone of Sections 126 and 127, read in the light to the explicit stipulations contained Exts.P-2 and P-5, it stands proved that defendants No. 2 to 7 stood guarantee for the repayment of the initial loan of Rs.17.00 lacs, further enhanced to Rs.30.00 lacs, vis-a-vis Section 127. Consequently, all these three issues are liable to be decided in favour of the plaintiff. It is held that vide Ex.P-2, defendants No.5 to 7 furnished personal guarantees for repayment of the amount of Rs.17.00 lacs and interest thereon. Similarly it is held that defendants No.2 to 4 furnished personal guarantees for repayment of the amount of Rs.30.00 lacs and interest thereon vide Ex.P-5 and lastly, in view , of the findings in respect of Issue No. 2 above, it is held that the personal I guarantees furnished by defendants No. 5 to 7 were not without consideration. These issues are decided accordingly. 24. The case of the plaintiff, as submitted in para 14 of the plaint, and already referred to above, is that M/S Kuldeep Industrial Corporation and Shri Kuldeep Parkash of 41, Industrial Area, Chandigarh filed a petition under Section 433 of the Companies Act, 1956 for winding up defendant No. 1-com-pany as it was unable to pay its debts. This petition filed in this Court was registered as Company Petition No. l of 1977. This petition filed in this Court was registered as Company Petition No. l of 1977. The official liquidator was appointed as provisional liquidator by this Court, at the time of admission of the said petition. It is further the case of the plaintiff that it preferred a petition under Section 446 of the said Act read with Rule 117 of the Companies (Court) Rules, 1959 seeking permission to file a suit for recovery of its dues against defendant No. l - company by enforcing security of the directors who had guaranteed the repayment of the loan and interest thereon. This petition was registered as Company Petition No.3 of 1977 and by its order dated 16.5.1978 this Court allowed the same and permitted the plaintiff to take suitable proceedings for realisation of its dues under Section 31 of the State Financial Corporations Act, 1951. Further the plaintiff was also allowed to file suit for realisation of the personal guarantees of any person including the Directors who had given guarantee to secure the repayment of the loan. These pleadings of the plaintiff have not been controverted or disputed by defendants No.5 to 7 in the written statement, inasmuch as there is no specific denial as envisaged under Order 8 Rule 3 C PC. It is a settled legal proposition that in the absence of any specific denial of a pleading, it is deemed to be admission by implication. 25. In view of the undisputed facts, it will be seen that defendants No.2 and 3 and 5 to 7, being guarantors of defendant No. 1 - Company, and proceedings having been initiated against the Company under Section 31 of the State Financial Corporations Act, 1951, property of the surety or guarantors cannot be a subject matter of such proceedings under the said Act as has been held in the case of Munna Lal Gupta v. The Uttar Pradesh Financial Corporation, AIR 1975 A11.416. It has further been laid down by the Allahabad High Court in the above case that a surety can be proceeded against under the general law. This is precisely what has happened in the present case where the plahtiff is claiming the relief against the sureties i.e. defendants No.2 to 7. This line of reasoning finds support from the following authorities: 1. Sidramappa v. Rajashetty - AIR 1970 S.C. 1059; 2. M/s Parkash Playing Cards Manufacturing Co. Delhi & Ors. This is precisely what has happened in the present case where the plahtiff is claiming the relief against the sureties i.e. defendants No.2 to 7. This line of reasoning finds support from the following authorities: 1. Sidramappa v. Rajashetty - AIR 1970 S.C. 1059; 2. M/s Parkash Playing Cards Manufacturing Co. Delhi & Ors. v. Delhi Financial Corporation, N. Delhi - AIR 1980 Delhi 48. 3. M/s Bharat Chemical Works v. Gujarat State Financial Corporation -AIR 1983 Gujarat-104. 26. In the latter authority it has been held that an application under Section 31(1) of the State Financial Corporations Act, 1951 is neither a plaint nor an application in the nature of a plaint and that such an application is not even a suit. Moreover, the defendants have not led any evidence whatsoever as regards these two issues i.e., No.7 and 8. Consequently, in view of the above discussion of both facts and the legal position as culled from the case law cited above, both these issues arc liable to be answered, in favour of the plaintiff-Corporation. It is therefore held that this Court has the jurisdiction to entertain the suit and that the same is not barred either under Order 2 Rule 2 or Section 11 C.P.C. Both these issues arc decided accordingly. Issues No. 6 and 10 27. Both these issues are the real contentious issues between the plaintiff on the one hand and defendants No.5 to 7 on the other. The only difference between Ex.P-2 and P-5 is that the former has been executed by defendants No.5 to 7 as guarantors for repayment of Rs.17.00 lacs, while the latter has been executed for repayment of Rs.30.00 lacs. 28. A minute perusal of the guarantee deed Ex.P-2, more particularly, clause No.6 and paras 2, 8, 9 and 12 thereof, indicates that the liability of defendants No.5 to 7 is a continuing one because Ex.P-2 is a continuing guarantee. Further, under the terms of agreement deed, contained in para 5 thereof, it is clear that the guarantors therein have indemnified the plaintiff-corporation against all loss of principal, interest etc., which the plaintiff may incur by reason of any default or breach of Covenant on the part of the company, its successors or assigns. The effect of the said guarantee deed is that defendants No.5 to 7 have been equated as principal debtors. The effect of the said guarantee deed is that defendants No.5 to 7 have been equated as principal debtors. Their liability is also joint and several along with the principal debtors. They had themselves agreed that they would remain bound to pay the amount so long as it is not paid by the company. Under Section 128 of the Indian Contract Act, 1972, the Inability of the surety is co-extensive with that of the principal debtor, unless it is otherwise provided by the contract, which is not the case here. Under Section 129 of the said Act a guarantee which extends to a series of transactions is called a continuing guarantee. Under Section 130 there of a continuing guarantee may, at any time, be revoked as to future transactions by notice to creditors of the same. 29. Now the question arises for determination is as to what is the starting point of limitation against a surety. Admittedly, the loan for the enforcement of which the present suit has been filed, was secured by creating a charge on immovable property vide Ex.P-1 and Ex.P-6. Limitation to enforce payment of money secured by a mortgage or otherwise charged upon immovable property is 12 years from the date when the money sued becomes due under Article 62 of the Indian Limitation Act, 1963. Since in the present case, the original loan of Rs.6,44,700/- was agreed to be given on 10.4.1970, in both documents Ex.P-1 and P-4 repayment schedule has been incorporated, whereby the first instalment was payable on 10.10.1972 and the last was payable on 10,4.1980. Therefore, the period of limitation as regards defendants No.5 to 7 would begin on 10.10.1972, and since there are instalments provided for in Ex.P-1 and P-4, non payment of each instalment is a recurring and a successive cause of action. The plaintiff is at liberty to treat any default for filing the suit as his cause of action. In case of successive breaches of a contract, the mere fact that the plaintiff has not availed of earlier cause of action will not prevent i him from availing successive default as his cause of action. The starting point of limitation in such cases would be each successive default. Attention in this connection is invited to the, case reported as Mukhdeo Singh & Anr. v. Harakh Naraycm Singh & Ors., AIR 1931 Patna (DB) 285. The starting point of limitation in such cases would be each successive default. Attention in this connection is invited to the, case reported as Mukhdeo Singh & Anr. v. Harakh Naraycm Singh & Ors., AIR 1931 Patna (DB) 285. Therefore, on default of non-payment of any instalment mentioned in Ex.P-1 or Ex. P-4, as in the present case, the plaintiff could file the suit. In other words, looking st it from any angle, the suit is within time inasmuch as the same could be filed within a period ] of 12 years from the date of any defaulter even reckoning limitation from 10.10.1972 when the first instalment was payable, the suit is within time. 30. The same would be the position as regards defendants No.2 and 3. The suretys liability depends upon the terms of each contract because the obligation of the surety is a collateral one. In the present case demand on the principal debtor was made on 4.3.1977 through Ex.P-8 (notice), which was served on 10.3.1977 as per Exts.P-9 to P-l 1. In terms of clauses 2,9 and 12 of the guarantee deed Ex.P-2, the plaintiff-corporation is entitled to give time to the principal debtor for repayment of the amount or postpone the payment of the amount. Moreover, the plaintiff is entitled to make variation in the conditions of loan and mortgage deed or give more money to the borrower under the said guarantee deed. Therefore, the defendants have contracted themselves out with respect to their alleged rights under Sections 133,134 and 135 of the Indian Contract Act, which negatives the arguments on behalf of I defendants No,5 to 7 by their learned counsel that in view of the said provisions of the Contract Act, there having been variance in terms of the contract .originally entered into between the plaintiff and the company, this will have the effect of discharging the sureties, i.e. defendants No.5 to 7, unless the surety had assented to such a variation in the contract, and in the present case the defendants No.5 to 7 had no assented to the same. 31. 31. Similar would be the fate of the additional argument raised on behalf of defendants No.5 to 7 by their learned counsel that there has been novation of the original contract because there is a change in mode of advance, rate of interest, mode of repayment and the instalments have also been changed, which would not be binding on the guarantors. The various clauses of the guarantee deed Ex.P-2, referred to above, makes short shrift of this argument. Suffice it to say that defendants No.5 to 7 contracted themselves to be liable vide Ex.P-2 guarantee deed, which makes their liability a continuing one for all amounts advanced or to be hereafter advanced (emphasis supplied) by the plaintiff- corporation to the company-defendant No. l under the mortgage, as also for the interest etc. which may from time to time become due and remain unpaid. In these circumstances it does not lie in their mouth to say that there was a novation of the original contract which had the effect of exempting them from the liability originally undertaken by them through the guarantee deed Ex.P-2. 32. In the case reported as Smt. R.Lilavati v. Bank of Baroda & Ors., AIR 1987 Karnataka 2 (head note D para 10) it has been laid down that where the surety bond is a continuing guarantee, as in the present case vide Ex.P-2, the question of limitation does not arise. The Karnataka High Court followed the view taken by the apex Court in Margaret Lalita Samuel v. Indo Commercial Bank Ltd., AIR 1979 SC 102. 33. As a result of the above discussion this Court has no hesitation in coming to the conclusion that the suit as against defendants No.5 to 7 is within time and consequently the fresh agreement entered into between the plaintiff and defendant No. l on 21.11.1974 vide which the limit of Rs.17.00 lacs was raised to Rs.30.00 lacs, would not have any effect on the personal guarantees furnished earlier by the said defendants No.5 to 7. Both these issues are decided accordingly. 34. For the reasons recorded above, the suit of the plaintiff- corporation is decreed and a decree for Rs.57,19,487.06 is hereby passed in favour of the plaintiff and against the defendants No.2,3,5,6 and 7, whose liability shall be joint and several. Both these issues are decided accordingly. 34. For the reasons recorded above, the suit of the plaintiff- corporation is decreed and a decree for Rs.57,19,487.06 is hereby passed in favour of the plaintiff and against the defendants No.2,3,5,6 and 7, whose liability shall be joint and several. In view of the protracted and tortuous nature of litigation between the parties no future interest is awarded, nor there will be any order as to costs. Decree-Sheet be prepared accordingly.