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1996 DIGILAW 1395 (RAJ)

Union of India v. Ex L/Nk Kishan Singh

1996-12-12

BHAGWATI PRASAD, M.G.MUKHERJI

body1996
JUDGMENT 1. - The respondent-writ-petitioner was initially employed as Sepoy in Army. He worked as Cook from 1979 to 1986. He was enrolled as Combatant Sepoy. During his services, he was promoted as Lance Nayak Cook in January, 1986. While he was serving in the Army as Cook, in October, 1986 a show cause notice was issued to the petitioner as to why his services should not be dispensed with. The notice was issued to the petitioner in the background that the petitioner had developed conjunctivitis. There was excess discharge of water in the eyes of the petitioner. The notice was issued to the petitioner under Rule 13 item (3)(v) of the Army Rules, 1954. Clause (v) of the A/my Rules 13(3)'deals with all other classes of discharge from service. Clause (iii) of the same rule deals with those who are to be discharged having been found medically unfit for further service. The petitioner replied to the show cause notice. In his reply, the petitioner submitted that the Medical Officer directed him to Psychiatrist. The Psychiatrist has in his medical opinion expressed that he is not suffering from any psychiatric dis-order. The only thing directed against the petitioner was that he had some problem with the eyes and except that problem otherwise the petitioner was found fit. Not only this, the Medical Officer who examined the petitioner even recommended that the petitioner can be considered for alternative employment. The case of the respondent writ petitioner was that his case was not considered for alternative employment. The respondent-writ-petitioner had to come to this Court for getting his case considered all over again. Not only this, he was even required to file a Contempt Petition before this court and the same contempt notices were discharged after tendering of un-conditional apology by the respondent-contemnor. the appellant (respondent in the trial court) failed to produce before the Court the orders of recommendations of the case of the petitioner which was directed by this Court earlier. 2. The medical report which was the basis of medical opinion contained in the discharge certificate of the petitioner shows that the petitioner was in medical category AYE at the time of release. In the discharge certificate the petitioner was found to have conducted himself with exemplary character. 2. The medical report which was the basis of medical opinion contained in the discharge certificate of the petitioner shows that the petitioner was in medical category AYE at the time of release. In the discharge certificate the petitioner was found to have conducted himself with exemplary character. In this background, learned single Judge considered the case of the petitioner and found that the petitioner deserve to be considered for alternative employment because Medical Officer only found him unfit as a cook but recommended him for alternative assignment. 3. Learned counsel appearing for Union of India Mr. P. P. Chaudhary submitted that in terms of Army Order 24/25 issued in the month of March, 1981 it has been observed that for re-mustering there will be restrictions and such restrictions were that re-mustering could be within two years of the date of mustering and not more than four years of total service. This restriction, according to learned counsel for the appellant, is contained in sub-clause (b) of Clause 7 of the aforesaid Army Order and, therefore, the learned single Judge ought not have directed the consideration of case of the petitioner for reemployment. 4. Another argument raised by learned counsel for the appellant, without prejudice to his earlier argument, is that even if the respondent-petitioner is to be re-mustered, he could not have been awarded backwages as principle of no work no remuneration was applicable in his case and from the date of discharge the petitioner had not worked and the learned single Judge could not have granted half of the salary to the petitioner. In this connection, learned counsel for the appellant has relied upon decision in Smt. Saran Kumar Gaur v. State of U.P. reported in (1991) 3 JT (SC) 478 . 5. Learned counsel for respondent-writ-petitioner Mr. S. K. Nanda contested the proposition that Army Order 24/25 places any restriction on the re-mustering of the petitioner. He wanted to assert that sub-clause (d) of Clause 7, as appearing in the case of personal requests, is contained in Clause 6(a) and such requests are to be considered only in terms of sub-clause (d) of Clause 7. He has also drawn attention of the Court towards an another Army Order No. 46/80 wherein it has been observed as to how will the disposal of permanent low medical category personnel take effect. He has also drawn attention of the Court towards an another Army Order No. 46/80 wherein it has been observed as to how will the disposal of permanent low medical category personnel take effect. In this Army Order, there is no prohibition as to when this can happen and in the general principle (a), it has been held that employment of permanently low medical category personnel at times is subject to availability of suitable alternative employment, commensurate to the low medical category assigned to such personnel. There is no prohibition in this Order that after a particular number of years or before completion of a number of years of service, the low medical category personnel can be allowed alternative employment. 6. We have considered the rival submissions. Stand of the appellant does not appear to be well founded. If a harmonious construction is given to the two Army Orders, referred to above, then it cannot be said that there is any prohibition that if a person becomes a low medical category after referred four years in Army Order No. 24/25 then he cannot be re-employed. The spirit of both the Army Orders is that if a Army personnel becomes low medical category during the period of service then if he can be accommodated otherwise then he should not be refused that accommodation and a suitable employment should be offered to him. In the instant case, the learned single Judge has taken this view and we do not feel any illegality in the view taken by learned single Judge. Thus, we find no merit in this appeal. 7. As regard the salary, a reasonable view has been taken by the learned single Judge on the submission of learned counsel for the respondent-writ-petitioner that he had not been without working facilities anywhere. He was not without work at all. In this background, award of 50% backwages does not appear to be in-appropriate. There is no illegality in the order of the learned single Judge and the same is upheld. This special appeal is, thus, dismissed.Appeal dismissed. *******