JUDGMENT This writ petition raises a very short but interesting question as to whether the Sales Tax Appellate Tribunal while remanding the case to the assessing authority by an order dated August 9, 1994 (annexure 3 to the writ petition) unequivocally recorded a finding that the activity of blending the tea carried on by the petitioner during the assessment year 1990-91 did not amount to "manufacture" of the tea. 2. Before the Tribunal, the petitioner contended that it purchased tea leaves of various sizes from various concerns and then they were put into the drums for being rotated in order to get them mixed thoroughly and thereafter they were packed and sold. The question arose whether such processing carried on by the petitioner tantamounted to manufacture of the tea. The Tribunal considering the decisions of the Supreme Court and of the High Court relied on by the petitioner in the course of hearing and an order of the assessing authority relating to the assessment year 1977-78 reached the conclusion that the blending process carried on by the petitioner, did not tantamount to manufacture. The assessing authority made an ex parte order for the assessment year 1990-91 which is relevant in this case. The Tribunal set aside the order of the assessing authority and remanded the case directing the assessing authority to redo the assessment keeping in view the observations made. 3. While completing the assessment pursuant to the remand order the assessing authority differed from the view taken by the Appellant Tribunal and held that the blending process carried on by the petitioner was nothing but manufacture. 4. The grievance of the petitioner before us is that the Tribunal having held that the blending process carried on by the petitioner was not in the nature of manufacture it was not open to the assessing authority to take the view contrary to that, taken by the Appellate Tribunal. 5. We find force in the submission of Sri Bharatji Agrawal, learned counsel for the petitioner. In Bhopal Sugar Industries Ltd. v. Income-tax Officer, Bhopal [1960] 40 STC 618 (SC); AIR 1961 SC 182 , an assessment order was made against the appellant-company against which an appeal was preferred before the Appellate Assistant Commissioner, Jabalpur by the appellant-company. Not satisfied with the order of the Appellant Assistant Commissioner, the appellant-company preferred an appeal to the Income-tax Appellate Tribunal, Bombay. Not satisfied with the order of the Appellant Assistant Commissioner, the appellant-company preferred an appeal to the Income-tax Appellate Tribunal, Bombay. The Tribunal then gave certain directions which were not given effect to by the respondent. In those circumstances, the appellant-company moved the Judicial Commissioner, Bhopal, then exercising the powers of a High Court for that area, for the issue of a writ to compel the respondent to carry out the directions given by the Tribunal. The Judicial Commissioner found in expressed terms that the respondent had acted arbitrarily and in clear violation of the directions given by the Tribunal. In that background, the Supreme Court held as follows : "(8)........... If a subordinate Tribunal refuses to carry out directions given to it by a superior Tribunal in the exercise of its appellate powers, the result will be chaos in the administration of justice and we have indeed found it very difficult to appreciate the process of reasoning by which the learned Judicial Commissioner while roundly condemning the respondent for refusing to carry out the directions of the superior Tribunal, yet held that no manifest injustice resulted from such refusal. (9)......... The Judicial Commissioner was not sitting in appeal over the Tribunal and we do not think that in the circumstances of this case it was open to him to say that the order of the Tribunal was wrong and, therefore, there was no injustice in disregarding that order. As we have said earlier, such a view is destructive of one of the basic principles of the administration of justice. (10).......... (11)........... In the view which we have expressed, namely, that by the impugned order the respondent failed to carry out a legal duty imposed on him and such failure was destructive of a basic principle of justice, a writ of mandamus should issue ex debito justitiae to compel the respondent to carry out the directions given to him by the Income-tax Appellate Tribunal, Bombay........." 6. In Union of India v. Kamlakshi Finance Corporation Ltd. AIR 1992 SC 711 , the Supreme Court almost in a similar situation said : (para 6, page 712) "........ It cannot be too vehemently emphasised that it is of utmost importance that, in disposing of the quasi-judicial issues before them, revenue officers are bound by the decisions of the appellate authorities. It cannot be too vehemently emphasised that it is of utmost importance that, in disposing of the quasi-judicial issues before them, revenue officers are bound by the decisions of the appellate authorities. The order of the Appellate Collector is binding on the Assistant Collectors working within his jurisdiction and the order of the Tribunal is binding upon the Assistant Collectors and the Appellate Collectors who function under the jurisdiction of the Tribunal. The principles of judicial discipline require that the orders of the higher appellate authorities should be followed unreservedly by the subordinate authorities....... If this healthy rule is not followed, the result will only be undue harassment to assessees and chaos in administration of tax laws." From these authorities, it is amply clear that the assessing authority was bound by the decision taken by the Appellate Tribunal in the remand order. 7. We are, therefore, of the opinion that the assessing authority authority while making the assessment pursuant to the remand order, was not right in holding that the blending process carried on by the petitioner, tantamounted to manufacture of the tea, when the counter view was taken by the Appellate Tribunal in the remand order. 8. However, submission of the Standing Counsel before us is that there was no categorical finding of the Appellate Tribunal in the remand order that the blending process carried on by the petitioner, was not in the nature of manufacture. His submission has no force, as a clear finding that the blending process carried on by the petitioner, did not amount to manufacture, was recorded by the Appellate Tribunal and the matter was remanded by the Appellate Tribunal to the assessing authority to redo the assessment in view of the finding. From the perusal of the remand order of the Tribunal it clearly appears that the Tribunal adverting to the decisions of the Supreme Court, of the High Court and the order of the assessing authority relating to the assessment year 1977-78, clearly concluded that the blending process carried on by the petitioner, was not in the nature of manufacture. 9. From the perusal of the remand order of the Tribunal it clearly appears that the Tribunal adverting to the decisions of the Supreme Court, of the High Court and the order of the assessing authority relating to the assessment year 1977-78, clearly concluded that the blending process carried on by the petitioner, was not in the nature of manufacture. 9. The Standing Counsel relying on Ram Dayal Harbilas v. Commissioner of Sales Tax [1979] 44 STC 84 (All.) [FB]; 1979 UPTC 999 (FB) urged that the appellate authority set aside the assessment order and remanded the case to the assessing authority to complete the assessment without any rider keeping the entire case open under section 7 of the U.P. Sales Tax Act. 10. The facts in the case in hand are entirely different and the Standing Counsel cannot take advantage of the case of Ram Dayal Harbilas [1979] 44 STC 84 (All.) [FB]; 1979 UPTC 999 (FB). The Tribunal having clearly held that the blending process carried on by the petitioner was not in the nature of manufacture, it was not kept open to the assessing authority to take a view contrary to the view taken by the Appellate Tribunal and the duty of the assessing authority was to complete the assessment pursuant to the remand order following the decision of the Appellate Tribunal that the blending process carried on by the petitioner, was not in the nature of manufacture of the tea. 11. In the result, the petition succeeds and is allowed. The impugned order dated 13th February, 1995 passed by the assessing authority (annexure 4 to the writ petition) is quashed to the extent the assessing authority held contrary to the Tribunal's order that the blending process carried on the by the petitioner, tantamounted to manufacture. The case is remanded to the assessing authority with the direction that the assessment order will be made afresh keeping in view the above observations. Petition allowed.