Judgment : B. M. Lal and B. K. Sharma, JJ. 1. M/s. Jhunjhunwala Oil Mills Limited, Varanasi, the petitioner in this petition, invoking Article 226 of the Constitution of India, has approached this Court seeking a writ of mandamus commanding respondent Nos. 2 to 5 i.e. Chairman/managing Director, Northern Coalfields, Stngrauli and others to supply Grade 'e' ROM Coal to the petitioner for the month of January and February-1993 and April to August-1993 by pay loader of Jhingurdah Project of Northern Coalfields Limited. It is further prayed that by issuing a writ of mandamus the respondents be further commanded to ensure supply of coal month to month by 'pay Loader' to the petitioner from the said project and also to supply balance quantity of coal for the months of September and October-1993, for which money has already been accepted by the respondents. 2. SHORT facts leading to this petition are as under: The petitioner M/s. Jhunjhunwala Oils Limited is a registered unit and re quires coal for its manufacturing process, which is being supplied as one of the raw material to this industrial unit from Northern Coal fields Limited, one of subsidiary company of Coal India Limited under the linkage sanctioned by the Coal India Limited. The linkage of Coal India Limited was sanctioned by the Coal India Limited in pursuance of judgment and order dated 8th March, 1989 passed in Writ Petition No. 24630 of 1988. On this basis, the aforesaid relief is claimed by the petitioner. While filing counter-affidavit, the respondents Nos. 2 to 5 emerged with the plea that the petition as framed and filed is not maintainable inasmuch as after the decision rendered in Writ Petition No. 24630of 1988 (M/s. Jhunjhunwala Oilmills Ltd. v. Coal India Limited and others), an agreement was arrived at between the par ties i.e. the petitioner and respondent Nos. 2 to 5 on 25-4-1989, which is filed as An- nexure-3 to the counter-affidavit, according to which coal is to be supplied to the petitioner. Thus, according to the petitioner, is there is any breach of the same agreement, in that event at the most the petitioner may sue the respondents for committing breach of the agreement and also claim damages, but certainly such relief cannot, he claimed in the writ jurisdiction. In shies regard, it is also submitted that any decision taken by respondent Nos. In shies regard, it is also submitted that any decision taken by respondent Nos. 2 to 5 either prior or subsequent to the agreement, is not enforceable command-invert. 3. COMING to the impugned notice dated 16/18-8-93, it is submitted on behalf of the respondents that in August, 1993 a decision was taken to supply coal to all road linked units of Kakri colliery by feeder breaker system. This decision was taken to avoid the complaints regarding removal of better quality of coal by road sale units drawing coal by pay loader and leaving the residue for linked power houses deteriorating the quality of the coal. 4. IN the last, it is submitted that there is no question of denying coal to the petitioner by the respondents. It is also submitted that the petitioner-unit did not apply for coal for the months of January and Feb. 1993 and April to Aug. 1993 as is being prayed in this petition, ft is further submitted that the petitioner un-authorisedly has got written in the delivery orders that coal should be loaded by pay loader, but the same is of no avail to the petitioner since it has been written by a person who is not competent to do so and further in view of the fact that the notice dt. 16/18-8-1993 is a part of the agreement. We have heard Sri S. P. Gupta, learned senior counsel for petitioner and Sri Sudhir Chandra, learned Senior counsel for respondents at length. 5. HAVING heard the learned counsel for respective parties and perusing the record, in the considered opinion of this Court, this petition has no substance and is liable to be dismissed for the following reasons: 6. FIRSTLY, perusal of the agreement arrived at between the parties dated 26-4-1989 contained in Annexure-3 to the counter- affidavit, demonstrates that the petitioner is entitled for Grade 'e' coal from the respondents. The said agreement nowhere speaks about the mode of loading. Thus, in the absence of any clause in the agreement in respect of mode of loading, in the opinion of this Court, the notice dated 16-8-1993 (Armexure-8) in no way infringes the terms and conditions enumerated in the agreement i.e. An nexure-3. Secondly, the whole petition is based on the agreement. Thus, in the absence of any clause in the agreement in respect of mode of loading, in the opinion of this Court, the notice dated 16-8-1993 (Armexure-8) in no way infringes the terms and conditions enumerated in the agreement i.e. An nexure-3. Secondly, the whole petition is based on the agreement. As observed above though there is no breach of the agreement, but assuming that any party to the agreement commits any breach, whether such breach would be resolved in the writ jurisdiction? 7. THE proposition of law in respect of contractual obligations is well settled that where parties to an agreement commit any breach of contractual obligations, the same cannot be gone into in writ jurisdiction for the simple reason that such disputes could only be resolved by appreciating evidence which cannot be done by writ Court. Therefore, the aggrieved party has to resort to the common remedy available to him by way of filing a civil suit or if jurisdiction is conferred to any special tribunal or authority, by approaching that forum. Thus, in the instant case either a civil suit or approaching to District Consumer Forum would have been the proper and appropriate remedy. In Food Corporation of India v. Jagannath Dutta, AIR 1993 SC1494, the Apex Court ruled that question of contractual obligations cannot be gone into in the writ jurisdiction. 8. THIRDLY, it may be pointed out here titat by the present petition, the petitioner seeks a writ in the nature of mandamus. A mandamus can be issued only when the petitioner establishes that he has a legal right to the performance of legal duty by the party against whom the mandamus is sought. The duty that may he enjoined by mandamus may be one imposed by the Constitution, Statute or by Rules having the force of law. If the case of the petitioner is tested with these touch-stones, it would emerge that this petition has no substance and is liable to be dismissed outright as there is neither any right or duty as discussed above. Besides this, Sri Sudhir Chandra, learned senior counsel for respondents, also pointed out that the petitioner got an ex-parte stay order from this Court on 11.4.94 whereby operation of the impugned notice dated. 16/18.8.93 was stayed. The respondents though filed an application for vacating the stay order dt. Besides this, Sri Sudhir Chandra, learned senior counsel for respondents, also pointed out that the petitioner got an ex-parte stay order from this Court on 11.4.94 whereby operation of the impugned notice dated. 16/18.8.93 was stayed. The respondents though filed an application for vacating the stay order dt. 11.4.94 on 14.9.94, but surprisingly enough the same was not placed before the Court. 9. IN this regard, we may point out that the provisions of sub- clause (3) of Art. 226 of the Constitution of India have taken care of it and if within the period of two weeks from the date on which application for vacating stay is received in the office of the Registry and the same is not placed before the Court, the ex-parte stay order automatically stands vacated after expiry of two weeks' period. Thus, the provisions of snb-cl. (3) of Art. 226 in respect of vacating interim order is automatic after expiry of two weeks from the date on which the application is received in the office and by the petitioner. This being so, in our opinion, when the application for vacating stay is filed on 14th Sep. 1994, the interim order dt. 11-4-94 automatically stands vacated on 28th September-1994. 10. TO be more precise and ready reference, Sub-clause (3) of Art. 226 of the Constitution of India is quoted below: " (3 ). Where any party against whom an. interim order, whether by way of injunction or stay or in any other manner, is made on, or in any proceedings relating to, a petition under clause (1) without- (a ). . . . . . . . . . (b ). . . . . . . . . . Where any party against whom an. interim order, whether by way of injunction or stay or in any other manner, is made on, or in any proceedings relating to, a petition under clause (1) without- (a ). . . . . . . . . . (b ). . . . . . . . . . makes an application to the High Court for the vacation of such order and furnishes a copy of such application to the party in whose favour such order has been made or the counsel of such party, the High Court shall dispose of the application within a period of two weeks from the date on which it is received or from the date on which the copy of such application is so furnished, whichever is later, or where the High Court is closed on the last day of that period, before the expiry of the next day afterwards on which the High Court is open; and if the application is not so disposed of, the interim order shall, on the expiry of that period, or as the case may be, the expiry of the said next day, stand vacated. " It is usually seen here that not withstanding the fact that application for vacating interim order is made which, in fact, as per the Rules of the Court, is to be listed within a week, before the Court, but no prompt action is being taken by the Registry in adhering to the Rule of the Court. May be inadvertently or by any other reason, the applications for vacating stay are not being placed before the Court. In this respect we may observe that within the statutory period stipulated in sub-clause (3) of Art. 226 if the application is not being placed before the Court in time, a duty is cast upon the party who had obtained ex-parte order to take active steps to get the matter listed before the Court within the specified period soon after copy of the application for vacating stay is received, and if he does not do so, he can do so at his own peril in view of mandate in Art, 226 (3) and the serious consequences envisaged therein. Therefore, the petitioner as well as the Registry both must get the matter considered by the Court immediately, and if that is not done within the stipulated period, the petitioner cannot escape the liability by pointing out that the Registry has failed to list the case in Court. In case 14 days are likely to expire and the Registry has failed to list the case, the counsel for the petitioner can bring this fact to the notice of the Court and get the petition listed immediately because this constitutional mandate admits of no exceptions. (See Cheesa Lal v. State of Raj as This being the legal position that provisions of Article 226 (3) are of imperative nature, therefore, the application for vacating the ex-parte interim order if not disposed of within the specified period mentioned therein, the said ex-parte interim order by operation of law automatically stands vacated, 11. THUS, from the above discussion, this petition has no merit and is accordingly dismissed. Petition dismissed.