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Allahabad High Court · body

1996 DIGILAW 1432 (ALL)

RAMHIT v. STATE OF U P

1996-12-13

D.C.SRIVASTAVA

body1996
D. C. SRIVASTAVA, J. The short ques tion of law, involved for consideration in this petition under Section 482 Cr. PC. is whether a Magistrate in exercise of his powers under Section 156 (3) Cr. PC. is justified and authorised to direct the police to register a case and the F. I. R. and inves tigate the same in accordance with law. 2. In this case Annexure No. 3 is the impugned order which shows that an ap plication under Section 156 (3) Cr. PC. was given to the C. J. M. Jaunpur. He examined the application and passed the following order which is translation of the Hindi order of the C. J. M. : "on the basis of facts, given in the applica tion, prima facie cognizable offence is made out. S. O. , P. S. Line Bazar is directed to register the case and investigate according to rules. " 3. It is this order which is under chal lenge. 4. It has been contended that the Magistrate has no jurisdiction to direct the police to register a case or register the F. I. R. while acting under Section 156 (3) Cr. P. C. Several cases were cited in support of the contention whereas as learned A. G. A. contended that direction to register a case is neither illegal nor irregular and no inter ference is required. He also cited two cases of single Judge of this Court in support of his contention. 5. Learned counsel for the petitioners referred to the case of Raghbir Singh v. State of Haryana, 1990 (1) Crimes 600. In this case it was held that the learned Magistrate in terras of Section 156 (3) of the Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 can send the com plaint to Police for investigation and not for registration of the case. 6. Division Bench of the same High Court of Punjab and Haryana in Ganesh Dass v. State of Kerala, 1996 Cri. LJ 612 held resolving earlier conflict of the decision in that Court that the Magistrate while passing order under Section 156 (3), Cr. P. C. is not \empowered to direct the police to register F. I. R. This Division Bench case also took into consideration the pronouncements of the Supreme Court in D. L. Reddy v. V. N. Reddy, 1976 SCC (Cri.) 380 and Tula Ram v. Kishore Singh, AIR 1977 Supreme Court 2401. 7. P. C. is not \empowered to direct the police to register F. I. R. This Division Bench case also took into consideration the pronouncements of the Supreme Court in D. L. Reddy v. V. N. Reddy, 1976 SCC (Cri.) 380 and Tula Ram v. Kishore Singh, AIR 1977 Supreme Court 2401. 7. The order of the Magistrate in Ragh bir Singh s case (supra) was as follows: "forwarded in original alongwith the docu ments filed with the complaint under Section 156 (3) of the Code of Criminal Procedure to the Station House Officer, Police Station Radaur, for registration of the case end investigation. " 8. The order of the Magistrate, direct ing registration of the case was found to be unwarranted and illegal. However, in this case the proceedings were not quashed only on this ground, but on two other grounds, namely, on the ground of limitation because the complaint was filed nearly 22 to 30 years after the alleged incident and also because of the pendency of the civil suit in respect of the same matter. Consequently, on the basis of this case it cannot be said that the entire proceedings can be quashed only for the reason that there is direction by the Magistrate to register the case and the F. I. R. 9. In the Division Bench case of Ganesh Dass (supra) the reference was answered that the provisions of Chapter XII do not contemplate any direction by the Magistrate to the police to register F. I. R. With these observations the reference was returned to the Single Bench. The judgment of the Single Bench, after this answer to the reference, has not been filed or cited. Con sequently, it cannot be said that merely for this technical reason entire investigation is to be quashed. 10. In Tula Rams case (supra) the facts were different. The police submitted charge sheet on the basis of F. I. R. and investigation conducted thereon. A cross version was set up by the other side and complaint before the Magistrate. The Magistrate ordered the police to investigate the case under Section 156 (3), Cr. P. C. The police submitted final report. The police submitted charge sheet on the basis of F. I. R. and investigation conducted thereon. A cross version was set up by the other side and complaint before the Magistrate. The Magistrate ordered the police to investigate the case under Section 156 (3), Cr. P. C. The police submitted final report. On protest petition by the complainant and after examining him and his witnesses the Magistrate issued process against the accused and summoned them under Sections 304/149 and 148 I. P. C. The accused approached the High Court for quashing this order of the Magistrate. The contention was that once the Magistrate ordered investigation under Section 156 (3) Cr. P. C. he was not competent to revive the complaint and issued process against the accused. The High Court rejected this con tention. The Supreme Court laid down cer tain guidelines and guideline No. 4 was where a Magistrate orders investigation by the police before taking cognizance under Section 156 (3) of the Code and receives report thereupon he can act on the report and discharge the accused or straightway issue process against the accused or apply his mind to the complaint filed before him and take action under Section 190 of the Code. It was further found that the case was covered by proposition No. 4 aforesaid. Consequently, in this case the Supreme Court has not held that a magistrate cannot order registration of a case. Moreover the order of the Magistrate was not disturbed by the Supreme Court. 11. In D. L. Reddys case (supra) scope of Section 156 (3), Cr. P. C. was considered but again in this case there was no direct observation that the Magistrate cannot order registration of a case or the F. I. R. These two cases were considered by the Division Bench of Punjab and Haryana High Court in the case of Ganesh Dass (supra ). 12. The order of the Magistrate in D. L. Reddy s case (supra) was as follows: "forwarded under Section 156 (3), Cr. P. C. to the Inspector of Police, Dharmavaram for in vestigation and report on or before August, 5, 1975" 13. It is thus clear that in the order of the Magistrate in this case there was no direction for registration of the case. 14. The impugned order before me clearly shows that the learned Magistrate has not taken cognizance of the case. It is thus clear that in the order of the Magistrate in this case there was no direction for registration of the case. 14. The impugned order before me clearly shows that the learned Magistrate has not taken cognizance of the case. It was pre-cognizance stage that he directed the police to register the case and investigate. Power to direct the police to investigate on an application under Section 156 (3), Cr. P. C. cannot be disputed. 15. Learned A. G. A. has cited two decisions, one of a Single Bench and the other of a Division Bench of this Court. In Suraj Mai v. State of U. P. , 1993 A. C. C. 81 a Division Bench of this Court had con sidered this very question and held that a Magistrate is competent to issue direction for registration of a case under Section 156 (3) Cr. P. C. It was held at page 86, column 1, that the objection of the learned counsel that the registration of the case in the Police Station could not be directed by the learned Magistrate is not correct and we express our respectful disagreement to the case of Raghbir Singh v. State of Haryana, 1990 (1) Crimes 600. 16. This Division Benchs verdict was followed by a learned single Judge of this Court in Jagan Singh v. State of U. P. , 1996 JIC 293 (All ). 17. Thus in view of the Division Bench pronouncement of this Court which was subsequently followed by a learned Single Judge of this Court, there is no scope for holding that a Magistrate has no power to direct the police to register a case on an application under Section 156 (3) Cr. P. C. 18. For the reasons, given above, there is no merit in this petition which is hereby dismissed. Petition dismissed. .