Judgment : S. Rafat Alam, J. 1. The petitioner, tenant of a shop, seeks quashing of the order dated 26th August, 1982 of the Und Addl, District Judge, Etawah, allowing the appeal under Section 22 of the U. P. Urban Buildings (Regulation of Letting, Rent and Eviction) Act, 1972, (hereinafter referred to as the Act), of respondent No. 3. 2. THE admitted facts in short is that the respondent No. 3 is the owner of the shop situated at Bharthana, Bajaj Road, in the district of Etawah. THE said shop was let out to the petitioner on the basis of tenancy deed dated 1-4-1970 for a period of one year on a monthly rental of Rs. 60. THE respondent No. 3 filed an application on 30-5-1979 under Section 21 (1) (a) of the Act for the release of the shop in question on the ground, inter alia, of personal necessity. THE case of respondent No. 3 (landlord) was that at the time when the shop in question was let out to the petitioner (tenant), his sons were studying and now Ms two sons, namely, Amul Prabal Singh and Acchhaya Pauraus have finished their studies and the wants to settle them. His further case was that his son Amul Prabal Singh wants to set up a business of clothes and therefore, the shop in question is urgently required to start a cloth shop in the same. His further case was that the tenant has got other shops and property arid he is not doing any business from the shop in question and his brother Subhash Chandra was sitting in the shop in question and carrying on the business of Usha Machines and Fans. THE tenant and his brother Devendra are doing the business of Sarrafa, fire-arm and clothes in other shop located at Bakewar Road, Bharthana. Further, the tenant has a large residential house which is very close to the shop in question, hardly 4-5 shops away from it. In the ground floor of the said house there is a large size room just on the side of the road from where any business can be done easily. It has further been alleged by the landlord in the release application that the tenant has constructed a shop in Bharthana which is still lying vacant since last three years and therefore, he has no need for the shop in question. It has further been alleged by the landlord in the release application that the tenant has constructed a shop in Bharthana which is still lying vacant since last three years and therefore, he has no need for the shop in question. The tenant contested the aforesaid application for the release of the shop on the ground, inter alia, that the landlord is a big agriculturist and his sons are engaged in agriculture and he has no need of the shop in question. The plea of bona fide need set up by the landlord is false and has only been cooked up to get him evicted from the shop in question. 3. BOTH the parties filed their evidence on affidavit to establish their case. The Prescribed Authority, (Respondent No. 2), held that the need of the landlord was not genuine and accordingly dismissed the release application dated 30-5-1979 by his order dated 6-12-1980, a copy of which is Annexure 6 to the present petition. 4. AGGRIEVED landlord (respondent No. 3) preferred an appeal before the Appellate Authority (respondent No. 1) under Section 22 of the Act. The Appellate Authority having, heard the respective parties and after going through the evidence on record, held that the Prescribed Authority wrongly reached the conclusion that the landlord has no bona fide requirement of the accommodation in dispute. While considering the comparative hardship, the learned trial Court held that admittedly the tenant has two shops in Bharthana in which he is carrying on business. It has further been held that there is a large size room on the ground floor in the residential house under the occupation of the tenant located in the main market wherefrom he can run his business and therefore, if he is evicted from the shop in question, he will not be thrown on the street, whereas the landlord has no other shop at Bharthana except the present one. It has also been held that the brother of the tenant, Subhash Chandra, who was doing business of Usha Machines and fans from the shop in question, has also now shifted to Bombay and the shop is not in use, and admittedly the tenant is sitting on another shop. It has also been held that the brother of the tenant, Subhash Chandra, who was doing business of Usha Machines and fans from the shop in question, has also now shifted to Bombay and the shop is not in use, and admittedly the tenant is sitting on another shop. After discussing the comparative hardship at length, the Appellate Court held that the hardship to the landlord would be more than the hardship to the tenant and accordingly allowed the appeal by his judgment dated 26-8-1982 (Annexure 14 to the petition), which has been impugned in the present petition. I have heard Mr. Ravi Kant, learned Counsel for the tenant and Sri M. M. D. Agarwal, learned Counsel for the landlord and also perused the judgment/orders passed by both the Courts below. The contention of the learned Counsel for the tenant are two fold: Firstly, that the ground of personal need set up by the landlord seeking eviction of the petitioner from the shop in question is not genuine and the same has now vanished, as his son Amul Prabal Singh has been ap pointed as Chaukidar. Secondly, that the Appellate Court ought not to have placed reliance on additional evidence without affording any opportunity to the tenant to rebut the same. 5. THE contention that the need of the landlord is not genuine, is the question of fact which has fully been discussed by the learned Additional District Judge in the impugned order and after long discussion on the basis of evidence on record, he recorded a categorical finding that the landlord has bona fide requirement of the accommodation in dispute. 6. IT is well settled legal position that the finding of fact arrived at by the Subordinate Court is usually not upset in writ jurisdiction of this Court because the judicial review is not an appeal from a decision, but a review of the manner in which the decision was made, and therefore the Court, on an application for judicial review is not required to consider whether the decision itself was fair and reasonable and it only reviews the manner in which the decision was made. IT is also settled law that while considering the application for judicial review, it cannot re-appreciate the primary or perspective fact recorded by the fact finding authority, unless it is shown that the finding arrived at, is by ignoring or excluding the relevant materials or the same is perverse. It is apparent from the perusal of the record that the tenant has taken vacillating stand in the Court below to establish that the landlord does not bonafidely re quire the shop in question. Initially it was alleged that his son Amul Prabal Singh is engaged in cultivation work, thereafter it is alleged that he is running a fair price shop for the distribution of sugar and then that he is working as Community Health Volunteer in village Bholli on an honorarium of Rs. 50 per month. Now in the present proceeding a stand has been taken that Amul Prabal Singh is working as a Chaukidar in the Primary Health Centre, Mahoba in the District of Etawah, in sup port of which a certificate issued by the Medical Officer incharge, Primary Health Centre, Mahoba, Etawah dated 10-5-1994 has been filed as Annexure S. A. 4 to the supplementary affidavit filed on 20-2-1995. This certificate does not disclose the nature of appointment and other detail. That apart no reliance can be placed on the said certificate to because the petition earlier filed an application under Order VI, Rule 17 read with Section 151 of the Code of Civil Procedure in the present proceeding to bring on record this very document dated 10-5-1994 by way of additional evidence which was rejected by order dated 5-1-1995 of this Court. The said order having not been recalled or set-aside, it became final and it is not a part of record of this petition. Further, the fact that Amul Prabal Singh for sometime was doing business of sugar under the Public Distribution System and thereafter worked as a Community Health Volunteer on an honorarium of Rs. 50 per month, leads to the only conclusion that he was not settled in his life and was running hither and thither and then it appears that as a last resort he accepted the job of a low paid Chaukidar. 7. 50 per month, leads to the only conclusion that he was not settled in his life and was running hither and thither and then it appears that as a last resort he accepted the job of a low paid Chaukidar. 7. THEREFORE, in my view the learned Appellate Court after examining and appreciating the evidence on record has rightly reached the conclusion that Amul Prabal Singh is still unemployed and not taking any interest in the cultivation work, and made sincere efforts to start a cloth shop in the shop in question. 8. EVERY citizen has a right to choose his profession or to do work of any particular kind of his choice. Article 19 of the Constitution of India gives to all citizens to carry on any trade or business free from unreasonable restrictions. Article 21 of the Constitution further protects life and personal liberty of every citizen. Life does not mean mere survival or animal existence but a decent, meaningful and complete life worth living. Admittedly, the landlord primarily comes from an agriculturist class and possesses some landed property also. He may not be very affluent but by any stretch of logic cannot be reduced to a State of penury whose son would gladly accept the lowest level of employment as Chaukidar and that too whose tenure is not certain. His employment as Chaukidar appears to be borne out of his frustration to find an opening for him. It is a sheer exploitation of somebody's misery to call him an employed person. Landlord's son after completing his education wanted to start business from the shop in question. The learned appellate Court on the basis of the evidence and material on record has recorded a finding, "it would be sufficient to remark that the respondent himself admits that Amul Prabal Singh is not doing the cultivation work and is going here and there in search of business. Sometimes he does business of sugar and sometimes he gets some employment though on honorarium." Further, the landlord has filed a supplementary counter-affidavit in this Court stating that his son will do business in the shop in dispute as soon as he gets possession over it. It has also been stated that his son who was facing great difficulty accepted the job of a temporary Chaukidar. 9. It has also been stated that his son who was facing great difficulty accepted the job of a temporary Chaukidar. 9. IN this view of the matter, I do not find any substance in the submission that need of the landlord has now vanished and therefore, it deserves to be rejected. 10. NOW coming to the next contention that the Appellate Court has taken into account the additional evidence without affording any opportunity to rebut the same, it is apparent from two different orders, dated 25-8-82 (Annexures 9 and 10), that ten day's time was allowed to the petitioner on 13th July, 1982 to give documents in rebuttal of the documents filed by Respondent No. 3 as additional evidence, but the petitioner did not avail the opportunity by filing the same within the time, which expired on 23rd July, 1982 itself. Thereafter, it appears that on 25th August, 1982 during the course of the hearing documents were filed for rebutting the additional evidence which was rejected by the learned Appellate Court and there fore, the contention that no opportunity was given to rebut the additional evidence is wrong and is not borne out from the record of the proceedings, rather it is established that ten days' time was allowed and the petitioner failed to file any document within the aforesaid petition. There fore, in my view, the petitioner having failed to avail the opportunity given to him by the Appellate Court, cannot raise this point in the present proceedings and there is no error in the impugned order in rejecting the documents filed by the petitioner beyond the time given by the Court. In Section 21 (1) (a) of the Act gives a right to a landlord to get eviction of a tenant from the building under the tenancy, if the same is bonafidely required by the landlord for occupation by himself or any member of his family or any person for whose benefit it is held by him, either for residential purposes or for purposes of any profession, trade. Rule 16 (2) of the U. P. Urban Buildings (Regulation of Let ting, Rent and Eviction) Rules, 1972, framed under the Act, provides that while considering the application under clause (a) of the sub-section (1) of Section 21 in respect of a building let out for purposes of any business, the Prescribed Authority shall also have regard to the facts where the tenant has available with him suitable accommodation to which he can shift his business without substantial loss, there shall be greater justification for allowing the application. 11. IN view of the finding of the learned Appellate Court that the tenant has two shops in Bharthana and a room fit for business purposes in his residential house only 4-5shops away from the shop in question, which is located in the main market place, whereas the landlord has no shop except the present one which is in dispute and the hardship to the landlord will be more than the hardship to the tenant, I do not find any reason to interfere with the impugned order passed under Section21 (1) (a)of the Act. 12. IT is the settled legal position that this Court in its writ jurisdiction under Article 226 of the Constitution, cannot reassess the evidence and disturb the finding arrived at by the authority concerned on the basis of evidence, unless the same is perverse. Bonafide requirement and comparative hardship is a question of fact and are to be decided on the basis of evidence on record. The learned Appellate Court on the appreciation of evidence has arrived at a finding that the bonafide need of respondent No. 3 (landlord) is proved and the hardship of the landlord is much more than the petitioner if he is evicted from the shop in question. Having considered the submissions and documents on record of this proceedings, I am of the view that the finding recorded by the learned Appellate Court is not perverse nor it suffers from any error of law requiring interference under writ jurisdiction of this Court. 13. IN the result, the writ petition is dismissed with costs. Petition dismissed.