Honble YADAV, J. – Appellant has filed the instant First Appeal against the judgment and decree dated 1.2.86 passed by learned Addl. District Judge No.2 Sri Ganganagar whereby suit for eviction filed by land lord-plaintiff-respondents was decreed against the tenant-defendant -appellant under Clause (h) of sub-sec. 10F Sec. 13 of the Rajasthan Premises (Control of Rent & Eviction) Act, 1950 (herein- after referred to as Act No. 17 of 1950). (2) Brief facts leading up to filing of the instant First Appeal are that the land lord-plaintiff-respondents filed a suit for eviction and arrears of rent against the tenant-defendant- appellant on 25.8.81 on the ground of default, sub-letting and reasonable and bonafide necessity. According to the plain averments it is alleged that the plaintiffs house having constructed grounds floor and first floor at 3, public park, Sri Ganganagar. Its western portion belongs to the plaintiff No. 2 and the eastern portion belongs to plaintiff No. 1 The tenant-defendant- appellant took suit premises on the ground floor measuring 21 1/4x 31 1/4 on rent of Rs. 200/- per month from 1.7.64 from the plaintiff No. 1 and executed rent note on 8. 7.64.After some time the defendant further took portion measuring 10 x 27 belonging to plaintiff No. 2 on rent and the rent of entire portion was fixed at Rs. 360/-per month. (3) It is stated in the plaint that the defendant has not paid rent from 1.8.79 and therefore, he has become defaulter. (4) It is also alleged in the plaint that defendant took the suit premises on rent as proprietor of Marwah Automobiles in his individual capacity and then thereafter he has shifted his business to Bikaner and started residing there permanently. The tenant- defendant has sub-let the suit premises to his brothers without consent of the plaintiffs and thus he has parted with the possession of the suit premises. It is also averred in the plaint that the defendant has constructed new show room at 67-H.Block,Sri Ganganagar for his firm Marwah Automobiles and he is carrying on his business there. Therefore the defendant is not in need of the suit premises. (5) It is stated in the plaint that the plaintiffs reasonably and bonafidely need the suit premises. The plaintiffs two sons Daljeet Singh and Mohanjeet singh have already obtained M.B.B.S. degree and they have also completed their training. Therefore the defendant is not in need of the suit premises. (5) It is stated in the plaint that the plaintiffs reasonably and bonafidely need the suit premises. The plaintiffs two sons Daljeet Singh and Mohanjeet singh have already obtained M.B.B.S. degree and they have also completed their training. Smt. Nirmal jeet Kaur wife of Daljeet Singh is also a doctor .The plaintiffs reasonably and bonafidely need the suit premises for opening clinic for their doctor sons and sons wife. On the ground floor they will run their Clinic and on the Ist floor they will make arrangements for stay of patients, employees and themselves.The plaintiffs have already obtained decree for eviction in respect of Ist floor and against that decree appeal is pending in this court. (6) It is also alleged in the plaint that tenant-defendant would not suffer any hardship in case he was evicted from the suit premises as the defendant has already started his business at Bikaner and at his own show room situated at 67 H.Block Sri Ganganagar. In case the plaintiffs did not get the suit premises, they would suffer greater hardship. The plaintiffs therefore prayed that the decree for eviction and arrears of rent amounting to Rs. 8640/- be passed against the defendant. (7) The tenant-defendant contested the suit by filing his written statement. The last amended written statement was filed on 29.5. 84. The defendant admitted that he took 21 1/4 x31 1/4 portion on rent of Rs. 200/- per month on 1.7.64 and executed rent note in favour of plaintiff No. 1 on 8.7.64. He however stated that the remaining portion measuring 10x 27 belonging to the plaintiff No. 2 was taken by him on rent of Rs. 60/- per month in Nov. 1966. Both the said portions were combi- ned and it was made on hall. It was denied that after taking the remaining portion, the rent of the suit permises was raised to Rs. 360/- per month. The facts alleged in the written statement were that in the beginning the defendant was the sole proprietor of Marwah Automobiles. From Nov. 1966 the rent of the combined portion of the suit premises was Rs. 260/- per month. The plaintiff Manjeet Singh wanted to raise rent of the suit premises. The defendant told plaintiffs that he wanted to take his brothers Jagjeet Singh and Bhupendra Singh as partners in his firm. From Nov. 1966 the rent of the combined portion of the suit premises was Rs. 260/- per month. The plaintiff Manjeet Singh wanted to raise rent of the suit premises. The defendant told plaintiffs that he wanted to take his brothers Jagjeet Singh and Bhupendra Singh as partners in his firm. The plaintiffs gave their consent and thereupon from 1.4.74 the rent of the suit premises was raised from Rs. 260/- to Rs. 360/- per month. On account of some legal difficulties the partnership firm could not commence its business from 1.4.74. However, the firm started its business from 1.4.75.Thus firm Marwah Automobiles became tenant of the suit premises with the consent of the plaintiffs and rent of Rs.360/- per month was also fixed with the said firm. In this manner new tenancy with partnership firm came into existence. Since then the plaintiffs have been accepting rent paid by the cheques from the partnership firm Marwah Automobiles, therefore the question of sub-letting does not arise. (8) It is stated in the written statement by the defendant that grounds of eviction as stated in the plaint are not available to the plaintiffs. It was stated that after Aug. 1979, the rent was tendered to the plaintiffs but they did not accept the same and pressurized the partnership firm to double the rent. The partnership firm sent rent by money orders but the same were refused.Thereafter the firm deposited rent under Sec. 19 A and 19C of Act No. 17 of 1950. Therefore, in such a situation the question about default in payment of rent does not arise in the present case. (19) It is also averred in the written statement that the defendant has not sub-let or assigned the suit premises to his brothers. It is stated that the tenancy of the defendant in his individual capacity came to an end when the tenancy in favour of the partnership firm Marwah Automobiles was agreed between the parties on a monthly rent of Rs. 360/- per month. It is also alleged in the written statement that after institution of the suit for eviction, the plaintiffs son Dr. Mohanjeet singh has died. Dr. Daljeet Singh and his wife Nirmaljeet Kaur have permanently shifted to Pubjab and they are serving as doctors in Punjab Government service. 360/- per month. It is also alleged in the written statement that after institution of the suit for eviction, the plaintiffs son Dr. Mohanjeet singh has died. Dr. Daljeet Singh and his wife Nirmaljeet Kaur have permanently shifted to Pubjab and they are serving as doctors in Punjab Government service. Both of them are neither residing in Sri Ganganagar nor they are carrying on their private Practice at Sri Ganganagar. They do not therefore, require the suit premises and in any case their alleged need has already come to an end. Firm Marwah Automobiles has no other accommodation in Ganganagar.They are carrying on their business since 1964 in the suit premises and according to the rules of the company show room for the Lamby scooters must be in the main market. It was also stated that even if it is assumed that the plaintiffs need suit premises for their son and sons wife, then the plaintiffs have got alternative accommodation for that purpose. They have got shops No. 9 and 10 in H.Block and two vacant plots measuring 30 x 40 in Vinoba Basti. The plaintiffs can easily open clinic in the said accommodations for their son and sons wife. (10) After filing of written statement the plaintiffs filed replication as envisa- ged under Civil Procedure Code stating therein that they never wanted to enhance rent and they have filed the suit on the ground of personal necessity and sub-letting.It was also stated that the rent of the suit premises was raised when portion belonging to plaintiff No. 2 was added in the tenancy. The rent was not increased on account of the constitution of partnership firm. (11) On the basis of the pleadings of the parties 8 issues were framed by the learned trial court and both the parties were given opportunity to adduce evidence in support of their respective claims. (12) The plaintiffs in their evidence examined P.W.1 Manjeet Singh, P.W.2 Nirmaljeet Kaur and P.W.3 Dr. Daljeet Singh . The defendant, examined himself as D.W.1 and Deena Nath as D.W.2. In rebuttal the plaintiffs re-examined their witnesses again as P.W. 1, P.W.3 and P.W.2 respectively. (13) After hearing the parties the learned trial court decided issue No. 1 regarding default in favour of the defendant. Daljeet Singh . The defendant, examined himself as D.W.1 and Deena Nath as D.W.2. In rebuttal the plaintiffs re-examined their witnesses again as P.W. 1, P.W.3 and P.W.2 respectively. (13) After hearing the parties the learned trial court decided issue No. 1 regarding default in favour of the defendant. Under Issue No. 2 regarding subletting, the learned trial court came to the conclusion that the defendant has failed to establish the plaintiffs consent for making the partnership firm as tenant of the suit premises.However, it was held by the learned trial court that the defendant has not parted with the possession of the suit premises and that he is continuing his business in the suit premises as partner of the registered partnership firm Marwah Automobile, therefore, it cannot be said that the defendant has sub-let the premises to his brothers. Consequently, the said issue has been decided against the plaintiffs. On issue No. 3 regarding the opening of show room by the defendant at 67 H Block, the counsel for the plaintiffs did not address any arguments. On the other hand he candidly conceded that the availability of the alternative accommodation was only relevant for residential premises and the said fact was not at all relevant for commercial purposes. Accordingly, the said issue was decided against the plaintiffs. On issue No. 4 regarding reasonable and bonafide necessity, the learned trial court came to the conclusion that the plaintiffs needed suit premises for opening clinic by his son and sons wife and the plaintiffs need was reasonable and bonafide. The learned trial court decided issue No. 5 regarding comparative hardship in plaintiffs favour by coming to the conclusion that the plaintiffs would suffergreater hardship in compatision to the defendant. Issue No. 6 regarding the maintainability of the suit against the defendant was decided against the defendant on the basis of the finding on issue No. 2. It was held that the defendant was responsible for payment of rent and therefore the suit was rightly filed against him. Issue No. 7 regarding special costs was decided against the defendant. Issue No. 6 regarding the maintainability of the suit against the defendant was decided against the defendant on the basis of the finding on issue No. 2. It was held that the defendant was responsible for payment of rent and therefore the suit was rightly filed against him. Issue No. 7 regarding special costs was decided against the defendant. (14) It is pertinent to mention that while deciding issue No. 8 regarding relief, the learned trial court examined the case in the light of Sec. 14(2) of the Act No. 17 of 1950 and it was held that though no issue was framed on the said question still it was open to examine the case on the said question in the light of the evidence on record. After addressing itself about the partial eviction the learned trial court examined the reliefs, evidence on record and came to the conclusion that plaintiffs need could not be satisfied by partial eviction. (15) After recording the aforesaid findings on issue No. 1 to 8, the suit for eviction was decreed by learned trial court on 1.2.86 against tenant/ defendant/ appellant aggrieved against the aforesaid judgment and decree the present appeal has been preferred before this court by tenant/ defendant /appellant. (16) I have heard the learned counsel for parties and perused the material evidence from the record of the learned trial court. (7) Main thrust of argument of the learned counsel for appellant Shri Rajendra Mehta before me is that the learned trial court seriously erred in deciding issue No. 4 regarding reasonable and bonafide necessity in favour of plaintiffs.According to Shri Mehta plaintiffs have miserably failed to prove their reasonable and bonafide necessity as alleged in the plaint while on the other hand the defendant has clearly established by cogent evidence on record that the plaintiffs did not require the suit premises reasonably and bonafidely for opening clinic for their son and sons wife. Shri Mehta urged before me that during the pendency of the suit Mohanjeet Singh died and Daljeet Singh and his wife Nirmaljeet Kaur joined government service in Punjab on permanent basis.The aforesaid facts clearly indicate to the effect that the entire case built up by the plaintiffs in their pleadings and evidence regarding their alleged bonafide and reasonable necessity is incorrect. It is also urged by Shri Mehta that Daljeet Singh and Smt. Nirmaljeet Kaur never wanted to open any clinic in Sri Ganganagar. According to Shri Mehta it is not believable that the aforesaid doctors will leave their permanent government job when the suit premises would be vacated and will open their clinic in the said premises. (18) Learned counsel Shri D.S.Shishodia appearing on behalf of respondents refuted the aforesaid arguments and has invited my attention towards the statement of PW2 and PW3. From perusal of the aforesaid statements it is evident that in the suit shop i.e. the lower portion of the building the doctors intend to establish their clinic and in the upper portion they intend to make arrangements for stay of patients as well as their own stay and stay of their employees as such this building as a whole is required reasonably and bonafidely. The fact of the eviction decree in respect of upper portion which was on rent with Congress office has already been granted was mentioned in the judgment of the learned trial court itself. It is pertinent to note that during the pendency of the suit the upper portion of the premises was evicted and possession of the upper portion had already been acquired by the respondents and in this respect it is evident from the perusal of the cross-examination in the statement of Nirmaljeet Kaur which was recorded on 28.8.85 in the first line of the cross-examination she clearly stated as follows:– ``Opper portion Khali Hua tha usme Karobar shuru Nahi Kiya Kyoki wah Rahne Ke Lia Hai Aur Maternity Karya Ke Liye Hai. (19) Learned counsel Shri Shisodia also invited my attention that whole suit premises was required by the plaintiff respondents for establishing their clinic, therefore by eviction of the part of the whole building cannot be used as a clinic and dispensary. After eviction of the whole premises the plaintiff would establish their clinic,dispensary and maternity home. It is clear that the lover portion which is in possession of the appellant is not still vacant hence the plaintiff/respondent cannot be able to establish their clinic in a portion of suit premises and to say that the need of the plaintiff is fully satisfied is totally baseless and wrong. It is clear that the lover portion which is in possession of the appellant is not still vacant hence the plaintiff/respondent cannot be able to establish their clinic in a portion of suit premises and to say that the need of the plaintiff is fully satisfied is totally baseless and wrong. It is to be noticed that the suit filed against Harbans Singh was decreed by way of compromise and in the compromise Harbans Singh admitted the necessity as claimed by the plaintiffs Dr. Daljeet Singh and Dr. Nirmaljeet Kaur for establishing a clinic.Shri Shishodia also invited my attention towards two site plans which were filed by the plaintiff/respondents and exhibited before the lower court as Ex. 2 and Ex. 3. Ex.2 is existing site plan and Ex. 3 is proposed site plan. In Ex. 2 shop of the Harbans Singh which was shown by Marking `C in the site plan and in the proposed site plan Ex.3 it was shown that it will be used as Dispensary and laboratory after constructing a partition wall between the two rooms.Therefore, by evicting this shop of Harbans Singh the necessity of the plaintiff cannot be satisfied at all and it still survives because the plaintiff cannot establish their clinic and maternity home unless the appellant is evicted from the suit premises. (20) I have given my thoughtful consideration to the rival contentions raised at the Bar. I have critically examined the evidence recorded by the learned trial court about reasonable and bonafide necessity of the plaintiff/respondents. I am of the opinion that the learned trial court has committed no error in arriving at a conclusion about the reasonable and bonafide necessity of the plaintiff/respon- dents. The aforesaid finding recorded by learned trial court is based on analytical discussion of the oral and documentary evidence on record with which I am at one. The finding on issue No. 4 recorded by the learned trial court is eminently just and proper and it does not require interference by this Court. (21) It is next contended by Mr.Mehta that the learned trial court has not com- pared the hardships of the tenant-defendant- appellant and the land lord-plaintiff-respondents properly and therefore it requires to be set aside. The learned counsel Mr. (21) It is next contended by Mr.Mehta that the learned trial court has not com- pared the hardships of the tenant-defendant- appellant and the land lord-plaintiff-respondents properly and therefore it requires to be set aside. The learned counsel Mr. Mehta invited my attention towards application moved by defendant/appellant under Order 7 Rule 7 CPC read with Order 41 Rules 1 & 2, Order 41 Rule 33 and Sec. 151 CPC for bringing subsequent events on record, stating that for the last more than 10 years Dr. Daljeet Singh and his wife Smt. Nirmaljeet Kaur are very well settled at Ludhiana. Apart from their permanent Government job after their selection through Public Service Commission, they have also got established their private practice there. The aforesaid subsequent events have been denied by the land lord- plaintiff-respondents stating that the defendant-appellant has closed their business of Luna Moped Agency in the premises of 67 H Block, Sri Ganganagar which is the premises of appellant himself. It is stated that after closure of the business of Luna Moped Agency the appellant has let out this 67 H Block, premises to four tenants, namely Vatan Gas Agency, where the business of LPG Gas is being carried on . Next to it is ``Studying in Canada where business of Video Games and cassettes is carried on. Next to it is Gayatri Medical Store which carries on the business of medicines and the last is World Video Mixiing Center which is a colour Lab and the upper portion of the 67 H Block is also let out by the appellant recently. The photograph showing the position of shops are being annexed with the reply to the application moved under Order 7 Rule 7 CPC.Shri Shishodia urged before me that it is clear that appellant has given on higher rents his own premises in 67 H Block, Sri Ganganagar to above named tenants and realising higher rents from them, and on the other hand the appellant is not vacating the premises with mala fide intention. According to Shri Shishodia even the business of Scooter Lamby Agency of the tenant/defendant/appellant in the suit premises is admittedly closed long back. Thus the conduct of the appellant to let out his own premises to four tenants in the lower portion and one tenant on the upper portion clearly establishes that the appellant is not entitled to any relief for this court. Thus the conduct of the appellant to let out his own premises to four tenants in the lower portion and one tenant on the upper portion clearly establishes that the appellant is not entitled to any relief for this court. There is substance in the aforesaid argument of the learned counsel for land lord/plaintiff/ respondents. (22) I am of the view that the learned trial court has correctly appreciated the comparative hardships of the tenant-defendant- appellant and land lord-plaint- if-respondents and correctly came to the conclusion that if the suit for eviction is not decreed the land lord-plaintiff-respondents would suffer greater hardship than the tenant-defendant- appellant. I am in full agreement with the aforesaid finding recorded by the learned trial court. (23) It is next contended by learned counsel Shri Rajendra Mehta that the learned trial court was under legal obligation to frame an issue on the question of partial eviction as envisaged under sub-sec. 2 of Sec. 14 of the Act No. 17 of 1950. Mr. Shishodia refuting the aforesaid argument invited my attention towards the elaborate finding recorded by the learned trial court on the question of partial eviction after giving cogent and convincting reasons in support of it. (24) I am of the view that the aforesaid argument advaced by the learned coun- sel for the appellant is untenable in the present case for the simple reason that issues are framed as envisaged under Order 14 CPC when the parties are at variance. Here in the present case, since parties were not at variance, therefore, framing of an issue was not necessary for the trial court. However it is held that no decree for eviction on the ground set forth in Clause (h) of sub-sec. 1 of Section 13 of the Act No. 17 of 1950 could be passed if the court is not satisfied that having regard to all the facts and circumstances of the case, including the question whether other reasonable accommodation is available to the land lord or the tenant greater hardship would be caused by passing the decree than by refusing to pass it. It is further held that where the court is satisfied that no hardship would be caused either to the tenant or to the land lord by passing a decree in respect of a part of the premises, the court has discretion to pass a decree in respect of such part only. To my mind the learned trial court has correctly addressed itself while dealing issue No. 8 that partial eviction would not be sufficient to meet the reasonable and bonafide necessity of the land lord, therefore, he has rightly passed a decree, evicting the tenant/defendant/appellant from whole of the premises in question. In my considered opinion, non-framing of an issue on the question of partial eviction has no bearing on the merits of the present case. (25) Lastly learned counsel for the appellant Shri Mehta urged before me that since the land lord-plaintiff-respondent had already settled at Ludhiana in connec- tion with their permanent Government job after their selection through Public Service Commission and got established their own house at 383, Bhai Randhir Singh Nagar, Ludhiyana, therefore, there is no chance of their shifting to Sri Ganganagar for opening Clinic and maternity home on basis of which they are obtaining decree of eviction against tenant-defendant -appellant.The aforesaid ar- gument of the learned counsel Shri Mehta is not acceptable for the simple reason that to arrest such mischief by land lord, penal provisions have been made under Section 15 of the Act No. 17 of 1950 which reads thus :– ``15 (Restoration of possession to evicted tenant-Where a decree for eviction of any premises has been passed by the Court against a tenant on any of the grounds specified in clause (h) of suv-sec. (1) of Sec. 13 and the landlord fails to utilise the premises the use or purpose for which such eviction shall have been decreed within two months of obtaining possession thereof, or in the case of premises let out for residential purpose, at any time within one year and in the case of premises let out of commercial or business purposes, at any time within five years of obtaining possession, lets the whole or any part thereof to any person other than the evicted tenant, the court which passed the decree may on the application of the evicted tenant, place him in possession of the premises.) (26) A close scrutiny of the provisions postulated under Sec. 15 of the Act No. 17 of 1950 reveals that where a decree for eviction of any premises has been passed by a court against a tenant on any grounds specified in clause(h) of sub-sec.(1) of Sec.13 and the land lord fails to utilise the premises for the use or for the purposes for which such eviction decree have been obtained within two months of obtaining possession thereof or in the case of premises let out for residential purposes at any time within one year and in the case of premises let out for commercial purposes at any time within five years of obtaining possession lets the whole or any part thereof to any person other than the evicted tenant, the court which passed the decree may on the application of the evicted tenant place him in possession of the premises in question. Hence in the present case if after obtaining the decree under clause (h) of sub-sec. (1) of Sec. 13 of Act No. 17 of 1950 the land lord-plaintiff-respondents fail to utilise the premises for the purpose within two months of obtai- ning possession thereof or in the event of let out to somebody else within five years from the date of obtaining possession, the tenant appellant would be at liberty to proceed under Sec. 15 of the aforesaid Act. (27). Consequently, the instant First Appeal lacks merit and it is hereby dismissed.Costs easy. (27). Consequently, the instant First Appeal lacks merit and it is hereby dismissed.Costs easy. Land Lord-plaintiff-respondents would be required to make certain alterations and changes in the premises to make if fit for opening Clinic and Maternity Home.The reasonable time taken in making necessary alterations for opening of the Clinic and Maternity Home would be added within two months period contemplated under Sec. 15 of the Act No. 17 of 1950. _