Judgment : Alok Chakrabartl, J. 1. THE sole petitioner, an Advocate practising at Kanpur by this public interest litigation challenged admission of students in the Institute of Engineering and Technology for the session 1996-97 and for declaring the decision of Shri Shahu Ji Maharaj Kanpur University, Kanpur (for short, Kanpur University) to run the Institute of Engineering and Technology as ultra vires. 2. AT the outset, the respondents raised objection as regards maintainability of the writ petition at the instance of sole petitioner. As regards maintainability, the first objection is that the petitioner, herein, is not entitled to file the present public interest litigation as he has no locus standi and no evidence was disclosed that the petitioner had any Interest in the field of education much less in technical education. It is also said that no material has been disclosed as to how the sole petitioner, herein, could take up the cause of students and the guardians. Learned counsel for the petitioner argued that the law as settled permits the petitioner, a public spirited citizen and a practising Advocate to take up the cause of the citizens and in particular the students when education is being sold amounting to commercialisation of education and that too violating the provisions of Constitution of India and without obtaining the necessary approval either from the State Government or from All India Council for Technical Education (for short, A.I.C.T.E.) established under Statute with a view to proper planning and co-ordinated development of technical education system throughout the country. 3. LAW has been referred to by the respective parties by referring to decisions of Hon'ble Supreme Court mainly relying upon the law decided In the case of S. P. Gupta v. Union of India. AIR 1982 SC 149 and the case of Krishna Swami v. Union of India, AIR 1993 SC 1407 . 4. ON the question of locus standi and the right to maintain public interest litigation, law has undergone substantial change. The Initial view on the question of locus standi to maintain a writ petition as decided in the case of State of Orissa v. Madan Gopal AIR 1952 SC 12 ; Veerappa v. Raman and Raman. AIR 1952 SC 192 ; Calcutta Gas Company Limited v. State of West Bengal AIR 1962 SC 1044 , was not followed after Innovation of concept of public interest litigation. AIR 1952 SC 192 ; Calcutta Gas Company Limited v. State of West Bengal AIR 1962 SC 1044 , was not followed after Innovation of concept of public interest litigation. There came a distinct departure from the age-old concept of 'locus standi and 'persons aggrieved'. Thereafter new concept of locus standi and the public interest litigation started crystaltsing in the case of Mumbai Kamgar Sabha v. Abdulbhal Faizullabhai, AIR 1976 SC 1455 and Fertilizer Corporation Kanpur Union v. Union of India, AIR 1981 SC 344 . The position was made further clear In the case of S. P. Gupta v. Union of India, AIR 1982 SC 149 , when the public spirited practising Advocates were permitted to approach the law court In public Interest to vindicate constitutional or legal rights of determinate class of society. The concept has been further developed In various cases including People's Union for Democratic Rights v. Union of India, AIR 1982 SC 1473 (popularly known as Asiad Case), Bandhua Mukti Morcha v. Union of India, AIR 1984 SC 802 ; Bihar Legal Support Society v. Chief Justice of India, AIR 1987 SC 38 ; Sheela Barse v. Union of India, AIR 1988 SC 2211 and Janta Dal v. H. S. Chaudhary, AIR 1993 SC 892 . The decision in the case of Krishna Swami (supra) being different on facts and relevant consideration, does not apply here. The position as it stands now Is that a public spirited citizen may be allowed to approach the law court taking up the cause of public interest when the persons affected are weak and under-privileged and are unable to vindicate and protect their rights fighting legal battles provided such citizen is not mere a busy body or a meddlesome interloper and has no personal gain or oblique motive. The other limitations discussed in various cases may also lead a writ petition not maintainable. The present case involves cause of the students mainly on the allegation of sale of education at a very high price by University without approval of Government making it impossible for meritorious but poor students to get technical education in view of fees prescribed beyond the reach of large majority of meritorious students coming from poor families affecting their constitutional right to get education. Moreover, no acceptable case has been made out, of any personal Interest of the present petitioner particularly when the allegation of bias of the petitioner against Vice- Chancellor of the Kanpur University has not been made out producing sufficient material. In the above background, I And that this writ petition is maintainable. 5. ON merits, the contention of the petitioner is mainly on want of approval either by AICTE or by the State Government and as regards prescription of charges. Contentions also related violation of prescribed conditions. 6. ON the factual aspect regarding prescription of fees, the materials available on record include the information Brochure annexed as Annexure No. I to the writ petition showing the fees structure as Rs. 3,000 for category- I being normal seats, Rs. 35,000 for category- II being self supporting seats and U.S. Dollars 15,000 or Rs. 5.25 lacs for category-Ill being NRI/NR1 sponsored seats. In the counter-affidavit further disclosure has been made showing that 15% of the seats have been proposed to be allocated for NRI/NRI sponsored candidates belonging to category-Ill, 35% of the seats for self-supporting students belonging to category- II and the balance 50% of the total seats for general candidates belonging to category- I. 7. IN the writ petition, one of the main complaints was that the establishment of the institute of Engineering and Technology has not been approved by the AICTE and the State Government. Learned counsel for the respondents strongly denied such contention and referred to documents disclosed as Annexures to the counter-affidavit as also to the writ petition. 8. A perusal of the materials available show that by letter dated 17.5.1996 (C.A.-5) proposal for establishment of an Institute of Engineering and Technology for B. Tech. courses was referred to by the Joint Secretary of the University Grants Commission to the AICTE seeking decision of the Council and making declaration that the Commission will not bear any financial liability. Faculty of Engineering and Technology of Kanpur University resolved on 27.6.1996 approving the course structure formulated by Board of studies for certain branches of Engineering to be initially started (C.A.-8). The academic council on 7.7.1996 approved the recommendation made on 27.6.1996 as referred to above. This appears from Annexure No. C.A.-9. Faculty of Engineering and Technology of Kanpur University resolved on 27.6.1996 approving the course structure formulated by Board of studies for certain branches of Engineering to be initially started (C.A.-8). The academic council on 7.7.1996 approved the recommendation made on 27.6.1996 as referred to above. This appears from Annexure No. C.A.-9. The Annexure No. C.A.-10 shows that the Executive Council of the Kanpur University approved the resolution dated 7.7.1996 recommending certain alteration regarding creation of posts and also approved ordinance of the Institute. The document at Annexure No. C.A.-6 Is approval of establishment of the Institute dated 23.7.1996/10.9.1996 by AICTE Imposing certain conditions. The State Government communicated its approval for opening B. Tech. course in Kanpur University by letter dated 23.8.1996 at Annexure No. CA-I. The aforesaid materials particularly the approval by the AICTE at Annexure No. CA.-6 and approval by the State Government as appears from documents annexed to the counter-affidavit CA-I and C.A.-2 show that the establishment of the said institute had due approval. 9. ON the question of fee structure, the contention of the petitioner is that sub-Section (i) of Section 51 of the U. P. State Universities Act, 1973 (for short, the Act) shows provision of Ordinance providing for the fees which may be charged by the University or by an affiliated or associated college for any purpose. ON behalf of the petitioner, reference was made to the new Ordinance as annexed as Annexure No. C.A.- XI showing that the fee structure has not been provided in the said ordinance and accordingly the petitioner contends that the fee structure proposed is illegal. 10. IN the counter- affidavit, the respondents have not made out any case of having Ordinance providing for fee structure as required by Section 51 of the said Act. On behalf of the respondents, it has been contended, as also appears from the written notes, that such ordinance for the purpose of fees to be charged must be brought into existence before fee is actually charged and It is now premature to raise such objection. 11. IN view of the fact that the respondents have not yet made the ordinance providing for fees to be charged from the students in the institute, I am of the opinion that this is not the appropriate stage for considering the said aspect. The charges as proposed are to be considered while making the Ordinance. 11. IN view of the fact that the respondents have not yet made the ordinance providing for fees to be charged from the students in the institute, I am of the opinion that this is not the appropriate stage for considering the said aspect. The charges as proposed are to be considered while making the Ordinance. Section 52 of the Act empowers the Executive Council to make new or additional Ordinances or amend the Ordinances. The Executive Council has been also empowered to reject any draft of Ordinance proposed by Academic Council or to return it either in whole or IN part together with suggested amendments. Further all Ordinances made by the Executive Council are to be submitted to the Chancellor who in turn may signify to the Executive Council his disallowance of such Ordinances. When the matter has not yet been decided by the appropriate statutory authority by framing Ordinances, mere proposal or draft of various charges are not to be considered on merit by the Court. Such administrative functions by such statutory functionaries are not to be interfered at such preliminary stage of consideration. On the material available and the stands taken by the respondents, I am of the opinion that until the matter is decided by the statutory authority by making appropriate Ordinances in accordance with law, It is a premature stage to consider the validity of the charges at the stage of mere proposal. Moreover, no allegation has yet been made against the Executive Council of bias or mala fide or that Executive Council will not consider the prevailing law and policy of the Government while making such ordinance. 12. THE apprehension of the petitioner as regards sale of education or charging fees at a level not permissible to the University, is, thus, premature In view of the disclosure made by the respondents admitting that such Ordinance has not yet been made and until Ordinance is made, admission will not take place. Thus, the question of deprivation of students belonging to poor families will not arise until rates of fees are decided by making the appropriate ordinance by statutory authorities. With regard to the contentions of the petitioner about non-compliance of the conditions imposed while granting approval by AICTE, I find that the said conditions themselves provide for development In phases and there is a provision of monitoring by AICTE itself. With regard to the contentions of the petitioner about non-compliance of the conditions imposed while granting approval by AICTE, I find that the said conditions themselves provide for development In phases and there is a provision of monitoring by AICTE itself. In the circumstances, the complaint of the petitioner that till now all the conditions have not been specified, is not tenable. Moreover, if there is a violation of such condition, it can be pointed out to the monitoring authority who can consider it on facts and take appropriate decision particularly when the Institute has not yet started functioning. When such expert body Is provided for monitoring, I do not feel that writ court should enquire into allegation on facts as regards insufficiency of accommodation, laboratory, teachers, etc. resulting in Infraction of those conditions of approval. 13. THE writ petition is, therefore, disposed of with the above observations. THE respondents are at liberty to proceed with the process of admission but not to effect actual admission charging any fees until proper Ordinance is framed In accordance with law. There will be no order as to costs.