Principal, Ewing Christian College v. Director of Education
1996-12-19
D.K.SETH
body1996
DigiLaw.ai
Judgment : D. K. Seth, J. 1. THE appointment of class ivth staff by the college was refused to be approved by an order dated 25th October, 1983 being Annexure-1 to this writ petition on the ground that the appointment in the vacant post of class ivth staff does not appear to be justified for according approval. THE said order has been impugned in the present writ petition. 2. MR. R.K. Jain, learned counsel for the petitioner, contends that the petitioner is a minority institution so recognised by the University in its order dated 27.1.1982 being Annexure 1A to the writ petition as well as by the order dated 24th November, 1983 issued by the Higher Education Service Commission. Annexure-A-3. This fact is not disputed by MR. R. K. Saxena, learned standing counsel, the restriction on the appointment of employees Imposed in Statute 25.04 of the First Statutes, 1976 of the Allahabad University read with Section 60A (iii) (hi of the State Universities Act, 1973 does not apply in the case of the minority institutions particularly, in view of Section 24 of the U. P. Higher Education Service Commission Act. The second contention of MR. Jain was that the said post having already been in existence, there was no question of holding the appointment non-justified. In support of his contention Mr. Jain has asserted that the restrictions imposed by Section 60A (ill) (b) of the Act does not apply in the case of minority institutions in view of Section 24 of the U. P. Higher Education Service Commission Act and Article 30 of the Constitution of India, therefore, the order impugned cannot be sustained. 3. MR. R. K. Saxena, learned standing counsel, on the other hand, contends relying on Section 24 of the Service Commission Act read with Article 30 of the Constitution of India that liberty is given to minority institutions from the restrictions in its administration and management. But the same does not extend to the liberation of the regulatory measures imposed by the State Government Particularly, when a minority institution is an aided one and the liability of payment of salary is with the Government. The according of permission does not affect the right to appoint any person. Because, according to him, the restriction is with regard to the creation and continuation of posts as is required to be sanctioned on the proportion of the teachers-students ratio.
The according of permission does not affect the right to appoint any person. Because, according to him, the restriction is with regard to the creation and continuation of posts as is required to be sanctioned on the proportion of the teachers-students ratio. On the strength of the students it is determined to be 28. Whereas the college had employed as many as 53 non-teaching staff which, according to MR. Jain is 55 including 43 class IVth employees. The strength having been in excess of the sanctioned posts, relying on the statement made in paragraph 12 of the counter-affidavit, MR. Saxena contended that by reason of circular Issued In 1968 on the strength of the ratio of students the number of class IVth staff would not exceed 28. But since there were excess staff instead of retrenchment it was decided that on the day of retirement of excess staff the post would cease to exist so as to bring the strength of the staff within the sanctioned ratio. Present appointment having been sought to be made beyond the strength, it was open to the Director of Higher Education to refuse the approval. 4. IN reply Mr. Jain contended that the U. P. State Universities Act came into force in 1973. The circular issued in 1968 cannot have any effect after the promulgation of the State Universities Act, 1973. Since no rules have been framed in terms of Section 60A ft? of the State Universities Act with regard to the number of strength of class IVth staff, regulating the service condition of class IVth employees, the respondents cannot impose any restrictions on the question of strength of staff by virtue of 1968 circular and the circular cannot remain valid after the promulgation of the State Universities Act 1973. Now Section 60A (til) while denning an employee says that an : "'employee', in relation to a college means a non-teaching employee of {Such college." 5. STATUTE 25.04 of the First Statutes, 1976 of the Allahabad Universities Act provides : "25.04 Appointment of employees shall be subject to the approval of the Director of Education (Higher Education), or an officer authorised by him in this behalf.
STATUTE 25.04 of the First Statutes, 1976 of the Allahabad Universities Act provides : "25.04 Appointment of employees shall be subject to the approval of the Director of Education (Higher Education), or an officer authorised by him in this behalf. If the approving authority does not within two months from receiving the proposal for approval intimate Its disapproval or does not send any intimation in respect of such proposal to the appointing authority, the approving authority shall be deemed to have approved the appointment." 6. THE above two provisions make it clear that the appointment to the post can only be made with the permission of the Director of Education (Higher Education) as provided in Section 60A (iii) (b) of the Act. THE said provisions is recognised in Statute 25.04 which provides approval of the Director of Education in respect of appointment of an employee. THE consequence of non-intimation of approval or disapproval rendered the appointment approved by deeming clause. THE two provisions read together make it clear that an appointment unless approved either directly or through deeming clause, cannot continue. The State Universities Act defines University in Section 2 (20) to mean an existing University or a new University established after the commencement of this Act under Section 4. The Allahabad University, admittedly, is an existing University. The said Act applies to different existing Universities from the date of its coming into force. The said Act has not made any specific provision with regard to the minority Institutions. Chapter XI provides for regulatory measure in relation to degree colleges, while Chapter XIA regulates the question of payment of salary to the teachers and other employees of the degree colleges. The said Act has been brought about In order to consolidate the laws governing the Universities so as to remove the discrepancy. 7. ARTICLE 30 of the Constitution of India allows a minority institution to carry on with its management free from any restrictions. Now the question as to the regulatory method imposed by Section 60A (iii) (b) read with Statute 25.04 imposing restrictions by which the liberty to manage or control the affairs of a minority institution is restricted. Is to be decided in the context of the present case. 8. NORMALLY the question of management is considered to be the right to form its own management, its own rules and regulations in the governance of the minority institution.
Is to be decided in the context of the present case. 8. NORMALLY the question of management is considered to be the right to form its own management, its own rules and regulations in the governance of the minority institution. The same also applies in the relation between the employer and employee of the minority Institutions as well. The decision of such management with regard to the appointment, dismissal, discharge of its employee are its internal management on which no restriction can be Imposed. But such liberty cannot be to the extent that the institution would employ unqualified persons for the purposes of some posts where minimum qualification is required for the purposes of performance of such duties. Neither such liberty permits employment of such number of staff without any limitation in the institution nor maintain such number of posts without any limitation when the responsibility of payment of persons holding such post is on the State exchequer. Admittedly, the institution being an aided one, responsibility to pay the salary of the employees of the institution is that of the State Government. The State Government may impose regulatory method in respect of its liability to reimburse payment made to the employees and such restrictions cannot be treated to be a restriction on the management of the Institution but It is a regulatory measure with regard to the assumption of liability of the State Government by itself. Such restrictions imposed through the regulatory method by the State Government with regard to its acceptance of liability of payment of an aided Institution. The same has nothing to do with one right to manage the affairs of the institution with regard to its employee as has been allowed by reason of Section 24 of the U. P. Higher Education Service Commission Act, 1986 which Is as follows : "24.
The same has nothing to do with one right to manage the affairs of the institution with regard to its employee as has been allowed by reason of Section 24 of the U. P. Higher Education Service Commission Act, 1986 which Is as follows : "24. Exemption to minority Institution.- Not with standing anything contained in this Act, the management of any college established by a minority based on religion or language which the minority has the right to administer, shall be entitled to appoint, dismiss, remove, terminate the service of or reduce in rank teacher or take other disciplinary measures subject only to the approval of the Commission and of the University concerned." After the promulgation of the Service Commission Act, restriction was imposed on the degree college in the matter of appointment of staff except in accordance with the provisions contained In the said Act as well as the question of punishment as provided thereunder. A.W.C. 91 9. SECTION 24 thereof recognises the liberty of a minority institution in the matter of appointment, dismissal, removal, termination of services or reduction in rank of teacher or take other disciplinary measures but then again the said SECTION 24 also imposes regulatory method to the extent that taking of such steps are only subject to the approval of the Commission and the University concerned. So long as SECTION 24 remains in the statute, the minority institutions can not claim exemption from approval by the Commission or the University in respect of the matter covered under SECTION 24 of the said Act. But in the present writ petition. SECTION 60A (iii) (b) of the University Act and Statute 25.04 in its application to minority institution or SECTION 24 of the Commission Act has not been challenged. The said provisions stare at the fact of the petitioner. Only relying upon Article 30 of the Constitution, the petitioner cannot claim that these restrictions would not be applicable In his college since the same has the effect of unreasonable restrictions imposed on it by curving out liberty provided under Article 30 of the Constitution, affecting the fundamental rights guaranteed to a minority institution. 10. AS observed earlier, the according of approval is not a restriction on the power of appointment or dismissal as the case may be.
10. AS observed earlier, the according of approval is not a restriction on the power of appointment or dismissal as the case may be. The liberty to manage its affairs has not been touched by reason of the said provision which had only imposed regulatory method so as to regulate the activities of the management of minority institutions and the schools taking advantage of the system and process in the matter of Imparting education and taking the aid of the University itself. When admittedly, the degree college is affiliated to the University, such affiliation is governed by the State Universities Act after the same has come into force. The first statute and the rules are fully applicable In the said college. The said provision is also recognised by Incorporating clause making the approval, dismissal etc. subject only to the approval of the Commission and the University concerned by Section 24 of the U. P. Higher Education Service Commission Act. The existence of regulatory method in no way affects the internal management or affairs of the college. The liberty guaranteed under Article 30 of the Constitution is not absolute to the extent of doing anything or everything. The said liberty cannot be taken to be purposive and not subject to other law imposing reasonable restrictions when it is related to the liability of the State. The decisions cited by Mr. Jain being cases D. A. V. College, Jullandhar v. State of Punjab and others, AIR 1971 SC 1737 and Ahmedabad St. Xaviers College Society and another etc. v. State of Gujarat and another, AIR 1974 SC 1389 , do not help In the context of the present case. 11. THE ratio decided therein is accepted principle of law that any restrictions contrary to the rights guaranteed under Article 30 of the Constitution cannot be allowed to operate in respect of the minority institution in the same affects the liberty so guaranteed. In the present case, as observed earlier, the regulatory method does not operate as a restriction on the liberty guaranteed under Article 30 of the Constitution of India to a minority institution. 12.
In the present case, as observed earlier, the regulatory method does not operate as a restriction on the liberty guaranteed under Article 30 of the Constitution of India to a minority institution. 12. IN the case of Smt. J. K. Kalra v. Regional Inspectress of Girls Schools, Meerut and others, 1996 (3) UPLBEC 1691 , the Full Bench of our High Court had held: "It Is now settled by catena of decisions of the Hon'ble Supreme Court that all minorities have the right to establish and administer their educational institution but the State can impose regulatory measures in functioning of the institution." "State can make regulation whereby action of management in discharging dismissing, or imposing any penalty on a member of the teaching staff will be subject to approval of the authority appointed in that behalf by the state." Mr. Jain contended that the said decision does not help the contention of Mr. Saxena since the decision was rendered while considering the question of dismissal, removal, imposing penalty on a member of the teaching staff .There was no occasion to consider the question of appointment and that too of class ivth staff in the said decision. 13. THOUGH it is correct that the question of appointment of class ivth employee was not under consideration before the Full Bench but still then the contention of Mr. Jain appears to be devoid of any merit because Section 24 of the Commission Act has made both appointment and dismissal etc. subject to the approval of the Commission or the University. If the dismissal is accepted to be subject of approval, it cannot be said that the appointment is excluded to be subject of approval. 14. THEN again the question of liability of the State Government in making payment of the salary is also involved. In that case, by means of regulation State has every right and authority to regulate the activities of management of a minority institution in respect of its acceptance of liability.
14. THEN again the question of liability of the State Government in making payment of the salary is also involved. In that case, by means of regulation State has every right and authority to regulate the activities of management of a minority institution in respect of its acceptance of liability. Where the State is discharging its liability and when a minority institution opts to accept the aid to shift liability of making payment to its employees on the State Exchequer, it has to accept the regulatory measures provided therein, which does not have the effect of interfering with its internal management The creation of a post shifts the liability on the Government and thereby involves the Government to make payment of salary of such incumbents appointed on such posts. It does not remain in the realm of internal management of the, minority institution. It travels beyond the internal management when it involves the State in the matter of bearing the burden of payment and saddling the State with the liability. Therefore the said regulation does not affect the right guaranteed under Article 30 of the Constitution and the regulation imposed on the minority institutions does not hit Article 30. In the case of Smt. J. K. Kalra (supra) Full Bench had referred to various decisions of the Apex Court right from 1958 dealing with Article 30 of the Constitution of India, the acceptance of a reasoning given in the said judgments would help us to understand the scope of liberty that might be available to minority institution in the context of the present case. 15. THE decision in re Kerala Education Bill, 1967, AIR 1958 SC 956 . was reiterated and approval in St Xaviers College v. State of Gujarat. AIR 1974 SC 1389 . It was observed that such right is not an absolute right free from regulation. Regulatory measures are necessary for maintaining the educational character for ensuring orderly, efficient and sound administration. THE right to administration is not the right to maladministration. 16. IN Lilly Kurian v. Sr. Lewina and others, AIR 1979 SC 52 , it has been observed that Article 30 (1) is couched in absolute terms in mark contrast with other fundamental freedoms enunciated in Article 19 has to be read subject to the regulatory power of the State.
THE right to administration is not the right to maladministration. 16. IN Lilly Kurian v. Sr. Lewina and others, AIR 1979 SC 52 , it has been observed that Article 30 (1) is couched in absolute terms in mark contrast with other fundamental freedoms enunciated in Article 19 has to be read subject to the regulatory power of the State. IN the case of All Saints High School v. Government of Andhra Pradesh and others, AIR 1980 SC 1042 , the Supreme Court quoted the observation made in re Kerala Education Bill (supra) with approval. Thus, by now, it is well settled/established that the State Government can take regulatory measures in respect of administration of the minority institutions. The Full Bench in the case of Smt J.K. Kalra (supra), while considering the extent of power of the State to interfere with the administration of such minority institution has looked into the same from the stand point of the right to dismiss, discharge and inflicting other penalties, and thus, according to Mr. Jain this case is distinguishable with the facts of the said case from the facts in hand. 17. IN Re Kerala Education Bill (supra) the question of dismissal and removal was considered and was accepted. The provision for previous sanction by the Government with regard to such action on the reasoning that these are no doubt serious Inroads on the right of administration and appear perilously near violating that right. But considering that those provisions are applicable to all educational Institutions and that the alleged restrictions were designed to give protection and security to the teachers engaged, therefore, these restrictions are still permissible for a minority institution as a condition for grant-in-aid to such educational institutions. 18. VIEWING from the said stand point, the present case appears to be stronger one. Inasmuch as In the case of dismissal, the State is relieved of liability to pay the salary to the dismissed teachers whereas in the present case the appointment would entail saddling with the liability. Therefore, the minority institutions receiving grant-in-aid will be subject to such regulations, when it creates a liability on the State Government as a condition for receiving grant-in-aid.
Therefore, the minority institutions receiving grant-in-aid will be subject to such regulations, when it creates a liability on the State Government as a condition for receiving grant-in-aid. When regulatory method with regard to disciplinary action effecting cessassion of its liability has been accepted not to offend the freedom of the minority institutions in its administration, by no stretch of imagination it can be said that its creation would. In the case of St Xaviers College v. State of Gujarat (supra) as well as in the case of Lilly Kurian v. Sr. Lewina and others (supra), if to the extent, dismissing and discharging can be accepted as such not offending of freedom, the approval to appointment on the same analogy cannot be said to offend. Such restrictions on dismissal being subject to approval by the competent authority is not violative of Article 30 (1) of the Constitution of India. This view was also accepted in the case of All Saints High School (supra) that such regulatory power was also so recognised as not to offend the freedom of the minority Institution. In all Bihar Christian Schools Association v. State of Bihar, AIR 1988 SC 305 , this provision was held to be valid as it was regulatory provisions for administration of the minority institutions. The above cited decisions make it clear that the approval of dismissal is only regulatory measures. Similarly the approval of appointment cannot but be a regulatory measure. The requirement for permission or approval with regard to the appointment by no stretch of imagination can be said to offend Article 30 of the Constitution of India. 19. NOW the question that since 1968 circular was a circular in vague before the enactment of 1973 Act, cannot be effective, does not stand to reason because of the reason that some specific rule has been specified in the said circular deals with the strength of the staff to be dependent upon the proportion of the strength of the students. This provision is applicable to the college affiliated to the University and is being followed in every case. Because the institution is a minority institution, it cannot claim exemption therefrom, particularly when fund Is provided by the Government. In the absence of any specific rule, otherwise framed the said circular continued to operate until otherwise declared to be void.
This provision is applicable to the college affiliated to the University and is being followed in every case. Because the institution is a minority institution, it cannot claim exemption therefrom, particularly when fund Is provided by the Government. In the absence of any specific rule, otherwise framed the said circular continued to operate until otherwise declared to be void. No such pleading, case, or prayer has been made out in the writ petition for declaration of the said rule void or otherwise. The said circular being a circular Introducing guidelines for regulating the strength of staff of the institution receiving grant-in-aid, the same is the restrictions imposed by the State upon itself on its acceptance of liability. When a minority institution opts to come under the grant-in-aid scheme. It accepts such a scheme on the condition on which such grant-in-aid scheme is made available to such Institutions, but restrictions on the sanction of the strength for which aid would be granted, is not a restriction within the Internal administrative affairs or the management of the institution. It is a relation of the Institution with the Government which is wholly outside its self-administration. Therefore, such regulatory method cannot be said to be offending Article 30 of the Constitution. 20. AS it appears from the statement made In the counter-affidavit that on the basis of strength of the students in terms of 1968 circular, only 28 post of class IVth employee can be sanctioned by the State. Since there were more than 28 posts in existence prior to 1975, therefore, the said posts were allowed to continue on the condition that the said posts will cease to exist or shall stand abolished on the date of retirement or resignation of the incumbent holding the post in order to bring the number of posts at par with the other institutions such regulations do not offend Article 30 of the Constitution of India, inasmuch as this relates to shouldering of the responsibility of the payment of teachers. The college may maintain this posts out of Its own fund if It so likes.
The college may maintain this posts out of Its own fund if It so likes. In case there are only 28 posts that can be sanctioned on the strength of the students, it cannot be said that the minority institution can claim special privilege of having more staff disproportionate to the strength of the students and thereby availing additional staff not available to other institutions simply because the institution is a minority Institution, obtaining of such advantage is not the internal affair of the institution which additionally burden the State Exchequer. Following these reasons, I am unable to agree with the submissions of the learned counsel for the petitioner. I, therefore, do not find any valid ground to Interfere with the order impugned on the basis of the facts of the case. 21. ON the other hand, learned counsel for the petitioner in the rejoinder-affidavit has averred that there has been an increase in the number of students requiring class IVth staff more than 28. Such a question cannot be gone into. If the occasion so arises and if the institution makes such representation before the concerned authority it would be for such authority to consider the same accordingly. 22. IN the result, the writ petition fails and is accordingly dismissed. There shall be no order as to costs.