JUDGMENT : V.D. Gyani, J.—The petitioner started his service career as an Assistant Engineer with the respondent Board in the year 1959. By 1981, he climbed the ladder right upto the post of Additional Chief Engineer. The petitioner was appointed as Project Manager of Karbi Langpi Hydro Electric Project on July 5, 1980 and continued till June 16, 1986. It was during this period that certain gross irregularities in the matter of payments to a contractor came to light. On September 1, 1986 an FIR u/s 409, 120B IPC read with Section 5(1), (C),(D), punishable u/s 5(2) of the Prevention of Corruption Act was lodged against him with the superintendent of Police, Vigilance Cell. The petitioner was placed under suspension vide order dt. September 4, 1986 Annexure-1, pending departmental inquiry into the charges of having given undue monetary benefit to one Contractor M/s. Sibson Construction Company, defrauding the Board by abusing his official position, having caused payment of Rs. 15,40,658.62 without proper verification and in face of objections from subordinate officers. 2. The charges levelled against him read as follows: "(1) Dishonesty in connection with the business of the Board under Regulation 10 (b). Under the charge the payment of 75% of the claims has been questioned. (2) Fraud in connection with the business of the Board under Regulation 10(c). The set of facts on which this charge is grounded are those stated in charge-1. (3) Causing wilful loss to Board's property under Regulation 10(c) with the same set of facts as in Charge-1. (4) Moral turpitude on the basis of the facts given in charge-1. The charge of moral turpitude is derived." 3. The Petitioner submitted his reply, denying the above charges. The inquiry proceeded. By order dt. July 19, 1988 his suspension was revoked and the petitioner was allowed to resume duty without prejudice to the ongoing departmental inquiry. In the meanwhile, the Inquiry Officer submitted his inquiry reports but the respondent Board being not satisfied with the re- ports ordered the inquiry to proceed de novo vide resolution dated September 29, 1988. 4. A fresh charge sheet Annexure -3 was issued on May 19, 1989. The petitioner submitted his objections to the commencement of inquiry de-novo on recasting and revised charges. On April 12, 1990 another charge sheet Annexure-6 which pertains to altogether different work of open cut excavation for penstock, was issued. 4. A fresh charge sheet Annexure -3 was issued on May 19, 1989. The petitioner submitted his objections to the commencement of inquiry de-novo on recasting and revised charges. On April 12, 1990 another charge sheet Annexure-6 which pertains to altogether different work of open cut excavation for penstock, was issued. The petitioner was placed under suspension. 5. On completion of inquiry, the Inquiry Officer submitted his report holding that out of four, two charges relating to causing loss to the Board and neglect of duty were proved. A second show cause notice proposing termination from service was issued on November 14, 1991, to which the petitioner submitted his explanation, which culminated in the punishment of 'warning' to the petitioner. The petitioner preferred an appeal against the aforesaid punishment of warning. The Chairman of the Board directed a fresh inquiry vide order dated October 30, 1992, Annexure-9A. It was during pendency of this inquiry that the petitioner retired from service on April 30, 1993. 6. By this petition under Article 226 of the Constitution, the petitioner, who has now retired from service of the respondent Board, having held the post of Additional Chief Engineer seeks to challenge and prays quashing charge-sheet dated Mayl9, 1989 and order dated October 30, 1992 Annexure 9A and prays for a direction to the respondents to pay the petitioner his full pay for the periods during which he was under suspension from September 4, 1986 to July 19, 1988 and March 19, 1990 to February 6, 1992. He has also prayed for a direction to the respondents to release his post-retiral benefits such as pension, gratuity and earned leave encashment. 7. Few basic facts may now be noted- The case of the respondent Board to put it in nut-shell was that the petitioner without following the prescribed procedure and rules required for payment of public money allowed unauthorised payments of Rs. 10,60,290.00 only along with another sum being 75% of the aforesaid amount claimed by the Construction company as compensation for flood damage and this amount was paid by cheque No. OAOG/50 462787 dated February 1, 1986 to the company. This unauthorised payment was made by the petitioner with utter disregard to rules, procedure and standing instructions and that by ignoring lawful and valid objections raised by the Executive Engineer and Accounts Officer of the Project against genuineness and admissibility of the bill. This unauthorised payment was made by the petitioner with utter disregard to rules, procedure and standing instructions and that by ignoring lawful and valid objections raised by the Executive Engineer and Accounts Officer of the Project against genuineness and admissibility of the bill. The petitioner allowed payment of another amount of Rs. 4,90, 171.62 being 75% of the bill for special diversion system as aforesaid and adding some other amount. The company was accordingly paid this amount by the same cheque No. OAOG/50 462787 dtd. February 1, 1986 which included the aforesaid amount. Thus the total unauthorized payment on the above two counts is Rs.s 15,40,658.62. The said amount Rs. 4,90, 171.62 was also paid by the petitioner without following rules and procedure of payment and standing instruction and that too ignoring the lawful and valid objections raised by the Executive Engineer concerned and the Accounts Officer of the project against genuineness and admissibility of the bill. It is pertinent to mention that the petitioner posted as Project Manager in the rank of Additional Chief Engineer by Board's order No. ASEB/PLT/4/79/134(F) dtd.February 3, 1981 with all powers of Chief Engineer in regard to administration and financial management of the KLHEP with a view to facilitate to progress and completion of works within the time schedule. The petitioner allowed payment of the aforesaid unauthorised amounts to M/s. Sibson Construction Company against their fraudulent bills as aforesaid and thereby caused huge loss of public money. 8. Now coming to the submissions, made by the learned counsel for the petitioner, the first contention as advanced relates to the order dated May, 1989 Annexure-3 directing a de-novo inquiry on the following charges: "(1) Defrauding the Board of Rs. 10,60,290 in collusion with the Contractor and causing wilful loss to the Board's money under Regulation 10(b) and 10(c). (2) Defrauding the Board, causing wilful loss to Board s money to the extent of Rs. 4,90, 171.62 under Regulations 10(b) and 10(c). (3) Moral turpitude on account of Charges-land 2" 9. Comparing the above charges with the charges as contained in the first charge-sheet dated December 1, 1986 Annexure-2, really speaking, there is no difference between the two, they are substantially the same, except for some slight change in the language employed in framing the charges. 10. (3) Moral turpitude on account of Charges-land 2" 9. Comparing the above charges with the charges as contained in the first charge-sheet dated December 1, 1986 Annexure-2, really speaking, there is no difference between the two, they are substantially the same, except for some slight change in the language employed in framing the charges. 10. The contention is based on two grounds, firstly, the service regulations do not provide for such de-novo inquiry and secondly no fresh inquiry can be held on the same set of facts once the delinquent is exonerated of the charges. As a proposition of law, there can be no legitimate dispute, that once a delinquent is exonerated of the charges he cannot be subjected to a fresh inquiry on the same or similar charges based on the same set of facts. But the moot question is 'was the petitioner exonerated of the charges as contained in the charge sheet dated December 1, 1986 Annexure-1 (2). The petitioner was not exonerated of the charges. On the other hand, the Enquiry Officer felt that the charges were not properly framed. The Board, therefore, by its resolution dt. September 29, 1988 (filed as An-nexure -D with the affidavit in opposition) decided that "on the basis of the same allegations the charges may be framed afresh properly and proceedings may start de-novo and a new Enquiry Officer be appointed for the purpose." 11. Coming to the case law relied upon by the petitioner 1976 LLJ 17 State of Assam v. J.N. Roy Biswas, does not help the petitioner. Firstly, because the petitioner was never exonerated of the charges and secondly, because this case has been distinguished by the Supreme Court in its later decision as reported in R.R Verma v. Union of India 1980 LLJ 152 and Anand Narain Shukla Vs. State of Madhya Pradesh, AIR 1979 SC 1923 wherein it has been categorically held: "we find no substance in either of the points urged on behalf of the appellant. The earlier order was quashed on a technical ground. On merits a second enquiry could be held. It was rightly held. The order of reinstatement does not bring about any distinction in that regard. The Government had to pass that order because the earlier order of reversion had been quashed by the High Court. The earlier order was quashed on a technical ground. On merits a second enquiry could be held. It was rightly held. The order of reinstatement does not bring about any distinction in that regard. The Government had to pass that order because the earlier order of reversion had been quashed by the High Court. Without reinstating the appellant, it would have been difficult, perhaps unlawful to start a fresh enquiry against the appellant. The observations of this Court in the last paragraph of the Judgment in State of Assam v. J.N. Roy Biswas are not applicable to the facts of the present case and do not help the appellant at all". 12. Mr Saikia learned Standing Counsel pointed out that Regulation 10, clearly provided for further inquiry, it was warranted by circumstances. Thus there is no force in the contention that de novo inquiry could not be ordered. 13. The second contention raised by the petitioner relates to the power of the appellate authority. It has been contended that an appeal preferred by the petitioner against the punishment 'warning' the Chairman of the Board could not have legally ordered a de-novo enquiry afresh by recasting of charges. 14. So far as recasting of charges is concerned there is hardly any substantial change except for slight modification in the language which really speaking has diluted the rigour of the earlier charge to the advantage of the delinquent. It was necessitated because the Enquiry Officer felt that the charges were not properly framed. Hence recasting of charges. It is not the petitioner's case that on recasting of the charges he was not afforded any opportunity to defend himself against the charges as recast or revised. 15. It is a settled proposition of law that the Disciplinary Authority is not bound by the report submitted by the Enquiry Officer. The Supreme Court in Union of India v. M.B. Patnaik 1981 LLJ 453 has held that fresh inquiry can be held on merits, even after ordering reinstatement of delinquent but it should not be delayed. In the instant case the Enquiry Officer as per his report dated July 27, 1988 even while holding the charges 2 and 4 as not proved against the delinquent observed that the charges were not in proper form. The Board therefore ordered further enquiry vide its resolution No. 42 dt. September 29, 1988, Annexure -1. 16. In the instant case the Enquiry Officer as per his report dated July 27, 1988 even while holding the charges 2 and 4 as not proved against the delinquent observed that the charges were not in proper form. The Board therefore ordered further enquiry vide its resolution No. 42 dt. September 29, 1988, Annexure -1. 16. Counsel for the petitioner argued that it was merely because of the enquiry report which was not as desired, that fresh enquiry was ordered. This criticism is not borne out from record. It is very easy to impute motives but extremely difficult to substantiate the same. Considering the gravity of the charges, and the huge amount involved, directing further enquiry cannot be faulted with on any legitimate ground. 17. Coming to the last point as urged by the learned counsel that no departmental enquiry can be allowed to continue after retirement of the delinquent, the contention is without any substance. Apart from Rule 21 of the Assam and Meghalaya Pension Code, which permits continuance of such enquiry even after retirement, there are several judgments of the Supreme Court holding that Departmental Enquiry even after retirement of the delinquent is permissible (See State of Uttar Pradesh Vs. Brahm Datt Sharma and Another, AIR 1987 SC 943 18. In view of the foregoing discussion, this petition fails, it is accordingly dismissed with no order as to costs.