Brij Kishore Jhawar v. State Of Bihar — 1996 DIGILAW 155 (PAT)

Judgment S. K. Chattopadhyaya, J. 1. Invoking the jurisdiction of the High Court under Articles 226 and 227 of the Constitution of India, the petitioners have prayed for quashing the entire proceeding as well as the investigation and order issuing warrant of arrest arising out of patna Vigilance PS Case no.5/89, now pending in the court of the Special Judge (Vigilance), Ranchi. 2. As both the writ petitions arise out of the same FIR and similar points are involved, they have been heard together and they will be governed by this common judgment. 3. During the course of hearing an english translation of the First Information report was submitted on behalf of the petitioners from persual of which it appears that one Mohan Rajak, Deputy Superintendent of Police, cid (Vigilance) of the Bihar state Electricity Board (shortly the Board), opposite party no.2, lodged an FIR on 16.6.89. It was expressly averred therein that the petitioners, Brij Kishore Jhawar as the owner and O. P Kapila as the Chief Executive Officer of the Usha Alloy Steel Ltd. , in connivance with the officers of the electricity Board, motivated manipulation in reading of the meter situated within the premises of the consumer as a result of which readings are recorded less and electrical energy has been thus stolen. The vigilance Department of the Board received a complaint that in collusion with the local officials of the Board the electrical energy consumed in the factory is not correctly recorded and billed and every month there have been losses amounting to lacs of rupees. It was also reported that payments which are being made by the Company towards electricity bills, were being made by cheques and were credited to the account of the board even after two months for which the Board is suffering loss in two ways, namely, the interest for Rs.40 to 50 lacs and secondly, owing to this payment, the Company gets improper and illegal rebates. A preliminary investigation was made and after completion of the same it transpired that only in 33 months during the period of investigation, the Board suffered a loss to the extent of more than four crores of rupees and Usha Alloy Steel Ltd. has gained by that amount. A preliminary investigation was made and after completion of the same it transpired that only in 33 months during the period of investigation, the Board suffered a loss to the extent of more than four crores of rupees and Usha Alloy Steel Ltd. has gained by that amount. A special committee was constituted by the General Managercum-Chief Engineer of Ranchi Area Board for reading the meters of the grid sub-sta-tion connected with and installed in the premises of the Company. The details have been given in the FIR to indicate as to how the investigation revealed that there was constant theft of electrical energy by the company in collusion with the officials of the Board resulting in huge loss to the State revenue. Names of such officials have also been mentioned in the FIR including the petitioners. It was concluded that for the purpose of causing loss to the revenue of 1he Board and improper financial gain to the Company, the petitioners indulged into criminal conspiracy with the aforesaid officials of the Board. According to the informant due to the aforesaid criminal conspiracy and loss to the Board the petitioners and the officials have committed offences under sections 409, 420, 467, 468, 471, 120b and 210 of the Indian Penal Code and Section 13 (2) of the Prevention of Corruption Act, 1988 and Sections 39/39a of the Indian electricity Act, 1910. On the basis of the said FIR Patra vigilance PS case No.5/89 corresponding to Sepcial case no.30/89 was registered. 4. Dr. Debi Pal, learned counsel appearing on behalf of the petitioners raised the following points in support of his contention : (i) so far the allegation for the offences under Sections 467, 468 and 471 of the penal Code are concerned, no case has been made out even prima facie to suggest that the petitioners can be held guilty of such offences; (ii) the petitioners not being the public servants, no offence can be said to hawe been committed by them under Section 13 (2) of the Prevention of Corruption Act; (iii) the offence under Sec.409 of the Penal Code cannot have any application so far the petitioners are concerned as the petitioners are neither public servants nor were entrusted or had any domain over ary property alleged to have been misappropriated. Electricity being intangible, camnot fall within the definition of property and, as such, there cannot be any question of entrustment. In support of this contention reliance has been placed on the decision of the Supreme Court reported in AIR 1962 sc 1821 . (iv) there being no allegation of any dissuation leading to fraudulent or dishonest inducement to deliver any property, no case of cheating can be said to have been made out so as to attract the provisions of Sections 420 and 120b of the Penal Code; (v) mandatory requirement of Section 50 of the Indian Electricity Act, 1910 have not been complied with inasmuch as the prosecution has not been initiated by the government of Bihar or any Electrical Inspector or by the board when one of the principal charges is regarding alleged violation of Sec.39 of the Electricity Act for dishonest abstraction of energy and also under Sec.39a for abatement. Further opposite party no.2 admittedly not being an Electrical Inspector, cannot be treated as a person aggrieved and, as such, the proceeding initiated at his instance is incompetent and improper. Reliance has been placed on the decision of the Supreme court reported in 1972 ITR 787 and of this court in 159 ITR 818; (vi) the company not being prosecuted, the petitioners cannot be held responsible for the alleged offence. The company being a public limited company, petitioner Jhawar cannot be said to be the owner of the Company. Similarly, petitioner kapila has been wrongly described as the chief Executive Officer although he is the special Adviser of the Company. In this connection decision reported in 1977 Cr. L. J.1821 has been relied on; (vii) there being no allegation that petitioners Jhawar and Kapila were incharge of and were responsible to the company for the conduct of the business of the Company at the time when the alleged offence was committed, Sec.39a of the indian Electricity Act has no application. In this connection decision reported in 1977 Cr. L. J.1821 has been relied on; (vii) there being no allegation that petitioners Jhawar and Kapila were incharge of and were responsible to the company for the conduct of the business of the Company at the time when the alleged offence was committed, Sec.39a of the indian Electricity Act has no application. In support of this contention decisions reported in 1985 BLJ 320 and 1995 (1)PLJR 633 have been referred; (viii) the allegations made in the FIR, on the face of it, are self contradictory and inconsistent which do not even prima facie disclose any offence under Sections 39 or 39a of the Indian Electricity Act; (ix) in view of the decision reported in air 1982 SC 949 no investigation should normally be permitted to continue if the materials do not disclose any offence; 5. Mr. M. Y Eqbal, learned Government adyocate, countering the submissions of Dr. Pal has contended as follows : (i) the allegations made in the FIR do disclose an offence of dishonest abstraction of electrical energy. Even though specifically the word dishonest abstraction has not been used but the FIR has to be read as a whole," (ii) whether petitioner Jhawar was the owner and overall incharge of the Company and was interested with the loss and profit of the company, is to be seen at the trial and not at this stage by the High Court while exercising its powers under Articles 226 and 227 of the Constitution; Reference has been made to a decision reported in 1981 Cr. L. J.203; (iii) the complaint being, made to the vigilance department of the Board regarding huge pilferage of electricity in the said area and the opposite party no.2 being the d. S. R of the Vigilance department of the board is definitely a person aggrieved. Reference has been made to the decisions reported in AIR 1936 Allahabad 742 followed in air 1938 Patna 15, AIR 1969 madras 280, 1978 Cr. L. J.1824, 1976 cr. L. J.942 (Pat), 1981 Cr. L. J.1230, and 1980 Cr. L. J.1394 (Delhi); (iv) investigation may reveal as to why there was difference in reading of the, meters i. e. whether for the fault of the grid meter or that of the consumers meter. L. J.1824, 1976 cr. L. J.942 (Pat), 1981 Cr. L. J.1230, and 1980 Cr. L. J.1394 (Delhi); (iv) investigation may reveal as to why there was difference in reading of the, meters i. e. whether for the fault of the grid meter or that of the consumers meter. Though the term dishonesty is not particularly mentioned in the FIR but the allegation of cheating and lack of honesty mentioned therein has to be considered in its true perspective as the ingredients of abstraction is not necessary to be there in all cases. Reference has been made to the decision reported in AIR 1936 Calcutta 753, (v) at this stage the petitioners cannot be allowed to pray for quashing of the FIR as well as the investigation and if after completion of the investigation it is found that no case has been made out against the petitioners, charge sheet may not be submitted against them. Reference has been made to the decisions reported in (a) AIR 1974 SC 1146 , (b) 1980 Cr. L. J.98, (c) AIR 1991 SC 1260 , (d) 1987 (Sup) SCC 89, (e)AIR 1992 SC 930, (f) 1994 (II) SCC 227, (g) 1995 (II) SCC 449 and the decision renderd in Cr. W. J. C. No.73/92 (R)decided on 28.7.95. 6. In order to enter into the domain of the contending claims put forward before this court, the relevant provisions of the penal Code and other laws relating to the case may profitably be looked into. 7. Section 2 (c) of the Indian Electricity act, 1910 (the Electricity Act in brief)defines the term "consumer" thus : " (C) "consumer" means any person who is supplied with energy by a licensee of the government or by any other person engaged in the business of supplying energy to the public under this Act or any other law for the time being in force, and includes any person whose premises are for the time being connected for the purpose of receiving energy with the works of a licensee, the government or such person, as the case may be;" Sec.2 (g) defines "energy" which means "electrical energy"- (i) generated, transmitted or supplied for any purpose, or (ii) used for any purpose except the transmission of a message; section 2 (h) defines licensee which means any person licenced under part II to supply energy. 8. 8. The older definition of the term "consumer" has been amended by Act 32 of 1959 and at present a consumer means any person who is supplied with energy by (a) licensee, (b) Government, and (c) any other person engaged in the business of supplying energy to the public under this act or any other law for the time being in force. It appears that it is expressly made clear that this definition would include any person whose premises are, for the time being, connected for the purpose of receiving energy, whether that person is actually receiving at that time any evergy or not. I have already indicated that the expression energy means electrical energy. Thus the word consumer with reference to the expression "whose premises are for the time being connected for the purpose" does not include in the case of a Mill, the Manager thereof. In order to be a consumer the person must be either a person to whom energy for any other purpose, but transmission of a message, was supplied or he was owner or occupier of the premises connected up with the supply companys electric system. A person who is a registered consumer falls under the definition of consumer. The definition of. the word consumer does not deal only with the intentional or conscious supply or only with a valid and contractual receipt of energy. It is only the actual supply of energy which is relevant. If electrical energy is supplied to any person by the licensee or the Board, he will be a consumer. Thus the definition of consumer will include a person receiving energy even by tapping, pilferage and theft. This is one part of the defintion of consumer. Second part of this definition of consumer includes within its ambit any person whose premises are connected for the purpose of receiving energy with the works of a licensee. It is immaterial how and under what circumstance the supply line is connected with the consuming line in the premises. May be as the connection was not made at the owners request but as electrical energy was supplied to the meter, there was undoubtedly a connection. What is relevant is only whether energy is supplied or not from the connection. 9. May be as the connection was not made at the owners request but as electrical energy was supplied to the meter, there was undoubtedly a connection. What is relevant is only whether energy is supplied or not from the connection. 9. Similarly Bihar Electricity Duty Act, 1948 defines consumer as any person who is supplied with energy by licensee and licensee means any person including a company or local authority licenced under part II of the Indian Electricity Act, 1910 , to supply energy or any person including a company or a local authority who has obtained sanction under Sec.28 of that act, to engage in the business of supplying energy. In the case of Bhagalpur Electric supply Co. Ltd. V/s. Hari Prasad Saha and ors. (AIR 1938 Pat 15) the court, while interpreting the meaning of the term consumer has held, inter alia - "the definition of consumer includes any person who is supplied with energy by a licensee, and any person whose premises are for the time being connected for the purpose of supply of energy with the works of the licensee. Therefore prima facie, it should be enough to prove either that energy was supplied for use of the persons or that the persons were owners or occupiers of premises connected up with the licensees electric system. " 10. In view of the above definition it is clear that Usha Alloy Steel Ltd. is a consumer and the petitioner Jhawar being the owner of Usha Alloy Steel Ltd. will also come within the purview of S.2 (c) of the electricity Act. 11. Section 22 of the Indian Penal code defines movable property which reads : - "s.22. movable property : The words movable property are intended to include corporeal property of every description, except land and things attached to the earth or permanently fastened to anything which is attached to the earth. " 12. 11. Section 22 of the Indian Penal code defines movable property which reads : - "s.22. movable property : The words movable property are intended to include corporeal property of every description, except land and things attached to the earth or permanently fastened to anything which is attached to the earth. " 12. In the case of Avtar Singh V/s. State of Punjab, reported in AIR 1965 SC 666 , it is held that electricity is not considered to be movable property and that Sec.378 by itself would not include theft of electricity however, abstraction of electricity, by virtue of Sec.39 of the Electricity Act is to be deemed to be an offence under the Indian penal Code and the offence so created would entail punishment mentioned in the indian Penal Code for that offence even though punishment is not under the Indian penal Code itself. Thus, though theft of electricity is not theft within the meaning of section 378 of the Penal Code itself, nevertheless a theft by virtue of fiction created by section 39 of the Electricity Act, is liable to be punished in the like manner as theft under Sec.379. The Madras High Court in the case of Tamilnadu Electricity Board v. Kariappa Mudaliaya, reported in 1985 cr. L. J. R.561, relying on the aforesaid decision of the Supreme Court, has held that where consumer has wilfully or fraudulently altered index of the meter and tampered with the wiring for preventing it from duly registering energy consumed, must be held to have committed offence of theft of energy. 13. In the instant case one of the allegations in the FIR is that during the period of 1986-88, on the one hand there was a large increase in the electric units supplied according to the reading of the meter of the grid whereas in the meter situated at the factory premises of the consumer the units of power consumed were less than before and more so, when there was substantial increase of production of iron blades in the factory. It is alleged that with the connivance of the f. I. R. named Board officials, the consumer motivated manipulations in the reading of the meter situated within the premises of the consumer by recording less consumption by the consumer and thus resulted in theft of energy. It is alleged that with the connivance of the f. I. R. named Board officials, the consumer motivated manipulations in the reading of the meter situated within the premises of the consumer by recording less consumption by the consumer and thus resulted in theft of energy. It is to be borne in mind that the F. I. R. has been lodged not only against the petitioners but also the aforesaid officials of the Board under sections 409, 420, 467, 471, 120b and 201 of the Indian Penal Code read with other sections of the Prevention of Corruption Act and Electricity Act. Under this circumstance, which of the accused is liable for the offence under the aforesaid provisions of the Penal Code, has to be gone into at the trial stage. In my opinion, on that ground itself the F. I. R. against the petitioners for the alleged offence under the penal Code cannot be quashed in its threshhold. My aforesaid conclusion can be looked into from another angle. Admittedly, the petitioners are not public servants but as because the officials of the Board have been made accused, the allegation of committing offence under Sec.13 (2) of the prevention of Corruption Act, 1988 has been levelled. The matter can be thrashed out at its proper stage at the time of framing of charge as to which of the accused can be proceeded against under a particular provision of the Penal Code or the act. In this view of the matter, I am unable to agree with the submission of Dr. Pal and the same must be rejected. 14. The contention of Dr. Pal that the informant not being the Electrical Inspector, cannot be treated as a person aggrieved and, as such, he had no authority to lodge the F. I. R, is to be considered in the light of the provisions contemplated under Section 50 of the Electricity Act. Sec.50 of the electricity Act reads as follows : - "institution of prosecution.-No prosecution shall be instituted against any person for any offence against this Act or any rule, licence or order thereunder, except at the instance of the Government or a State Electricity Board or an Electrical Inspector, or of a person aggrieved by the same. " 15. In the case of Avtar Singh (supra)on which strong reliance has been placed by Dr. " 15. In the case of Avtar Singh (supra)on which strong reliance has been placed by Dr. Pal, the Supreme Court allowed the appeal by setting aside the conviction observing as follows : - "learned counsel for the respondent also sought to contend that the present prosecution was at the instance of a person aggrieved by theft. We do not think we should allow him at this stage to go into that question. The appellant has all along been contending that his prosecution was bad because it was not at the instance of the Government or an Electrical Inspector or a person aggrieved by the theft. It was clearly for the respondent if it was minded to go into that question, to establish that the prosecution had been instituted at the instance of a person aggrieved as it now seeks to do. It has never been disputed at any earlier stage that the prosecution had not been at the instance of one of the persons mentioned in s.50. The onus of proving that fact was clearly on the respondent. It is a question of fact and we have no material on the record by which we can decide it. We, therefore, think that this case must be decided on the basis, as it was in the courts below, that the prosecution would be incompetent under s.50 if it was in respect of an offence against the Act. We have found that it was in respect of such an offence. " However, in that decision their lagd ships considering the allegations made against the appellant, held that the offence was created under Sec.39 and since in the Legislatures view Sec.39 created an offence, it has to be held that that was one of the offences to which Sec.50 was intended to apply. Thus, it is clear that their lordships were of the opinion that dishonesty in abstracting electricity is an offence against the Electricity Act but as because the onus of proving that the informant in that case was a person aggrieved, was not discharged by the prosecution and which was question of fact, the Supreme Court refused to permit the respondent to agitate the same at the appellate stage. 16. 16. On the other hand, in the case of bhagalpur Electric Supply Company (Supra) this Court has held that the Resident Engineer being the principal officer of the Company incharge of the management, is a person aggrieved by an offence against the Company. This Bench relied on a division Bench decision of the Allahabad high Court reported in AIR 1936 Allahabad, 472 wherein it was explained that when a responsible officer of a company reports an offence to the police and prosecution thereupon is set on foot, it will be considered to be a prosecution instituted at the instance of the Company. The aforesaid Patna decision has been again relied upon by the madhya Pradesh High Court in the case of jhalkan Singh and anr. V/s. State of Madhya Pradesh reported in 1981 Cr. L. J. R.1230 where the officer incharge of the Madhya pradesh Electricity Circle was held to be a person aggrieved as required under section 50 of the Electricity Act. The view taken by this High Court in the case of bhagalpur Electrict Supply Company Ltd. (supra) has been confirmed by the supreme Court in the case of Ram chandra Prasad Sharma V/s. State of Bihar reported in A. I. R.1967 S. C.349. Same view has been reiterated by a Division Bench of the Delhi High Court in the case of State of delhi Administration V/s. Dharmapal reported in 1980 Cr. L. J. R.1394. 17. In the instant case the F. I. R. has been lodged by one Mohan Rajak, the Dy. Superintendent of Police C. I. D. (Vigilance)of the Board. It is a question of fact to be gone into in view of Avtar Singhs case (supra) as to whether Mohan Rajak was a person aggrieved or not. In the case of ram Chandra Prasad Sharma and Ors. (supra) this aspect of the matter has been dealt with by the Supreme Court by following observations : "the prosecution here was commenced with a charge sheet submitted by the police to the Judicial Magistrate. The offences were investigated into by the police after the first information report was lodged with them by Bhattacharya. What is contended is that information given by him could not entitle the police to submit the charge sheet. The offences were investigated into by the police after the first information report was lodged with them by Bhattacharya. What is contended is that information given by him could not entitle the police to submit the charge sheet. It is also said that the submission of a charge sheet by the police is not the same thing as institution of prosecution at the instance of the State. It is, however, not disputed that if the law was set in motion by a person aggrieved by making a first information report to the police a charge sheet could properly be submitted by the police. It is true that Bhattacharya was not himself, a person aggrieved and that the person aggrieved was P. E. S. Company. The RE. S. Co. however, is a body corporate and must act only through its directors or officers. Here we have the evidence of Ramaswami to the effect that he held a general power of attorney from the RE. S. Co. and that he was specifically empowered thereunder to act on behalf of RE. S. Co. in all legal proceedings. The evidence shows that it was at his stance that Bhattacharya lodged the first information report, and therefore, it would follow that the law was set in motion by the person aggrieved. The objection based on S.50 must, therefore, be held to be untenable. " 18. In the backdrops of the aforesaid authoritative pronouncement, in my view, the objection put forward by Dr. Pal must be held to be without merit and the decisions relied by him on this point have no application to the facts and circumstances of the present case. 19. I now pass on to consider the next question argued on behalf of the petitioners, namely, whether without prosecuting the Company, the petitioners can be proceeded against. In this context the argument of Dr. Pal is that the Company being a Public Limited Company, Jhawar cannot be said to be the owner of the Company. Similarly Kapila has been wrongly described as the Chief Executive Officer and he being only the special adviser of the company, cannot be held responsible for the alleged offence. In the FIR allegation against Jhawar is that being the owner of the Company he has connived with the officials of the Board to commit the offence. Similarly Kapila has been wrongly described as the Chief Executive Officer and he being only the special adviser of the company, cannot be held responsible for the alleged offence. In the FIR allegation against Jhawar is that being the owner of the Company he has connived with the officials of the Board to commit the offence. It is not in dispute that the Company is the consumer under the Board. Whether being the owner, he is taking part in running the company, again is also a question of fact which cannot be gone into at this stage. Similarly, whether kapila was adviser of the Chief Executive officer of the Company, is to be decided at the proper stage. This aspect of the matter fell for consideration before the Supreme court in the case of Ram Chandra Prasad sharma and others (supra) where their lordships, after noticing the defintion of the consumer in Sec.2 (c) of the Electricity act, observed as follows : -"it is an admitted fact that the mill was connected with works of RE. S. Co. If, therefore, the appellant became coowners by reason of the purchase of the mill from Musanlal, they must be regarded as consumers even though musanlals name still continues to be borne on the records of RE. S. Com. " 20. In this connection provisions laid down in S.49-A of the Electricity Act may be looked into : - "49-A. Offences by companies.- If the person committing an offence under this Act is a Company, every person who at the time the offence was committed was in charge of, and was responsible to the Company for the conduct of the business of the company as well as the company, shall be deemed to be guilty of the offence and shall be liable to be proceeded against and punished accordingly : provided that nothing contained in this sub-section shall render any such person liable to any punishment, if he proves that the offence was committed without his knowledge or that he exercised all due- diligence to prevent the commission of such offence. (2) Notwithstanding anything contained in sub-section (1), where an offence under this Act has been committed with the consent or connivance of, or is attributable to any neglect on the part of, any director or manager, secretary or other officer shall also be deemed to be guilty of that offence and shall be liable to be proceeded against and punished accordingly. Explanation.- For the purpose of this section : - (a) consumer means any body corporate and includes a firm or other association of individuals; and (b) director in relation to a firm, means a partner in the firm. 21. In order to appreciate the argument of dr. Pal, similar provisions in Section 10 of the Essential Commodities Act can be usefully quoted : - "10. Offences by Companies.- (1) If the person contravening an Order made under Sec.3 is a Company, every person who, at the time the contravention was committed, was in charge of, and was responsible to the Company for the conduct of the business of the Company, shall be deemed to be guilty of the contravention and shall be liable to be proceeded against and punished accordingly : provided that nothing contained in this sub-section shall render any such person liable to any punishment if he proves that the contravention took place without his knowledge or that he exercised all due diligence to prevent such contravention. (2) Notwithstanding anything contained in sub-Section (1), where an offence under this Act has been committed by a company and it is proved that the offence has been committed with the consent or connivance of, or is attributable to any neglect on the part of any director, manager, Secretary or other officer, shall also be deemed to be guilty of that offence and shall be liable to be proceeded against and punished accordingly. Explanation.-For the purpose of this section - (a) company means any body corporate and includes a firm or other association of individuals; and. (b) director in relation to a firm, means a partner in the firm. " Bare reading of these two sections of the Electricity Act as well as the Essential commodities Act reveals that both the provisions are in pan materia. (b) director in relation to a firm, means a partner in the firm. " Bare reading of these two sections of the Electricity Act as well as the Essential commodities Act reveals that both the provisions are in pan materia. The Full bench of this Court in the case of Madan mbhan Upadhyaya V/s. State of Bihar reported in 1986 PUR 537, after elaborate consideration of similar provisions in respect of other Acts, have held that once the allegation is levelled or established, then by fiction of law every person, including the partner incharge of or responsible to the firm of the conduct of its business is in the eye of law, deemed as much guilty of the offence as the partnership firm itself. I cannot do better except in following the principles enunciated in paragraph 10 of the full Bench decision which read thus : - "it is well settled that strict criminal liability of companies or partnership firm or other association of individuals is in a class by itself and posses legal problems peculiar to them. The issue of vicarious liability of a partner of a firm through whom the notional firm must necessarily act, therefore, comes to the fore in this context. A plain reading of Sec.10 of the Act would indicate that it is expressly intended to incorporate the stringent principles of strict vicarious criminal liability of persons, who are in charge of and responsible to the firm for the conduct of its business for all offences committed by the partnership firm. Now strict wicarious liability is somewhat of an exception to the general rule of direct personai culpability and is a modem development through statutory provisions. That there can be such vicarious criminal liability by legislative mandate is no longer in dispute. Nevertheless steeped as we are in the basic principle of criminal jurisprudence that mens rea must be the ingredient of an offence, it needs some effort to accept whole-heartedly the legislative mandate of vicarious criminality even in the absence of one or the other of the aforesaid ingredients, namely, that both the act and the intent must concur to constitute a crime. " 22. It is manifest from the allegations made in the FIR against the petitioners of their deep interestedness in the loss and profit of the business of Usha Alloy Steet ltd. " 22. It is manifest from the allegations made in the FIR against the petitioners of their deep interestedness in the loss and profit of the business of Usha Alloy Steet ltd. and the petitioner Jhawar is the owner of the said Company and Kapila is the Chief executive Officer of the same. Sub-section (2) of Sec.10 of the Essential Commodities Act has been held to be wider in its application. Their Lordship continued further by observing that as against sub-section (1) which foists the vicarious liability only on the person incharge of or repon sible to the Company for the conduct of its business, sub-section (2) imposes a somewhat similar liability on a larger class of directors, managers, secretaries or even other officers of the Company. In a way, according to their lordships, this sub-section is envisaged to widen the net of a vicarious liability and to bring within its ambit not only the primal officers of the Company, partnership or other association of individuals, but even other officers thereof, if the commission of the offence by the Company can be established to have been done with the consent, connivance or neglect on their part. According to their lordship the role and scope of sub-section (2) are somewhat different to that of section (1 ). The former is made applicable only to persons directly incharge of or responsible to the Company and the latter having a wider application, though in a somewhat narrower field, they might slightly overlap. Equally the stringency of vicarious liability in the two sub-sections is variable In such view of the matter, in my considered opinion, the argument of dr. Pal has on leg to stand. 23. The next contention of Dr. Pal that without proceeding against the Company the petitioners cannot be proceeded against, in my view, is only to be noticed and rejected. This aspect of the matter is no more in controversy. Pal has on leg to stand. 23. The next contention of Dr. Pal that without proceeding against the Company the petitioners cannot be proceeded against, in my view, is only to be noticed and rejected. This aspect of the matter is no more in controversy. In the case of sheo Ratan Agrawal and others V/s. The state of Madhya Pradesh reported in AIR 1984 SC, 1824, the same point was agitated before their lordships in a case under the essential Commodities Act and interpreting section 10 of the E. C. Act their Lordships, observed as follows : - "we do not think that the language of S.10 of the Essential Commodities Act justified the submission made on bahelf of the petitioners that if it is alleged that the person contravening the Order made under the Essential Commodities Act, is a Company, the prosecution of the Directors, the officers, and servants of the company or other persons is precluded unless the Company itself is prosecuted. We are afraid the submission made on behalf of the petitioners proceeds upon a misunderstanding of the decision of this court in State of Madras V/s. C. V. Parekh (supra ). So do the various other decisions of the High Courts cited before us. " After noticing the provisions of Section 10 their Lordships inter alia, held, that there" is no statutory compulsion that the personin-charge or an officer of the Company may not be prosecuted unless he be arraigned alongside the company itself. 24. Section 49a of the Electricity Act indicates the person who may be prosecuted where the contravention is made by the company. It does not lay down any condition that the person incharge or an officer of the company may not be separately prosecuted if the Company itself is not prosecuted. Explaining the decision in the case of State of Madras V/s. C. P. Parekh (supra) their Lordships have held that on a careful reading of that case will show (sic) and not that the person incharge of or an officer of the Company must be arraigned simultaneously with the company if he is to be found guilty and punished. Explaining the decision in the case of State of Madras V/s. C. P. Parekh (supra) their Lordships have held that on a careful reading of that case will show (sic) and not that the person incharge of or an officer of the Company must be arraigned simultaneously with the company if he is to be found guilty and punished. Noticing paragraph 3 and underscoring some sentences therein, their lordships quoted by observing that : "the sentences underscored by us clearly show that what was sought to be emphasised was that there should be a finding that the contravention was by the company before the accused could be convicted and not that the Company it -. self should have been prosecuted along with the accused. We are, therefore, clearly of the view tha the prosecutions are maintainable _and the is there ing in S.10_pf thte E. C. Act which bars such prosecution. " 25. In view of this settled law, in my considered opinion, it is futile for the petitioners to urge that without proceeding against the Company, the petitioners cannot be prosecuted. 26. The jurisdiction of the High Court in exercise of its power either under Articles 226 and 227 of the Constitution or under section 482 of the Code of Criminal Procedure for quashing an FIR and criminal proceedings has been explained by the supreme Court in various decisions. In order to avoid multiplicity of decisions, I may usefully refer to the recent decision of the Apex Court in the case of State of tamilnadu V/s. Thirukkural Perumal reported in 1995 (2) Supreme Court Cases, 449 where, while setting aside the order of the high Court quashing the FIR their Lordships have laid that : - "the power of quashing an FIR and criminal proceeding should be exercised sparingly by the courts. Indeed, the High court has the extraordinary or inherent power to reach out injustice and quash the first information report and criminal proceedings, keeping in view the guidelines laid down by this Court in various judgments (reference in this connection may be made with advantage to state of Haryana V/s. Bhajan Lal), but the same has to be done with circumspection. The normal process of the criminal trial cannot be cut short in a rather casual manner. The normal process of the criminal trial cannot be cut short in a rather casual manner. The court is not justified in embarking upon an enquiry as to the reliability or genuineness of the allegation made in the FIR or the complaint on the basis of the evidence collected during investigation only while dealing with a petition under Sec.482 Cr. RC. seeking the quashing of the FIR and the criminal proceedings. The learned Single Judge apparently fell into an error in evaluating the genuineness and reliability of the allegations made in the FIR on the basis of the evidence collected during the investigation. " 27. From the aforesaid observations it is clear that the Supreme Court is of the view that the High Court will not be justified in quashing an FIR or criminal proceedings even after completion of investigation on scrutinising the evidence collected during investigation. On the other hand, in the present case the petitioners have moved this court as soon as the FIR was lodged against them in the year 1989. This court stayed the proceeding as well as the execution of warrant of arrest so far the petitioners are concerned. It appears that liberty was given to either party to move the Hon ble the Chief Justice for fixing an early date of hearing after six weeks from the date of admission i. e.4.8.89 but no step was taken by either of the parties for hearing this matter at an early date and ultimately the case was listed for hearing in the year 1995. Though this court did not stay the investigation by the concerned officer but no information to this court could be given by the counsel for the parties as to the result of such investigation. However, that cannot be a ground to quash either the fir or the criminal proceedings. 28. Having given my anxious consideration to the facts and circumstances of the case, in my view, no case has been made out by the petitioners for quashing the FIR as well as the criminal proceedings against them and, as such these petitions are dismissed. Office is directed to communicate this order to the court below forthwith without any further delay. Having given my anxious consideration to the facts and circumstances of the case, in my view, no case has been made out by the petitioners for quashing the FIR as well as the criminal proceedings against them and, as such these petitions are dismissed. Office is directed to communicate this order to the court below forthwith without any further delay. The learned court below, before whom the case is pending, is directed to proceed in the matter as expeditiously as possible taking into consideration the fact that there has been much delay in the investigation and submission of final form.