Judgment : .1. The above second appeal has been filed by the 1st defendant, who was unsuccessful throughout. The suit O.S.No.269 of 1976 has been filed by the 1st respondent herein, who is the widow of one Duraisamy Mudaliar, for declaration of the plaintiff’s title to the suit property and for vacant possession of the same. The plaintiff claims that the suit properties originally belonged to her husband Duraisamy Mudaliar, have been allotted to his share in the family partition deed dated 12. 1954, marked as Ex.A.1; that he had been in possession and enjoyment of the same eversince the partition; that the plaintiff and her husband having sold the same for themselves and on behalf of their minor children in favour of the 2nd defendant by name Panchakshara Mudaliar, under a sale deed dated 23. 1959, marked as Ex.A.2 and subsequently the 2nd defendant along with his wife and minor children, in their turn, sold the same in favour of the plaintiff, under a sale deed dated 19. 1973, marked as Ex.A.3. The 3rd defendant has been a tenant of the suit property. Though after the purchase by the plaintiff he was informed of his duty to pay the rent to the plaintiff and he has agreed also to pay the same to the plaintiff, later, he not only failed to pay the rent to the plaintiff, but started disputing the title of the plaintiff, in collusion with the other defendants. It is also stated that subsequent to her purchase the plaintiff was asked to sell the property to the 1st defendant M.Gopal Mudaliar, the appellant in the above appeal, and when the plaintiff declined to accede to such a request, it appears that the 1st defendant got the 2nd defendant execute a cancellation deed, dated 110. 1973, marked as Ex.B.1, purporting to cancel the sale deed dated 19. 1973 and had another sale deed, dated 20.1.1975, executed by the 2nd defendant in favour of the 1st defendant, which has been marked as Ex.B.10. It is in such circumstances, the suit came to be filed by the 1st respondent/plaintiff for the relief referred to above. .2. The 1st defendant has filed a written statement and contended that the suit is not maintainable since the plaintiff has no title or possession of the suit property; that her claim of title under the sale deed dated 1 2. .2. The 1st defendant has filed a written statement and contended that the suit is not maintainable since the plaintiff has no title or possession of the suit property; that her claim of title under the sale deed dated 1 2. 9.1973 is not true, valid or supported by consideration; that the same has been subsequently cancelled and that he has purchased the property for valid consideration and, as bona fide purchaser for value, his title has to be upheld and that he being the absolute owner with exclusive possession of the property and entitled to a preferential right of purchase as per the terms of the partition deed in the family under Ex.A.1, he alone has got valid title and right to possession. The 2nd defendant also filed a written statement contending that the suit was not maintainable in law; that the plaintiff has no title or possession to the suit property and the sale deed in her favour was executed without any consideration. The 3rd defendant merely contended that he is the tenant of the property and denied title of the plaintiff and, at any rate, not liable to be evicted except in accordance with the provisions of the Tamil Nadu Buildings (Lease and Rent Control Act, 1960. 3. On the above claims and counter-claims, the suit came to be tried and both parties have adduced oral and documentary evidence. The learned trial Judge, by his judgment and decreed dated 2 1. 8.1979, held that the plaintiff has got title to the suit property and the sale deed Ex.A.3 was true and valid, and binding upon the defendants. While declaring the right of the plaintiff for recovery of possession, it was also held that the 3rd defendant was a tenant obliged to pay the rent to the plaintiff to the portion of the property in question. Aggrieved, the 1st defendant filed an appeal in A.S.No.149 of 1979. The learned first appellate Judge also, after a careful and exhaustive consideration of the materials on record, held that the document Ex.A.3 sale in favour of the plaintiff by the 2nd defendant is not a sham and nominal one, but executed for valid consideration and that the plaintiff has got valid title to the suit property, having purchased the same and that the 1st defendant is not entitled to any right whatsoever over the suit property. The lower appellate court also held that the sale by the 2nd defendant in favour of the plaintiff is not in violation of the condition incorporated in the partition deed, marked as Ex.A-1, having regard to the fact that the plaintiff was none other than the wife of Duraisamy Mudaliar, one of the shares and that the 2nd defendant has purchased his share initially under a sale deed executed by not only Duraisamy Mudaliar, but also the plaintiff and her children. Aggrieved, the above second appeal has been filed. .4. Mr.M.S.Subramanian, learned counsel appearing for the appellants contended that as per the stipulations contained in the partition deed, Ex.A.1 between four brothers, the sale of the right, title or interest of any one of the sharer can only be to the other sharer brother and could not be even in favour of the wife of such sharer brother and, therefore, the plaintiff cannot claim any right or title under Ex.A.3 purchase made by her. It was also contended, for the appellants, that the appellant having purchased as a co-sharer entitled to a right of pre-emption as granted and confirmed under a contractual stipulation between the parties engrafted in Ex.A.1 partition deed itself, he must have been held to have acquired title to the share held originally by Duaraisamy Mudaliar also and that the interpretation placed by the courts below on the scope and purport of the condition granting the preferential right of purchase to the sharers among themselves is contrary to law. The learned counsel while placing reliance upon the decision reported in Ram Baran Prasad v. Ram Mohit Hazara , AIR 1967 SC 744 contended that a partition among the original sharers containing a clause, giving preferential right of purchase to the sharer among themselves is enforceable by and against the parties thereto as also their legal heirs and legal representatives, including assignees and transferees, and that such provision does not offend the rule against perpetuities. A perusal of the decision of the Apex Court go to show that their Lordships have held that the preemption clause considered by them was not merely a personal covenant between the contracting parties, but was a covenant binding on assignees or successors-in-interest of original contracting parties and having regard to the passing of the Transfer of Property Act and, particularly, the provisions contained in Ss. 14, 40 and 54 of the said Act the rule against perpetuity which applies to equitable estates in English law cannot be applied to a covenant of preemption. Pursuing the said line of approach, drawing inspiration from the said decision, it is contended by the learned counsel for the appellant that a contractual obligation has been cast on the parties to the document mutually among themselves and the recitals or stipulations in this regard contained in the partition deed Ex.A.1 have to be so construed as to exclude for enforcement of the right given to the sharers, even their heirs or, at any rate, the family members and instead it should be confined to only the parties to the transaction the original sharers, parties to the transaction evidenced by Ex.A.1. 5. Per contra, Mr.L.K.Sankaran, learned counsel appearing for the 1st respondent/plaintiff, relied upon the reasons assigned by the courts below and contended that the construction placed upon the recitals in Ex.A.1 by the courts below and that too on the scope and purport of the clause giving mutual right to the co-sharers to purchase the right of the other sharers as and when one sharer wants to have the some sold and the findings recorded sustaining title in the plaintiff are quite in accordance with law and unassailable and, therefore, do not call for any interference in the above second appeal. 6. To appreciate the respective stand of the learned counsel appearing on either side, it becomes necessary to have a glipse of the contents of Ex. A.1 partition deed and the relevant stipulation granting the right of preferential purchase to the sharers, who are parties to the document. Ex.A.1 was executed on 12. 1954 and it is a registered document of partition, entered into among the four sons of late Raja Murugesa Mudaliar viz. Damodara Mudaliar, Duraisamy Mudaliar, Panchatchara Mudaliar and Gopal Mudaliar. The relevant portion of the recital in the Tamil vernacular reads as hereunder: The sum and substance of the above is that the property partitioned being a compact one and if any one of us, meaning thereby the brothers, are desirous of selling the same, we agree to effect such a sale among our brothers and in case, any sale of the same is effected to a stranger, such sale shall not be a valid one. 7. 7. Learned counsel for the appellants, as noticed earlier, placed very strong reliance upon the words” and “ “to contend that the intention was to give such right of preferential purchase and sale to the brothers and brothers alone and not to any stranger and that the word”outsider or stranger” expressed in Tamil” “ has to be so construed as to refer to and apply to no one other than the four brothers be it that such person be the wife or any other heir or successor-in-interest of any one of the four brothers. 8. I have carefully considered the submissions of the learned counsel appearing on either side in the light of the relevant principles to be kept into consideration while considering a document of the nature Ex.A.1 and a stipulation like the one in a partition deed. A proper appreciation of the clause would require a proper understanding of the concept of family and a stranger of an outsider since the partition was of the property belonging to the ancestral family among the sharers. In Kishore Chunder Chosal and another v. Sarada Prosad Mitra , 1910 (12) Cal.L.J.525 a Division Bench of the Calcutta High Court had an occasion to consider the scope of the word “family” in the context of Sec .4 of the Partition Act, 189 3. On an exhaustive consideration of the case law on the subject it was held that the word “family”, as used in the Partition Act ought to be given liberal and comprehensive meaning and it does not include a group of persons related in blood, who live in one house or under one head or management, and that there is nothing in the Partition Act suggestive of the fact that the term ‘family’ was intended to be used in a very narrow and restricted sense, namely a body of persons who can trace their descent from a common ancestor and in the case before their Lordships the owners of the property were found to be fifth in the descent from the founder and, that too, all daughters. In Makhan Lall Bose and others v. Smt. Sushama Rani Basu , AIR 1953 Cal. In Makhan Lall Bose and others v. Smt. Sushama Rani Basu , AIR 1953 Cal. 164 DB, a Division Bench of the Calcutta High Court while dealing with the issue in construing Sec.4 of the Partition Act held that the word “family” should be given a liberal interpretation so as to give effect to the basic principles enshrined in the Act and the object of the provision being to prevent a transferee, who is an outsider to the family, itself from forcing his way into the family house or property in which the other members have a right to live. The word’family’ was held to include not merely a body of persons who originate from a common ancestor, but also a group of persons related by blood and living in one house or under one head of management. It was also held therein, that according to the Hindu law and the social structure of the Hindu society the wife or a member of the joint family is, for all practical purposes, a member and part of the joint family, who cannot be regarded as strangers. It was observed therein as hereunder: “In the case now before us the transferee is the wife of one of the members of the joint family owning the dwelling house. Under normal condition of things contemplated in a Hindu society and under Hindu Law the residence of the wife is the home of her husband. Reference may in this connection be made to the various original authorities on Ritual and Law quoted in “Churamon Saha v Gopi Sahu, 37 Cal 1 defining the duties of a wife in the home of her husband. The reasons which were assigned in - ‘ Gopinda Rani Dassi v. Radha Ballabh Das ’, 12 Cal L.J.173 in support of a right of maintenance in favour of a son-in-law so long as he resides as a member of the family of his father-in-law apply with greater force when considering the wife of a member of the joint family as she is herself a member of that family. To a wife or minor children of the members of a joint family, the members of the joint family owe certain duties and the former having the right of residence and/or maintenance under certain circumstances make it abundantly clear that such relations must be deemed to be members of the undivided family. To a wife or minor children of the members of a joint family, the members of the joint family owe certain duties and the former having the right of residence and/or maintenance under certain circumstances make it abundantly clear that such relations must be deemed to be members of the undivided family. In accordance with the notions of a Hindu family infant children are considered to be members of the family.” A Division Bench of the Patna High Court had an occasin to deal with this aspect in Aley Hassan v. Toorab Hussain and others , AIR 1958 Pat.232. Relying upon the decisions in Kishore Chunder Chosal and another v. Sarada Prosad Mitra , 1910 (12) Cal. L.J.525, cited supra, and Salim Ullah v. Faquir Ullah , AIR 1948 All. 142 it was held that the expression “family” must be construed in wide sense and ought not to be restricted to persons tracing their descent from a common ancestor. 9. I have carefully considered the submissions of the learned counsel appearing on either side. In my view, the submission on behalf of the appellants does not merit the acceptance of this Court. The construction suggested by the learned counsel, if countenanced, would lead to defeat the very object of the stipulation providing for preferential right to purchase among the sharers which ought to be normally the avowed object and intention and aim of engrafting a clause of the nature concerned in a deed of partition as part of the partition arrangement, apart from resulting in absurd consequences. The sum and substance of the arrangement evidenced by the clause apart from the division effected under the document appears to be to conserve the property among the sharers having regard to the fact that it is a compact item and the induction of a stranger into it may lead to not only inconvenience, but embrassment to the other sharers, who are the members of the erstwhile joint family. The stipulation made with reference to the brothers who divided the property among themselves as sharers, in my view, therefore should be necessarily for the benefit of the brothers who succeed or on whom the interest in the property devolve. Such construction alone, in my view, is found necessitated and acceptable on account of the specific stipulation, further made therein that any sale to a stranger may not be valid. Such construction alone, in my view, is found necessitated and acceptable on account of the specific stipulation, further made therein that any sale to a stranger may not be valid. The attempt of the learned counsel for the appellants to have the word “stranger” construed only in contrast to the brothers and also as meaning or referable to any and everyone other than the four brothers will be self-destructive of the very purpose, object and aim of such a stipulation. If such a literal construction restricted to the mere letters is adopted it will lead to such an anomalous situation that even the Class-I heirs of one of the sharers, after the death of such sharer, cannot claim the benefit of the stipulation. Though it is claimed that Duraisamy Mudaliar, the husband of the plaintiff, was alive on the date of Ex.A.3 and such a situation may not be said to arise on the facts of this case as on that date but still to test the futility of the submission on behalf of the appellants, the consequence of adopting such a construction even after the death of one of the sharers have to be visualised for a proper and better understanding of the real object of the clause of the nature under consideration in this case. The construction proposed may also lead to further anomaly as to whether a sharer who has parted with his share in favour of the other sharers has any right under the clause to get back the property even by re- purchase. Having regard to all these, in my view, the restriction against alienation to a stranger has to be construed to as applicable to cases of alienation to any one outside the family or those other than the heirs of the brother-sharers and it is only such construction which would not only be keeping in with the substance, spirit as well as the intention of the parties to the document but would perpetuate the object of the stipulation. 10. 10. The learned counsel also contended that on the date of Ex.A.3 sale in favour of the plaintiff her husband, one of the brother sharers, was alive and he was an identifying witness to the document and that, therefore, at any rate, the wife cannot be considered to be entitled to the benefit of the preferential purchase and in other respects she must be considered to be a stranger during the life time of her husband, the sharer. In my view, even this submission of the learned counsel for the appellants does not appeal to me. As noticed earlier, when Duraisamy Mudaliar, the husband of the plaintiff sold his share under Ex.A.2 in favour of the 2nd defendant it was not as though he alone sold it, but his wife, the plaintiff was the second executant in addition to the other minor heirs who were represented by their guardian and father. Similarly, when the reconveyance of the share sold under Ex.A.2 was made under the sale deed Ex.A.3 not only the 2nd defendant but his wife and his minor children also were shown as executants to the sale deed Ex.A.3. The wife of one of the sharer brothers viz., M.Duraisamy was living only with him. It is not as though there has been a valid dissolution of the marriage between the plaintiff and Duraisamy Mudaliar. A wife in Hindu societal system in given not only an honoured position in the house, but is always treated as the other half of her husband. According to the Hindu Law, as also the social structure of the Hindu Society, the wife or a member of the Joint Family is, for all practical purposes, a member and part of the Joint Family, who cannot be regarded as strangers. That being the position, if, as contended, the husband of the plaintiff himself was taking part in the transaction by being the identifying witness to have the sale deed Ex.A.3 executed in his wife’s name can it be stated that the husband, who was an indisputable sharer, is not a willing part to the transaction and that his concern and role should be totally ignored in the transaction. To put it otherwise, is there anything wrong, either on facts of this case or in law, to presume that the husband of the plaintiff, the indisputable sharer brother, got the property purchased in the name of his wife and was he precluded from so doing particularly having regard to the fact that what was purchased under Ex.A.3 is only the very share that has been conveyed under Ex.A.2. Even that apart, it is not as though the plaintiff has come before the court to seek for a specific enforcement of the contractual stipulation in an attempt to enforce a right which was otherwise given to her husband. On the other hand, the case on hand, as borne out by the facts on record, is one where one sharer has, of his own, resold the share of one of the brothers purchased by him, in the name of the wife of such sharer brother. On this account also, I am of the view that the conveyance effected under Ex.A.3 cannot be said to be hit by the stipulation or prohibitory clause contained in the partition deed Ex.A.1. In view of the above, necessarily the subsequent so called cancellation of the said sale and a further sale of the very same share to the 1st defendant by the 2nd defendant cannot have any force or effect in law. For all these reasons, I do not find any error of law or perversity of approach in the interpretation placed by the courts below on the clause contained in Ex.A.1 conferring a preferential right to purchase upon the sharers. Consequently, the second appeal fails and shall stand dismissed.