JUDGMENT : A.P. Shah J. 1. Rule. 2. Mr. Nargolkar, learned counsel for the respondent No. 1 waives service. By consent the petition in taken up for hearing. 3. This petition arises under Articles 226 and 227 of the Constitution of India and is directed against a common judgment passed by the Industrial Court, Pune, on the five separate revision applications filed by the respondent No. 1. 4. The respondent No. 1 is a private limited company registered and incorporated under the Companies Act, 1956, having its factory at Ambervet in district of Pune. The petitioners were employed as security watchmen in the factory of respondent No. 1 which is running in all three shifts. The first shift starts from 7 a.m. to 3 p.m., the second shift from 3 p.m. to 11 p.m. and the 3rd shift from 11 p.m. to 7 a.m. On September 11, 1992 at about 2 p.m. one Shri Ghatge and one Shri Mhaske who are the engineer and the manager of the respondent No. 1, visited the factory and they found that the gate of the factory was open : one watchman was found sleeping in the cabin and another was not found at his appointed place of duty. All the security watchmen were then informed that action would be taken against them for the serious lapse on their part. On September 20, 1992, the respondent No. 1, terminated the services of all the five security watchmen with effect from that date after payment of retrenchment compensation and other legal dues. 5. Aggrieved by the termination of their services, the petitioners filed five separate complaints before the Labour Court, Pune, alleging acts of unfair labour practices under Items 1(a), (b), (d), (f) and (g) of Schedule IV of the Maharashtra Recognition of the Trade Unions and Prevention of Unfair Labour Practices Act, 1971 (for short, the Act), It was contended before the Labour Court that the termination of their services are illegal and void ab-initio as the same cast stigma upon them. It was alleged that the action was punitive in nature. It was further alleged that even assuming that the action of termination was for loss of confidence, even in that case an enquiry ought to have been held. Since no enquiry was held, the termination was in utter disregard to the principles of natural justice. It was alleged that the action was punitive in nature. It was further alleged that even assuming that the action of termination was for loss of confidence, even in that case an enquiry ought to have been held. Since no enquiry was held, the termination was in utter disregard to the principles of natural justice. It was contended that after terminating their services, the respondent No. 1 engaged the security contractor who, in turn, engaged security watchmen to look after the security of the respondent No. 1 factory. It was urged that even assuming that the termination of their services was by way of a valid retrenchment, preference in employment ought to have been given to the petitioners-workmen. Thus, the respondent No. 1 has violated section 25-H of the Industrial Disputes Act, 1947. Lastly, it was alleged that the termination of services was illegal being in colourable exercise of employer's right and, therefore, the workmen were entitled to reinstatement with full back wages. 6. In contesting the proceedings, the main defence of the respondent No. 1 was that the administrative decision was taken to change the security system of the factory for maintaining proper safety and security. The respondent No. 1 denied that the termination has punitive. It was stated that the workmen were not working properly and, therefore, it was found necessary to change the security system. It was further stated that having regard to the policy decision, the services of the security watchmen were terminated by way of retrenchment and they were paid retrenchment compensation and as such there is no question of any stigma being attached to the termination of the workmen. 7. The Labour Court, on appreciation of the evidence led by the parties, came to the conclusion that the termination was not by way of retrenchment but, in fact, it was a punitive action taken by the employer mainly due to the lapse on the part of the two watchmen which was discovered, during the surprise visit by the engineer and manager of the respondent No. 1. In order to arrive at this finding, the Labour Court relied upon the evidence led by the parties and the factual background which was almost admitted by both the parties. In order to arrive at this finding, the Labour Court relied upon the evidence led by the parties and the factual background which was almost admitted by both the parties. The Labour Court next held that assuming that the retrenchment was legal and valid, the action of the management in engaging the security services on contract basis is violative of Section 25-H of the Industrial Disputes Act. In this view of the matter, the Labour Court directed reinstatement of the petitioners with full back wages. 8. The respondent No. 1 questioned the legality and correctness of the decision of the Labour Court by filing five separate revision applications which were disposed of by the Industrial Court by a common judgment. The Industrial Court, inter alia held that the action taken by the Management was not a punitive action but it was taken on account of the decision taken by the Management for nationalisation of the security services. The Industrial Court, then, further held that when the job of the security is entrusted to violation, there is no question of a contractor, of section 25-H of the Industrial Disputes Act because the workmen engaged through the contractor cannot be considered as a workmen engaged by the Management within the meaning of Section 2(s) of the Industrial Disputes Act. Although the Industrial Court was pleased to reverse the findings of the Labour Court on the aforesaid two aspects of the case, the Industrial Court proceeded to record a categorical finding that the termination is invalid as it is violative of section 9(A) of the Industrial Dispute Act, as no change notice was given before introducing the change in the security system of the company. The Industrial Court held that the action of the Management amounts to unfair labour practice within the meaning of item 10 of Schedule IV of the Act. However, as far as the relief of reinstatement and backwages claimed by the petitioners is concerned, the industrial Court held that having regard to the facts and circumstances of the case, the workers are not entitled to reinstatement but they should be given compensation in lieu of the reinstatement. The Industrial Court felt that it would be fair and proper if the retrenchment compensation is fixed at the rate of 45 days for every completed year of service instead of minimum retrenchment compensation of 15 days for every completed year. The Industrial Court felt that it would be fair and proper if the retrenchment compensation is fixed at the rate of 45 days for every completed year of service instead of minimum retrenchment compensation of 15 days for every completed year. In addition to this, the Industrial Court was pleased to grant further compensation of 50 per cent back wages from the date of retrenchment till the date of the order, i.e., from September 20, 1992 to October 6, 1994. The Industrial Court also directed the payment of gratuity in case of the workmen who have completed five years of service. 9. Mr. Bapat, learned counsel for the petitioners, urged that the order of the Industrial Court is in excess of jurisdiction. Mr. Bapat brought to my notice several decision of this Court in order to impress that the revisional jurisdiction of the Industrial Court is extremely limited and it has no power to embark upon fresh appreciation of evidence in revisional jurisdiction conferred u/s 44 of the Act. Mr. Bapat urged that the Industrial Court has reappreciated the entire evidence as if it is sitting in appeal contrary to the well established limits of the revisional jurisdiction of the Industrial Court. I find considerable substance in the grievance of Mr. Bapat. The Labour Court has recorded categorical finding that the action taken by the Management was a punitive action and therefore the termination order passed by the Management cannot be said to be retrenchment within the meaning of section 2(OO) of the Industrial Disputes Act. In para 11 of its order, the learned Labour Court observed : "11. Now, the very fact of mass retrenchment is challenged by the complainant alleging that when the respondent has come with a case that all watchmen including and complainant were not diligent in discharging their duties, it amounts to be a loss of confidence. Beside that it was also stressed on the incident that took place on 11-9-1992 when the surprise visit was given by the office-bearers of the respondent to the factory premises with an allegation that, one watchmen was found sleeping and another was found mission from duty, for which, memos were issued to them on the spot. This also amounts to be a misconduct committed by them, for which the enquiry ought to have been made against them by giving proper opportunity to explain the same. This also amounts to be a misconduct committed by them, for which the enquiry ought to have been made against them by giving proper opportunity to explain the same. Thus, it was sought to be argued on behalf of the complainant that when the respondent alleged the in capacity of all watchmen inclusive of complainant while discharging their duties as a watchmen, it amounts to be a stigma upon them and as such the action taken by the respondent amounts to be a punitive one, for which, a due enquiry ought to have been conducted by affording reasonable opportunity to them. This has not been apparently done by the respondent. However, it was sought to be argued on behalf of the respondent that since it was a mass retrenchment of all the watchmen inclusive of complainant on account of change of security, in that case, it was not necessary for the respondent to hold enquiry as adhered by the complainant. This contention of the respondent cannot be upheld in view of the definition give in section 2(00) of the I.D. Act, which contemplates that the retrenchment u/s 2(00) of the I.D. Act means a termination by the employer of the services of a workman as a surplus labour for any reason whatsoever otherwise than as a punishment inflicted by way of disciplinary action. In the instant case, as discussed above, that the main reason for initiating the action against the complainant including 4 others is on the basis of their inefficiency while discharging their duties as watchmen and as such, has also quoted the various incident or which the memos were issued to them, not only hints, but clearly establish the position that it was a punitive action, for which, enquiry ought to have been made. Hence, the mass retrenchment effected by the respondent, cannot come within the purview of the section 2(OO) of the I.D. Act. In this view I am also fortified by the dictum reported in 1990 2 CLR 1 on which the learned advocate for complainant has also placed his reliance. 10. Now, the aforesaid finding which is purely a finding of fact, is not open for interference in revisional jurisdiction u/s 44 of the Act. The provisions of section 44 are almost in pari materia with the provisions of Article 227 of the Constitution of India. 10. Now, the aforesaid finding which is purely a finding of fact, is not open for interference in revisional jurisdiction u/s 44 of the Act. The provisions of section 44 are almost in pari materia with the provisions of Article 227 of the Constitution of India. This is not so much a revisional jurisdiction but the jurisdiction of superintendence. It has been well settled about four decades that in exercise of this jurisdiction of superintendence and supervision the Court cannot go to appreciate and reappreciate the materials on record. Unfortunately the Industrial Court completely ignored this well established principle which has been stated and restated by this Court on a number of occasions. A careful scrutiny of the order passed by the Industrial Court, it is seen that the only reason given by the Industrial Court for taking a contrary view was that no specific or general allegations attributing any act of misconduct or attaching any stigma, have been made in the termination order. In my opinion, the approach of the Industrial Court is wholly erroneous. The question as to whether a particular order is simpliciter discharge or punitive action, cannot be decided solely on the basis of the wording of termination letter but the intention must be gathered from the circumstances leading to such termination and the material produced on record. It is a common case that prior to the termination order, there was a surprise visit by the Manager and the Engineer at the site and during the said visit one watchman was found to be sleeping and other was absent. It is on this background that the order to termination came to be passed by the Management. The evidence of the management witnesses also clearly indicate that the termination was a punitive action and not a simpliciter retrenchment as suggested on behalf of the respondent No. 1. Therefore, the findings recorded by the Industrial Court are clearly unsustainable in law. In any event, the question is really academic because even the Industrial Court has, otherwise, come to a conclusion that the termination is illegal, of course, on the basis of the completely different reasoning. Therefore, the findings recorded by the Industrial Court are clearly unsustainable in law. In any event, the question is really academic because even the Industrial Court has, otherwise, come to a conclusion that the termination is illegal, of course, on the basis of the completely different reasoning. The Industrial Court has found that even if the Management's plea of reorganisation of security system is to be accepted, the termination which has been effected without, giving a change notice u/s 9(A) of the Industrial Disputes Act, is bad in law and illegal. The order of the Industrial Court is not challenged by the employer and, therefore, we have to proceed on the basis that the termination is illegal in the eye of law. 11. Now, the only question which remains to be considered is, whether the workmen are entitled to reinstatement with backwages. It is true that when the termination is found to be illegal, normal rule of granting reinstatement with back wages must be followed. But the well established rule is not a rule of thumb and it recognises exceptions in the deserving cases. All the five petitioners were working as security watchmen which is a department carrying crucial duty of protecting the factory of the respondent No. 1. It has come on record that the petitioner's services were never found to be satisfactory. In fact, the petitioners, themselves, were not willing to work as watchmen as they wanted to be accommodated on the shop floor. They were ready to do even the job of helper but they did not wish to continue the present job. A representation to that effect was submitted by the workmen which clearly shows their disinterest in working as watchmen. It has also come on record that time and again the Management had put up notices directing the security staff to improve their workings. In a surprise visit, the gate of the factory was found open after mid-night and one of the watchmen was found sleeping and other was simply not present in the factory. In these circumstances, it will be improper to grant the relief of reinstatement. Therefore, in my opinion, a proper order will be to award compensation to the workmen in lieu of reinstatement. The Industrial Court was, therefore, right in setting aside the order of reinstatement with back wages. In these circumstances, it will be improper to grant the relief of reinstatement. Therefore, in my opinion, a proper order will be to award compensation to the workmen in lieu of reinstatement. The Industrial Court was, therefore, right in setting aside the order of reinstatement with back wages. However, in my view, the compensation granted by the Industrial Court is totally inadequate and insufficient. It cannot be forgotten that all the petitioners were working as Class IV employees drawing meagre wages. To my mind, interest of justice will be served if the employer is directed to pay salary of 60 months on the basis of last drawn wages instead of 50 per cent back wages granted by the Industrial Court in para 23 of its order. This compensation shall be in addition to the other reliefs granted by the Industrial Court in para 24 of the order. The respondent No. 1 is directed to make the said payment within three months from today. Mr. Bapat agrees to return the Bank Drafts issued by the respondent No. 1 which are, according to Mr. Bapat, not encashed by the workmen so far. In any event, it is clarified that the direction for payment of salary of 60 months is not in addition to the compensation of 50 per cent back wages granted by the Industrial Court. 12. Rule is made absolute accordingly with no order as to costs. 13. Certificate copy expedited.