Judgment : SUDHIR Narain, J. 1. This writ petition is directed against the order dated 2-2-1995 passed by the Prescribed Authority, allowing the release application filed by the landlords-respondents 3 to 8, for release of the disputed accommodation and the order dated 15-9-1995 passed by the respondent No. 1 dismissing the Appeal against the aforesaid order. 2. THE petitioner is*a. tenant of house No. 74 Mohalla Khoonipur, Gorakhpur City. Respondents 3 to 7 are the landlords of the disputed accommodation and respondent No. 8 is holder of their power of attorney. They filed application for release of the disputed accommodation under Section 21 (1) (a) of U. P Urban Buildings (Regulation of Letting, Rent and Eviction) Act, 1972 (hereinafter referred to as 'the Act') on the allegation that sons of respondent No. 3, namely, Shahid and Majid are living at Bhppal but they want to carry on business in Gorakhpur city and for that purpose they require the accommodation for residential purpose. Rukhshana is the daughter of respondent No. 5 Naseer Fatma. She is living in a rented house and the disputed accommodation is required for her residential purpose. Smt. Ektesadun Nisa-respondent No. 7 is living in tenanted accommodation in Gorakhpur city and she also requires the accommodation in question for residential purpose. It was further stated that. the respondents 3 and 4 who were living at Bhopal they had to visit Gorakhpur city and whenever they visit, they have to stay in some hotel. They require the disputed accommodation for residential purpose. It was further stated that the petitioner had purchased a house in the year 1979 in the name of his wife and sons of petitioner who were residing with the petitioner and were dependent upon him, constructed another house in Gorakhpur city, therefore, the petitioner did not require the disputed accommodation and his objection was not liable to be considered in view of explanation (i) to sub-section (1) of Section 21 of the Act. Petitioner contested the application and it was denied that the need of the landlords was bona fide. It was contended that Shahid and Majid sons of Abdul Wahid-respondent No. 3 were already engaged in business at Bhopal and they are not to come to settle in Gorakhpur city. It was stated that Smt. Rukhsana daughter of respondent No. 5 was married and her need cannot be taken into account. It was contended that Shahid and Majid sons of Abdul Wahid-respondent No. 3 were already engaged in business at Bhopal and they are not to come to settle in Gorakhpur city. It was stated that Smt. Rukhsana daughter of respondent No. 5 was married and her need cannot be taken into account. As regards respondent No. 7 it was stated that she is re-married and her need cannot be taken into account. It was, however, admitted that the petitioner's wife had purchased a house in the year 1979 but the said house is in the occupation of a tenant. It was admitted that his son had constructed a house but it was stated that his sons left his premises in the year 1987 and, therefore, he was not living with the petitioner at the time he had constructed the house and the explanation (i) to sub-section (1) (a) of Section 21 of the Act, was, thus, not applicable. 3. PRESCRIBED Authority found that the need of the landlords was bona fide. Sons of respondent No. 3 are unemployed and they want to settle at Gorakhpur and require the disputed accommodation for residential purpose. It was further found that the respondents 3 and 4 whenever visit Gorakhpur they require the disputed accommodation for stay. It was found that sons or petitioner had constructed house in the city of Gorakhpur and therefore the objection of the petitioner was not entertainable in view of Explanation of the of Section 21 (1) (a) of the Act. The PRESCRIBED Authority allowed the application by order dated 2-2- 1995. Petitioner preferred appeal against this order and the appeal has also been dismissed by order dated 15-9-1995. Petitioner has challenged these orders in the present writ petition. 4. LEARNED counsel for the petitioner has challenged the findings recorded by the respondents 1 and 2 on the question of bona fide need. It is urged that Shahid and Majid sons of respondent No. 3 had not filed any affidavit stating that they would settle at Gorakhpur and carry on business and in absence of affidavit filed by them, the conclusion drawn by respondents 1 and 2 that they require the disputed accommodation for residential purpose is incorrect. Respondents 1 and 2 have relied upon the affidavit filed on behalf of the landlords. Respondents 1 and 2 have relied upon the affidavit filed on behalf of the landlords. It was not necessary that unless sons of respondent No. 3 themselves file affidavit, the version of the landlords could not have been believed at all. There was no documentary evidence to establish that Shahid and Majid were carrying on business at Bhopal. On finding that they are unemployed at Bhopal and want to live at Gorakhpur in order to settle themselves in some business, their need to occupy some residential accommodation was justified. It was not necessary to disclose any nature of business at the time of filing of the application itself when they have yet not been provided any accommodation for residential purpose. 5. IN Raj Kumar Khaitan and others v. Bibi Zubaida Khatun and another, AIR 1995 SC 576 , it has been held that where the landlord asserts that he has got no other means of livelihood and wants to start own business in the premises in question it is not necessary for the landlord to indicate the precise nature of business which he intends to start in the premises in question. The finding recorded by the respondents 1 and 2 that sons of respondent No. 3 are unemployed and they will settle at Gorakhpur city to carry on some business, does not suffer from any manifest error of law. 6. IT is urged that respondent No. 7 remarried with Abdul Ahmad but she continues to live with her first husband Shri Himayat Ali in Mohalla Dhammat Gorakhpur City. IT is not denied that respondent No. 7 is one of the co-owner and landlord of the disputed house. IT is a question of fact as to whether she is living in a tenanted accommodation. In the application and the affidavit filed in support of it, it is staled that respondent No. 7 is living in Mohalla Khoonipur in house No. 87 as tenant. The case of the petitioner was that respondent No. 7 was re-married but is still living with her first husband. There was no documentary evidence to prove this fact. In these circumstances the respondent No. 1 has rightly recorded finding that she is living in a rented accommodation and her need is bona fide. The case of the petitioner was that respondent No. 7 was re-married but is still living with her first husband. There was no documentary evidence to prove this fact. In these circumstances the respondent No. 1 has rightly recorded finding that she is living in a rented accommodation and her need is bona fide. It is next contended that daughter of respondent No. 5, namely, Smt. Rukhsana is married daughter and she cannot be treated as family member of respondent No. 5, and her need cannot be taken into consideration. Even if this need is excluded, the requirement of the accommodation for other landlords- respondents would establish that the accommodation in question is bona fide needed by them. The accommodation in question as shown in map viz. Annexure-1 to the writ petition, shows that the disputed accommodation consists of one big room and four small rooms besides Dalan court-yards. Considering the extent of the accommodation and requirement other landlords-respondents, excluding respondent No. 5, it cannot be said that the accommodation in question is very specious and more than sufficient for their need. The requirement to settle two sons of respondent No. 3 and accommodation for stay of respondents 3 and 4 whenever they visit from Bhopal to Gorakhpur and need of respondent No. 7 for residential purpose was rightly held bona fide. 7. LEARNED counsel for the petitioner then urged that the view taken by the respondents 1 and 2 that the objection of petitioner was barred by Explanation (i) of Section 21 (1) (a) of the Act is erroneous in law. It is contended that sons of petitioner, namely, Aslam Parvez and Akram Parvez purchased land by two separate registered sale-deeds on 2nd January, 1986. Akram Parvez purchased for Rs. 10,000 and Akram Parvez purchased for Rs. 12,000 They became adult in the year 1986. They left the house of the petitioner in the year 1987 and thereafter start td living in a rented house. Aslam Parvez carried on business of selling oils. He Constructed a house and started living there. They are living separately and the petitioner has no right to live with them. Explanation (i) to Section 21 (1) (a) of the Act, therefore, was not applicable. 8. THE wife of the petitioner purchased a house in the year 1979 but it is under the tannacy of Bal Vikas Pariyojana at monthly rent of Rs. 100. They are living separately and the petitioner has no right to live with them. Explanation (i) to Section 21 (1) (a) of the Act, therefore, was not applicable. 8. THE wife of the petitioner purchased a house in the year 1979 but it is under the tannacy of Bal Vikas Pariyojana at monthly rent of Rs. 100. Learned counsel for the petitioner submitted that unless it is established that his two sons had been normally residing with him or were dependent upon him at the time they built the house, Explanation (i) of Section 21 (1) of the Act is not applicable. 1. 1 It is a question of fact whether sons of petitioner-Aslam Parvez and Akram Parvez were living with the petitioner, it is not denied that prior to the year 1987 they were residing with the petitioner. They are alleged to have purchased land in the year 1986. THE petitioner has himself not disclosed that when they constructed house on such land. In para 29 of his affidavit dated 19th December, 1994 (Annexure 5 to the writ petition) it has been stated that they left the house of the petitioner in the year 1987 after having some quarrel with the petitioner and they started living in another tenanted accommodation and thereafter constructed their own house. THE petitioner has not given the date of construction of the house by his son*. Explanation (i) to Section 21 (1) (a) of the Act does not provide that family member must also be living with him on the date of the construction has been mace by his sons. 13. Learned counsel for the petitioner has placed reliance upon Harish Tandon v. Additional District Magistrate, Allahabad, 1995 (1) ARC 220, wherein their Lordships of the Supreme Court while interpreting sub-section (3) of Section 12 of the Act, held that Explanation (b) to sub-section (3) of the Act shall not include a person who has neither been normally residing with nor is wholly dependent on such tenant. As such, if a son "of the tenant who is not wholly dependent on such tenant acquires or gets any residential building in the same city or town, there is no question of the tenant to have ceased to occupy the building under sub-section (3) of Section 12. 14. As such, if a son "of the tenant who is not wholly dependent on such tenant acquires or gets any residential building in the same city or town, there is no question of the tenant to have ceased to occupy the building under sub-section (3) of Section 12. 14. THE mere use of present perfect tense in Explanation (i) to Section 21 (1) of the Act does not coptemplate that on the dale of the construction or acquisition of a building by a family member of the tenant, he should have been residing with him or dependent upon him on the date of construction or acquisition. 15. In Hiralal Swami v. IIIrd Additional District Judge, Bundn, 1986 (1) ARC 432, while interpreting Explanation (i) to Section 21 (1) of the Act, it was held that it was not necessary that member of the tenant's family after building a house continues to live with the tenant. 16. In Kesari Lal v. IIIrd Additional District Judge, Meerut, 1987 (2) ARC 49, while interpretating the words "the member of family who has been normally residing with", it has been held that it is not necessary that the member of the family should also be residing in the premises in dispute, on the day when the release application is filed. In the said case contention raised on behalf of the tenant was that the family member who builds or acquires a residential building should continue to reside with the tenant on the date the landlord files an application for release under Section 21 of the Act. This contention was repelled. THE Court, however, made following observations in para 9 of judgment which is quoted as under: "the word used in the explanation 'who has been normally residing with or is wholly dependent on him' has to be interpreted. In 'high School English Grammer and Composition' by Wren and Martin, Hundred and Nith Edition, at p. 109 Article 223, it has been laid down that the present perfect continuous tense is used for an action which began at some time in the past and is stili continuing. In 'high School English Grammer and Composition' by Wren and Martin, Hundred and Nith Edition, at p. 109 Article 223, it has been laid down that the present perfect continuous tense is used for an action which began at some time in the past and is stili continuing. THE use of the expression by the Legislature "who has been normally residing is a present perfect continuous tense and as such the submission of the learned counsel is that the residence of the member of the family must begin some time in the past and should still continue when he acquires another building in a vacant state. There is no dispute in my opinion to this part of the submission made by the learned counsel for the petitioner. In order to make the explanation applicable it is necessary at the time when the member of the family acquires in a vacant state another residential building he should be a member who has been normally residing with the tenant. " THE above observations was made giving grammatical meaning of the words used in present perfect continuous tense. There was no controversy of the situation where family member for short period lives in another accommodation and thereafter constructs another building in the same city. THE observation in the judgment was obiter. In para 6 of the judgment the court observed that it was not necessary to decide regarding applicability of Explanation (i) to Section 21 (1) of the Act after having recorded finding on the question of bona fide need, but as the arguments were raised it is expressing opinion on the point raised. 17. THE court has to give grammatical meaning of words used in a statute but they have to be read in the context in which they are used expressing true legislative (vide Smt. Pushpa Devi v, Milkhi Ram, AIR 1990 SC 808 ; N. K. Jain v. C. K. Shah, AIR 1991 SC 1289 ). THE object of Explanation (i) of Section 21 (1) of the Act is that if a family member of the tenant who was normally residing with him or was dependent upon him made construction, the tenant's objection to the application of the landlord filed under Section 21 of the Act should not be entertained. THE object of Explanation (i) of Section 21 (1) of the Act is that if a family member of the tenant who was normally residing with him or was dependent upon him made construction, the tenant's objection to the application of the landlord filed under Section 21 of the Act should not be entertained. THE time gap between making of the construction and leaving the house by family member of tenant will always not conclusively be determining factor for making continuity of the occupation of the disputed house by the member of the family otherwise even for a short while a member of family lives in an accommodation and makes another house the purpose of Explanation (i) of Section 21 of the Act will be frustrated. It has to be gathered from the circumstances as to whether family member had been residing with the tenant and in case he had been normally residing and later on constructs while living in another accommodation after leaving the accommodation of tenant still Explanation (i) of Section 21 (1) (a) will be attracted. 18. In para 29 of the affidavit the petitioner has not disclosed when his sons had constructed the house. THE inference drawn from the facts, clearly indicates, that sons of the petitioner were normally residing with the petitioner before they constructed the house and in these circumstances Explanation (i) of Section 21 of the Act is attracted. 19. Learned counsel for the petitioner in the end has urged that even if Explanation (i) of Section 21 (1) of the Act is applicable, the landlord has to establish bona fide need before the application under Section 21 (1) (a) is allowed. He has placed reliance upon the decision of Division Bench in Smt. Kanita Devi Join v. Additional District Judge, Dehradun and others, 1984 (2) ARC 245, wherein it was held that if tenant comes within the purview of Explanation (i) of Section 21 (1) of the Act, he is debarred from raising any objection to the landlord's release application. He is, however, not absolved from the burden to establish his bona fide need. This preposition of law is well settled and not disputed. THE landlord- respondents have, however, established their bona fide need and concurrent findings have been recorded by the respondent No. 1 that they require the disputed accommodation bona fide. He is, however, not absolved from the burden to establish his bona fide need. This preposition of law is well settled and not disputed. THE landlord- respondents have, however, established their bona fide need and concurrent findings have been recorded by the respondent No. 1 that they require the disputed accommodation bona fide. THE finding recorded does not suffer from any manifest error of law. 20. In view of the above, there is no merit in this petition and the writ petition is, accordingly, dismissed. Petition dismissed.