Judgment : SUDHIR Narain, J. 1. The petitioner has sought a writ of certiorari for quashing the order dated 4-9-1995, passed by respondent No. 1, rejecting the objection of the petitioner filed under Section 47 of the Code of Civil Procedure and the order dated 16-9-1995, passed by respondent No. 1, dismissing the revision against the aforesaid order. 2. THE facts in brief are that respondent No. 3 is landlord of the premises in dispute. He filed suit No. 57 of 1985 for recovery of arrears of rent, ejectment and damages against the petitioner on the allegation that the petitioner was a tenant at monthly rent of Rs. 100 per month, He failed to pay rent since 1-10- 1980. Respondent No. 3 sent a notice dated 30-11-1983/1-12-1983, demanding arrears of rent and terminating the tenancy of the petitioner. THE notices was served upon the petitioner on 6-12-1983. THE petitioner gave a reply to the said notice. THE petitioner filed written statement on 28-11-1985. It was stated by him that the shop in question was taken on rent in the year 1965 at the rate of Rs. 20 per month. It was enhanced to Rs. 25 per month in the year 1972. He paid the rent to the landlord- respondent for the period till 4-12-1983 but the landlord did not issue any rent receipt. For the period 5- 12-1983 to 4-12-1985, it was alleged that he was going to deposit in Court. During the pendency of the suit the petitioner and respondent No. 2 entered into compromise. They filed compromise application dated 17-7-1986 before the Civil Judge exercising the power of Judge, Small Causes Court, Mathura. THE terms of the compromise were as follows : (1) THE suit for ejectment be decreed but the plaintiff shall not execute the decree for a period of two years and in case the defendant does not vacate the disputed shop, it will be open to the plaintiff to obtain the possession through execution of the decree. (2) THE plaintiff shall pay Rs. 8,000 to the tenant as the defendant had affixed certain furniture in the shop in question, the cost of which is Rs. 8,000. THE amount shall be payable. at the time the possession is taken by the landlord. (3) THE suit for recovery of arrears of rent shall be dismissed regarding recovery of rent and damages. 8,000 to the tenant as the defendant had affixed certain furniture in the shop in question, the cost of which is Rs. 8,000. THE amount shall be payable. at the time the possession is taken by the landlord. (3) THE suit for recovery of arrears of rent shall be dismissed regarding recovery of rent and damages. (4) THE defendant shall pay damages at the rate of Rs. 25 per month for the period of two years during which he continued in occupation of the shop in ques tion. This compromise was signed by the petitioner and respondent No. 3 and their counsel. It was verified by the court. THE suit was decreed in terms of the compromise on 17-7-1986. The petitioner did not vacate within two years from the date of passing of the decree as provided under the terms of the compromise. Respondent No. 3 filed application for execution of the decree before the executing court. The petitioner filed objection under Section 47 before respondent No. 2 in the execution case. In the objection the petitioner stated that the compromise was got signed by him against his wishes forcibly and secondly, the suit could not have been decreed in terms of the compromise unless the court was satisfied with the existence of the grounds for eviction as mentioned under Section 20 (2) of U. P. Urban Buildings (Regulation of Letting, Rent and Eviction) Act, 1972 (hereinafter referred to as 'the Act' ). Respondent No. 2 dismissed the objection vide order Dated 4-9- 1995. The petitioner preferred a revision against the said order. Respondent No. 1 dismissed the revision on 4-9-1995. 3. LEARNED counsel for the petitioner urged that the compromise was fraudulently obtained by respondent No. 2 and, as such, compromise is not binding upon him. The petitioner has annexed copy of the objection filed before respon dent No. 2 as Annexure 5 to the writ petition. In paragraph 3 of the objection it has been stated' that the plaintiff had put undue pressure upon him and obtained signature on the compromise and thereafter got it filed in the court. The petitioner has not given the details as to how the plaintiff had put pressure upon him in obtaining signature on the compromise application. The petitioner has admittedly signed the compromise application. There also appears the signature of counsel for the petitioner. The petitioner has not given the details as to how the plaintiff had put pressure upon him in obtaining signature on the compromise application. The petitioner has admittedly signed the compromise application. There also appears the signature of counsel for the petitioner. It was duly verified and thereafter the court had passed the order deciding the suit in terms of the compromise. The petitioner has further not stated that he was not aware of the compromise decree which was passed by the court. The suit was admittedly pending in which he had filed written statement. The suit was decided in terms of the compromise on 17-7-1986. The petitioner continued to occupy the disputed shop for two years in pursuance of the terms of the com promise and it is only when the application for execution of the decree was filed on 10th March, 1989 that he filed objection under Section 47 of the Code of Civil Procedure on 24-10-1989. There is no material to indicate that any fraud has been practised upon the petitioner. 4. THE second submission of learned counsel for the petitioner is that the provisions of U. P. Act No. 13 of 1972 were applicable and the suit could not have been decreed unless the trial Court was satisfied that the grounds for eviction exist as enumerated under sub-section (2) Of Section 20 of the Act. THE court passed the decree in terms of the compromise without recording any satisfaction that any ground exists for decreeing the suit as enumerated under Section 20 (2) of the Act and unless the court was satisfied of the existence of any such ground, the decree passed in terms of the compromise was a nullity. The legal position as to when the decree in terms of the compromise in a suit for eviction can be decreed and enforcible in respect of the accommodation which is governed by the provisions of Rent Acts has been considered in Ferozi Lal Jain v. Man Mai and another, AIR 1970 SC 794 , wherein the landlord had filed an application for eviction under Section 13 (1) of Delhi and Ajmer Rent Control Act on the ground that the tenant had sublet the accommodation but later on the par ties entered into the compromise and the suit was decreed for recovery of possession. It was held that the court was not competent to pass the decree solely on the basis of the compromise arrived at between the parties and such compromise shall be treated as nullity under the execution of the decree. Similar view was taken in Smt. Kaushatya Devi and others v. K. L. Bansal, AIR 1970 SC 838 . 5. IN K. K. Chan v. R. M. Seshadri, AIR 1973 SC 1311 , the case referred to above were considered and it was clarified that an order of eviction passed on con sent of the parties is not necessarily void if the jurisdictional fact viz. the existence of one or more of the conditions mentioned in the section were shown to have existed when the court made the consent order. If it can be shown that the court was satisfied about the grounds on which the order of eviction was passed, the consent order is enforceable under law. It was also not necessary for the court to record the satisfaction in the order itself. The Hon'ble Court made the following observation: "if the court had expressed its satisfaction in the order itself that will conclude the matter. That the court was so satisfied can also be considered from the point of view whether stage has been reached in the proceedings for the court to apply its mind to the relevant question. Other materials on record can also be taken into account to find out if the Court was so satisfied. " On the facts of that case, it was found that there was material to show that the court could have been satisfied of the existence of the grounds for eviction under the provisions of Tamil Nadu Buildings (Lease and Control) Act, 1960. 6. THE validity of the consent decree for possession passed under the provisions of Bombay Rents, Hotel and Lodging House Rates Control Act (Act No. 57 of 1947) came up for consideration in Nagin Das Ram Das v. Dalpat Ram Icchoram alias Brij Ram and others, AIR 1974 SC 471 . THE court further enunciated the principle that if there was a clear admission in the compromise incorporated in the decree of the fundamental facts that could constitute a ground for eviction. THE court further enunciated the principle that if there was a clear admission in the compromise incorporated in the decree of the fundamental facts that could constitute a ground for eviction. Under the Act it will be presumed that the court was satisfied about the existence of such statutory ground and the decree for eviction though apparently passed on the basis of the compromise would be valid. This admission may be expressed or implied. THE court observed as under: "form a conspectus of the cases cited at the bar, the principle that emerges is, that if at the time of the passing of the decree, there was some material before the court, on the basis of which, the court could be prima facie satisfied, about the existence of a statutory ground for eviction, it will be presumed that the court was so satisfied and the decree for eviction apparently passed on the basis of a compromise, would be valid. Such material may take the shape either of evidence recorded or produced in the case, or, it may partly or wholly be in the shape of express or implied admission made in the compromise agreement itself. " THE principle laid down in Nagin Das's case (supra) was followed in Roshan Lal v. Madan Lal, AIR 1975 SC 2130 . It was observed as under: "the compromise must indicate either of its face or in the background on other materials in the case that the tenant expressly or impliedly is agreed to suffer a decree for eviction because the landlord in the circumstances, is entitled to have such a decree under the law. " Similar view as expressed in Smt. Nai Baku v. Lala Ram Narain and others, AIR 1978 SC 22 . In Suleman Noor Mohamed v. Umar Bhair, AIR 1978 SC 952 , it was further laid down that if a court has passed a decree in terms of the compromise there will be presumption that the Court has done so unless the contrary is proved. Order XXIII, Rule 3 of the Code of Civil Procedure itself provides that the court will have to pass a decree in terms of the compromise and the agreement is lawful. Order XXIII, Rule 3 of the Code of Civil Procedure itself provides that the court will have to pass a decree in terms of the compromise and the agreement is lawful. The Supreme Court found that the landlord filed the suit against the tenant in Small Causes Court claiming the decree for eviction against him on the ground of non payment of rent and bona fide personal need. The tenant filed written statement with a view to contest the suit. Eventually on account of default of the defendant the suit was decreed ex parte, but it was later on set aside. The suit was admittedly disposed of in terms of the compromise entered into between the parties. The judgment-debtor was to hand over possession of the suit premises to the decree-holders within a period of three years. But the did not do so. The Supreme Court after considering the plaint and written statement found that it was for the tenant to prove that he was in a position to pay or tender the rent due on the last date of hearing of the suit. It was held that the compromise decree was valid and the tenant impliedly admittedly his liability. 7. IN Heeralal Moolchand Doshi v. Barot Raman Lal Ranchhoddas, AIR 1993 SC 1449 , it was made clear that in case where the plaintiff comes with allegation that the tenant has failed to pay arrears of rent, the burden of proof is upon the tenant that he paid the rent. The court examining the compromise decree and the relevant circumstances came to the conclusion that the compromise decree was a valid one. It made the following observation : "on the facts of the case it is clear that the burden was on the tenant to prove the tender of rent before the suit, after service of notice of demand. " IN para 8 it was observed that a decree can be said to be nullity if it is passed by the court having no inherent jurisdiction but merely because a Court erroneously passed a decree or there is error while passing the decree, the decree cannot be called a nullity. The decree to be called a nullity is to be understood in the sense that it is ultra vires of the powers of the court passing the decree and not merely voidable decree. 8. The decree to be called a nullity is to be understood in the sense that it is ultra vires of the powers of the court passing the decree and not merely voidable decree. 8. FROM the various decisions, referred to above, the following principles emerge while considering the validity of a compromise decree passed in a suit/application regarding an accommodation which is governed by the Rent Control Acts: (1) The court cannot decree a suit solely on the ground that the parties have entered into compromise unless the court is satisfied that the ground for eviction as contemplated under the Rent Control Act exists. (2) It is not necessary that the court must record its reasons of the existence of the ground for eviction while deciding the suit in terms of the compromise. (3) The satisfaction of the existence of grounds for eviction as provided under the Rent Control Acts may be found from the material which is on record. (4) The tenant may admit the claim of the landlord and such admission may be expressed or implied. (5) The burden to prove is upon the tenant that he has paid the rent after service of notice of demand in a suit filed for eviction of the tenant on the ground that he failed to pay arrears of rent after service of notice of demand. Applying these principles it has to be ascertained as to whether any ground exists for eviction of the petitioner as enumerated in Section 20 (2) of the Act. Respondent No. 3 had filed suit for recovery of arrears of rent and damages on the allegation that the petitioner failed to pay arrears of rent since 1-10- 1980. A notice demanding arrears of rent and terminating the tenancy was sent on 1-12-1983. The rent payable by the petitioner was at the rate of Rs, 100 per month. The petitioner filed written statement and it was stated that the rent was Rs. 20 per month but since 1972 the rent was enhance to Rs. 25. It was further asserted by him that he had paid the rent for the period 1980 to 4th December, 1983 but the landlord had not given any receipt for such payment. For the period 5-12-1983 to 4-12-1985 he is depositing in Court. On the pleadings of the parties there were two issues which were to be decided by the Court. It was further asserted by him that he had paid the rent for the period 1980 to 4th December, 1983 but the landlord had not given any receipt for such payment. For the period 5-12-1983 to 4-12-1985 he is depositing in Court. On the pleadings of the parties there were two issues which were to be decided by the Court. Firstly, as to what is the rate of rent ; and Secondly, as to whether the petitioner had paid the rent to the landlord-respondent for the period 1-10-1980 to 4-12-1983, as alleged by him. Even assuming that the rate of reift is accepted as Rs. 25 per month as alleged by the petitioner, the burden to prove was upon the petitioner to prove that he had paid rent for the period 1-10-1980 to 4-12-1983. In the written statement he admitted that no rent receipt was ever issued by the landlord to him. The burden of prove was upon the petitioner. If he entered into the compromise there will be an implied admission that he accepted the position that he did not pay rent for the period 1-10-1980 to 4-12-1983. The petitioner was fully aware of the issues involved in the case. 9. LEARNED counsel for the petitioner urged that the suit as regards the recovery of arrears of rent and damages till the parties entered into compromise was dismissed under the terms of the compromise. It will be a case of relinquishment of his right on the part of the landlord claiming the rent and damages for the said period as he had obtained the decree for eviction of the shop in question. The petitioner had admittedly put his signature on the compromise. The compromise decree was passed on 17-7-1986 under which he was granted two years time to vacate the accommodation in question. He did not vacate the same. Under the terms of the compromise decree the plaintiff was made liable to pay Rs. 8,000 to the petitioner as the petitioner had affixed furniture in the shop in question. Considering the entire facts it cannot be held that the court was not satisfied of the existence of default in payment of arrears of rent by the petitioner within one month from the date of service of the notice as contemplated under Section 20 (2) (a) of the Act. The decree cannot be held to be a nullity. 10. Considering the entire facts it cannot be held that the court was not satisfied of the existence of default in payment of arrears of rent by the petitioner within one month from the date of service of the notice as contemplated under Section 20 (2) (a) of the Act. The decree cannot be held to be a nullity. 10. IN view of the discussions made above, the writ petition is dismissed. The parties shall, however, bear their own costs. Petition dismissed.