B. K. SANGALAD, J. ( 1 ) THE petitioners have challenged the order dated 4-12-1991 passed by the Presiding Officer, Special Court (Economic offences), Bangalore, by which it is stated that there are sufficient grounds to proceed against the Accused-petitioners for offence punishable under Section 85 (a) of E. S. I. Act, 1948. ( 2 ) THE first petitioner is the factory. The petitioners 2 to 5 are the partners and petitioner 6 is in no way concerned with the partnership. ( 3 ) THE respondent filed a complaint under Section 85 (a) of the E. S. I. Act, 1948 (hereinafter called 'the Act') stating that the petitioners have failed to pay the contribution which should have been paid on or before 21st of the following month for the wage period which ended on 31-3-1991, 30-4-1991 and 31-5-1991. Thus there is violation of Section 40 of the E. S. I. Act and Regulation of the E. S. I. (General) Regulations, 1950 for which the petitioners are liable to be prosecuted. It is also stated that all these petitioners are the principal employees of the aforesaid establishment as defined in clause (17) of Section 2 of the Act. ( 4 ) NOW it is challenged stating that the petitioners have made the payment but beyond the statutory period. As such, they are not liable to be prosecuted under Section 85 (a) of the Act, but alternatively at the best they are liable to be prosecuted under section 85 (g) of the Act. The second point that was canvassed by the learned Counsel for the petitioner is that 'who should be prosecuted'. On the otherhand, the learned Counsel for the respondent submitted that failure to make the contribution within the stipulated time clearly comes within the ambit of section 85 (a) of the Act. ( 5 ) I think if the Point No. 1 does not survive, it is unnecessary for me to consider Point No. 2. In view of this, first, I am inclined to consider the Point No. 1. Section 85 (a) states "that if any person fails to pay any contribution which under this Act, he is liable to pay. The plain reading of 'any contribution' shows that the word 'any' in my opinion is incorporated to indicate that there is failure to make any payment. Section 85 (a) states "that if any person fails to pay any contribution which under this Act, he is liable to pay. The plain reading of 'any contribution' shows that the word 'any' in my opinion is incorporated to indicate that there is failure to make any payment. In the present cases even the documents appended along with the complaint show that payments have been made (vide challans for the wage periods 3/91, 4/91 and 5/91 ). The learned Counsel for the petitioners fairly concedes that there is delayed payment. Hence at the best, the petitioners are liable to be prosecuted under Section 85 (g) of the Act. I have given careful consideration to Section 85 (a ). If the petitioners have not made any payment at all or by the time the complaint was made by the respondent, if there was non-payment, then only Section 85 (a) is applicable. When there is delayed payment, Regulation 31-B states that any interest payable under Regulation 31-A may be recovered as arrears of land revenue. Regulation 31-A states that "an employer who fails to pay contribution within the periods specified in regulation 31, shall be liable to pay interest at the rate of six per cent per annum in respect of each day of default or delay in payment of contribution". Definitely the respondent has a remedy by invoking Regulation 31-A. Admittedly there is delayed payment. The respondent is not precluded from levying interest as contemplated under Regulation 31-A. If this is to be accepted, the only inference that can be drawn is that no offence is committed under Section 85 (a) of the Act. According to the paid challans, it is clear that there is payment. So this definitely indicates that there is no failure of making contribution. It is only made beyond the period stipulated. Hence in my opinion, it cannot be stated that the petitioners have totally committed to make any payment. In view of this, I am inclined to hold that section 85 (a) is not applicable. ( 6 ) THE learned Counsel for the respondent strenuously submitted that alternatively if Section 85 (g) is applicable, the wrong mentioning of the provision of law should not be construed as a technical defect and the complaint should not be thrown out. In view of this, I am inclined to hold that section 85 (a) is not applicable. ( 6 ) THE learned Counsel for the respondent strenuously submitted that alternatively if Section 85 (g) is applicable, the wrong mentioning of the provision of law should not be construed as a technical defect and the complaint should not be thrown out. This was strongly rebutted by the learned Counsel for the petitioners stating that the present complaint is under section 85 (a) of the Act and the learned Magistrate has taken the cognizance under Section 85 (a) of the Act. As such, this court should be very slow in converting the offence from under section 85 (a) to 85 (g)of the Act. In order to take cognizance under Section 85 (g), it has to be imperatively pleaded that there is non-payment within the stipulated time, because Section 85 (g) states that "if any person is guilty of any contravention of or non-compliance with any of the requirements of this Act or the rules or the regulations in respect of which no special penalty is provided". Definitely there is non-compliance with the requirement of this Act i. e. , the petitioners were required to make the contribution within the stipulated date i. e. , within 21st of next month ending. Admittedly, this has been violated. But at this stage, I do not think that there are any convincing reasons to convert the cognizance from Section 85 (a) to 85 (g ). I am only to see whether the cognizance taken under Section 85 (a) is in accordance with law or not. For the aforesaid reasons, I am of the opinion that the cognizance taken under Section 85 (a) of the act does not survive. ( 7 ) WHEN I hold that cognizance taken itself is not correct inaccordance with law, it is not necessary for me to give any finding on Point No. 2. In the light of this observation, the following order is passed. In the result, the petitions are allowed and consequently the proceedings in Criminal Case Nos. 1187, 1188 and 1190 of 1991 on the file of the Special Court, (Economic Offences) Bangalore stand quashed. --- *** --- .