Judgment : SUDHIR Narain, J. 1. This writ petition is directed against the order dated 18-10-1995, whereby respondent No. 1 dismissed the revision against the order of the Judge, Small Causes Court dated 4-5-1985. 2. THE facts in brief are that respondent No. 2 filed suit No. 7 of 1991 for recovery of arrears of rent, ejectment and damages against the petitioner on the allegation that he was a tenant of the premises in question. He sublet it to one Roshan Lal Kalra. Roshan Lal Kalra was impleaded in the suit as defendant No. 2. Defendant No. 2 died on 20-4-1991. THE plaintiff-respondent filed application (15-C) on 30-10- 1991 praying that an amendment be made by stating the fact that defendant No. 2 has expired. THE petitioner filed an objection to the said application stating that the plaintiff having not filed any application for substitution of the heirs of the deceased defendant No. 2, the whole suit stood abated and the application for amendment of the plait was not maintainable. THE Additional Judge Small Causes Court vide his order dated 10-12-1991 hell that the right of the plaintiff to sue still survives and the suit does not abate. THE petitioner preferred a Civil Revision against the said order before the District Judge, Moradabad. THE District Judge dismissed the revision on 13-1-1992 on the ground that no revision lies against the order dated 10-12-1991 but in the order he made an observation that as sub-tenant was not substituted and if he was in exclusive possession, the whole suit may abate. He directed the lower court to decide the application of the defendant afresh for abatement of the suit. The Judge, Small Causes Court again considered the application a and held that as defendant No. 2, who was impleaded as sub-tenant in the suit, was not impleaded, the right to sue did not survive and the whole suit stands abated. Respondent No. 2 filed revision No. 56 of 1994 against the said order. Respondent No. 1 took the view that defendant No. 2 was impleaded in the capacity of sub tenant. He was not a necessary party and on his death the right to sue still survives against the tenant-petitioner and the court below acted illegally in treating the whole suit as abated. The revision was allowed vide his order dated 18-10-1995. Respondent No. 1 took the view that defendant No. 2 was impleaded in the capacity of sub tenant. He was not a necessary party and on his death the right to sue still survives against the tenant-petitioner and the court below acted illegally in treating the whole suit as abated. The revision was allowed vide his order dated 18-10-1995. The petitioner has challenged this order in the present writ petition. 3. LEARNED counsel for the petitioner urged that the learned District Judge while disposing of the revision by his order dated 31-3-1992 made an observation that as the heirs of defendant No. 2 were not impleaded the whole suit stands abated. This observation was binding on the trial court as well as the revisional court and a different view cannot be taken on the basis of the principle of res judicata. 4. RESPONDENT No. 2 had filed a revision against the order of the trial Court dated 10-12-1991 whereby the Court had taken the view that after death of defendant No. 2, who was impleaded as defendant No. 2 in the suit, the right to sue still survives. The petitioner preferred a revision against the said order. The revision was dismissed by the District Judge holding that it was not maintainable but still in his order made an observation that as the petitioner has claimed relief against the sub-tenant, the shole suit may abate and directed the trial Court to decide the application afresh. It was not a case where the revision was finally allowed. The matter was remanded. It was open to respondent No. 2 to place his submissions before the trial Court and the trial Court was required to decide the matter afresh. The learned District Judge had dismissed the revision as not maintaianble. In these circumstances, if the matter is to be decided again, it cannot be held that the matter was conclusively decided by the learned District Judge which operates as res judicata. The learned District Judge had dismissed the revision as not maintaianble. In these circumstances, if the matter is to be decided again, it cannot be held that the matter was conclusively decided by the learned District Judge which operates as res judicata. Learned counsel for the petitioner has placed reliance upon the decision Satyadhan Ghosal and others v. Smt. Deorajin Debi and another, AIR 1960 SC 941 and Arjun Singh v. Mohindr Kumar and others, AIR 1964 SC 993 in which it was held that the principle of res judicata is applicable to different stages of the proceedings in the same suit, the nature of the proceedings, the scope of inquiry which the adjudcial law provides for the decision being reached as well as the specific provisions made on the matters touching such decisions or some of the material and relevant factors to be considered before the principle is held applicable. In Jagannath Prasad v. District Judge, Allahabad, AIR 1987 All, 317, the court held that where the defendant filed an application under Section 23 of the Provincial Small Causes Courts Act and the application having been rejected the second application on similar ground was not maintainable. In Punjab and Sind Bank v. M/s. Majit Properties (P) Ltd. and others, AIR 1995 Delhi 355 v it has been held that if an order is left unchallenged and an order is allowed to become final, the same cannot be challenged at a later stage as it will be a bar on principle of res judicata. This has to be examined as to what order has become final, between the parties before applying the principle of res judicata. The petitioner had filed a revision against the order passed by Judge, Small Causes Court dated 10-12-1991. The revision was dismissed as not maintainable but on the observation made by the District Judge in his order directing the trial court to decide the application afresh, respondent No. 2 could await for fresh decision instead of challenging the same by filing a writ petition or resorting the any other appropriate remedy. The observation of the learned District Judge in his order dated 31-3-1992 itself could not be treated as final. The observation of the learned District Judge in his order dated 31-3-1992 itself could not be treated as final. The question involved in the suit was as to whether the suit still survives as against the petitioner who was impleaded as defendant in the suit even after the death of the sub-tenant who was impleaded as defendant No. 2 in the suit. The trial court decided the matter afresh and the revision was filed again. It was open to respondent No. 2 to consider other aspect of the matter on t his question. Any observation made by the District Judge while dismissing the revision vide his order dated 31-3-1992 could not be taken as final and conclusive. 5. LEARNED counsel for the petitioner next submitted that the defendant No. 2 was impleaded on the allegation that he was sub-tenant. The plaintiff has claimed relief as against him also. After death of defendant No. 2 the whole suit shall be treated as abated. 6. IT is settled law that a sub-tenant is not a necessary party in a suit filed for recovery of arrears of rent and eviction against the tenant. A sub-tenant cannot claim a higher right than the tenant. Respondent No. 2 filed the suit on the allegation that the petitioner had illegally sublet the accommodation in question to defendant No. 2 and he was liable for eviction on that ground. Defendant No. 2 was impleaded on the ground that he was subtenant and had no independent right to remain in occupation of the property in question. In Roop Chand Gupta v. Raghuvanshi (P) Ltd., AIR 1964 SC 1889 , where the sub-tenant challenged the decree on the allegation that the tenant had colluded with the landlord and obtained a decree for ejectment and he was not even impleaded as a party in the suit with the result that he is liable for eviction. Their Lordships of the Supreme Court observed as under : "it is quite clear that the law does not require that the sub-leasee need be made. A party. Their Lordships of the Supreme Court observed as under : "it is quite clear that the law does not require that the sub-leasee need be made. A party. IT has been rightly pointed out by the High Court that in all cases where the landlord institutes a suit against the lessee for possession of the land on the basis of a valid notice to quit served on the lessee and does not implead the sub-lessee as a party to the suit, the object of the landlord is to eject the sub-lessee from the land in execution of the decree and such an objection is quite legitimate. The decree in such a suit would bind the sub-lessee. This may act harshly on the sub-lessee, but this is a position well understood- by him when he took, the sub-lessee. The law allows this and so the omission cannot be said to be an improper act. " Respondent No. 2 had filed suit against the petitioner on the allegation that he was tenant and his tenancy has been terminated and he is liable for eviction on the ground specified under Section 20 (2) of U. P. Urban Buildings (Regulation of Letting, Rent and Eviction) Act, 1972. The right to sue survives against him. In Dalla v. State of U. P and others, AIR 1979 All 229 , it was held that where the respondent was not a necessary party to the suit and his heirs having not been brought on the record in appeal, the appeal does not fail in its entirety on account of such death. The defendant No. 2 was not a necessary party in the suit and, as such, the whole suit did not abate. In the present case the Court can still decide the rights of respondent No. 2 to evict the petition on the basis of the allegations made against him in the suit. In State of Punjab v. Nathi Ram, AIR 1962 SC 89 , it was held that if the Court can deal with the matter in controversy so far as regards the rights and interests of the appellant and the respondents other than the deceased respondent, it has to proceed with the appeal and decide it. In State of Punjab v. Nathi Ram, AIR 1962 SC 89 , it was held that if the Court can deal with the matter in controversy so far as regards the rights and interests of the appellant and the respondents other than the deceased respondent, it has to proceed with the appeal and decide it. It is only when it is not possible for the Court to deal with such matters, that it will have to refuse to proceed further with the appeal and, therefore, dismiss it. 7. IN view of the discussions above, there is no merit in this writ petition and it is accordingly dismissed. Petition dismissed.