JUDGMENT A.R. Tiwari, J. 1. The aforesaid miscellaneous civil cases, presented by the Commissioner of Income-tax, Bhopal, under Section 256(2) of the Income-tax Act, 1961 (for short "the Act"), contain the common question, as extracted below, and categorised by the applicant as one of law, for a direction to the Tribunal to state the cases and refer the same for our opinion : "Whether, on the facts and in the circumstances of the case, the Income-tax Appellate Tribunal was justified in law in holding that the amended provisions of Section 43B were applicable to the assessment year 1984-85 when the said amendment was effective from April 1, 1988 ?" 2. Miscellaneous Civil Case No. 683 of 1992 was got listed for today. The other miscellaneous civil cases were listed for today. On request of counsel for the applicant this miscellaneous civil case, entailing an identical question, is also taken up for consideration along with the other miscellaneous civil cases. 3. The aforesaid question of law is sought to be supplemented and supported by the undernoted three common grounds contained in these applications : "(i) That the Tribunal erred in law in giving retrospective effect to the amendments effective from April 1, 1988, in Section 43B of the Income-tax Act by exceeding its jurisdiction in reading more than what Parliament has expressly provided. (ii) That the taxing statute is passed after great scrutiny and the Tribunal erred in holding that the meaning of the words being dubious it required interpretation and under that tried to grant more retrospectivity to the amended provision than what is prescribed. (iii) That as the question is not finally decided by the Supreme Court, a question of law did arise worth opinion of the hon'ble court." 4. Briefly stated, the facts of the case are that the Assessing Officer made additions of certain amounts in terms of Section 43B of the Act. In appeals, the Commissioner of Income-tax (Appeals) deleted the addition. The Department then filed appeals before the Tribunal. The Tribunal held that the claim was allowable in view of the decision rendered by the High Court of Patna in the case of Jamshedpur Motor Accessories Stores v. Union of India [19911 189 ITR 70, and thus affirmed the orders passed by the Commissioner of Income-tax (Appeals). Section 43B was inserted by the Finance Act, 1983, with effect from April 1, 1984. Section 43B was inserted by the Finance Act, 1983, with effect from April 1, 1984. The proviso to this section was inserted by the Finance Act, 1987, with effect from April 1, 1988. The Tribunal, however, held that the amendment was declaratory in nature and was available for being applied retrospectively. It, therefore, held that the amended provisions of Section 43B were applicable to assessments for the assessment years prior to April 1, 1988. The decision of the Tribunal had rested on the order passed in I. T. A. No. 1151/Ind. of 1988-Mantri Brothers v. ITO. Aggrieved, the applicant/Revenue filed applications under Section 256(2) of the Act. The applications were rejected. As the Tribunal declined to state the case and refer the question, and held that no referable question was in existence, the applicant filed these cases under Section 256(2) of the Act. 5. We have heard Shri D.D. Vyas, learned counsel for the applicant/Revenue, and counsel for the non-applicant/assessee in some of these cases. 6. Counsel for the applicant has conceded before us that the common order passed by this court on January 24, 1996, in Miscellaneous Civil Case No, 458 of 1992-CIT v. Uttamchand Sahijram [1996] 220 ITR 517 and other miscellaneous civil cases, governs the fate of these miscellaneous civil cases. 7. The core question is whether the amended provision of Section 43B is retrospective or prospective in operation ? The applicant contends that it is prospective whereas the non-applicants contend that it is retrospective and that the benefit is available to the assessees. 8. Shri Vyas has placed reliance on Sanghi Motors v. Union of India [1991] 187 ITR 703 (Delhi), in support of his contention. 9. We have read the aforesaid decision. Two features are noticeable :-- (i) The petition was dismissed in limine, (ii) The several decisions taking the contrary view were not before the Bench for consideration because of the same being of later date. 10. Section 43B provides that, notwithstanding anything contained in any other provision of this Act, a deduction otherwise allowable under this Act in respect of any sum, enumerated under Clauses (a) to (d), shall be allowed only in computing the income referred to in Section 28 of that previous year in which such sum is actually paid by him. 10. Section 43B provides that, notwithstanding anything contained in any other provision of this Act, a deduction otherwise allowable under this Act in respect of any sum, enumerated under Clauses (a) to (d), shall be allowed only in computing the income referred to in Section 28 of that previous year in which such sum is actually paid by him. The first proviso, inserted with effect from April 1, 1988, contains as under : "Provided that nothing contained in this section shall apply in relation to any sum referred to in Clause (a) or Clause (c) or Clause (d) which is actually paid by the assessee on or before the due date applicable in his case for furnishing the return of income under Sub-section (1) of Section 139 in respect of the previous year in which the liability to pay such sum was incurred as aforesaid and the evidence of such payment is furnished by the assessee along with such return. " 11. The core question is whether the Tribunal rightly applied the amended provision of the aforesaid section to the assessment years prior to April 1,1988 ? The answer depends on as to whether the amendment is declaratory of pre-existing law or it affected vested rights of the parties ? In the case of the former, it can be deemed to be retrospective and in the case of the latter, it has to be construed as prospective. In ITO v. S.K. Habibullah [1962] 44 ITR 809 ; AIR 1962 SC 918 , 922, it is held that (see at page 815 of 44 ITR) : "In our view, it was rightly held in Kundan Lal v. ITO [1959] 37 ITR 337 (Punj) following Kanumarlapudi Lakshminarayana Chetty v. ITO (First Addl.) [1956] 29 ITR 419 ; AIR 1957 AP 159, that Clause (5) of Section 35 of the Indian Income-tax Act, which was enacted by the Income-tax (Amendment) Act, 1953, was not declaratory of pre-existing law, and as it clearly affected vested rights which had accrued to the assessee, must be deemed to have come into force from April 1, 1952. It had no greater retrospective effect than was expressly granted to it. It had no greater retrospective effect than was expressly granted to it. The power to rectify the assessment of a partner consequent upon the assessment of the firm of which he is a partner by including or correcting his share of profit or loss can, therefore, be exercised only in case of assessment of the firm made on or after April 1, 1952. The Income-tax Officer has no jurisdiction under Clause (5) of Section 35 of the Act to rectify the assessment of a partner of a firm consequent upon the assessment or reassessment of the firm disclosing an error made before April 1, 1952." 12. In Channan Singh v. Jai Kaur (Smt.) AIR 1970 SC 349 , the Supreme Court observed that it is well settled that if a statute is curative or merely declares the previous law, retroactive operation would be more rightly ascribed to it. 13. Manifestly, the first proviso, as extracted above, is declaratory of preexisting Section 43B, effective from April 1, 1984, and did not affect vested rights. It is explanatory of the provision and is procedural in nature. That being so, there is no question of ignoring its effect on the linchpin of its introduction at a later date, i.e., from April 1, 1988. The object is to advance the remedy and curb the mischief. The dictionary meaning of the word "provided" is "on condition that", "on this term". The provision supplied periphery and purpose to the point. It thus explained as to how to read and apply Section 43B. It has nothing to do with the "date". It variegated and vellicated like "egocentric conception". Luculently, it controls Section 43B and cannot be treated as "insipia" till March 31, 1988. In other words, cases of assessment years till 1987-88, decided after April 1, 1988, have to be viewed in the light of the proviso. 14. In New York v. United States (326 US 572), Mr. Justice Douglas, in a dissenting opinion, expressed thus : "The former obviously is not true. The latter overlooks the fact that the power to tax lightly is the power to tax severely. The power to tax is indeed one of the most effective forms of regulation." 15. In the case on hand, the first proviso is intended to "regulate" the course of permissible deductions. The latter overlooks the fact that the power to tax lightly is the power to tax severely. The power to tax is indeed one of the most effective forms of regulation." 15. In the case on hand, the first proviso is intended to "regulate" the course of permissible deductions. While deciding this point, the amended provision has to be kept in focus irrespective of the date of its arrival on the statute. This then imparts logical retrospectivity. 16. In CIT v. Sri Jagannath Steel Corporation [1991] 191 ITR 676 (Cal), CIT v. Polar Fan Industries Ltd. [1992] 197 ITR 718 (Cal), CIT v. Chandulal Venichand [1994] 209 ITR 7 (Guj), CIT v. Vinar Systems Pvt. Ltd. [1993] 203 ITR 756 (Cal), and CIT v. Edcons (India) Pvt. Ltd. [1992] 198 ITR 86 (Cal), it is held that the aforesaid provision is clarificatory and explanatory in nature and is required to be interpreted to have retrospective effect. 17. The first proviso is a remedial one as the mistake had crept in Section 43B and, therefore, it would have retrospective effect from the date when Section 43B was introduced, i.e., from April 1, 1984. Section 43B was introduced to curb the practice of some of the taxpayers who were not discharging the undisputed tax liabilities even though they were getting deductions by maintaining accounts on mercantile basis. 18. This court had also taken the same view as is taken by the Tribunal in Miscellaneous Civil Case No. 665 of 1992--CIT v. Dhiraj Kumar and Co., [1997] 226 ITR 443, decided on January 3, 1996, and Miscellaneous Civil Case No. 514 of 1992--CIT v. Shree Tea Co. [1997] 226 ITR 445 and several connected miscellaneous civil cases decided on January 17, 1996. 19. Nothing substantial is urged to persuade us to take a different view in the matter. 20. In our view, the Tribunal took the view sustainable in law. In face of the view we take and in the light of the decisions, cited in paras 14 and 16 above (see above ) with which we respectfully agree, Sanghi Motors' case [1991] 187 ITR 703 (Delhi), dismissed in limine, does not tilt the balance in favour of the Revenue. On the other hand, we hold that provision in question, as noted above, is declaratory and explanatory, and, being procedural in content and context, is retrospective like the law of limitation. 21. On the other hand, we hold that provision in question, as noted above, is declaratory and explanatory, and, being procedural in content and context, is retrospective like the law of limitation. 21. The grounds as noted above are inutile and futile and have no material bearing on the question presented and projected. 22. In Parashuram Pottery Works Co. Ltd. v. ITO [1977] 106 ITR 1 ; AIR 1977 SC 429 , pertaining to the Income-tax Act, it is held that (headnote of AIR 1977 SC) : "At the same time, it must be borne in mind that the policy of law is that there must be a point of finality in all legal proceedings that stale issues should not be reactivated beyond a stage and that lapse of time must induce repose in and set at rest judicial and quasi-judicial controversies as it must in other spheres of human activity." 23. In some applications, an additional question is proposed to the effect "Whether Mandi fee is a duty under Section 43B of the Income-tax Act, 1961 ?" This court has taken the view in CIT v. Mohansingh and Sons [1995] 216 ITR 432, that the question whether mandi fee is a tax or duty is a question of fact and is thus not a referable question of law. In view of this position, even this additional question is not found to be a referable question of law. The Tribunal has passed the order on appreciation of facts and the conclusion based on findings of fact does not yield a question of law for opinion. 24. On bestowal of our anxious consideration, we thus hold that there are no referable questions of law as contained in these applications and noted above. 25. Consequently, we dismiss all these miscellaneous civil cases as devoid of merit but with no orders as to costs. 26. Counsel fee is, however, fixed at Rs. 750 for each side in each case, if certified. 27. Retain this order in Miscellaneous Civil Case No. 432 of 1992 and place its copy each in the connected miscellaneous civil cases for ready reference.