K. J. VAIDYA, J. ( 1 ) THE State of Gujarat by his Misc. Criminal Application under Sec. 5 of the Limitation Act, 1963; has moved this Court inter alia praying for condoning the delay of 10 days which has taken place due to the belated filing of the Criminal Appeal No. 605/94. ( 2 ) TO briefly narrate few relevant facts, the applicant-State while making good the case of "sufficient cause" for condoning the delay in question, has submitted that the impugned judgment and order of acquittal came to be passed on 28. 2. 1995 and the certified copy of the same was applied for on the very same day i. e. 2. 2. 1995 without losing any time. The same was ready for delivery on 4. 3. 1995 however it was obtained on 10. 3. 1995. Thereafter the proposal dated 6. 4. 1995 to file an acquittal appeal forwarded by the learned Additional PP was received by the Legal Department on 10. 4. 1995. This was, ultimately placed before the concerned Branch of the Legal Department on 15. 4. 1995. On the very same day the papers were submitted to the concerned Dy. Secretary, who in his turn, took a decision to file acquittal appeal before this Court on 5. 6. 1995. Thereafter the papers were placed before the RLA for his approval on 5. 6. 1995, which was granted on the very same day and necessary resolution to the said effect was passed on 7. 6. 1995 and forwarded to the office of the learned PP. High Court of Gujarat at Ahmedabad to do the needful and ultimately the appeal came to be filed on 13. 6. 1995. According to the applicant-State, from 8. 6. 1995 to 12. 6. 1995 the were public holidays and that the delay in question to file an appeal occurred due to some honest mistake committed in calculation of the period of Limitation, and that there was neither negligence nor inaction on their part in processing the matter in time. On the basis of these submissions, it is prayed by the applicant-State to condone the delay and hear and decide the appeal on merits. On the basis of these submissions, it is prayed by the applicant-State to condone the delay and hear and decide the appeal on merits. ( 3 ) INCIDENTALLY it may also be pointed out at this stage that the acquittal Appeal No. 605/95 pertains to the appeal filed by the State against Koli Mohan Nanubhai and two others who came to be tried for the alleged offences punishable under Secs. 302, 323, 324, read with Sec. 114 of the IPC in Sessions Case No. 116/95, wherein at the end of the trial, they were ordered to be acquitted vide judgment and order dated 28. 2. 1995 passed by the learned Additional Judge, Bhavnagar. ( 4 ) WHEN this matter was called out, Mr. D. N. Patel, the learned APP fairly submitted that in view of the Division Bench decision of this Court rendered in the case of State of gujarat vs. Ramesh Laxman Chauhan, reported in 1994 (2) GLR 1577 , ordinarily, it was not necessary to issue notice to the other side. However, thereafter when identical question of condoning the delay arose before the another Division Bench of this Court comprising of Honble M/s Justice A. N. Divecha and H. R. Shelat, JJ. in Misc. Criminal application No. 4735/95 in Criminal Appeal No. 568/95, the said bench by its order dated 9. 1. 1996 has been pleased to refer to the point for re-consideration to the Larger Bench. The said short reference order reads as under::"the State of Gujarat has preferred this application for condonation of the delay of 81 days in preferring an appeal against the judgment and order of - acquittal passed by the learned Special Judge of Court No. 2 at Ahmedabad on 17. 10. 1994 in Special Criminal Case No. 4 of 1993. "2. We were inclined to issue rule in this case calling upon the other side to show cause why delay should not be condoned. At that stage, learned additional Public Prosecutor Shri D. N. Patel for the appellant has invited our attention to the Division Bench ruling of this Court in the case of State of , gujarat vs. Ramesh Laxmanbhai Chauhan reported in 1994 (2) 35 (2) GLR 1577. At that stage, learned additional Public Prosecutor Shri D. N. Patel for the appellant has invited our attention to the Division Bench ruling of this Court in the case of State of , gujarat vs. Ramesh Laxmanbhai Chauhan reported in 1994 (2) 35 (2) GLR 1577. It has been held therein mat condonation of delay is a discretionary power of the Court in view of the language of Sec. 5 of the Limitation Act, 1963 and the Court can condone the delay in instituting an appeal or a revisional proceeding without hearing the other side. 3. In the recent ruling of the Supreme Court in the case of State of maharashtra vs. Sharadchandra Vinayak Dongre and Ors. , reported in 1995 scc (Cr.) 16 the relevant provisions contained in Secs. 473 and 468 of the code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 (Crpc for brief) came up for consideration. It has been held therein that before condonation of delay in taking cognizance of the case a notice and an opportunity of hearing to the accused is necessary. It cannot be gainsaid that Sec. 473 of the Crpc confers on the Court discretionary jurisdiction with respect to condonation of delay in taking cognizance of the matter. 4. In view of the aforesaid binding of the Supreme Court on consideration of secs. 473 and 468 of the Crpc, we are of the opinion that the aforesaid Division bench ruling of this Court in the case of Ramesh Chauhan (supra) requires reconsideration by a larger Bench at this stage itself. 5. In that view of the matter we refrain from expressing our opinion on the merits of the delay condonation application. 6. THE Registry is directed to place the papers of this Misc. Criminal application before the learned Chief Justice for appropriate orders regarding placement of this matter before a larger Bench for reconsideration of the aforesaid Division Bench ruling this Court in the case of Ramesh Chauhan (supra ). "however, according to the learned APP despite the fact that the reference on the identical point involved to the larger bench is already made. "however, according to the learned APP despite the fact that the reference on the identical point involved to the larger bench is already made. In his respectful submissions since the view taken by this Court in the case of State of Gujarat vs. Ramesh Chauhan, (supra) gets due support from the Supreme Court decision rendered in the case of L. Naik mahabir Singh vs. Chief of Army Staff, reported in 1990 SCC (Cr.) 625, the delay in question in the instant case is required to be at once condoned straightway without issuing the notice to the otherside. In case of L. Naik Mahabirsingh vs. Chief of the Army Staff (supra) the Supreme Court has held as under: "heard counsel for the petitioner. This petition is barred by limitation and no application for condonation of delay has been made. We have, however, accepted the oral prayer of the counsel to condone the delay and have proceeded to hear the matter on merits. " ( 5 ) SIMILAR is the view taken earlier by our High Court in decision rendered in case of M/s. Markland Pvt. Ltd. and Ors. vs. State of Gujarat, reported in AIR 1989 Guj. 44 , where while ex-parte condoning the delay of ten months, in para 9 of its judgment, it has been held as under: "in this case the revision application is filed after a period of about ten months from the prescribed date of limitation. As submitted by the learned counsel for the petitioners the Tribunal may condone the delay, but in the instant case there was no application for condonation of delay, the delay could not have been condoned. The contention is misconceived. There is no dispute with regard to the fact that provision of Sec. 5 of the Limitation Act do apply to these proceedings. Sec. 5 of the Limitation Act only requires the appellant or the applicant to satisfy the Court that he had sufficient cause for not preferring the appeal or making the revision application within such period. The section does not require that there should be a written application for condonation of delay. In fact this is the view which has been taken by this Court in the case of naran Anneppa Shethi vs. Jayantilal Chunilal Shah, AIR 1987 Guj. 205 and in the case of Patel Purshottamdas Motilal vs. Patel Chootabhai Motibhai, 1979 (20) Guj. LR 918. In fact this is the view which has been taken by this Court in the case of naran Anneppa Shethi vs. Jayantilal Chunilal Shah, AIR 1987 Guj. 205 and in the case of Patel Purshottamdas Motilal vs. Patel Chootabhai Motibhai, 1979 (20) Guj. LR 918. Therefore, the contention that the Tribunal ought not to have condoned the delay in absence of written application for condonation of delay has no merit and the same is required to be rejected. ( 6 ) OVER and above the aforesaid decision, we have also come across one more latest judgment of the Supreme Court rendered in Criminal Misc. Petition No. 5862/94, rendered in case of Ramlal Galaji Purohit vs. State of Gujarat, wherein the Supreme court condone the delay of as many as 130 days in filing a Special Leave Petition without issuing notice to the other side. In this case, the petitioner Ramlal Galaji Purohit and one another were tried by the City Sessions Court No. 8 Ahmedabad in Sessions Case No. 282/9 for the alleged offences punishable under Secs. 17 and 18 of the NDPS Act, 1985. According to the prosecution when the search of the shop was taken on 19. 5. 1992, 940 gms. of opium was recovered in the presence of the panchas. At trial, both accused decided the charges and at the end of the trial, by the judgment and order dated 10. 8. 1993 the petitioner came to be convicted for the alleged offences and sentenced to RI for ten year, and fine of Rs. 1 lac, etc. while another accused-Bhagirath was acquitted. This order of conviction and sentence was challenged before this Court by way of appeal, the same being Criminal Appeal No. 966/93. This appeal was admitted, however, Appellants application for suspension of sentence the same being Misc. Criminal Application No. 546/93 was dismissed by this Court by an order dated 3. 2. 1994. Being aggrieved by the same, the petitioner filed a Special Leave Petition before the Supreme Court inter alia contending that when appeal was admitted that meant there was a prima facie case for holding that the appeal was likely to be allowed and in that view of the matter, the High court ought to have suspended the order of sentence and granted the bail. However, since the said S. L. P. was beyond time by 130 days an application for condoning said delay, the same being Cr. M. A. No. 5682 of 1994 was filed when this came to be placed before the supreme Court (Coram : Honble Chief Justice, B. L. Hansaria and S. C. Sen JJ) upon hearing the learned counsel for the petitioner by an order dated 5. 1. 1995, the delay was condoned without issuing the notice to the otherside. ( 7 ) IN view of the aforesaid two Supreme Court decision rendered in case of (1) L naik Mahabirsingh vs. Chief of Army Staff (supra) and (2) Ramlal Galaji Purohit vs. State of Gujarat (supra) was are indeed under the constitutional obligation and accordingly duty bound to immediately follow the same with utmost respect and without any reservations. We are indeed quite conscious of the fact that our learned esteemed Brother A. N. Divecha and H. R. Shelat, JJ. while referring the matter to the Larger Bench has also relied upon the supreme Court decision rendered in the case of State of Maharashtra vs. Sharadchandra vinayak Dongre, report in 1995 SCC (Cr.) 16. 6. 1 We have carefully perused this judgment. However, with utmost respect to our learned esteemed Brothers, the two Supreme Court decision rendered in cases of (1) L. Naik Mahabirsingh and (2) Ramlal Galaji Purohit (supra) where delay came to be condoned without issuing the notice, directly covers the point involved and accordingly is unquestionably on sounder footing than the decision rendered in the case of State of maharashtra (supra) which ex facie stands on the different footing. The aforesaid two decisions of the Supreme Court are directly applicable to the facts of the present case, where at the appellate stage of the delay came to be condoned without issuing the notice. While there in the case of the State of Maharashtra, facts law-situation has indeed nothing in common and in tune to have direct bearing on the facts, law situation of the instant case. In that case, the basic question was of the delay in launching the prosecution and accordingly having regard to the relevant provisions pertaining to the period of Limitation in taking cognizance of the offence as contained in Secs. In that case, the basic question was of the delay in launching the prosecution and accordingly having regard to the relevant provisions pertaining to the period of Limitation in taking cognizance of the offence as contained in Secs. 468 and 473 of the Criminal procedure Code, whether the trial Court was empowered to straightway take cognizance of the offence condoning the delay without issuing any notice to the other side. Now undoubtedly when the delay had taken place in the matter of filing the complaint in time before the trial Court taking cognizance of the offence, then by virtue of Secs. 468 and 473 etc. a notice is ordinarily required to be issued to the other side before condoning the delay because it is that the initial stage of taking cognizance of the offence. However, as against the above, in the cases where in the cognizance is already taken, trial is over, and the accused is acquitted and it is in an appeal or revision to be filed before the higher forum there is some delay in filing appeal or revision as the case may be then the same stands basically and entirely on different footing as appeal is considered to be continance of proceedings, and therefore, the ratio laid down in the case of State of Maharashtra with respect will not be applicable remotely even. In fact had indeed the two Supreme Court decisions rendered in cases (1) L. Naik Mahabirsingh vs. The Chief of Army Staff (Supra) and (2) Ramlal Galaji Purohit (supra) been brought to the notice of our esteemed brothers, perhaps there would not have been any need to make a reference to the larger bench. ( 8 ) ORDINARILY, once on any point the matter is referred to the Larger Bench by any one of our esteemed brothers, the judicial property and decency unquestionably demands that one should not be in any undue haste and hurry to express any opinion on the point referred and the matter at hand is required to wait till the time the controversy is resolved by the final decision given by the Larger Bench, where we are indeed humbly bound by the said ultimate decision of the Larger Bench. No Court for a minute even can react and arrogate itself to think that it is always and invariably right and not at all infallible. No Court for a minute even can react and arrogate itself to think that it is always and invariably right and not at all infallible. This we are saying because one of us (K. J. Vaidya, J) was a party rather judgment delivered by him in the State of Gujarat vs. Ramesh L. Chauhan (supra ). This indeed is an exceptionless rule. Even in the case of the State of Gujarat vs. Ramesh L. Chauhan (supra), on the point of limitation, if we are wrong, we can certainly be corrected either by the larger Bench or for that purpose even by the Apex Court. And to be corrcated is always a matter of greatest pleasure for two simple reasons viz. , if firstly, in case ultimately we are found to be wrong in our judgment by the ultimate decision either of the larger bench or the Apex Court (as the case may be) then there is a pleasure of the benefit of obtaining a corrected settled legal position, and secondly, in case if the full Bench or the Apex Court places seal of approval on the view on the point taken by us than in that case, also it gives an equal pleasure of the satisfaction of having arrived at just legal decision. Anyway apart the honest difference of opinion on the point, since the view taken by this Court in the case of State of Gujarat vs. Ramesh Chauhan (supra) is ultimately found to be duly supported and fortified by the aforesaid two decisions of the Supreme court , this court do not think that it should unnecessarily wait for condoning the delay by issuing rule to the other side till the Larger Bench gives its verdict on the point referred to. At the cost of repetition, it may once against be pointed out that in a matter before the supreme Court in the case of L. Naik Mahabirsingh (supra), there even delay condonation application was not made and accepting the oral prayer of the learned counsel to condone the delay, the delay was ex-parte condoned and the Supreme Court proceeded to hear the matter on merits. We think that there indeed can not be any better and further decision on the point directly applicable on facts situation in the instant case than the one rendered in the case of (1) L. Naik Mahabirsingh (supra) and (2) Ramlal Galaji Purohit (supra) supporting the view taken by this Court in the case of State of Gujarat vs. Ramesh chauhan (supra ). To cite one more decision on the point of our High Court, yet in one another decision rendered in the case of Patel Puroshottamdas Motilal vs. Patel chhotalal, reported in 1979 GLR 918 , it has taken a view that delay can be condoned even on oral application, meaning there by there is indeed no need for issuing notice to the other side. In this view of the matter, with profound respect to our learned esteemed brothers A. N. Divecha and H. R. Shelat, JJ, and with the utmost humility, we following two direct Supreme Court decisions referred to above, feel that it is indeed not necessary to issue notice to the other side before condoning the delay as already held by our court in case of the State of Gujarat vs. Ramesh L. Chauhan (supra ). It may be clarified that we may not be misunderstood as sitting in appeal over the reference made by our learned esteemed Brothers to the larger bench. No such an arrogance is not only unpardonable but is simply unthinkable. However, what we are doing is simply following the binding decision of the Supreme court which with all force applicable to the facts-situation of the case, which we are unquestionably duty bound to flow, further with a view to see that on a technical ground of issuing notice for condoning the delay, hundreds and thousands of such delayed appeals, revisions before High Court are not further unnecessarily delayed to the greatest detriment of public interest, public time in these days of stunning arrears and docket explosion. ( 9 ) NOW turning to the facts of the present case, the very fact that the learned APP in charge of the matter had applied for the certified copy of the impugned judgment and order on the very day of its pronouncement goes to indicate that at no point of time state had ever abandoned its intention to file an appeal before the High Court. This is indeed one of the most important circumstances in favour of the applicant praying for the condonation of delay. In that view of the matter, there can not be said to be any remissness or negligence on the part of the State Government. Not only that but when the impersonal, irresponsible officers of State are in between the overall public-justice and the Court of law, the Court must take a realistic stock of such situation in general public interest and must as of necessity condone the delay as the cause of public justice can not be made to suffer on the ground of technicality of the limitation for the purpose default committed by concerned public servants incharge of the case and that too in a murder case and or for the purpose any other serious offences. In any appeals, revisions or Applications, if there is a delay and because of that only the cause of substantial justice was likely to suffer, it would be the duty of the concerned Court to report at once to the concerned Higher ups regarding the remissness of concerned public servant to the departmental proceeded with and punish him but under no circumstances, for the default of public servant the cause of public justice can be allowed to suffer !! This most important aspect and the consideration the Court loving substantial justice shall have to constantly bear in mind, more particularly in these delays of fast falling standards in public- services, some cases of even corruption and inefficiency !! If the Courts some how would prefer to be ignorant and adopt ostrich like attitude on this material aspect, the disease of delay and technicality borne out of utter pollution of inefficiency and corruption will invariably prove to be fatal to the cause of substantial justice. Further still, whether grounds pleaded in support of condoning delay constitute the sufficient grounds or not is always a matter of discretion based upon judicial pragmatism of the court to be exercised/decided on the basis of the settled Supreme Court and High courts decisions. Not only that but we humbly reiterate that the condonation of delay is essentially and always a matter strictly between the applicant and the Court and the other side has indeed no business to claim to be heard at this stage. Not only that but we humbly reiterate that the condonation of delay is essentially and always a matter strictly between the applicant and the Court and the other side has indeed no business to claim to be heard at this stage. By deciding, allowing delay condonation application, Court is not remotely even touching the merits of the case of decided in favour of other side !! This is the view taken by our High Court in the case of State of Gujarat vs. Ramesh Laxman Chauhan (supra) which stands now duly fortified by Supreme Court decisions in the cases (1) L. Mahabirsingh vs. the chief of army Staff and (2) Ramlal Galaji Purohit vs. State of Gujarat (supra ). ( 10 ) IN the result, this application is allowed. Delay in question is condoned. This application stands disposed of accordingly. The appeal to be placed on admission board at the earliest. ( 11 ) THE office is directed to keep a copy of this order alongwith the" order passed in misc. Criminal Application No. 4735/95 in Criminal appeal No. 568/95 on 9. 1. 1996, which is referred to the Larger Bench. .