R. B. MEHROTRA, J. The dispute in the present case relates to the agricultural land in Khata No. 145 situate in village Lar Tappa Balia, Pergana Salempur Majhauli, district Deoria. The Notification under Section 4 of the U. P. Consolidation of Holdings Act (hereinafter referred as the Act) was issued in regard to the agricultural land situate in the aforesaid village some time in the year 1971. The petitioner filed an objection before the Assistant Consolidation Officer, in regard to the aforesaid Khata some time in the year 1979, alongwith an application under Section 5 of the Limitation Act, for condoning delay in filing objection. The aforesaid application filed under Section 5 of the Limitation Act, was duly supported by an affidavit. In the affidavit, the petitioner had contended that the agricultural land of Khata No. 145 of village Lar Tappa was joint family property of petitioner and respondent No. 1, who has been arrayed as respondent No. 2 in the present matter and they were owners of half and half shares. The petitioner and respondent No. 2 are co-tenure-holder of the aforesaid land even before U. P. Zamindari Abolition and Land Reforms Act was enforced and are paying land revenue jointly. In the affidavit it was further stated that the petitioner is in Government employment and his uncle Jangi Singh (respondent No. 2) was looking after the litigation and Sri Jangi Singh has manoeuvred that the petitioners name be deleted from the revenue record of the aforesaid Khata. In the affidavit it was further stated that the petitioner came to know of the aforesaid manoeurvring on hearing rumour on 20-6-1979, on which date petitioner inspected revenue record. It was further stated in the affidavit that the petitioner has not intentionally delayed, the filing of objection. In reply to the aforesaid affidavit, respondent No. 2 did not file any counter-affidavit before the Assistant Consolidation Officer, but he chose to file objection to the aforesaid affidavit, wherein the respondent has contended that the petitioner is a well read person and is an employee of State Government and was working in the collection department under Naib-Tehsildar and the petitioner had due knowledge of the consolidation proceedings in the village. The explanation for delay given by the petitioner is not acceptable. It was further contended that the land in dispute has been acquired solely by the respondent No. 2. 2. The explanation for delay given by the petitioner is not acceptable. It was further contended that the land in dispute has been acquired solely by the respondent No. 2. 2. The Consolidation Officer vide his order dated 6-10-1980 condoned the delay in filing objection on the condition that the petitioner pays cost of Rs. 40 to the respondents. 3. The Consolidation Officer in his order accepted petitioners contention that since he was an employee of the State Government, he could not know about manipulation in consolidation proceedings and on the aforesaid basis allowed the application filed under Section 5 of the Limitation Act. 4. Aggrieved thereby, respondent No. 2 filed a revision under Section 48 of the Act. The Deputy Director of Consolidation vide his order dated 27-6-1981 allowed the said revision and set aside the order dated 6-10-1980 passed by the Consolidation Officer and rejected the petitioners application filed under Section 5 of the Limitation Act. 5. Aggrieved by the aforesaid order, the petitioner has filed present writ petition. 6. I have heard learned counsel for the parties, Sri A. K. Mishra in support ofthe writ petition and Sri Sankatha Rai in opposition thereof. 7. It is settled principle of law that if the statement is made on oath and the said statement is not contradicted on oath normally the statement should be accepted unless for the reasons to be recorded. In view of the facts of the present case, as brought out on record by means of the counter-affidavit filed by respondent, it is apparent that the respondent did not choose to controvert the statement made by the petitioner on affidavit before the Assistant Consolidation Officer instead chose to file objection, which was not supported by any affidavit. In the light of the facts of this case, the consolidation officer believed the version of the petitioner and held that the petitioner had no knowledge regarding manipulation of entry in the village records in regard to Khata in dispute. 8. The Deputy Director of Consolidation in the impugned order has set aside the order of the Consolidation Officer on the ground that the Consolidation Officer has not given his judgment in context of the affidavit and the counter-affidavit, filed by the parties, the explanation given by the petitioner that he was in service was not sufficient ground for condonation of delay. In relation to some other matter, the petitioner himself filed objection in the consolidation proceedings. On this basis, the Deputy Director of Consolidation held in the impugned order that the petitioner had knowledge of consolidation proceedings and was not entitled for the benefit of Section 5 of the Limitation Act. 9. In Ram Dular v. Deputy Director of Consolidation, Jaunpur and others, 1994 RD 290, the Apex Court while considering the scope of Section 48 of the Act has held that the Director of Consolidation under Section 48 of the Act had power to satisfy himself as to the legality of the proceedings or as to the correctness of the proceedings or correctness, legality or propriety of any order other than interlocutory order passed by the authorities under the Act. But in considering the correctness, legality or propriety of the order or correctness of the proceedings or regularity thereof it cannot assume to itself the jurisdiction of the original authority as a fact finding authority by appreciating for itself of those facts de novo. 10. In Collector, Land Acquisition, Anantanag v. Mst. Katiji, (1987) 2 SCC 107 , the Apex Court while considering the issue of condonation of delay under Section 5 of the Limitation Act, has held that liberal attitude should be adopted in condonation of delay. The relevant portion of the aforesaid judgment is being reproduced below: (3) The Legislature has conferred the power to condone delay by enacting Section 5 of the Indian Limitation Act of 1963 in order to enable the courts to do substantial justice to parties by disposing of matters on merits. The expression "sufficient cause" employed by the Legislature is adequately elastic to enable the courts to apply the law in a meaningful manner which subserves the ends of justice - that being the life-purpose for the existence of the institution of courts. It is common knowledge that this Court has been making a justifiable liberal approach in matters instituted in this Court. But the message does not appear to have percolated down to all the other courts in the hierarchy. An such a liberal approach is adopted on principle as it is realized that : 1. Ordinarily a litigant does not stand to benefit by lodging an appeal late. 2. But the message does not appear to have percolated down to all the other courts in the hierarchy. An such a liberal approach is adopted on principle as it is realized that : 1. Ordinarily a litigant does not stand to benefit by lodging an appeal late. 2. Refusing to condone delay can result in a meritorious matter being thrown out at the very threshold and cause of justice being defeated. As against this when delay is condoned the highest that can happen is that a cause would be decided on merits after hearing the parties. 3. "every days delay must be explained" does not mean that a pedantic approach should be made. Why not every hours delay, every seconds delay? The doctrine must be applied in a rational common sense pragmatic manner. 4. When substantial justice and technical considerations are pitted against each other, cause of substantial justice deserves to be preferred for the other side cannot claim to have vested right in injustice being done because of a non-deliberate delay. 5. There is no presumption that delay is occasioned deliberately, or on account of culpable negligence, or on account of mala fides. A litigant does not stand to benefit by resorting to delay. In fact he runs a serious risk. 6. It must be grasped that judiciary is respect not on account of its power to legalize unjustice on technical grounds but because it is capable of removing injustice and is expected to do so. In the light of the aforesaid decision, I am of the view that the statement made on oath was not controverted by the respondent on oath, and in view of the facts that the Consolidation Officer having condoned the delay, the Deputy Director of Consolidation has set aside the aforesaid order by impugned order on irrelevant consideration. The Deputy Director of Consolidation could not have considered the facts itself and recorded its finding that the delay was not properly explained. The Deputy Director of Consolidation in the impugned order did not care to take into the matter that the statement made on oath was not controverted on oath by the respondents. Besides that petitioners contention that the land was continuously recorded as joint holding of the petitioner and respondent No. 2, and respondent No. 2 being uncle of the petitioner was looking after the litigation. Besides that petitioners contention that the land was continuously recorded as joint holding of the petitioner and respondent No. 2, and respondent No. 2 being uncle of the petitioner was looking after the litigation. The Consolidation Officer by condoning the delay only permitted the parties to contest their case on merits. The facts of the case also shows that the objection raised by the petitioner was not frivolous. 11. In view of the principle laid down by the Apex Court in Collector, Land Acquisition, Anantonag (supra), I am clearly of the view that unless the court comes to the conclusion that there was intentional delay in making application or filing appeal or there was gross negligence on the part of the litigant for not approaching the Court after coming to know of the proceedings to be filed, the delay under Section 5 of Limitation Act should normally be condoned. 12. Learned counsel for the respondent, Sri Sankatha Rai, has placed reliance on two decisions and contended that unless the explanation given by the petitioner was satisfactory, delay could not have been condoned. 13. In Binod Bihari Singh v. Union of India, (1993) 2 ACJ 772, the Apex Court held that since a false plea was taken, application for condonation of delay was rightly refused by the High Court. In this decision the Court also accepted the principle that sufficient cause appearing in Section 5 of the Limitation Act should be considered with a pragmatic approach and the court should be slow in shutting the door of justice to a litigant on the score of limitation to defeat a just claim because a litigant does not stand to gain by coming late to a court and then suffer a prejudice by making his case barred by limitation. However, in view of the facts of the case, the Court found that the appellant had made false statement on the question of receiving the award and on that basis that High Court has clearly come to the finding that the case of the appellant was untrue, the said finding was affirmed by the Apex Court. 14. In Ram Char an v. Ziladhikari/deputy Director Consolidation, Banda and others, (1995) ACJ 273, a learned Single Judge of this Court upheld the order passed under Section 5 of the Limitation Act for condoning the delay in filing objection. 14. In Ram Char an v. Ziladhikari/deputy Director Consolidation, Banda and others, (1995) ACJ 273, a learned Single Judge of this Court upheld the order passed under Section 5 of the Limitation Act for condoning the delay in filing objection. However, the learned single Judge of this Court imposed penalty of Rs. 3,000 on the petitioner. In this case the Court also held that this Court is slow in interferring with the orders condoning the delay under Article 226 of the Constitution of India. 15. It is also settled proposition of law that the revisional jurisdiction is a discretionary and eauitable jurisdiction. The Consolidation Officer having con doned the delay and having permitting the parties to contest their dispute on merit, there was no justification for the Deputy Director of Consolidation to interfere with the aforesaid order in exercise of his revisional jurisdiction in the present case. 16. On the aforesaid analysis, I am satisfied that the order passed by the Deputy Director of Consolidation is based on irrelevant consideration and have not taken into consideration the correct approach in the matter of condonation of delay and erred in interferring with the order of condoning delay and permitting the parties to contest their dispute on merits. 17. In view of the facts and circumstances of the case, I allow this writ petition, set aside the order of the Deputy Director of Consolidation, passed on 27-6-1981 and direct that the Consolidation Officer should decide the dispute between the parties within four months from the date of receipt of a certified copy of this order. Petition allowed. .