D. K. SETH, J. ( 1 ) THE petitioner has completed his M. B. B. S. Course from Motilal Nehru Medical College, Allahabad securing 56. 5 percent marks and in the year 1989 completed his internship from S. R. N. Medical College and became eligible for Post Graduate Medical Course Entrance Examination (hereinafter called as PGMEE ). According to the recommendations of Medical Council of India he appeared in both P. G. M. E. E. 1990 and 1991 conducted by the Lucknow University and secured marks slightly less than fifty percent. The cut-off marks fifty percent introduced by the statutory Notification under section 28 (b) of the U. P. State Universities Act is arbitrary illegal and against the statutory norms. In as much as due to such cut off marks many seats remained vacant in different disciplines in the Seven Medical colleges. The said notification while being held valid by Honble Supreme Court when challenged, the State Government was directed to evolve the criterion whereby no seat in any academic session should go waste but no steps towards that end have been taken. According to the petitioner over hundred seats remained vacant in which ineligible Medicos who had their family members in-the administration of he Medical colleges of U. P. and high influential link are admitted in violation of statutory guideline, while the students like the petitioner securing marks a little less than fifty percent without having any influential link are denied such opportunity, though academically they are better situate than those persons admitted through such back door method. There being no provision for any appeal or any other remedy against denial of admission the petitioners do approach the High Court and Honble Supreme Court but when the decision is given the session passes by some times more than one. In para-14 and 15 the petitioner has cited the case of one Dr. Bhagwat Prasad Pandey and Dr. Basant Jindal, as an instance of violation of the same. The petitioner has also alleged the irregularities in the manner of admission. Thus the petitioner prays for a mandamus commanding the respondents to admit the petitioner as junior Resident (Surgery) in Motilal Nehru Medical College, Allahabad, against the vacant seats of PGMEE-1991 or in any other Medical Colleges of U. P. where such seat is lying vacant. The petitioner has also alleged the irregularities in the manner of admission. Thus the petitioner prays for a mandamus commanding the respondents to admit the petitioner as junior Resident (Surgery) in Motilal Nehru Medical College, Allahabad, against the vacant seats of PGMEE-1991 or in any other Medical Colleges of U. P. where such seat is lying vacant. ( 2 ) IN the Counter-affidavit it has been asserted that Residency scheme was implemented by the Government order w. e. f. 1-8-1987. The introduction of cut off marks by fifty percent as the eligibility criterion was held to be valid by Supreme Court. Admission cannot be given to a candidate who could not succeed in the competitive examination or had failed to obtain minimum marks. Such candidate cannot claim admission even if the seats remain vacant. The entrance examination for admission to P. G. Courses in different medical colleges in the State of U. P. are held through the Lucknow University. Neither there had been nor there is any irregularity in the procedure. The Lucknow University declared the result of P. G. M. E. E. on the basis whreof admission is allowed by the Directorate of Medical Education and Training, U. P. , Lucknow. The giving of admission through back door method is denied, where as it has asserted that some admission might have been given under the orders of the court. Dr. Bhagwat Prasad Pandey was admitted in compliance of the order of this Court passed in Writ Petition No. 17797 of 1989. All the said `23 students of the said batch were considered to be admitted because of the directions of this court. ( 3 ) IT was further contended that both the candidates named in para 15 were admitted on the basis of the order passed by this court. About the vacancy it has been pleaded that in 1991-Session, one seat in M. S. (Surgery) is lying vacant due to dropping of one student being the C. G. H. S. employee, where as no seat in session 1990 was left vacant. The allegation of admission as mentioned in para 19 have been asserted to have been made in compliance of the order of this court. The allegation of admission of the students having high connection, despite ineligiblity has been denied altogether. The allegation of admission as mentioned in para 19 have been asserted to have been made in compliance of the order of this court. The allegation of admission of the students having high connection, despite ineligiblity has been denied altogether. ( 4 ) IN the rejoinder-affidavit it has been sought to be reiterated and asserted that the candidates securing marks less than fifty percent were admitted through back door method. But however, no instance has been mentioned in the rejoinder affidavit except the bald statement, as stated above. It has been asserted that Dr. Bhagwat Prasad Pandey did not pass M. B. B. S. first Professional and he was admitted on the basis of tampered mark sheet, for which inquiry is pending. It has been further asserted that Dr. Bhagwat Prasad Pandey was not a party in the writ petition filed by Dr. Saroj Kumar Singh. In the rejoinder-affidavit apart from the above facts no further material has been disclosed. ( 5 ) THE respondents on the other hand had filed an application for vacating the interim order alleging interalia that the petitioner had been claiming admission in 1991 Session in the entrance examination whereof he had secured only 1005 marks out of 3000 marks which is far less than the qualifying marks of fifty percent prescribed by the Apex court for admission in PGMEE for the year 1991 and 1990. Sixty more students, who claimed admission in M. S. Surgery course, have secured marks higher than the petitioner. Suppressing the above facts the petitioner obtained conditional interim order in the Writ Petition on 9-12-1992. Subsequently he obtained another order dated 5-5-1993 directing straightaway admission. Against the said order dated 5-5-1993 alongwith the order dated 9-12-1992 Special Leave petition was moved, which was also rejected on 18-7-1995 with an observation that the matter being pending before the High Court the parties can agitate their contentions in the writ petition. Before the matter could be decided finally contempt petition no. 1184 of 1993 has been filed. ( 6 ) IN the counter-affidavit filed by the petitioner to the said application for vacating the interim order the petitioner admitted to have obtained 1005 out of 3000 marks. He further contended that despite the interim order the petitioner was not given admission though specific direction was given for straightaway admission in the order dated 5-5-1993. ( 6 ) IN the counter-affidavit filed by the petitioner to the said application for vacating the interim order the petitioner admitted to have obtained 1005 out of 3000 marks. He further contended that despite the interim order the petitioner was not given admission though specific direction was given for straightaway admission in the order dated 5-5-1993. Much stress was laid in the said counter-affidavit on the question of violation of two interim orders dated 9-12-1992 and 5-5-1993, for which further orders were obtained for compliance of those orders in Contempt petition no. 1220 of 1995 passed on 31-6-1995. In another Contempt application no. 1184 of 1993 further order was passed on 20/10/1995 while the Contempt Petition no. 1220 of 1995 was allowed to be withdrawn. In the said counter affidavit in para- II it has been admitted by the petitioner that one Dr. Anupam Gupta and Dr. Renu Agarwal who appeared in P. G. M. E. E. 1990 and Dr. Sanjay Agarwal, who appeared in P. G. M. E. E. in 1991, secured 41% and 40 % and 46% marks respectively which were less than the marks obtained by the petitioner in P. G. M. E. E. 1990, and obtained direction from this court for admission. Against the said order S. L. P. , preferred by the respondents was allowed and the order of the High Court was set aside by an order dated 13-2-1992. The said three doctors had moved Review petition no. 263 of 1992 where upon Honble Supreme Court directed admission of the said three doctors within ten days. He further mentioned that many other doctors who are similarly situate with regard to P. G. M. E. E. 1991, securing marks much less than the petitioner, were granted admission by the Principal, on the basisof order passed by the High Court. He has cited instance of Dr. Mohd. Haroon. Dr. V. K. Jindal, securing 30% and 40% marks in P. G. M. E. E. 1991 and Dr. Megh Singh and Dr. Yogendra Singh, procured marks less than fifty percent, yet they were allowed to be admitted on the basis of the order passed by this Court. He has cited instance of Dr. Mohd. Haroon. Dr. V. K. Jindal, securing 30% and 40% marks in P. G. M. E. E. 1991 and Dr. Megh Singh and Dr. Yogendra Singh, procured marks less than fifty percent, yet they were allowed to be admitted on the basis of the order passed by this Court. ( 7 ) IN the above background the submissions were made by Sri Dinesh Dwivedi, learned counsel for the petitioner which were countered by Sri A. N. Sinha, learned counsel appearing on behalf of Respondent No. 3 and Sri Rakesh Dwivedi, learned counsel appearing on behalf of Respondent No. 2. Sri Dinesh Dwivedi laid much stress on the conduct of the respondents with regard to non-compliance of the orders passed by this court for granting admission to the petitioner and contended that on account of such conduct the respondents had lost all eligibility to defend themselves and dis-entitled themselves to have any equity in their favour. Secondly, he contended relying on Article 14 of the Constitution and sought to invoke equality claue, citing the instances of admission of the past candidates, mentioned above. He contended that the persons similarly situate having obtained orders of admission passed by this court, the petitioners would also get the same benefit and the order passed by this court, though by way of interim order should be confirmed and complied with. With great emphasis he attempted to draw inspiration and support from the case of Dr. Anupam Gupta, in which even after the order setting aside the order passed by this court, admission was allowed upon an application for review by Honble Supreme court. He contended further that many seats remained vacant in each session and even if the present case there being vacancy the petitioner should be given admission and the seat should not be allowed to go vacant and waste. Sri Dwivedi however, further contended that cut off marks in the facts and circumstances of the case, is illegal and arbitrary, particularly when seats are allowed to remain vacant and go waste. ( 8 ) SRI A. N. Sinha, on the other hand contends that in admission in the mid term would disturb the studies of the academic session and would erode the excellence. ( 8 ) SRI A. N. Sinha, on the other hand contends that in admission in the mid term would disturb the studies of the academic session and would erode the excellence. He further contends that P. G. Course is higher course and technical one which requires particular standard, for which it is necessary to maintain standard. In order to maintain excellence it is more necessary to lay down certain norms. In the academic sphere a brilliant and less than medicos cannot be taught together, therefore, it is more necessary to lay down cut off marks in order to ensure academic standard. Therefore, there is no illegality or arbitrariness in fixing up the cut off marks. He further contends that there being no vacancy in 1990 course the petitioner cannot be accommodated where as there is only one vacancy in 1991 course and there being sixty other students who had secured marks higher than the petitioner, there cannot be any reason for admitting the petitioner. He further contends that since some other persons have been admitted by the orders either of this court or of Honble Supreme court cannot be a ground for admitting the petitioner, on the basis of the order passed on 9-12-1992. Thc subsequent order dated 5-5-1993 was obtained by the petitioner through suppression of material facts-at the stage when there was no scope for admitting the petitioner in as much as such admission became physically impossible because of the progress of the Session in the meantime. ( 9 ) SRI Rakesh Dwivedi while supporting Sri A. N. Sinha, contended that the order dated 5-5-1993 and 9-12-1992 having been challenged, by means of S. L. P. which was dismissed with the observation that the writ petition being pending the question can be agitated in the writ petition before the High Court, implies that the said order still can be agitated in the writ petition for which application for vacating the interim order was tiled. He contended that the decision of the application for vacating the interim order would virtually decide the writ petition and, therefore the writ petition may also be disposed of and the question of those interim orders may also be decided. He further contended that in the mid term session admission would disturb the academic session. He contended that the decision of the application for vacating the interim order would virtually decide the writ petition and, therefore the writ petition may also be disposed of and the question of those interim orders may also be decided. He further contended that in the mid term session admission would disturb the academic session. Even if the petitioners case is considered in 1991 Session then the case of sixty other candidates, securing marks higher than the petitioner, in 1991 Session are also to be considered. ( 10 ) SO far as the question of admission in 1990 session is concerned there is nothing to show that the statement made in the counter affidavit by the Respondent No. 3 that there is no vacancy is incorrect. In any event the petitioner having appeared in P. G. M. E. E. 1991 after having been unsuccessful in P. G. M. E. E. 1990 the petitioner himself has abandoned his case so far as P. G. M. E. E. 1990 is concerned. He is, therefore estopped from espousing his cause for 1990 session. Though in the pleading and at the time of argument at the bar the question of 1990 session has been raised and agitated but in the prayer mandamus was sought for only in respect of 1991 session. Therefore, it is not open to the petitioner for claiming the benefit for 1990 session. ( 11 ) SHRI Dinesh Dwivedi, however, wanted to cite the decision of Dr Anupam Gupta and others, who had secured marks less than 49%, were given admission under the orders of the court, in order to impress upon that similar direction should be given by the court in the case of the petitioner since he could get the same benefit having in his credit 49%, in 1990 session. Such impression was sought to be created by Sri Dinesh Dwivedi in order to point out a circumstance which may help the petitioner to draw sympathy of the court and pointed out instance for claiming equity in his favour. ( 12 ) SO far as the instances of admission through the orders of this court are concerned the facts of those cases are not before this court, therefore, it is difficult to assess as to which weighed with the court while granting admission to those candidates. ( 12 ) SO far as the instances of admission through the orders of this court are concerned the facts of those cases are not before this court, therefore, it is difficult to assess as to which weighed with the court while granting admission to those candidates. In any event those were given admission on the basis of facts and circumstances of the case. Each case depends upon the facts and circumstances of the particular case and no two cases can be presumed to be identical unless it is shown to be so. In any event Sri Dinesh Dwivedi has not been able to draw my attention from any order directing admission of those candidates, cited by the petitioner, to show that these cases laid down any ratio so as to declare them stare dices. The orders of the court can never be treated and/or cited to be a ground for discrimination for invoking Article 14 of the Constitution. Equality clause is applicable to the respondents who may be said to be discriminating. The same cannot be invoked while judicial decision is pronounced by the Judiciary. So far as the Judiciary is concerned, it is bound by precedence and not by Article 14 of the Constitution. There can not be any equality clause so far as judiciary is concerned while dispensing justice in itself enforcing equality clause. The said order could not be shown to be precedent by Sri Dinesh Dwivedi so as to compel me to follow the said order, in the present case. Even though lapse of time makes a great difference in the situation which also is to he taken into account. ( 13 ) SO far as the question of admission in 1991 session is concerned the petitioner has secured only 1005 marks out of 3000 which comes to 33. 35% which is much below fifty percent. This in itself shows that the petitioner has secured less marks from the eligibility criterion. In case this court invokes equity in favour of the petitioner then this court would do injustice to sixty other candidates who had secured marks higher than the petitioner and in that event if cited cases are followed those sixty students would also attempt to take advantage of the same situation while there is only one vacancy in 1991 session. In case this court invokes equity in favour of the petitioner then this court would do injustice to sixty other candidates who had secured marks higher than the petitioner and in that event if cited cases are followed those sixty students would also attempt to take advantage of the same situation while there is only one vacancy in 1991 session. The averments with regard to existence of only one vacancy though has been denied by the petitioner but he has not been able to point out anything to show that there are some seats vacant. In the facts and circumstances of the case, therefore neither the said orders of this court or that of Honble Supreme Court, cited by the petitioner, can either be treated as precedent or stare decis or to be followed on account of equality clause, as observed earlier. Neither the same can help the petitioner in invoking the equity jurisdiction, as has been attempted by Sri Dinesh Dwivedi. ( 14 ) SO far as the case of Dr. Bhagwat Prasad Pandey is concerned it is on the own showing of the petitioner inquiry is pending. In respect of admission of Dr. Bhagwat Prasad Pandey who, as alleged by the petitioner, got admission on the basis of tampered mark-sheets without entrance examination, shows that he was not given admission legally. Even assuming that the respondents are responsible for the said illegal admission of Dr. Bhagwat Prasad Pandey, inasmuchas Dr. Bhagwat Prasad Pandey was admitted by reason of an order passed in Writ petition No. 17797 of 1989, was not a party to the said writ petition, still then the petitioner cannot claim equity on the ground that the respondents having committed one illegality should commit another illegality. The court can not be a party to the enforcement of illegality or direct the respondents to follow or repeat the illegal activities. Such a situation would encourage the anarchy in the administration. Therefore citing the instance of Dr. Bhagwat Prasad Pandey, the petitioner cannot obtain any advantage. ( 15 ) MR. Dwivedi laid great emphasis in the case of Dr. Anupam Gupta, where upon a review, they were allowed admission and, therefore, sought to draw inspiration therefrom but the said question stands concluded by reason of the judgment in the case of Dr. Bhagwat Prasad Pandey, the petitioner cannot obtain any advantage. ( 15 ) MR. Dwivedi laid great emphasis in the case of Dr. Anupam Gupta, where upon a review, they were allowed admission and, therefore, sought to draw inspiration therefrom but the said question stands concluded by reason of the judgment in the case of Dr. Indu Kant v. State of U. P. Alr 1993 SC 1215, wherein it has been held : (at P. 1217 of AIR)"we have given our thoughtful consideration to the entire facts and circumstances of the case. We have already held that the rule laying down the minimum percentage of marks in the entrance examination is valid and no direction can be given to the State Government to fill up any vacant seats by the candidates securing less than the minimum qualifying marks. We had of course, made a recommendation to the State Government in respect of the vacant seats of Post Graduate Course for 1992 but we find no valid justification to make such recommendation in respect of the candidates of the earlier years of 1990 or 1991. The candidates who had not secured the minimum qualifying marks in the years 1990 or 1991 had an opportunity to appear in the entrance examination of 1992 and to make up the deficient. We find justification in the difficulties pointed out by the State Government in doing so. Granting admission to the candidates of 1990 and 1991 batch now and to allow them to join with the batch of 1992 is bound to increase the total strength of Post Graduate students in 1992. This would not only be in violation of the directions of the Medical Council of India but would also put an additional financial burden on the State Government. In any case the State Government itself is vehemently opposing such request made on behalf of the candidates of 1990 and 1991 and we cannot give any direction to the State Government in this regard. "admittedly long time has lapsed. The petitioner has made the present application on 3-12-1992 namely even after P. G. M. E. E. 1992 had taken place. "admittedly long time has lapsed. The petitioner has made the present application on 3-12-1992 namely even after P. G. M. E. E. 1992 had taken place. Therefore, the petitioner had an opportunity of making up the deficiency by appearing in 1992 P. G. M. E. Examination which he had not done and even then there would be excess load if the respondents are burdened with the case of the petitioner in view of the direction given in the case of Ombir Singh v. State of U. P. 1992 AIR SCW 3218: ( AIR 1993 SC 975 ). ( 16 ) SRI Rakesh Dwivedi has also contended that unless the candidate qualifies in securing minimum marks he cannot be admitted. Such proposition of minimum marks or qualifying marks was also having approval of the Apex court even when the candidates are nominated by the Government in the case of Suman Gupta v. State of J and K AIR 1983 SC 135. The contention of Sri Dinesh Dwivedi that by reason of the interim order of the Court the petitioner ought to have been given admission provisionally, cannot be accepted on the face of the decision in the case of Krishna Priya Ganguly v. Lucknow University AIR 1984 SC 186 wherein it has been laid down : (at p. 187 of AIR)"our suggestion, therefore is that whenever a writ petition is filed provisional admission should not be given as a matter of course on the petition being admitted unless the court is fully satisfied that the petitioner has a castiron case which is bound to succeed or the error is so gross or apparent that no other conclusion is possible. In order, however, to test this fact even a short notice may be given to explore as to what the other side has to say and thereafter if the court is satisfied that there is strong prima facie case and the matter needs thorough examination provisional admission may be given. We hope and trust that the High courts would in future discontinue the practice of lightly granting provisional admission to the candidates at the time of regular admissions as observed above. " ( 17 ) THE same view was reiterated in the case of Guru Nanak Dev University v. Parminder Kr. We hope and trust that the High courts would in future discontinue the practice of lightly granting provisional admission to the candidates at the time of regular admissions as observed above. " ( 17 ) THE same view was reiterated in the case of Guru Nanak Dev University v. Parminder Kr. Bansal AIR 1993 SC 2412 wherein it has been held as follows: (at p. 2414 of AIR)"sri Gambhir is right in his submission. We are afraid. that this kind of administration of interlocutory remedies, more guided by sympathy quite often wholly misplaced, does no service to any one. From the series of orders that keep coming before us in academic matters we find that lose, ill-conceived sympathy masquerades as interlocutory justice exposing judicial discretion to the criticism of degenerating into private benevolence. This is subversive of academic discipline or whatever is left of it, leading to serious impasse in academic life. Admissions cannot be ordered without regard to the eligibility of the candidates. Decisions on matters relevant to be taken into account at the interlocutory stage cannot be deferred or decided later when serious complications might ensue from the interim order itself. In the present case, the High Court was apparently moved by sympathy for the candidates then by an accurate assessment of even the Prima-facie legal position. Such orders can not be allowed to stand. The court should not embarrass academic authorities by itself taking over their functions. " ( 18 ) IN the case of State of U. P. v. Dr. Anupam Gupta AIR 1992 SC 932 it has been laid down: (at p. 938 of AIR)"considering from this point of view, to maintain excellence the courses have to be commenced on schedule and to be completed within the schedule, so that the students would have full opportunity to study full course to meet their excellence and come at par excellence. Admission in the midstream would disturb the courses and also work as handicap to the candidates themselves to achieve excellence. Considering from this pragmatic point of view we are of the considered opinion that vacancies of the seats would not be taken as aground to give admission and direction by the High Court to admit the candidates into those vacant seats cannot be sustained. Considering from this pragmatic point of view we are of the considered opinion that vacancies of the seats would not be taken as aground to give admission and direction by the High Court to admit the candidates into those vacant seats cannot be sustained. " ( 19 ) IN that view of the matter I am unable to persuade myself to agree with the contention of Sri Dinesh Dwivedi. ( 20 ) SO far as the question of interim order is concerned, it is necessary to refer to the orders dated 9-12-1992 and 5-5-1993 passed in the present case and the order dated 18-7-1995 passed by Honble Supreme Court, which are quoted below:"standing counsel is granted one months time to file a counter-affidavit. List this writ petition for admission in the 2nd week of January 1993. The petitioner contends that the persons who have obtained lesser marks than the petitioner have been given admission. If that be so, and if a seat of Junior Resident in Surgery is vacant, then the petitioner shall also be granted provisional admission meanwhile. Sd/-V. S. 9-12-1992"i am informed that despite the order of this Honble court dated 9-12-1992 the petitioner has not been admitted, it is admitted in paragraph-17 of the counter-affidavit that one seat in M. S. (Surgery) is lying vacant. In the circumstances I direct that the petitioner should be admitted in M. S. (Surgery) course within two weeks from the production of the certified copy of the order before the Principal, M. L. N. Medical College, Allahabad. Sd/- M. K. 5-5-1993""the order under appeal is an interim order. Infact it is a reiteration of an earlier order dated 9/12/1992 by which the High Court had directed the appellants to give admission to the first respondent in the M. S. Surgery course in the M. L. N. Medical College, Allahabad. The earlier order dated 9/12/1992 is, therefore, the operative order and it is not challenged. Even if we were to set aside the order under appeal the order dated 9/12/1992 would remain outstanding. Therefore this appeal cannot be allowed. The parties can agitate their contentions in the writ petition which is stated to be still pending before the High Court. The appeal is disposed of with no order as to costs. Even if we were to set aside the order under appeal the order dated 9/12/1992 would remain outstanding. Therefore this appeal cannot be allowed. The parties can agitate their contentions in the writ petition which is stated to be still pending before the High Court. The appeal is disposed of with no order as to costs. Sd/s. P. Barucha, J, Sd/- Faizan Uddin, J. , Sd/- S. B. Majumdar, J. 18-7-1995" ( 21 ) THEREFORE, it appears that the first order was not absolute order and it was conditional order. Sri Dinesh Dwivedi, learned counsel for the petitioner has not been able to point out that any person securing marks less than the petitioner in 1991 P. G. M. E. E. has been admitted in 1991 Course. Therefore, the order dated 9-12-1992 can not be said to have been violated by the respondents by not admitting the petitioner. Sri Dwivedi has not been able to point out any case of admission given by the respondents except under the orders of the High Court. Therefore the premise that despite order dated 9-12-1992 the petitioner has not been admitted is mis-nomer. The order dated 5-5-1993 which proceeds on the basis of such mis-nomer appears to be based on wrong information. Hon. Supreme Court in the order dated 18-7-1995 has refrained from deciding the question on the ground that the order dated 9-12-1992 was not challenged. But, however, liberty was given to the party to agitate their contention in the case. ( 22 ) IN my view the order dated 5-5-1993 was passed on the basis of the order dated 9-12-1992 which did not create any mandate in favour of the petitioner despite having secured 33. 35% marks when not a single instance has been shown that the respondents have admitted any candidate securing marks less than the petitioner. Therefore, it is abundantly clear that the order dated 5-5-1993 was obtained absolutely on the basis of wrong information and wrong premise. Therefore, no benefit can be derived from the said order by the petitioner. That apart by reason of the observations made in the cases of Guru Nanak Devil University v. Parminder Kr. Therefore, it is abundantly clear that the order dated 5-5-1993 was obtained absolutely on the basis of wrong information and wrong premise. Therefore, no benefit can be derived from the said order by the petitioner. That apart by reason of the observations made in the cases of Guru Nanak Devil University v. Parminder Kr. Bansal ( AIR 1993 SC 2412 ) (supra) and Krishna Priya Ganguly ( AIR 1984 SC 186 ) (supra) and in view of the decisions cited above I do not find any reason to sustain the interim order dated 5-5-1993 which was obtained solely on wrong premise and information. ( 23 ) IN the facts and circumstances of the case this writ petition can not be sustained and, as such, is dismissed with costs. Petition dismissed.