M. K. SHARMA ( 1 ) THIS writ petition is directed against the order passed by the Deputy Commissioner (C) of the Municipal Corporation of Delhi on 2. 4. 1985 imposing the penalty of removal of the petitioner from service with no disqualification for future employment and also against the order dated 26. 7. 1985 passed by the Commissioner of Municipal Corporation of Delhi, rejecting the statutory appeal filed by the petitioner against the aforesaid order imposing penalty on him by the Disciplinary Authority. ( 2 ) THE petitioner was employed as Pharmacist in the Municipal Corporation of Delhi with effect from 12. 1. 1964. The petitioner was transferred to Primary Health Centre, Mehrauli, with effect from 6. 11. 1981. Before transfer to Mehrauli, the petitioner was working as Pharmacist in Madanpur Khadar, where he was allotted a Quarter. It is stated by the petitioner that on the day when he was transferred to Primary Health Centre. Mehrauli, he requested for the allotment of a Quarter at Primary Health Centre, Mehrauli, and since he was not provided with any residential accommodation at Primary Health Centre. Mehrauli. he continued to retain the Quarter at Madanpur Khadar Dispensary. It is further stated by the petitioner that the distance between Madanpur Khadar and Primary Health Centre. Mehrauli was more than 20 kilometers and. therefore, the petitioner had some difficulty in attending to his work at Mehrauli as there w as no direct bus route from Madanpur Khadar to Mehrauli. with the result that the petitioner had to change two/three buses to reach Mehrauli from Madanpur Khadar. Subsequently, the petitioner was transferred to Primary Health Centre. Khanjawala vide order dated 7. 7. 1982, On receipt of the aforesaid order, the petitioner applied for leave for two days on the ground that his wife was ill. It is stated that the distance between Khanjawala and Madanpur Khadar was nearly 30 kilometers and, therefore, by the aforesaid transfer, the respondents put the petitioner into untold miseries as then the petitioner would have to cover about 30 kilometers one way every day to reach his place of posting from the place of his residence. It is stated that the distance between Khanjawala and Madanpur Khadar was nearly 30 kilometers and, therefore, by the aforesaid transfer, the respondents put the petitioner into untold miseries as then the petitioner would have to cover about 30 kilometers one way every day to reach his place of posting from the place of his residence. ( 3 ) A Departmental proceeding was drawn up against the petitioner with two charges, the fir being with the allegation that the petitioner was very irregular and unpunctual in attending his duties besides remaining absent from duty without any information and permission while working at Primary Health Centre. Mehrauli and the second charge being that he refused in writing to obey his transfer relieving orders and also did not handover the charge of his seat and Stores to the new Pharmacist a directed On the basis of the aforesaid two charges, a charge-sheet was issued 10 the petitioner on 24. 5. 1983 and during the course of the enquiry proceeding evidence was produced and of consideration of the said evidence on record, the Enquiry Officer submitted his report to the Disciplinary Authority. Having received the copy of the Enquiry Report filed against the petitioner in which the Enquiry Officer found the petitioner guilty on both the charges, the Deputy Commission considered the Enquiry Report as also the other connected records and on consideration of the same agreed with the findings of the Enquiry Officer and proposed to inflict the penalty of removal from service with no disqualification for future employment. ( 4 ) IN pursuance of the aforesaid decision of the Disciplinary Authority, a show cause notice was issued to the petitioner enclosing therewith a copy of the Enquiry Report and intimating the proposal to inflict upon him the punishment of removal from service with no disqualification for future employment. The aforesaid Memorandum was issued on 24. 1. 1985 calling upon the petitioner to submit his representation. The aforesaid Memorandum was issued on 24. 1. 1985 calling upon the petitioner to submit his representation. The petitioner as directed, submitted his representation as against tr aforesaid show cause notice and the Disciplinary Authority also gave a personal hearing to tr petitioner and on examining the reply to the show cause notice and on consideration of the pleas raise by the petitioner during the course of personal hearing, the Disciplinary Authority came to thec conclusion that no fresh argument of defence was advanced by the petitioner, in absence of which the Disciplinary Authority had reason to agree with the findings as well as order passed earlier by his predecessor as a Disciplinary Authority and directed that the petitioner be removed from service with no disqualification for future employment. ( 5 ) AS against the aforesaid order imposing penalty on the petitioner by the Disciplinary Authority on 14. 3 1985, the petitioner submitted a statutory appeal to the Appellate Authority on 8. 5. 1985. The Appellate Authority after the receipt of the aforesaid appeal submitted by the petitioner also gave personal hearing to the petitioner in response to his appeal against penalty of removal from service imposed by the Disciplinary Authority and, thereafter, on consideration of the records and the issue raised in the appeal petition came to the conclusion that there would be no justification for interferin with the orders of the Disciplinary Authority and, accordingly, rejected the appeal by his order date 26. 7 1985. Hence, the present writ petition challenging the aforesaid actions and orders passed b the concerned respondents. ( 6 ) MR G. D. Gupta, the learned counsel appearing for the petitioner drew my attention to the various statements made in the writ petition and other pleadings to show the circumstances under which the petitioner was absent from duties when he was posted at Primary Health Dispensary Mehrauli. ( 6 ) MR G. D. Gupta, the learned counsel appearing for the petitioner drew my attention to the various statements made in the writ petition and other pleadings to show the circumstances under which the petitioner was absent from duties when he was posted at Primary Health Dispensary Mehrauli. He specifically drew my attention to the statements made in Paragraphs 13 to 16 of the writ petition and stated that his casual absence from duty on being posted to Mehrauli werejustifie because of the fact that the petitioner was not provided with any Quarter at Mehrauli by the respondent According to him, if the petitioner would have been provided with aresidential accommodation ; Mehrauli there would have been no occasion for him to be absent from duty and therefore, the absenc of the petitioner from duty on the dates as shown in the list in the Enquiry Report were beyond his control. His submission was that, such an absence could not have been termed as unauthorised absence and lenient view should have been taken both by the Disciplinary Authority and the Appellate Authority. The further submission of the learned counsel was with regard to the other charge of his refusal to handover charge at the Primary Health Centre at Mehrauli on his transfer to the Dispensary at Khanjawala, for which his submission was that he was ready and willing to handover charge at the Primary Health Centre. Mehrauli and in fact he sent the key of the Primary Health Centre to the Pharmacist their through his son and therefore, the said charge is also not proved. ( 7 ) THE next submission of the learned counsel for the petitioner is that the Disciplinary Authority after receipt of the explanation given by the petitioner to the show cause notice mechanically passed the order of removal in a most cryptic manner w ithout recording any reason and w ithout a speaking order. Recording of detailed reasons after appreciation of evidence on record, in his submission, is a requirement in view of the necessity on the part of the Disciplinary Authority to issue a second show cause notice. Recording of detailed reasons after appreciation of evidence on record, in his submission, is a requirement in view of the necessity on the part of the Disciplinary Authority to issue a second show cause notice. The further submission of the learned counsel is that the penalty imposed on the petitioner is also not proportionate to the nature of the charges alleged to have been proved against him in as much as, the allegation against him only related to unauthorised absence only for a few days and not handing over the charge immediately for which lenient punishment could have been given by the Disciplinary Authority or by the Appellate Authority. The learned counsel also assailed the order passed by the Appellate Authority on the ground that no opportunity was given to the petitioner to meet the allegations made against him about his past instances of absence from duty and also not considering the factor of illness of his wife which were brought out in his representation specifically. ( 8 ) MR. K. K. Bhuchar, appearing for the respondents submitted that the petitioner is not entitled to challenge in this writ proceeding the finding of facts recorded by the authorities. According to him, there are concurrent findings of the authorities that both the charges have been proved beyond reasonable doubt and such finding of fact should not be disturbed in this proceeding. He also drew my attention to the findings recorded by the Enquiry Officer in coming to the conclusion that both the charges w ere proved. He also brought to my notice the fact that the petitioner w as allotted with a Class IV Quarter vacant at P. H. C. . Mehrauli. but the petitioner refused to reside in the same and that he was more interested in residing at the Quarter of Madanpur Khadar Dispensary and that because of the said fact he was allowed to retain the possession of the aforesaid Quarter at Madanpur Khadar Dispensary. According to him no document worth noticing was produced by the petitioner in support of his claim that his wife was suffering from heart ailment. According to him no document worth noticing was produced by the petitioner in support of his claim that his wife was suffering from heart ailment. The further contention of the learned counsel for the respondents was that the Disciplinary Authority apparently on the face of the records considered the entire records, applied its mind to the facts of the case and the records and agreed with the finding of the Enquiry Officer and, therefore, there was no further requirement for the Disciplinary Authority to again independently record all the evidence against the petitioner, appreciate them and then record his own findings, over and above the findings of the Enquiry Officer. The Appellate Authority according to the counsel for the respondent as disclosed from the order of the Appellate Authority applied its mind, considered all the pleas raised by the petitioner given him a personal hearing and, thereafter, passed a reasoned order and, therefore, there is no illegality committed in the instant case in imposing the penalty against the petition either by the Disciplinary Authority or by the Appellate Authority. ( 9 ) THE scope and ambit of appreciating the evidence and the jurisdiction of the Court to interfere with the report of the Enquiry Officer and the action taken by the Disciplinary Authority on it is by now well settled. In a recent decision of the Supreme Court in B. C. Chaturvedi Vs. Union of India, reported in JT 1995 (8) SC 65, this is what is authoritatively laid down by the Supreme Court:. Isl "judicial review is not an appeal from a decision but a review of the manner in which the decision is made. Power of judicial review is meant to ensure that the individual receives fair treatment and not to ensure that the conclusion which the authority reaches is necessarily correct in the eye of the court. When an inquiry is conducted on charges of misconduct by a public servant, the Court/tribunal is concerned to determine whether the inquiry was held by a competent officer or whether rules or natural justice are complied with. Whether the findings or conclusions are based on some evidence, the authority entrusted with the power to hold inquiry has jurisdiction, power and authority to reach a finding of fact or conclusion. But that finding must be based on some evidence. Whether the findings or conclusions are based on some evidence, the authority entrusted with the power to hold inquiry has jurisdiction, power and authority to reach a finding of fact or conclusion. But that finding must be based on some evidence. Neither the technical rules of Evidence Act nor of proof of fact or evidence as defined therein, apply to disciplinary proceeding. When the authority accepts that evidence and conclusion receives support therefrom, the disciplinary authority is entitled to hold that the delinquent officer is guilty of the charge. The Court/tribunal in its power of judicial review does not act as appellate authority to re-appreciate the evidence and to arrive at its own independent findings on the evidence. The Court/tribunal may interfere where the authority held the proceedings against the delinquent officer in a manner inconsistent with the rules of natural justice in violation of statutory rules prescribing the mode of inquiry or where the conclusion or finding reached by the disciplinary authority is based on no evidence. If the conclusion or finding be such as no reasonable person would have ever reached, the Court/tribunal may interfere with the conclusion or the finding, and mould the relief so as to make it appropriate to the facts of each case. The disciplinary authority is the sole judge of facts. Where appeal is presented, the appellate authority has co-extensive power to reappreciate the evidence or the nature of punishment. In a disciplinary inquiry the strict proof of legal evidence and findings on that evidence are not relevant. Adequacy of evidence or reliability of evidence cannot be permitted to be canvassed before the Court/tribunal. " ( 10 ) IN the light of the ratio of the aforesaid decision of the Supreme Court, it is not possible for this Court to reappraise the evidence laid before the Enquiry Officer as also the findings arrived at the Enquiry Officer unless it is perverse or there is procedural or statutory error in conducting to enquiry. On going through the report of the Enquiry Officer and the other records of the Disciplinary Authority, I have no hesitation in my mind to come to the conclusion that the findings of the Enquiry Officer is based on evidence. In my considered opinion the Enquiry Officer has considered to evidence on record, appreciated the same and has come to a definite conclusion that the charge against the petitioner are proved. In my considered opinion the Enquiry Officer has considered to evidence on record, appreciated the same and has come to a definite conclusion that the charge against the petitioner are proved. It also appears on record that the petitioner was offered a Quarter at Mehrauli which is just 10 kilometers away from Kanjawala, but the petitioner himself declined move to the said Quarter and he himself opted out of the offer and chose to retain the Quarter Madanpur Khadar. Therefore, the submission of the learned counsel for the petitioner that the reason for being absent from duty at Mehrauli on the part of the petitioner was beyond his control is supported by the records of the case. On going through the evidence on record. I find that the petitioner under his own signature dated 9. 7. 1982. specifically recorded on the back of relieving order "i totally refuse to obey the relieving orders. " In my opinion that action itself on the part of the petitioner was height of insubordination and the findings arrived at by the Enquiry Officer on this charge also appears to be amply proved. ( 11 ) COMING to the submission of the learned counsel for the petitioner that the Disciplinary Authority has mechanically passed the order of removal, I considered the said submission giving proper weightage to the same. The impugned order of the Disciplinary Authority removing the petitioner from service does disclose that the Disciplinary Authority gave a personal hearing to the petitioner subsequent to the filing of his explanation to the show cause notice and also considered the pleas raised in the said explanation and on consideration of the aforesaid aspects found no reason to disagree with the findings recorded by the Enquiry Officer as also with the order passed by his predecessor as the Disciplinary Authority. In Union of India and Ors Vs. K. Rajappa Menon, reported in A. I. R. 1970 S. C 748, the Supreme Court rejected a similar plea raised on behalf of the delinquent employee in the following manner: "rule 1713 does not lay down any particular form or manner in which the disciplinary authority should record its findings on each charge. All that the Rule requires is that the record of the enquiry should be considered and the disciplinary authority should proceed to give its findings on each charge. All that the Rule requires is that the record of the enquiry should be considered and the disciplinary authority should proceed to give its findings on each charge. This does not and cannot mean that it is obligatory on the disciplinary authority to discuss the evidence and the facts and circumstances established at the departmental enquiry in details and write as if it were an order or a judgment of a judicial tribunal. The rule certainly requires the disciplinary authority to give consideration to the record of the proceedings, which as expressly stated in Exh. R. 8, was done by the Chief Commercial Superintendent. When he agreed with the findings of the Enquiry Officer that all the charges mentioned in the charge-sheet had been established it meant that he w as affirming the findings on each charge and that would certainly fulfil the requirement of the Rule. The Rule after all has to be read not in a pedantic manner but in a practical and reasonable way and so read it is difficult to escape from the conclusion that the Chief Commercial Superintendent had substantially complied with the requirements of the Rule. The interference by the High Court, therefore, on the ground that there had been non- compliance with R. 1713 was not justified. " ( 12 ) INCIDENTALLY the provisions of Rule 8 (9) of the Delhi Municipal Corporation Service (Control and Appeal) Regulation. 1959 which is applicable to the case in hand is almost similarly worded as that of Rule 1713 of Railway Servants (Conduct and Disciplinary) Rules. It, thus, cannot be said that the order passed by the Disciplinary Authority was in any way devoid of reason or was not a speaking order. I. therefore, hold and conclude that the Disciplinary Authority in passing the order of removal against the petitioner substantially complied with the requirements of the regulation. The order passed by the Appellate Authority also contains well considered reasons and there is also no infirmity so far the said order passed by the Appellate Authority is concerned. The submission of the learned counsel for the petitioner to the effect that the penalty imposed on the petitioner is not proportionate to the charges is also devoid of any force, in as much as, in my opinion, both the charges against the petitioner. The submission of the learned counsel for the petitioner to the effect that the penalty imposed on the petitioner is not proportionate to the charges is also devoid of any force, in as much as, in my opinion, both the charges against the petitioner. that is, one with regard to unauthorised absence and the other w ith regard to his refusal to handover the charge have been proved in the Departmental proceeding. This Court as has been held by the Supreme Court in B. C. Chaturvedi s case (supra), is not competent to modify and/or change the quantum of penalty imposed on the delinquent officer, if the same is not shocking to the conscience. It is apt to quote the following lines from paragraph 18 of the judgment: "a review of the above legal position would establish that the disciplinary authority. and on appeal the appellate authority, being fact-finding authorities have exclusive power to consider the evidence with a view to maintain discipline. They are invested with the discretion to impose appropriate punishment keeping in view the magnitude or gravity of the misconduct. The High Court/tribunal, while exercising the power of judicial review, cannot normally substitute its own conclusion on penalty and impose some other penalty. If the punishment imposed by the disciplinary authority or the appellate authority shocks the conscience of the High Court/tribunal, it would appropriately mould the relief, either directing the disciplinary/appellate authority to reconsider the penalty imposed, or to shorten the litigation, it may itself, in exceptional and rare cases, impose appropriate punishment with cogent reasons in support thereof. " ( 13 ) I have no hesitation in my mind to hold that the refusal to hand over charge and to obey the transfer order is absolute insubordination, so also his unauthorised absence from duty and as such the penalty imposed on the petitioner of removing him from service without disqualification for future employment cannot be said to be disproportionate to the charges proved ( 14 ) IN view of my aforesaid conclusions. I do not find any merit in this writ petition and the same is dismissed, but without any costs.