T. S. DOABIA, J. ( 1 ) THIS petition has been preferred against an order passed by the Additional Sessions Judge, Vidisha in Sessions Trial No. 195 of 1995. This is dated 2nd of December, 1995. A charge under S. 307 read with S. 149 of the Indian Penal Code (for short IPC) stands framed against the petitioners. This order is being impugned in the present petition. Accused Khajjansingh and Sanmansingh are alleged to given a lathi blow, Ramkishore is said to have given a sword blow and Kalyansingh is also said to have given a lathi blow. ( 2 ) THE argument advanced by the learned counsel for the petitioners is that this is not a fit case for framing a charge under S. 307 of the IPC. According to him, the nature of the injuries should be examined at this stage and if these are not of such a nature which is likely to cause death then charge under S. 307 of the IPC should not have been framed. ( 3 ) INJURY No. 1 on the person of one of the injured, Iqbal be noticed. It is as under :"1. Lacerated wound 4. 5 cms. x 1 cm. x 1 cm. deep obliquely placed over the parietal region. Bleeding present. 2 and 3. *** ***". ( 4 ) INJURIES which are on the person of injured, Rais Khan be also noticed. "1. Lacerated wound 4 cms. x 1 cm. x 1 cm. Deep obliquely placed near middle and haircreye not visible on scalp. Bleeding present. 2. Pain and not visible swelling over proximal in the (not visible) joint of left middle finger. Abrasion 0. 5 cm. in size over dorsum. 3. Pain and not visible and swelling over dorsum of right hand. No external mark of not visible over back. Object - Hard and blunt. Duration - Within six hours. " ( 5 ) AS indicated above, the learned counsel for the petitioners submit that on the basis of decisions reported below, the charge should be quashed at this stage. 3. Pain and not visible and swelling over dorsum of right hand. No external mark of not visible over back. Object - Hard and blunt. Duration - Within six hours. " ( 5 ) AS indicated above, the learned counsel for the petitioners submit that on the basis of decisions reported below, the charge should be quashed at this stage. These decisions are : (I) Triyogi Narain v. State of M. P. , 1988 (II) MPWN (SN) 74; (II) Devendra v. State of M. P. , 1988 (II) MPWN (SN) 91; (III) Halka v. State of M. P. , 1988 (II) MPWN (SC) 130; and (IV) Ramesh v. State of M. P. , 1988 (II) MPWN (SN) 173. ( 6 ) I am of the view that this is not the stage for examining the question as to whether an offence under S. 307 of the IPC has been made out or not. Assessment of sufficiency of material for basing conviction for a particular charge is not within the domain of the Court when revisional jurisdiction is being exercised. Hon'ble Shri Shacheendra Dwivedi, Judge of this Court while dealing with this aspect of the matter in Ghumansingh v. Jaswant Singh, 1991 Jab LJ 387 : (1992 Cri LJ 1169), made following pertinent observations in paras 8 and 9 :"but for the appreciation of S. 307, IPC, it is not necessary that the injury, capable of causing death, should have been actually inflicted. The section makes a distinction between the act of the accused and its result. What is material to attract the provisions of S. 307, IPC is the guilty intention or knowledge with which the act was done, irrespective of its result. The intention precedes the act and is independentof the act not to be merely gathered from the consequences that ensue. Thus, once such guilty intention is established, the nature of the act would be immaterial. Intention and knowledge are matters of inference from totality of circumstances and cannot be measured merely from the results. But again if by the result of ultimate death, the accused is not to be found guilty of murder, but only of culpable homicide not amounting to murder, the act of accused would not fall within the purview of 'an attempt of murder'. The accused might have so acted under the right of his private defence. But again if by the result of ultimate death, the accused is not to be found guilty of murder, but only of culpable homicide not amounting to murder, the act of accused would not fall within the purview of 'an attempt of murder'. The accused might have so acted under the right of his private defence. But these would be the considerations only after the trial is held, and not at the stage of charge, where such an assessment is premature. The accused would be entitled to explain the circumstances of his act, and the Court would be within its powers to extend him such benefit. At the stage of trial as is held by the Apex Court in Mohd. Akbar's case, AIR 1981 SC 1548 : (1981 Cri LJ 1135), that at the stage of framing of charges, meticulous consideration of evidence and material by Court is not required. EACH case depends upon the facts that are involved in it and there can be no universal formula, but, 'the standard test proof and judgment which are to be applied finally before finding the accused guilty or otherwise, are not exactly to be applied at the stage of Ss. 227 and 228, Cr. P. C. " (See Supdt. Remembrancer of Legal Affairs, West Bengal's case, AIR 1980 SC 52 : (1979 Cri LJ 1390 ). This Court also following the verdict of the Apex Court in state of Bihar v. Ramesh Singh, AIR 1977 SC 2018 : (1977 Cri LJ 1606), and the subsequent decisions, in 4 at p. 1194), found that :"the distinction is thus : while recording the ultimate findings there is every presumption in favour of the innocence of the accused in the matter of determining his guilt and even in the matter of determining his intention or knowledge affecting the gravity of the crime, but at the stage of framing the charge, even a strong suspicion of course founded upon material, and a presumptive opinion, would enable the Court in framing a charge against the accused. " ( 7 ) IT would also be useful to refer to a decision given by the Supreme Court reported as Radhey Shyam v. Kunj Behari, AIR 1990 SC 121 : (1990 Cri LJ 668 ). " ( 7 ) IT would also be useful to refer to a decision given by the Supreme Court reported as Radhey Shyam v. Kunj Behari, AIR 1990 SC 121 : (1990 Cri LJ 668 ). It was observed that a charge is not to be quashed by going into the question as to whether there is sufficient evidence on the record or not. At page 123 (of AIR) : (at p. 670 of Cri LJ), it was observed as under :". . . . . In so far as the High Court's view that "in the interest of justice, it is the duty the Court under S. 482, Cr. P. C. to go into the merits of the evidence and appreciate correctly the documents and the statements filed by the police", we may only refer to Mohd. Akbar Dar v. State of Jammu and Kashmir, 1981 Supp SCC 80 : AIR 1981 SC 1548 : (1981 Cri LJ1135)WHERE it has been pointed out that at the stage of framing of charges, meticulous consideration of evidence and materials by Court is not required. " ( 8 ) IN view of the above position of law, it would not be apt to interfere with the order passed by the Additional Sessions Judge, Vidisha. The question as to whether an injury in the parietal region with a lathi would fall within the scope of S. 307 of the IPC would ultimately depend upon the evidence which is brought on the record and also the opinion which may be expressed by the medical experts when they come into the witness box. All this would come on the record during the trial only. In this view of the matter, there is no merit in this revision petition and the same is dismissed. Records of the case be returned forthwith and the trial be expedited. Petition dismissed. .