JUDGMENT : P.K. Misra, J. - This is an application filed by the accused person in G. R. Case No. 378 of 1995 in the file of the Judicial Magistrate, First Class, Nimapara, invoking the inherent jurisdiction of this Court u/s 482 of the Code of Criminal Procedure (hereinafter referred to as the "Code") for quashing the criminal proceeding on the ground that the dispute among the rival parties has been amicably settled. Charge-sheet has been filed and cognisance has been taken of offences under Sections 147, 148, 323, 294, 506, 336, 427, 307 read with Section 149 of the Indian Penal Code. The informant and two others (injured persons) have entered their appearance through counsel and supported the submission of the petitioners. It is submitted on their behalf that there was a clash between the neighbouring villagers and, in fact, an application u/s 482 of the Code has been filed which is numbered as Criminal Misc. Case No. 1363 of 1996, for quashing the counter case. Mr. S. K. Nayak, the learned Additional Standing Counsel appearing on behalf of the State, submitted that since the offences are not compoundable, power u/s 432 of the Cods should not be exercised to quash the criminal proceeding. 2. The learned counsel for the petitioners has placed reliance on the decision reported in AIR 1988 2111 (SC) . He has stated that even though an offence may not be compoundable, in a fit case in exercise of power u/s 482 of the Code, the High Court can quash a criminal proceeding to secure the ends of justice. He has further submitted that the principle laid down in the decision reported in AIR 1988 2111 (SC) has been followed by the decisions of the Orissa High Court reported in (1994) 7 OCR 207 (Sudam Charan Barik v. State and Ors.) and (1996) 10 OCR 533 (Hari Mohapatra and Anr. v. State of Orissa and Ors.). He has also placed reliance upon the decisions reported in (1988) 1 OCR 564 (Md. Khaliur Rahaman v. State of Orissa and Anr.); 1989 (I) OLR 183 (Debendra Kumar Mohanty v. State); (1993) 6 OCR 186 (Baby alias Sita Kumari Agrawal v. Officer-in-charge, Purighat Police Station and 3 others); (1995) 8 OCR 514 (Mrs. Rashmi Rekha Mohanty and Anr. He has also placed reliance upon the decisions reported in (1988) 1 OCR 564 (Md. Khaliur Rahaman v. State of Orissa and Anr.); 1989 (I) OLR 183 (Debendra Kumar Mohanty v. State); (1993) 6 OCR 186 (Baby alias Sita Kumari Agrawal v. Officer-in-charge, Purighat Police Station and 3 others); (1995) 8 OCR 514 (Mrs. Rashmi Rekha Mohanty and Anr. v. State of Orissa and Ors.) and (1995) 9 OCR 495 (Ali Khan v. State of Orissa and Anr.), Where without specifically referring to the decision of the Supreme Court reported in AIR 1988 2111 (SC) similar view had been expressed. In the decision reported in AIR 1988 2111 (SC), though the accused persons were acquitted by the trial Court, the High Court in appeal against acquittal had convicted them of the offence under Sec 307, Indian Penal Code, which was challenged in the SLP before the Supreme Court. In the Supreme Court, the parties filed a petition seeking permission to compound the offence. The Supreme Court while accepting such a plea directed the trial Judge to accord permission to compound the offence. Strictly speaking, the question whether a proceeding can be quashed u/s 482 of the Code on the ground of compromise in respect of non-compoundable offence had not been specifically raised, nor decided in the said case. However, following the said decision, in the decision reported in (1994) 7 OCR 207, an alleged offence u/s 307, Indian Penal Code, was quashed by this Court as the Court was satisfied that it was a fit case for exercising inherent jurisdiction of the Court in the interest of Justice, as the injuries were simple in nature and the parties had decided to settle up their dispute and live in peace. In the decision reported in (1995) 8 OCR 514 the dispute was between husband and wife. The Court held that the allegations did not make out a case u/s 307, Indian Penal Code, thought charge-sheet had been submitted under Sections 307 and 498A, Indian Penal Code. Considering the nature of injury, the Court held that no offence u/s 307 had been made out and even accepting the allegations to be true, it could be said that an offence u/s 323-had been prima facie made out. Considering the nature of injury, the Court held that no offence u/s 307 had been made out and even accepting the allegations to be true, it could be said that an offence u/s 323-had been prima facie made out. The Court further held that the offence u/s 323 was compoundable and though Section 498A was not compoundable, since the parties had decided to live together, relying upon the decision of the Patna High Court in the case of Jai Prakash Churasia v. State of Bihar and Anr. 1994 (1) Crime 404, the criminal case was quashed In exercise of power u/s 482 of the Code. Similar view was expressed by the same learned Judge in the decision reported in (1995) 9 OCR 495, which again related TO a dispute between the husband and wife. In the decision reported in (1988)1 OCR 564, charge-sheet had been filed under Sections 506 and 294, Indian Penal Code. Though compromise was effected, the G. R. case was not dropped as the offence u/s 294 was not compoundable. The accused persons moved the High Court u/s 482 of the Code for quashing the proceeding. Considering the fact that continuance of the proceeding would be an abuse of the process of the Court and would degenerate itself to be a weapon of harassment and would not achieve any beneficial result nor would be in aid either of achieving any social or public justice, the High Court quashed the proceeding in exercise of power u/s 482 of the Code. In the decision reported in 1989 (I) OLR 183, the proceeding was quashed as the accused and the alleged victim had married each other. It was observed ; "....In the circumstances allowing the trial of the petitioner to continue would not only be harassment to the petitioner and family of the petitioner and of his wife but also is likely to affect the marital relationship. ... Prosecution of the petitioner in the peculiar circumstances would be more detrimental to the society than to its benefit. Accordingly, this is a fit case where the inherent power is to be exercised to. quash the prosecution. ..." In the decision reported in (1993) 6 OCR 186. which was, of course, a decision rendered in exercise of power under Arts. Prosecution of the petitioner in the peculiar circumstances would be more detrimental to the society than to its benefit. Accordingly, this is a fit case where the inherent power is to be exercised to. quash the prosecution. ..." In the decision reported in (1993) 6 OCR 186. which was, of course, a decision rendered in exercise of power under Arts. 226 and 227 of the Constitution of India, the criminal proceeding was quashed as the alleged kidnapper and the alleged victim had married each other. In the decision reported in (1996) OCR 533, the allegations were u/s 376/511, Indian Penal Code. The alleged victim as well as her mother who was the informant, filed petittion/affidavits stating that the dispute had been settled. Considering the fact of amicable settlement and the fact that the alleged victim who' was the sole witness, had filed petition/affidavit reiterating the fact that a compromise had already been effected, and as such continuance of the prosecution would have been an exercise in futility, the proceeding was quashed in exercise of power u/s 482 though the alleged offence was not compoundable. 3. The learned Additional Standing Counsel, however, has sought to distinguish the aforesaid decisions, specially the decision of the Supreme Court reported in AIR 1938 SC 2111, and has submitted that the inherent power u/s 482 of the Code cannot be invoked in view of the specific provision contained in Section 320 of the Code. He has also submitted that in some of the decisions of the Orissa High Court, such petitions for quashing criminal proceeding on the ground of compromise in respect of non-compoundable offence had been rejected. Referring to the decisions of the Supreme Court reported in Rameshchandra J. Thakkar Vs. Assandas Parmanand Jhaveri, State of Maharashtra, and Rajinder Singh Vs. State (Delhi Administration), the learned Additional Standing Counsel submitted that the decision reported in AIR 1988 2111 (SC), should not be followed, as the aforesaid two earlier decisions of the Supreme Court have not been considered therein. He further submitted that the course adopted in AIR 1988 2111 (SC), can be supported on the basis of provisions contained in Article 142 of the Constitution as had been done in the decision reported in S. Venkitachalam Iyer Vs. S. Rama Iyer, . In the decision reported in Rameshchandra J. Thakkar Vs. He further submitted that the course adopted in AIR 1988 2111 (SC), can be supported on the basis of provisions contained in Article 142 of the Constitution as had been done in the decision reported in S. Venkitachalam Iyer Vs. S. Rama Iyer, . In the decision reported in Rameshchandra J. Thakkar Vs. Assandas Parmanand Jhaveri, State of Maharashtra the trial Court had-permitted th8 complainant to withdraw the complaints in respect of offences some of which were Compoundable and In respect of offence u/s 13-of the Maharashtra Ownership of Flats Act, 1963,which was not compoundable, or* the basis of compromise between the complainant and the accused. Subsequently, the trial Court forwarded the case to the High Court for taking out contempt proceedings against the accused, as the accused did not fulfil his part of the agreement. While eonsidering the aforesaid matter, the High Court in exercise of its suo motu power of revision set aside the original order of acquittal based on compromise and directed for the continuance of the prosecution. When the matter came to the Supreme Court, it was observed that the trial Court had no jurisdiction to permit composition of the offence u/s 13 of the Maharashtra Ownership of Flats Act, 1,63, and as such, the High Court was justified in reversing the said order in exercise of its suo motu power of revision. The question whether the High Court had inherent power of quashing an order or the basis of compromise even in respect of non-compoundable offence was neither raised nor decided in the said decision. In the decision reported in Rajinder Singh Vs. State (Delhi Administration) the accused-petitioner had been convicted under Sections. 325 and 45, Indian Penal Code. A petition was filed in the Supreme Court stating that the parties had compromised the case. The offence u/s 325 being compoundable with permission of the Court permission was granted and the offence u/s 452 being non-compoundable, the Supreme Court while maintaining the conviction reduced the sentence to the period already undergone. Ft is true that the aforesaid order of the Supreme Court had not been referred to in the decision reported in AIR 1988 2111 (SC), and both the decisions were rendered by Division Benches of the same strength. Neither in AIR 1988 2111 (SC) . nor in Rajinder Singh Vs. Ft is true that the aforesaid order of the Supreme Court had not been referred to in the decision reported in AIR 1988 2111 (SC), and both the decisions were rendered by Division Benches of the same strength. Neither in AIR 1988 2111 (SC) . nor in Rajinder Singh Vs. State (Delhi Administration) the scope of inherent power of the High Court u/s 482 of the Code has been raised or discussed. The main thrust of the submission of the learned Additional Standing Counsel is based on Section 320(9) of the Code which reads as follows; . "(9) No offence shall be compounded except as provided by "this section." He, therefore, submits that an offence can be compounded only in accordance with Sub-section (1) or Sub-section (2) of Section 320 of the Code. If the offence comes within the purview of the table contained in Section 320(1), the offence can be compounded and the Court has no say in the matter; whereas if the offences are of the nature described in the" table contained in Section 320(2), the offences can be compounded only with the permission of the Court. The power u/s 320 (1) and (2) can be exercised by the appellate Court under Sub-section (5) and the revisional Court under Sub-section (6). It is submitted that since ail the contingencies have been provided for and it has been specifically indicated in Sub-section (S) that no offence shall be compounded except as provided in Section 320, the power u/s 482 of the Code cannot be invoked to override specific prohibition contained in the Code. The aforesaid submission of the learned Additional Standing Counsel receives full support from the decision of the" Andhra Pradesh High Court reported in Annamdevula Srinivasa Rao and Another, Vs. State of Andhra Pradesh. Interpreting and placing reliance upon the aforesaid Supreme Court decision reported in Union Carbide Corporation, etc., etc. Vs. Union of India, etc. etc. the Andhra Pradesh High Court has held that in view of the specific bar contained in Section 320(9) the power u/s 432 of the Code cannot be invoked, as it is well-settled that the inherent power u/s 482 is not exercisable in the face of specific prohibition contained in the Code. In the decision reported in Union Carbide Corporation, etc., etc. Vs. Union of India, etc. etc. In the decision reported in Union Carbide Corporation, etc., etc. Vs. Union of India, etc. etc. validity of the order of the Supreme Court terminating the pending" criminal proceedings against Union Carbide Corporation in the Bhopal Gas Disaster case was in issue. While dealing with the aforesaid issue, the Supreme Court held (at page 278): "The order terminating the pending criminal proceedings is not supportable on the strict terms of Section 320 or 321 or 482, Cr PC..." Ultimately, the Supreme Court justified its earlier order by referring to Article 142 of the Constitution. On the basis of the aforesaid, the, contention of the learned Additional Standing Counsel is that no criminal proceeding in respect of non-compoundable offence can be quashed u/s 482 of the Code on the ground that the parties have amicably settled their dispute. 4. I am unable to agree with the submission of the learned Additional Standing Counsel and the views expressed by the Andhra Pradesh High Court in the decision reported in Annamdevula Srinivasa Rao and Another, Vs. State of Andhra Pradesh. The observation of the Supreme Court in the decision reported in Union Carbide Corporation, etc., etc. Vs. Union of India, etc. etc. to the effect that the order terminating the criminal proceedings is not supportable on the strict terms of Section 320 or 321 or 482, Cr PC does not have the effect of laying down the law in the broad terms indicated by the Andhra Pradesh High Court. In fact, in the Bhopal Gas Disaster case, there was no question of compounding the offence u/s 320, nor was there any application to withdraw the prosecution u/s 321 of the Code. Similarly, the question of invoking the power u/s 482 of the Code which is expressly vested in the High Court did not arise. That is the reason why the Supreme Court said that the order terminating the criminal proceeding was not supportable on the strict - terms of Section 320 or Section 321 of the Code. However, the Supreme Court has nowhere laid down that the power of the High Court u/s 482 of the Code was not exercisable in any case where parties had sought for quashing of criminal proceeding in respect of non-compoundable offences. However, the Supreme Court has nowhere laid down that the power of the High Court u/s 482 of the Code was not exercisable in any case where parties had sought for quashing of criminal proceeding in respect of non-compoundable offences. Learned Additional Standing Counsel had also placed strong reliance upon the decisions of the Orissa High Court reported in (1989) 2 OCR 128(Gopal Krishna Routa and Ors. v. State of Orissa and Anr.) (1991) 4 OCR 25 (Sanatan Ram and Ors. v. State and Ors.) and (1992) 5 OCR 461 (Golak Chandra Nayak and Anr. v. State of Orissa and Ors.). In (1989) 2 OCR 128, the SDJM in a complaint case had taken cognisance or the offences under Sections 147,148, 448, 323, 324 and 307 read with Section 149, Indian Penal Code. The accused persons had filed a revision before the Sessions Judge who directed that the complaint case as well as the connected G.R. case should be clubbed together. The accused persons had approached the High Court u/s 482 of the Code against the revisional order of the Sessions Judge. During the pendency of the said case, a petition u/s 320 of the Code for compounding the offences was filed in the High Court. While the offences under Sections 448,323 and 324 were compoundable the other offences including the offence u/s 307, Indian Penal Code, were not compoundable and as such, the High Court stated that it was not possible to record the compromise and compound ail the offences. It was further observed : "......That apart, a question arose whether this Court in exercise of its inherent powers u/s 482 can permit compromise of offences which are not compoundable u/s 320 of the Code. After discussion at length Mr. Ratho was unable to support his contention by any decision of any of the High Courts and finally gave up the plea. The net result on this aspect is that the offence under Sections 448, 323 and 324. IPC are permitted to be compounded. The other offences under Sections 147,148, 326 and 307 read with Section 149, IPC cannot be compounded." Unfortunately, the decision of the Orissa High Court reported in (1988) 1 OCR 564, was not cited before the learned Single Judge. Similarly .the decision of the Supreme Court reported in AIR 1988 2111 (SC), was also not cited. The other offences under Sections 147,148, 326 and 307 read with Section 149, IPC cannot be compounded." Unfortunately, the decision of the Orissa High Court reported in (1988) 1 OCR 564, was not cited before the learned Single Judge. Similarly .the decision of the Supreme Court reported in AIR 1988 2111 (SC), was also not cited. As is apparent from the underlined portion, the question was ultimately given up by the learned counsel appearing in the case.Ultimately, however, the Court held that the order of cognisance in respect of the offence u/s 307, Indian Penal Code, was bad. The aforesaid decision is, therefore, distinguishable and should be confined to its own peculiar facts. In the decision reported in Sanatan Ram and Others Vs. State and Others cognisance had been taken of the offences under Sections 147, 148, 336, 427, 454, 380, 294, 506,4 6, 511 read with Section 149, Indian Penal Code. The High Court was not inclined to quash the order of taking cognisance. In the High Court it was also pleaded that the parties had compromised and it was prayed that a direction should be given to the trial Court for compounding the offences on an application being filed to that effect in the trial Court. In the aforesaid context, it was observed that since the offences were not compoundable, the inherent jurisdiction u/s 482 of the Code cannot be exercised to defeat the legislative intention. Referring to the decisions of the Supreme Court reported in AIR 1988 2111 (SC), it was observed : "In special cases. Supreme Court may have the power to direct compounding of non-compoundable offence. High Court has no such power and accordingly, I am not inclined to exercise inherent power u/s 482, Cr PC which would be contrary to the legislative intent.'' Nevertheless, after making such observations, the learned Judge proceeded to direct the State Government to consider the question of withdrawal from the prosecution as envisaged in Section 321 of the Code. Unfortunately, the attention of the learned Judge was not drawn to his own decision reported is 1989 (I) OLR 183, wherein, as already indicated, the proceeding was quashed on the ground that continuance of the proceeding would be, no doubt, harassment to the accused persons and would be more detrimental to the society than to its benefit. Unfortunately, the attention of the learned Judge was not drawn to his own decision reported is 1989 (I) OLR 183, wherein, as already indicated, the proceeding was quashed on the ground that continuance of the proceeding would be, no doubt, harassment to the accused persons and would be more detrimental to the society than to its benefit. Similarly, the decision of the High Court reported in (1988) 1 OCR 564, was not brought to the notice of the learned Judge. In other words, the decision was rendered per incuriam without referring to two earlier decisions of the High Court on the point. Following the above decision and after referring to the decisions of the Supreme Court reported in Rajinder Singh Vs. State (Delhi Administration). another learned Single Judge of this Court, in the decision reported in Golak Chandra Nayak and Another Vs. State of Orissa and Others, held? "I am of the view that because the Supreme Court allowed an offence u/s 307, IPC to be compounded, this Court cannot in exercise of its inherent powers u/s 482 of the Code direct compounding an offence not permissible u/s 320 of the Code." However, the learned Judge proceeded to consider the question as to whether the alleged offence u/s 307, Indian Penal Code, had been made out and ultimately held that since there was no material to charge the accused u/s 307, the charge should be altered to one1 u/s 324, Indian Penal Code." It was further observed : "I may, point out that the lower Court misled itself that the . legal representative of the deceased cannot enter into a compromise. This is erroneous, since Section 320(4)(b) of the Code provides that the legal representatives of the deceased persons are competent to compound such offence. Therefore, the lower Court is directed to alter the charge as indicated above and proceed to dispose of the case according to law. The parties if they still insist to compromise the case on the basis of the petition already filed, the Court shall permit them to compound the offence." Unfortunately, the attention of the learned Judge was not drawn to the two earlier decisions of this Court reported in (1988) 1 OCR 564 : 1989 (I) OLR 183. The parties if they still insist to compromise the case on the basis of the petition already filed, the Court shall permit them to compound the offence." Unfortunately, the attention of the learned Judge was not drawn to the two earlier decisions of this Court reported in (1988) 1 OCR 564 : 1989 (I) OLR 183. It is thus clear that in the three decisions of the Orissa High Court reported in (1989) 2 OCR 128 ; (1991) 4 OCR 25 : (1992) 5 OCR 461, the earlier decisions of the Orissa High Court were not considered. 5. It is. well settled that the power u/s 482 of the Code has to be exercised sparingly depending upon the facts and circumstances of each case and no straitjacket formula can be laid down for exercise of such power. The power u/s 482 can be exercised by the High Court to prevent abuse of the process of any Court or to secure the ends of justice. To restrict the scope of Section 482 within the narrow confines of Section 320 (1) or (2) may result in manifest injustice in many cases. For example, supposing in a given case, the victim of an offence who happens to be the sole witness comes forward and supports the petition u/s 482 for quashing of the offence/criminal proceeding on the ground of amicable settlement, should the Court insist upon a trial being held merely because the offence is not compoundable ? If trial would continue in such a case, it would be an exercise in futility as ultimately there would be no chance of conviction. Of course, where the alleged offence is serious in nature and there is possibility of proving the offence even without the victim, the Court may in the facts and circumstances of a given case refuse quashing of an offence. Similarly, in a case involving matrimonial offence, such as u/s 498A. Indian Penal Code, which is not compoundable, would it be just and proper to insist upon the continuance of a criminal proceeding even if the warring spouses have made up ? In offences of kidnapping, would it be in the interest of justice to continue prosecution even if the accused and the alleged victim also have married each other. There can be many such illustrations. In offences of kidnapping, would it be in the interest of justice to continue prosecution even if the accused and the alleged victim also have married each other. There can be many such illustrations. Ultimately, the discretionary power u/s 482 of the Code has to be exercised judiciously keeping in view all the materials, facts and circumstances of the case including the question of impossibility of securing a conviction, or establishing amity between the warring factions, and the like. It is neither desirable nor possible to lay down the guidelines to be followed in such cases. The exercise of power u/s 482 for quashing a criminal case on the basis that the dispute has been amicably settled among the parties does not conflict with Section 320(9). As laid down in Section 320(8) of the Code, the effect of composition of an offence in accordance with Section 320 has the effect of acquittal of the accused. It cannot be said that when the High Court quashes a criminal proceeding, it has the effect of an acquittal. The power u/s 482 for quashing a proceeding is evidently to be exercised at the stage of investigation or, at any rate, before conclusion of the trial. If such a case comes up after the conviction, evidently the proper course would be to consider the question of compromise and to reduce or set aside the punishment part, as was done by the Supreme Court in several cases. 6. In the facts of the present case, I feel that it is a fit case where the criminal proceeding should be quashed. The occurrence was an outcome of a clash between neighbouring villagers and the matter has been amicably settled. Since the villagers have amicably settled the dispute and do not want to prosecute each other, it would not be in the interest of justice to continue the criminal proceeding. The continuance of the criminal proceeding is likely to re-open the wound. Instead of re-opening the wound by forcing the neighbouring villagers to fight out criminal cases, a healing touch is necessary so that the people of the two neighbouring villages can live in peace and amity. The object of penal law is not merely punitive. One of the objects is to maintain peace and harmony in the society. Instead of re-opening the wound by forcing the neighbouring villagers to fight out criminal cases, a healing touch is necessary so that the people of the two neighbouring villages can live in peace and amity. The object of penal law is not merely punitive. One of the objects is to maintain peace and harmony in the society. If peace and harmony can be brought about by amicable settlement, specially when large number of people are involved, it would not be proper to pursue a path of retributive justice. In the facts of the present case, I feel interest of justice would be better served in giving a decent burial to the unfortunate incident by quashing the criminal proceeding. Accordingly, this application is allowed and the criminal proceeding in G. R. Case No. 378 of 1995 pending in the Court of the Judicial Magistrate, First Class, Nimapara, is quashed. 7. Before parting with the case, I must place on record my appreciation for the sincere and able manner in which Mr. S. K. Misra, Advocate for the petitioners and Mr. S. K. Nayak, the Additional Standing Counsel, have conducted the case.