D. P. KUNDU, J. ( 1 ) -THESE two matters were heard analogously common arguments were made for both the two cases. Since affidavits have been filed by the parties to the litigation, they have agreed to have the matters finally heard. ( 2 ) BOTH Shri Guru Prosad Lai and Shirt Arun Kumar Jha are employees of Coal India Ltd. By Order No. CIL: C-5 (A) (iii)/929 dated 18-9-1987 issued by the Chairman-cum-Managing Director, Coal India Ltd. , the services of Shri Guru Prosad Lal was sought to be terminated in purported exercise of power under amended clause 12. 4 (i) (c) of the Common Coal Cadre of Coal India Ltd. Rules. Similarly, the services of Shri A. K. Jha was also sought to be terminated by virtue of order No. CIL:c-5 (A) (iii) 930 dated 18-9-87 issued by Chairman-cum-Managing Director, Coal India Ltd. , in purported exercise of power under amended clause 12. 4. (i) (c) of, the Common Coal Cadre of Coal India Ltd. Both the aforesaid orders of termination were set aside in view of Hon'ble Supreme Court order dated November 23, 1994 passed in Civil Appeal No. 3673 of 1988 with C. A. No. 3672 of 1088 [guru Prosad Lal v. Coal India Ltd. and Ors. ]. The aforesaid Order of Hon'ble Supreme Court reads as follows:-"learned Counsel has placed reliance on Delhi Transport Corporation v. D. T. C. Mazdoor Congress and Ors (1991 Suppl. 1 SCC 600 ). Following the ratio therein, clause 12. 4. (i) (c) of the Common Coal Cadre of Coal India Limited Rules is declared ultra vices, offending Article 14 of the Constitution. The appellants are entitled to be reinstated but subject to the result of the prosecution that would be launched against them. After filing the charge-sheet against the appellants in the proper court, it would be open to the respondent-management to make-appropriate action according to the Rules to have them suspended pending prosecution. The appeals are, accordingly, allowed but in the circumstances without costs". ( 3 ) THUS it is evident that Hon'ble Supreme Court kept it open for Coal India to place the writ petitioners under suspension after the charge sheet against the writ petitioners are filed in the proper court. The appeals are, accordingly, allowed but in the circumstances without costs". ( 3 ) THUS it is evident that Hon'ble Supreme Court kept it open for Coal India to place the writ petitioners under suspension after the charge sheet against the writ petitioners are filed in the proper court. ( 4 ) AFTER the aforesaid order of the Honble Supreme Court, both the writ petitioners, by different orders, were reinstated in service and in both the orders of reinstatement the following conditions were mentioned. "the aforesaid reinstatement order is subject to the final result of prosecution and is without prejudice to the rights of the Company to take appropriate action according to the Rules as contained in the aforesaid order dated 23. 11. 1994 passed by the Honble Supreme Court of India". ( 5 ) IT is to be noted here that after reinstatement no order of suspension was issued, in respect of any one of the writ petitioners, placing him under suspension. ( 6 ) IN both the writ petitions the prayers of the writ petitioners are similar. Both the writ petitioners have, inter alia, prayed for a writ of or a writ in the nature of Mandamus commanding the respondents to consider and dispose of the representations of the writ petitioners for back wages and restoration of seniority on promotion and further commanding the respondents in make payments of all back wages for the period between the purported termination and date of reinstatement treating the writ petitioners as on duty for all purposes Including pay and allowances as per specific provisions contained in the office Memorandum dated 8th May, 1987. ( 7 ) BY two separate orders both dated 18th September, 1987 and issued by Chairman-cum-Managing Director the services of the Writ petitioners were sought to be terminated, the relevant words read as follows:"certain facts pertaining to the assets acquired by you in the course of your services in CIL and its Subsidiaries have been brought to my notice. I have examined these facts carefully and have come to the conclusion that the same are disproportionate to your known sources of Income. There is, therefore, a bonafide suspicion about your integrity, On careful consideration, I have also come to the conclusion that your continuance in employment would be prejudicial to the interest of the company. I have examined these facts carefully and have come to the conclusion that the same are disproportionate to your known sources of Income. There is, therefore, a bonafide suspicion about your integrity, On careful consideration, I have also come to the conclusion that your continuance in employment would be prejudicial to the interest of the company. As such, your services are hereby terminated with immediate effect in terms of amended clause 12. 4. (i) (c) of the Common Coal Cadre of Coal India Ltd. " ( 8 ) IN view of aforesaid order dated November 23, 1994 of the Hon'ble Supreme Court, the said orders of termination were set aside and the Writ petitioners were reinstated in service as staled earlier. ( 9 ) IT appears from both the two affidavits-in-opposition filed on behalf of the respondents that both the writ petitioners, before their termination of service, were placed under suspension. Shri Guru Prosad Lal, one of the writ petitioners, was placed under suspension by an order of suspension dated 4-8-1986, while Shri Arun Kumar Jha, the other writ petitioner, was placed under suspension by an order of suspension dated 23rd July, 1987. ( 10 ) WHAT would be the fate of these two orders of suspension as soon as the services of the writ petitioners' services were terminated by orders of termination both dated 18th September, 1987? ( 11 ) MR. Mukherjee learned Senior advocate for the writ petitioner argued that the suspension was an interim suspension pending final action to be taken and with the orders of termination the orders of suspension lapsed. It was argued that the orders of termination replaced the orders of suspension which then ceased to exist. It was argued that In view of the above position, setting aside of the orders of termination could not revive the order of suspension which did not exist. ( 12 ) IN support of his contentions Mr. Mukherjee referred to Om Prakash Gupta v. State of Uttar Pradesh, AIR? 1955 SC 600. In this case six Judges' Bench of Hon'ble Supreme Court, in paragraph 12 of the Report, inter alia, observed as follows:-"the order of suspension made against the appellant was clearly one made pending an enquiry. It certainly was not a penalty imposed after an inquiry. As the result of inquiry an order of dismissal by way of penalty had been passed against the appellant. It certainly was not a penalty imposed after an inquiry. As the result of inquiry an order of dismissal by way of penalty had been passed against the appellant. With that order, the order of suspension lapsed. The order of dismissal replaced the order of suspension which then ceased to exist. That clearly was the position between the Government of United Provinces and the appellant. The subsequent declaration by a Civil Court that the order of dismissal was illegal and could not revive an order of suspension which did not exist. " ( 13 ) RULE 27 of the Conduct, Discipline and Appeal Rules of Coal India Ltd. and its subsidiaries told down the nature of penalties which can be imposed on an employee for good and sufficient reasons. Suspension has not been mentioned as one of the penalties. Therefore, suspensions of the writ petitioners were also not penalties. Such suspensions were nothing but interim step pending final action to be taken. As soon as tire writ petitioners' services were terminated, the order of termination replaced the orders of suspension and the orders of suspension lapsed and ceased to exist. Subsequent setting aside of the order of termination would not revive the orders of suspension which ceased to have any existence. ( 14 ) THEREFORE, a question arises as to how the period, starting from the date of suspension ending to the date of reinstatement should be treated. Are the writ petitioners entitled to full salaries and allowances for the said period? The Writ petitioners contended that they are entitled to full salaries and allowances for the said period while It is the case of the respondents that the Writ petitioners are not entitled to full salaries and allowances. ( 15 ) THE respondents in support their above contentions referred to Rules 24. 5, 24. 6, 24. 7 of the Conduct, Discipline and Appeal Rules of Coal India Ltd. and its subsidiaries. ( 16 ) THE facts and circumstances of these cases do not disclose that (I) the Writ petitioners were detained in custody whether on criminal charge or otherwise for a period exceeding forty-eight hours or (2) they have been convicted and sentenced to a tern of Imprisonment exceeding forty-eight hours. Under these circumstances said Rule 24. 7 has no manner of application in the instant case. ( 17 ) MR. Under these circumstances said Rule 24. 7 has no manner of application in the instant case. ( 17 ) MR. Roy learned senior advocate for the respondents referred to and relied upon Rule 24. 5 of the Conduct, Discipline and Appeal Rules of Coal India Ltd. and its subsidiaries to support the contentions of the respondents. Said Rule 24. 5 reads as follows:-"where a penalty of dismissal or removal from service imposed upon an employee is set aside or declared or rendered void in consequence of or by a decision of a court of law and the Disciplinary Authority, on consideration of the circumstances of the case, decides to hold a further inquiry against him/her on the allegation on which the penalty of dismissal of or removal was originally imposed, the employee shall be deemed to have been placed under suspension from the date of original order of dismissal and shall continue to remain under suspension until further orders. " ( 18 ) MR. Roy learned senior advocate for the respondents argued that the orders of termination terminating the services of the writ petitioners attached stigma to lire service careers of the writ petitioners and therefore those two orders of termination are nothing but orders of dismissal and therefore even after selling aside of those orders as a consequence of a decision of a court of law the Writ petitioners shall be deemed to be under suspension in view of provisions of said Rule 24. 5. ( 19 ) RULE 24. 5 cannot be read in isolation. It should be read along with other sub-rules of Rule 24. It must be remembered that Rule 24 is one of rules of the conduct. Discipline and Appeal Rules. Therefore, suspension contemplated by said Rule 24 though not a punishment but the same is related to disciplinary proceeding. ( 20 ) THE terms "dismissal" and "removal from service" have acquired a definite meaning in our Service Jurisprudence. "dismissal" and "removal from service" are considered as major penalties. Even in the Conduct, Discipline and Appeal Rules of Coal India Ltd. and its subsidiaries "dismissal" and "removal from service" are considered as major penalties vide Rules 27 (ii) (c) and 27 (ii) (d ). "dismissal" and "removal from service" are considered as major penalties. Even in the Conduct, Discipline and Appeal Rules of Coal India Ltd. and its subsidiaries "dismissal" and "removal from service" are considered as major penalties vide Rules 27 (ii) (c) and 27 (ii) (d ). ( 21 ) IT is necessary to consider whether the orders of termination both dated 18th September, 1987 were in fact "dismissal" or "removal from service" within the meaning of the aforesaid Rules 27 (ii) (c) and 27 (ii) (d ). Rule 29 of the aforesaid Conduct. Discipline and Appeal Rules lays down the procedures to be followed for imposing major penalties. Rule 29-1 lays down that no order imposing any of the major penalties specified in Rule27 shall be made except after an inquiry is held in accordance with Rule 29. Nothing has been placed before this Court from which it can be said that an inquiry was held in accordance with Rule 29 before termination of the Writ petitioners services by orders dated 18th September, 1987. Admittedly, no such enquiry was held. Admittedly, the writ petitioners' services were not terminated in exercise of powers under Rule 27 (ii) (c) or 27 (ii) (d ). No penalty of dismissal or removal from service as contemplated by Rule 27 (ii) (c) or Rule 27 (ii) (d) was ever imposed upon the Writ petitioners. ( 22 ) FOR deemed suspension as contemplated by Rule 24. 5 two conditions must be existed viz. (1) there should be a penalty of dismissal or removal from service imposed upon an employee which is set aside or declared or rendered void in consequence of or by a decision of a Court of law and (2) the Disciplinary Authority, on consideration of the circumstances of the case, decides to hold a further inquiry against him/ her on the allegation on which the penalty of dismissal or removal was originally imposed. Both these conditions are conditions precedent and must be existing for deemed suspension as contemplated by Rule 24. 5. Absence of any one of these conditions shall not allow a servant to be placed under deemed suspension. A servant shall not be held to be placed under deemed suspension if any one of these conditions precedent is not existing. ( 23 ) MR. 5. Absence of any one of these conditions shall not allow a servant to be placed under deemed suspension. A servant shall not be held to be placed under deemed suspension if any one of these conditions precedent is not existing. ( 23 ) MR. Roy argued that the orders of termination dated 18th September, 1987 attached stigma to the service career of the writ petitioners and therefore these were not cases of termination simplicitor but these were cases of dismissal from the service. ( 24 ) MR. Roy referred to P. L. Dhingra v. Union of India ( AIR 1958 SC 36 ). Attention of the Court was drawn to paragraph 28 of the report. The relevant lines read as follows:"but even If the Government has, by contract or under the rules the right to terminate the employment without going through the procedure prescribed for inflicting the punishment of dismissal or removal or reduction in rank, the Government may, nevertheless, choose to punish die servant and if the termination of service is sought to be founded on misconduct, negligence, inefficiency or other disqualification, then it is a punishment and requirements of Article 311 must be compiled with". ( 25 ) EVEN if the orders of termination dated 18th September, 1987 are considered as orders of dismissal then also the writ petitioners cannot be held to be placed under deemed suspension as contemplated by Rule 24. 5 because the disciplinary authority, on consideration of the circumstances of the case did not decided to hold a further inquiry against the writ petitioners on the allegation on which their services were terminated. Under these circumstances this Court is of the view that the writ petitioners cannot be held to be placed under deemed suspension as contemplated by Rule 24. 5. ( 26 ) NOW, the question which has to be decided is whether the writ petitioners are entitled to full salary and allowances for the period from the date of suspension till the date of reinstatement. This period has two parts. First part relates to the period from the date of suspension till the date of termination and the second part related to the period from the date of termination till the date of reinstatement. So far the second part is concerned reference may be made to proviso to sub-clause (e) of clause 12. This period has two parts. First part relates to the period from the date of suspension till the date of termination and the second part related to the period from the date of termination till the date of reinstatement. So far the second part is concerned reference may be made to proviso to sub-clause (e) of clause 12. 4 of Common Coal Cadre of Coal India Ltd. Rules (Annexure F of the Writ petition of Shri Guru Prosad Lal ). The said proviso reads as follows:-"provided that the intervening period shall be treated as a period spent on duty for all purposes including pay and allowances if it is specifically held by the authority ordering reinstatement that the premature termination was itself not justified in the circumstance of the case, or if the order of premature termination is set aside by a Court of law". ( 27 ) THE term "intervening period" as used in the above quoted proviso means "the intervening period between the date of premature termination and the dale of reinstatement" which is evident from sub-clause (e) of said clause 12. 4 of Common Coal Cadre. ( 28 ) FROM the order (Annexure--B of the writ petition of Guru Prosad Lal) of the Hon'ble Supreme Court it is evident that clause 12. 4 (i) (c) of the Common Coal Cadre of Coal India Ltd. Rules was declared ultra vires as the same offended Article 14 of the Constitution of India. In purported exercise of power under this clause 12. 4 (1) (c) the services of the Writ petitioners were sought to be terminated. Hon'ble Supreme Court also held "the appellants are entitled to be reinstated. . . " The true and real effect of the order passed by Hon'ble Supreme Court is setting aside of the orders of termination by Court of law. Under these circumstances this Court is of the view that the Writ petitioners are entitled to full salaries and allowances for the period from the date of termination till the date of reinstatement. ( 29 ) THE true and real effect of the aforesaid order of the Hon'ble Supreme Court is that the orders of termination of the Writ petitioners were set aside which means that the writ petitioners were never to be deemed to have been lawfully terminated from service and the orders of reinstatement were superfluous. ( 29 ) THE true and real effect of the aforesaid order of the Hon'ble Supreme Court is that the orders of termination of the Writ petitioners were set aside which means that the writ petitioners were never to be deemed to have been lawfully terminated from service and the orders of reinstatement were superfluous. The true and real effect of the adjudication of the Hon'ble Supreme Court is that the Writ petitioners were wrongfully prevented from attending their duties. It would not in such a contingency, be open to the authority to deprive the writ petitioners of the remuneration which they would have earned had they been permitted to work. Thus the Writ petitioners are entitled to their full salaries and allowances for the period from the date of suspension till the date of termination of service. ( 30 ) THE Writ petitioners in their writ petitions stated that though their juniors have been promoted to the higher posts, yet the petitioners were not considered for promotion. The respondents in their affidavits-in-opposition stated that the Writ petitioners are not entitled to get promotion in view of pendency of criminal cases against the writ petitioners. It appears from the affidavits-in-opposition filled by the respondents that the case of the respondents is that promotion and seniority of the writ petitioners are governed by Rules of company which do not contain provisions for promotion during pendency of the "disciplinary/criminal proceedings" though there are provisions for the "charged executive" to appear before the Departmental Promotion Committee (for short D. P. C) after completion of necessary formalities. It is further case of the respondents than even if a "charged officer" is selected for promotion, he can be promoted only when if he is exonerated from the said charges and subject to vacancy. The respondents craved leave to refer to Office Memorandum dated 19th/27th June, 1979 and Office Memorandum dated January 8, 1981 at the time f hearing. Unfortunately, those memoranda were neither annexed to the affidavits-in-opposition nor they were produced before the Court at the time of hearing. ( 31 ) MR. Mukherjee, learned senior advocate for the writ petitioners relied upon a decision of Hon'ble Supreme Court in [smt. Sudha Shrivastava v. Comptroller and Auditor General of India ( AIR 1996 SC 571 )] and argued that the respondents ought to have taken recourse to "sealed Cover" procedure. ( 31 ) MR. Mukherjee, learned senior advocate for the writ petitioners relied upon a decision of Hon'ble Supreme Court in [smt. Sudha Shrivastava v. Comptroller and Auditor General of India ( AIR 1996 SC 571 )] and argued that the respondents ought to have taken recourse to "sealed Cover" procedure. "sealed Cover" procedure is now well-know in our service jurisprudence. As stated hereinabove, the respondents case is that there is no provision in the Rules of the Company which entitles an employee to promotion during pendency of the "disciplinary/criminal proceedings" though there are provisions for the "charged executive" to appear before the D. P. C. after completion of necessary formalities. Thus even according to the respondents, a "charged executive" after completion of necessary formalities can appear before the D. P. C. though he is not entitled to promotion during pendency of "disciplinary/criminal proceedings". In the context of this situation Mr. Mukherjee learned senior advocate for the Writ petitioners pressed for taking recourse to "sealed Cover" procedure which is just and fair and inconsonance with the provisions of Articles 14 and 16 of the Constitution of India. This Court is of the view that the Bland taken by the respondents leads to "sealed Cover" procedure which is just and fair. Therefore, even now, the Writ petitioners are entitled to be considered by D. P. C. and the findings of D. P. C. should be kept in sealed cover so that in case of exoneration from the charges the writ petitioners' case can be considered in accordance with the findings of D. P. C. kept in sealed cover. Therefore, even now, the Writ petitioners are entitled to be considered by D. P. C. and the findings of D. P. C. should be kept in sealed cover so that in case of exoneration from the charges the writ petitioners' case can be considered in accordance with the findings of D. P. C. kept in sealed cover. ( 32 ) IN view of the discussions made hereinabove this court directs the respondents to (a) pay the Writ petitioners, within six weeks from the date of this order, full salaries and allowances for the period from the date of suspension till the date of reinstatement less the amount already paid as subsistence allowance and (b) send the cases of Writ petitioners before D. P. C. for consideration whether they were fit for promotion on the date when their juniors were promoted to the next higher post and to keep the findings of D. P. C. in Sealed Cover so that in case of exoneration from charges in future the Writ petitioners' case can be considered in accordance with the findings of D. P. C. The Writ petitions are allowed to the extent mentioned hereinabove. However, there shall be no order as to costs. Petition allowed