D. K. SETH, J. The respondent No. 2 filed an application under Section 12-C of. the U. P. Panchayat Raj Act, which was registered as Election Petition No. 6 of 1995. In the said case the respondent No. 2 filed on application on 23-5-1995 praying for calling for the record of the election from the Election Office and for some other interim order restraining the petitioner from taking over charge as Pradhan. By an order dated 15- 12-1995 the said application was allowed and the record of the impugned election were called for. It is against this order the petitioner has moved the present writ petition. 2. Sri M. C. Singh, learned Counsel appearing on behalf of the petitioner con tends that in the present case neither issues have been framed nor evidence had been led. There was no material available before the court to form an opinion as to the existence of the conditions as enumerated in the case of Ram Adhar Singh v. Sub-Divisional Officer, 1985 UPLBEC 317. Therefore, the said order cannot be sustained. He also relied on various decisions, which will be referred to shortly hereinafter, in support of his contention is two-fold; first, that in absence of any material and in absence of the conditions laid down in Ram Adhar Singhs case the court cannot pass any order for calling for the record and direction for recounting. Secondly, that while deciding the petition under Section 12-C of the said Act the Court does not have any power to grant any interim order. Whereas by allowing the said application dated 23- 5-1995 the court had allowed the prayer for restraining the petitioner from taking over charge as Pradhan and from carrying on the activities of Pradhan. Therefore, such an order cannot be sustained. 3. Sri Sanjay Kumar Singh, learned Counsel appearing on behalf of respondent No. 2, on the other hand contends that there are sufficient material to satisfy the court that the conditions laid down in the case of Ram Adhar Singh (supra) were in existence and, therefore, there is no infirmity in the said order for calling for the records of election from the Election Office. Drawig my attention to the said order while translating the same at the Bar Sri Sanjay Singh, learned counsel appearing on behalf of respondent No. 2, submits that the order is perfectly legal and valid since the order records satisfaction and existence of the material for arriving at such con clusion. He further contends that the petitioner had won the election after there was tie by a margin o: one vote which was allotted to him in compliance of Rule 108 of the U. P. Panchayat Raj (Election of Members, Pradhans etc.) Rules, 1994. Accord ing to him in such a situation when 74 votes polled by the petitioner was cancelled and 116 votes polled by the respondent No. 2 was cancelled it was more necessary, by reason of the fact in itself to presume that there might be reason due to which the records are required to be inspected. He also drew my attention in support of his contention to the decision in Ram Adhar Singhs case (supra ). He further relied on certain other decisions, which will be referred to shortly, hereinafter. 4. From the translation made at the Bar, translating the prayer made in the said application dated 23-5- 1995, it appears that there was comhind prayer for calling for the record of the election and for restraining the petitioner from taking over charge of the Office of Pradhan and carrying on the activity of Pradhan. Therefore, the moment by the order dated 15-12-1995, as I understand from the translation made at the Bar, the application is allowed, it allows the entire prayer made in the said application dated 23-5-1995. 1 further understand that in the said order the court had called for the record of election. 5. Section 12-C in itself does not make any provision by which the authority deciding the election petition, can derive jurisdiction to grant interim order, staying the result or the effect of the election. Neither the Rules have prescribed any such power to the authority to pass any interim order declaring the Pradhan to have been invalidly elected or restraining him either from taking over charge or from perform ing the duties of Pradhan. 6. Neither the Rules have prescribed any such power to the authority to pass any interim order declaring the Pradhan to have been invalidly elected or restraining him either from taking over charge or from perform ing the duties of Pradhan. 6. In order to appreciate the question as to whether the Prescribed Authority has power or jurisdiction to grant interim order, it is necessary to refer to sub-sec tions (4), (5), (6), (7), (8) and (9) of Section 12-C of the said Act- " (4) The authority to whom the application under sub-section (1) is made shall, in the matter of- (i) hearing of the application and the procedure to be followed at such Bearing; (ii) setting aside the election or declaring the election to be void ox declaring the applicant to be duly elected or any other relief that may be granted to the petitioner, have such powers and authority as may be prescribed. (5) Without prejudice to generality of the powers to be prescribed under sub section (4) the rules may provide for summary hearing and disposal of an application under sub-section (1 ). (6) Any party aggrieved by an order of the Prescribed Authority upon an ap plication under sub-section (1) may, within thirty days from the date of the order, apply to the District Judge for revision of such order on any one or more of the following grounds, namely: (a) that the prescribed authority has exercised a jurisdiction not vested in its by law; (b) that the prescribed authority has failed to exercise a jurisdiction so vested; (c) that the prescribed authority has acted in the exercise of this jurisdiction illegally or with material irregularity. (7) The District Judge may dispose of the application for revision himself or may assign it for disposal to any Additional District Judge, Civil Judge or Additional Civil Judge under his administrative control and may recall it from any such officer or transfer it to any other such officer. (8) The revising authority mentioned in sub-section (7) shall follow such proce dure as may be prescribed, and may confirm, vary or rescined the order of the prescribed authority or remand the case to the prescribed authority for re-hearing and pending its decision pass such interim orders as may appear to it to just and convenient. (8) The revising authority mentioned in sub-section (7) shall follow such proce dure as may be prescribed, and may confirm, vary or rescined the order of the prescribed authority or remand the case to the prescribed authority for re-hearing and pending its decision pass such interim orders as may appear to it to just and convenient. (9) The decision of the prescribed authority, subject to any order passed by the revising authority under this section, and every decision of the revising authority passed under this section shall be final. " 7. The power of authority, as has been laid down in clause (ii) of sub-section (4) shows that it can set aside the election or declare the election to be void or declare the applicant to be duly elected and it can grant any other relief to the petitioner. All those powers shows that those are to be passed at the final stage. The said provision does not contemplate of passing any interlocutory order in the form of an injunction so as to postpone the result or affect of election until final decision is arrived at. The other powers are also to be prescribed. But neither the rules nor the Act, has prescribed any other power. 8. The question whether the interim relief can be granted arose in the case of Devi Sharma v. Sub- Divisional Officer, Kichha Rudrapur, 1989 RJ 158 wherein it was held that no provision has been made for grant of any interim relief by staying the operation of the result of election during the pendency of an election petition. The prescribed authority has no power to pass any order for such interim relief, 9. The said view is also supported by reasons that while in sub-section (8) the Revising authority has been given power specifically to pass interim order pending its decision, whereas no sum specific power has been prescribed for the prescribed authority. This omission 10 mention such-power in-clause (ii) of sub-session (4) or in sub-section (5) of the section clearly indicates that the same was deliberate. This omission 10 mention such-power in-clause (ii) of sub-session (4) or in sub-section (5) of the section clearly indicates that the same was deliberate. The Legislature in its wisdom has omitted to include such power in sub-sections (4) and (5) of the said section he intention of the Legislature was clear by the incor poration of the power to grant interim order in sub-section (8) to the extent that the Legislature had never intended to confer any power or jurisdiction to grant any interim order upon the prescribed authority while it had so conferred upon the Revising authority. 10. In the present facts and circumstances of the case the order dated 15-12-1995 does not show that the court has arrived at any prima fade finding that the election of the petitioner was invalid, though such a finding cannot be arrived at when record of the election have been summoned. Therefore, that part of the order which might constitute to have the effect of declaring the election of the petitioner as Pradhan, as invalid or he may be restrained from taking over charge of the office of Pradhan or performing his duties as Pradhan, by way of interim order is without jurisdiction and cannot be sustained and, as such, the order allowing the whole prayer, as made in the said application dated 23-5- 1995, to that extent is liable to be set aside. 11. So far as the contention of Sri M. C. Singh that there cannot be order for re-counting is concerned, unless the conditions laid down in the case of Ram Adhar Singh (supra) is satisfied. I am unable to find out from the translation of the order dated 15-12-1995, made at the Bar by both the learned Counsel for the parties, that there was any order for recounting. On the other hand, it appears that the Court was satisfied on "inspection of some cancelled ballot papers. That those were wrongly cancelled and that there are force in the submission made on behalf of respondent No, 2. 12. Admittedly, here a case has been made out in the Election Petition there was tie in between the two candidates and the result was declare in compliance of Rule 108. Therefore, it is more desirable that in such case, in order to arrive at a finding, to have the record inspected. 12. Admittedly, here a case has been made out in the Election Petition there was tie in between the two candidates and the result was declare in compliance of Rule 108. Therefore, it is more desirable that in such case, in order to arrive at a finding, to have the record inspected. In the case of present nature it may not be necessary to lead oral evidence inasmuch as oral evidence would led nowhere in the given facts and circumstances of the case. The question is wholly dependent on the basis of material, namely, as to whether the cancelled ballot papers were rightly cancelled or not. When there was tie in the question was decided by lots as provided in Rule 108 it necessarily makes out a prima-facie case of recounting. 13. Therefore, I do not find any reason to hold that the order by which the records were called for, is illegally irregular or without jurisdiction, particularly, in view of the facts that in the present case the court had sufficient material before it to arrive at such a conclusion which necessary inspection of record. The very facts of the case are as such that in order to decide the same inspection of record are impera tive. 14. The contention of Sri M. C. Singh, learned Counsel air the petitioner that no recounting or inspection can be directed as contended by him, drawing inspira tion from the case of Ram Adhar Singh (supra) is correct and has substantial force. In the said case in Para 19 two conditions have been laid down. It was held that "before an authority hearing the election petition under the said Act can be permitted to look into or to direct inspection of the ballot papers, following two conditions must co-exist: (i) the petition for setting aside the election contains the grounds on which the election of the respondent is being questioned also the summary of circumstances alleged to justify the election being questioned on such ground ; and (ii) the authority is, prima facie, satisfied on the basis of the materials produced before it that there is grounds for believing the existence of such ground and that making of such an inspection is imperatively necessary for deciding the dispute and for doing complete justice between the parties. " 15. " 15. In the facts and circumstances of the present case, it appears that these two conditions have been satisfied. I have been shown nothing that there is anything in the petition itself which does not satisfy the condition No. 1. Where as the condition No. 2 appears to have been satisfied from the reasons given in the order dated 15-12-1995 itself. 16. So far as the question of recounting is concerned, such an order has not yet been passed. Therefore, the condition of the learned Counsel for the petitioner, relying on Para 20 of the said decision is premature at this stage. It would be open to the Court below to direct recounting according to its judicious discretion upon satisfaction of th2 said two conditions, as has been observed in the case of Ram Adhar Singh (supra), after the inspection is made. 17. Sri M. C. Singh, learned Counsel for the petitioner also relies on decision in the case of Kedar Singh v. Distt. Judge, Agra and others, 1983 UPLBEC 445. After the case of Ram Adhar Singh (supra) it is not necessary to draw any support from the decision in the case of Kedar Singh. Though, however, it has laid down almost similar view to the effect that if there was no evidence on record at the time of making of the impugned order of inspection and recounting and there was no occasion for the Tribunal for being prima facie satisfied about the same. 18. Learned Counsel for the petitioner further relied on the case of Tarif Giri v. Additional Sub-Divisional Officer, Hapur, District Ghaziabad and others, 1986 UPLBEC 183. In Para 4 of the said judgment the decision in the case of Ram Adhar Singh (supra) has been quoted and followed. Therefore, it would only add support to the contention of learned Counsel for the petitioner. 19. He then relied on the decision in the case of Lakhan Singh v. Babu Singh and others, 1987 IIPLBEC 202. The said decision does not refer to any of the judge ment cited on the subject. But, however, it held the same view, as has been held in the earlier decision to the effect that unless there is prima facie case in favour of the petitioner the order for recounting cannot be passed merely on the basis of suspicion. The said decision does not refer to any of the judge ment cited on the subject. But, however, it held the same view, as has been held in the earlier decision to the effect that unless there is prima facie case in favour of the petitioner the order for recounting cannot be passed merely on the basis of suspicion. This case deals with the question of recounting which is not a case at hand. 20. However the present case has a distinct feature, namely that no recounting has been ordered but the court was prima facie satisfied for calling for the record. I find that the court has rightly directed for calling for the record in the facts and circumstances of the present case. Therefore, I do not find any infirmity in the said order. 21. Now turning to the point raised by Sri Sanjay Singh that where the margin of difference is the minimal, the claim for fresh counting cannot be summarily brushed aside as futile or trumpery. He relies on the judgment in the case of 5. Baldev Singh v. Teja Singh Swatantra, AIR 1975 SC 698. In the facts and circumstan ces of the present case there was no margin rather there was tie and the result was declared in compliance of Rule 108. Therefore, in the present case the very situation in itself raises strong prima facie case on the face of rejection of 74 votes polled by the petitioner and 116 votes polled by the respondent No. 2, that the record of election should be inspected. It is correct that vague or general allegations that valid votes were improperly rejected or invalid votes were improperly accepted would not serve the purpose and parties cannot be permitted to get a chance to make roving or fishing enquiry in the ballot boxes so as to justify their claims. But at the same time in a case like this, misgivings made out in the election petition, cannot be said to be frivolous or unreasonable. It has been held in Para 18 of the said judgment as follows: "we frown upon frivolus and unreasonable refusals of recount by Returning Officers who forget the mandate of Rule 63 that allowance of recount is not the exception and refusal is restricted to cases where the demand itself is frivolous or unreasonable. These are strong words. The circumstances of each case decide. These are strong words. The circumstances of each case decide. Where the margin of difference is minimal, the claim for fresh count cannot be summarily brushed aside as futile or trumpery. If, as in this case, for the Sherpur segment a uniform view founded in legal error, has led to wrong rejection of votes, rectification by a recount on the spot when a demand was made, would have been reasonable. If formal defects had been misconstrued at some table as substantial infirmities or vice versa resulting in wrongful reception or rejection, the sooner it was set right the better, especially when a plea for a second inspection had been made on the spot. Many practical circumstances or legal misconceptions might honestly affected the legal or arithmetical accuracy of result and prestige or fatigue should not inhibit a fresh, may be partial check. Of course, baseless or concocted claims for recount or fabricated grounds for inspection or specious complaints of mistakes in counting when the gap is huge are obvious cases of frivolous and un reasonable demands for recount. Mala fide aspersions on counting staff or false and untenable objections regarding validity of votes also fall under the same category. We mean to be illustrative, not exhaustive, but underline the need, in appropriate cases, to be reasonably liberal in re-check and recount by Returning Officers. After all, fairness at the polls must not only be manifest but misgivings about the process must be erased at the earliest. Indeed the instructions to Officers are fairly clearly lay down. sound guidelines. " 22. Here in the present case the facts are somewhat stranger because there was no difference or margin, namely, there was tie. Therefore, drawing inspiration from the above observation in the case of Baldev Singh (supra), I find that there was justification in passing the order for inspection Therefore, I am not inclined to interfere with the part of the order by which records were summoned. 23. Sri Sanjay Singh learned Counsel appearing on behalf of respondent No. 2 has further submitted that in order to invoke writ jurisdiction which is an equitable relief, parties seeking equity must come with clean hands this is a well established principle, about which there cannot be any room for doubt. 23. Sri Sanjay Singh learned Counsel appearing on behalf of respondent No. 2 has further submitted that in order to invoke writ jurisdiction which is an equitable relief, parties seeking equity must come with clean hands this is a well established principle, about which there cannot be any room for doubt. He further relies on the decision in the case of Deo Nath Yadav v. District Inspector of Schools, 1996 (1) UPLBEC 60 : 1996 (1) LBESR 410 (All), where in referring to the judgment in the case of Asiatic Engineering Company v. Acchru Ram, reported in AIR 1951 All 786 (FB), it was observed "that a person obtaining a ex pane order or a rule nisi by means of a petition for exercise of extraordinary power Article 226 of the Constitution must come with clean hand, must not suppress any relevant facts from the court must refrain from making misleading statement and from giving incorrect information to the court. The Court cannot allow invoking of extraordinary power in any manner to misuse its valuable right by obtaining an ex pane order by suppression, misrepresen tation of fact. " 24. Drawing my attention to the facts of the case Sri Sanjay Singh submits that against the order dated 15-12-1995 the petitioner had moved revisional application before the learned District Judge under Section 12-C (6) of the said Act, which was dismissed on 9-1-1996, is not maintainable. It appears that while the said revision is pending, namely, on 5-1-1996 the present writ petition was affirmed without disclos ing the facts of pendency of the said revision before the District Judge. The writ petition was sought to be presented on 8-1-1996 and the notices were served on 8-1 -1996, though revisional application was pending till 9-1-1996 But nowhere in the body of the petition, the said fact has been disclosed. As, it is appears from the facts disclosed that on 5-1-1996, the petitioner has sought to prosecute two remedies at two different for a without making any averments or disclosing the said facts. Though the said situation has been sought to be explained away in the rejoinder affidavit, after the same was disclosed in the counter-affidavit but it does not appear that the petitioner had come with clean hands. Though the said situation has been sought to be explained away in the rejoinder affidavit, after the same was disclosed in the counter-affidavit but it does not appear that the petitioner had come with clean hands. Though Sri M. S. Singh has ascribed the same as mere error or mistake on account of certain communications gap, but it is very difficult to accept such explanation. It was the duty of the petitioner himself to disclose to the Lawyer that he had preferred a revision before the District Judge, which is still pending and sufficient explanation sought to have been given in prefer ring the writ petition even during the pendency of revisional application. It cannot be a ground to justify the fact that the revision was not maintainable before the District Judge. 25. Sub-section (6) of the Act, as quote above, uses the expression in the phrase "aggrieved by an order of the prescribed authority". The Legislature has not used "any". Instead it has used an in order to clarify the order of the prescribed authority. By using the article "an" the Legislature had clearly indicated its intention that all or any order passed by the prescribed authority is not reviseable. The expres sion an order read with sub-section (4) (ii) means the order enumerated in the said clause. Therefore, the order passed in the hearing of the application particularly with regard to the procedure followed by such hearing were not intended to be subject to revision. The enter Scheme with regard to the challenge of election is based on the consideration that same should be expedited and should not be imprisoned with technicalities of the procedure inasmuch as if the procedure is delayed then the purpose of challenge of election would be frustrated because of the "limited time during which the effect of the election survived. That is the reason which weighed with the Legislature to circumscribe the procedural aspects to such extent so as to minimise the time in disposal of an election petition. 26. The revision before the District Judge, therefore, was not maintainable and had been dismissed as such. The real remedy open to the petitioner was by means of a writ petition. That is the reason which weighed with the Legislature to circumscribe the procedural aspects to such extent so as to minimise the time in disposal of an election petition. 26. The revision before the District Judge, therefore, was not maintainable and had been dismissed as such. The real remedy open to the petitioner was by means of a writ petition. In that view of the matter I am only inclined to partly allow the present writ petition, as indicated above, namely, to the extent of setting aside that part of the order by which the interim order was said to have been passed and which has the effect of restraining the petitioner from taking over charge or Pradhan of from performing the duties of Pradhan. I however, affirm the order for calling for the record of the election. But on account of the conduct of the petitioner I impose cost, assessed at Rs. 1,000 to be deposited in the court below within a period of one month from today. In default the petitioner shall not be eligible to contest the said election petition in the court below, 27. With the above observation the writ petition is partly allowed as indicated above. 28. Let a copy of this order be given to the learned Counsel for the petitioner on payment of usual charges within two weeks. Petition partly allowed. .