JUDGMENT Tarun Chatterjee, J : This revisional application raises amongst others a question which has already been decided by me in the case of Minor Subir Ranjan Mondal vs. Sitanath Mukherjee. reported in 1994 (1) CLJ 106 . One of the question that is raised in this revisional application is whether, in & pre-emption proceeding filed under s. 8 of the West Bengal Land Reforms Act (hereinafter referred to as the 'Act'), s. 5 of the Limitation Act is for condonation of delay in filing the application under s. 8 of the Act attracted or not. Precisely this question was decided by me in the aforesaid decision. In that decision. 1 have given my reasons for the conclusion that s. 5 of the Limitation Act is not attracted to a proceeding under s. 8 of the Act. The learned Advocate for the pre-emptor/petitioner tried to persuade me to change my views expressed in the decision reported in 1994( 1) CLJ 106 by making an elaborate argument. A written argument has been filed on behalf of the pre-emptor/petitioner incorporating therein the argument in support of the conclusion that an application under s. 5 of the Limitation Act is maintainable in a proceeding under s. 8 of the Act. In the written argument some other points have also been raised by the petitioners. Before I go into the details of the submissions contained in the written argument, let me state in a nutshell the case of the petitioner in the petition under s. 8 of the Act which is as follows: 2. The petitioner was a co-sharer and also an adjoining land owner. He filed the pre-emption under s. 8 of the Act as a co-sharer and also as an adjoining land owner along with an application under s.5 of the Limitation Act. The application for pre-emption relates to a deed of sale executed on 12th of December, 1984. According to the petitioner, he was kept out of knowledge of the aforesaid transfer on account of fraud till 30th October, 1987 when the application under s. 8 of the Act for pre-emption of the aforesaid transfer on 29th of November, 1987 with an application under s.5 of the Limitation Act was filed. Both the Courts below proceeded on the basis that the petitioner had claimed pre-emption on the ground of vicinage only. Both the Courts below proceeded on the basis that the petitioner had claimed pre-emption on the ground of vicinage only. The learned advocate for the petitioner had also argued in respect of the claim for pre-emption on the ground of vicinage only. It is well settled law now that after the amendment of the definition of 'holding' in the Act practically the right of pre-emption on the basis that the pre-emptor is a cosharer of the holding has been taken away. 3. Let me now consider the first branch of submission of the learned Advocate for the pre-emptor/petitioner. He contended that when a non-notified co-sharer before the amendment of the definition of 'holding' could file an application for pre-emption under s. 8 of the Act within 3 years under Article 137 of the Limitation Act and as the right of pre-emption on the ground of being a cosharer has now been practically taken away after amendment of the definition of holding, why the same period of limitation of 3 years would not be attracted in the case of vicinage also. In support of this contention he relied on a Single Bench decision of this Court in the case of (Promod Ranjan Banerjee vs. Mirapada Mondal ) reported in AI R 1980 Cal 181. This argument of the learned Advocate for the petitioner is in my view, of no substance. Section 8 of the Act confers right of purchase to co-sharer or contiguous tenant. Section 8 (1) of the Act itself prescribe the period of limitation. Section 8 as it stands now confers right of pre-emption to (1) Bargadar, (2) Co-sharer Raiyat and (3) contiguous tenant. In the case of Bargadar the application for pre-emption is to be filed within 3 months from the date of transfer. In the case of co-sharer raiyat of the holding the application for pre-emption has to be filed by him within 3 months of the service of notice/given to him under s. 5(5). In the case a raiyat possessing land adjoining such holding the application for pre-emption is to be filed within four months from the date of transfer. In the case of co-sharer raiyat of the holding the application for pre-emption has to be filed by him within 3 months of the service of notice/given to him under s. 5(5). In the case a raiyat possessing land adjoining such holding the application for pre-emption is to be filed within four months from the date of transfer. Therefore, from the section itself it is evident that so far as the case of Bargadar and contiguous tenant is concerned, the period of limitation is three months or four months as the case may be, is to be computed from the date of transfer in question irrespective of service of notice under s. 5(5) of the Act, as sub-so (5) of S. 5 does not contemplate any service of notice either on a Bargadar or upon a contiguous tenant. In 1975 (1) CLJ 494 (Ashalata vs. Gopal Chandra) it was held that in the case of a contiguous tenant, the period of limitation of four months must be computed from the date of transfer. This decision was rendered in. the year 1975. The right given to a Bargadar of holding to pre-empt a sale under S. 8 of the Act was however, brought by an amendment of the West Bengal Land Reforms Act which came into force in the year 1981. Therefore, before the amendment was brought in respect of the right of pre-emption of a bargadar by legislature, the Division Bench decision of this Court in the case of Ashalata vs .Gopal Chandra was very much before the legislature. In spite of the aforesaid decision where it has been held that section 8(1) has clearly provided that contiguous raiyal is to make an application for pre-emption within four months from the date of transfer and that Article 137 of the Limitation Act in the case of an adjacent landowner cannot be attracted, the legislature still thought it fit to prescribe the period of limitation in the case of Bargadar within 3 months from the date of transfer. Therefore, it can be safely said that the intention of the legislature was to prescribe a fixed period of limitation which will start from the date of transfer in the case of Bargadar like the period of limitation prescribed in the case of an adjoining owner and not like the period of limitation prescribed for a co-sharer of the holding. Therefore, it can be safely said that the intention of the legislature was to prescribe a fixed period of limitation which will start from the date of transfer in the case of Bargadar like the period of limitation prescribed in the case of an adjoining owner and not like the period of limitation prescribed for a co-sharer of the holding. Since the legislature itself prescribed the period of limitation for different categories of persons to apply for pre-emption it is not open to the Court to say that the period of limitation prescribed in s. 8 for a co-sharer of a holding can be applied in the case of the bargadar or an adjoining owner. That apart, in my view, when the legislature amended the definition of 'holding' in the year 1981 and when the decision in the case of Ashalata vs. Gopal Chandra was very much before the legislature, it was open to the legislature to amend S. 8 of the Act for the purpose of making a uniform period of limitation for all categories of persons applying for pre-emption under s.8 of the Act. The legislature not having done so, it is not for the Court to compute the period of limitation in the manner asked for by the petitioner when the legislature itself prescribed the period of limitaion for different categories of persons in the section itself. Therefore it cannot be said that when a right to pre-emption has been taken away on the ground of co-sharership, such a co-sharer, if he is an adjacent owner, can get the period of limitation prescribed for a co-sharer of the holding. It is also difficult to understand how the period of limitation can be computed in respect of the right of pre-emption of an adjoining owner on the basis of the period of limitation provided in s. 8 of the Act for a cosharer of the holding because the right of pre-emption of a co-sharer has been taken away by the definition of 'holding' after the amendment of the Act. Apart from that, in view of the Division Bench decision in the case of Ashalata vs. Gopal Chandra this question cannot now arise at all. Apart from that, in view of the Division Bench decision in the case of Ashalata vs. Gopal Chandra this question cannot now arise at all. Before I proceed further, let me at this stage deal with the Single Bench decision cited at the bar for the petitioner which is reported in AIR 1980 Cal 181 (Promod Ranjan vs. Mirapada Mondal have carefully read the said decision. In my view, the view expressed in the Single Bench decision cannot be followed in view of the Division Bench decision in the case of Ashalata vs. Gopal Chandra. The principle laid down in Ashalata vs. Gopal Chandra was not followed by the learned Single Judge upon the view that the views expressed in the latest Division Bench decision of this Court reported in 83 CWN 62 (Debabrata vs. Nanibala) must be followed. With great respect to the learned Single Judge I may mention here that the aforesaid two Division Bench decisions stand on a different footing. In the case of Ashalata vs. Gopal Chandra the question that was raised and decided was that the commencement of the period of limitation for making an application by an adjoining owner would be the date of transfer and the other term of the said period would be the date of expiry of four months from the date of such transfer and when s. 8 itself in the case of an adjoining owner has prescribed four months limitation commencing from the date of transfer there is no scope for invoking Article 137 of the Limitation Act. On the other hand, the other Division Bench decision of this Court reported in 83 CWN 62 was followed by the learned Single Judge had dealt with the principles to be followed in the matter of allowing or rejecting an application for amendment of a preemption of a pre-emption in that context it was held in Dababrata vs. Nanibala that there was no limitation. In paragraph 6 at page 66 of the aforesaid decision, M.M. Dutta, J (As his Lordship then was) who spoke for the Division Bench observed as follows : "In view of the said decision of the Supreme Court in A.K. Gupta's case referred to above, let us see whether by the amendment, the opposite party seeks to introduce a new claim on a new cause-of-action. Under s. 8 of the Act, the right of a co-sharer raiyat to make an application for pre-emption arises on the transfer of a portion or share of a holding to any person other than a co-sharer in the holding. On such transfer, the right of pre-emption under s. 8 also accrues to a raiyat possessing land adjoining such holding. In other words, the accrual of the right to pre-empt under s. 8 is the accrual of a cause-of-action for the exercise of that right. When the opposite party ask for pre-emption on the ground of her being a co-sharer of the holding the cause of action was the transfer of the portion of the holding to a person other than a co-sharer. The claim to pre-emption made by the opposite party on the ground of vicinage by the amendment of the application, did not change the cause-of-action which remained the same, namely the transfer of a portion of holding to a stranger. The claim is also the same in both the cases, namely, a claim for pre-emption. Only the ground in support of the said claim in a new one, that is, the ground of vicinage. So considered from the point of view of the principles laid down by the Supreme Court in Ax. Gupta's case (supra), the amendment has neither changed the cause-of-action, nor a new claim has been introduced by the same. (Emphasis Supplied). 4. From the aforesaid observation of the Division Bench it is therefore, evident that by allowing an application for amendment of a pre-emption petition by inserting the ground of vicinage, only a new ground is added and there was no new cause-of-action because the cause-of-action remained the same namely the transfer in question to a stranger. 5. As noted herein earlier, the learned Single Judge, relying on Debabrata vs. Nanibala, Promod Ranjan vs. Mirapada Mondal has also held that there is no question of limitation as there was no cause-of-action. In view of my observations made hereinabove, and for the reasons aforesaid it must be said at this stage that the aforesaid observation made by the learned Single Judge in the said decision which was based on the principles laid down by the Division Bench in the case of Debabrata vs. Shrimati Nanibala, 83 CWN page 62. In view of my observations made hereinabove, and for the reasons aforesaid it must be said at this stage that the aforesaid observation made by the learned Single Judge in the said decision which was based on the principles laid down by the Division Bench in the case of Debabrata vs. Shrimati Nanibala, 83 CWN page 62. is not acceptable to me because the Division Bench in Debabrata vs. Shrimati Nanibala had only laid down such principle in the matter of allowing or rejecting an application for amendment of the pre-emption application. For the reasons aforesaid, in my view, the principle laid down in Debabrata vs. Nanibala in the matter of amendment cannot be applied in the case where the issue is whether the period of limitation can be extended in the case of vicinage like the period of limitation prescribed in the case of the co-sharer of the holding. In view of the Division Bench decision in the case of Ashalata vs. Gopal Chandra which is binding on me and as the said decision is on the point at issue, I am unable to rely on the Single Bench decision of this Court in Promod Ranjan vs. Mirapada Mondal which had delivered its decision following the Division Bench decision in the case of Debabrata vs. Nanibala as the said Division Bench decision had pronounced the principle that an application for amendment of a pre-emption application would be allowed even if it was barred by limitation. There is another aspect of this matter which should be taken note of. It is well settled law now that if an application for amendment of the pleading is allowed, the same shall relate back to the date on which the original pleading was filed. From the admitted facts of Debabrata vs. Nanibala it would be evident that as soon as the application for amendment was allowed and the ground of vicinage was incorporated, it would be taken that the application for preemption on the ground of vicinage was also filed on the date of filing the application for pre-emption on the ground of co-sharership and in that case would be within the period of limitation that is four months from the date of transfer. For the reasons aforesaid there is no substance in the argument of the learned advocate for the petitioner that in view of the Single Bench decision in the case of Promod Ranjan vs. Mirapda the period of limitation in the case of an adjoining owner can be computed under Article 137 of the Limitation Act. Therefore, the question now arises in this case whether the petitioner could file the application for pre-emption on the ground of vicinage after the expiry of period of limitation. In view of Ashalata vs Gopal Chandra, the answer is in the negative. The Division Bench decision of this Court clearly held that the application for pre-emption on the ground of vicinage must be held to be barred as the same is not filed within four months from the date of transfer and Article 137 of the Limitation Act had no manner of application in the cases of vicinage. From paragraphs 4 and 5 of the aforesaid decision and also from the observation made hereinearlier, it would be clear that s. 8 of the Act itself clearly specified that the commencement of the period of limitation for making an application by an adjoining owner would be the date of transfer and the other termini of the said period would be expiry of four months from the date of such transfer, where as unlike other class of persons eligible to exercise the right of the purchase namely co-sharer tenants, s. 8 makes no reference to sub-so (5) of s. 5 in the matter of starting point of the period of limitation for making an application for the exercise of the right of purchase by contiguous tenant. Once a claim for pre-emption is made on the ground of vicinage the period of limitation would be four months from the date of transfer of the property. As noted above the application for pre-emption in this case was filed well beyond the period of limitation of four months from date of transfer. Even following the principle laid down by the Division Bench of this Court in Debabrata vs. Nanibala it can be said that if the amendment is allowed it will relate back to the date of filing of the pre-emption application. As noted earlier the application for pre-emption on the ground of vicinage must be found to be barred on the date it was filed. As noted earlier the application for pre-emption on the ground of vicinage must be found to be barred on the date it was filed. Apart from date, there is no reason to rely on the principles laid down by the Division Bench decision of this Court reported in 83 CWN page 62 for the reasons (I) the said Division Bench decision was only dealing with an application for amendment of pre-emption application, and (ii) it never dealt with the question that if an application for preemption is filed on the ground of co-sharership and subsequently by amendment the ground of vicinage is pleaded the period of limitation cannot be four months from the date of transfer of property but it will be on the basis of Article137 of the Limitation Act. In view of the decision in Ashalata vs. Gopal Chandra reported in 1975 (1) CLJ 494 it must be held that the application filed by the pre-emptor/petitioner filed well beyond the period of limitation of four months from transfer which is the period of limitation for filing an application for pre-emption on the ground of vicinage was clearly time barred. 6. The second branch of submission of the learned advocate for the petitioner is that what would be the period of limitation when a pre-emptor files an application under s. 8 of the Act on both the grounds namely as co-sharer and also as an adjoining land owner? The answer to this question is flowing from s.8 itself. Section 8 of the Act specifies the period of limitation in the case of co-sharer and also in the case of adjoining land owner. So far as pre-emption on the ground of co-sharership is concerned section itself clearly says that such an application must be filed within three months of the service of notice given under sub-so (5) of S. 5 and in the case of an applicant possessing land adjoining such holding such an application shall be filed within four months of the date of such transfer. Safar as the period of limitation in the case of vicinage is concerned, the Division Bench decision in the case of Ashalata Bairagya vs. Gopal Chandra has aiready laid down that the period of limitation is four months from the date of transfer. Safar as the period of limitation in the case of vicinage is concerned, the Division Bench decision in the case of Ashalata Bairagya vs. Gopal Chandra has aiready laid down that the period of limitation is four months from the date of transfer. As noted hereinabove in the case of Ashalata vs. Gopal Chandra it has been decided, so far as the claim of pre-emption on the ground of vicinage is concerned that the application for pre-emption must be filed within four months from the date of transfer. In paragraph 6 of the said decision at page 497, Chittotosh Mukherjee ( as his lordship then was) observed as follows: Secondly when s. 8 itself expressly provides two different starting points for computation of limitation in case of co-sharership in cases of adjoining ownership, we are not prepared to read into section something which is not there in order to give an extended period of time to the adjoining owners for exercising their right of pre-emption." 7. Therefore, there is no hesitation in my mind to hold that even if the application is filed on both the grounds namely on the ground of co-sharership and vicinage the starting point of period of limitation having been made out in the application for pre-emption on the ground of vicinage must be filed within four months from the date of transfer and there is no question to hold that in case of adjoining owner, period of limitation is to be counted not from the date of transfer but from some other point of time. In this connection additional submission of the learned advocate for the petitioner may be referred to. The learned advocate for the petitioner submitted that even assuming that the period of limitation for filing an application under s. 8 of the Act on the ground of vicinage is four months from the date of transfer even then the question still arose as to whether the petitioner was kept out of knowledge of transfer by fraud and if such case of fraud is accepted then the limitation shall run from the date of such knowledge of transfer and not from the date of transfer. In Ashalata vs. Gopal Chandra in Paragraph 7 page 498 of the said decision, the Division Bench, however, did not say that the application for pre-emption can be filed out of time if a case is made out for enlargement of time or extension of time or suspension of time. If the case of fraud is accepted that is to say that the petitioner was kept out of knowledge of the date of transfer I would have no hesitation to hold that the application for pre-emption ought to have been held maintainable in law and was filed within period of limitation as the petitioner was kept out of knowledge by exercising fraud on him by the pre-emptee/opposite party. From the perusal of the two courts judgment and issues framed therein it is certain that the case of fraud as originally made by the petitioner was not accepted by the Courts below on a finding that the plea of the petitioner to the effect that he had known about the execution of the impugned deed only after obtaining the certified copy of the order was not believable. Since this finding is a finding of fact it is not permissible to the revisional court to interfere with such finding of fact. Since the case of fraud was not accepted by the courts below on merits there is no need to go into this question any further. 8. In view of the findings made by the Court below on the question of fraud it is not necessary to discuss the Division Bench decision cited at the bar which is reported in AIR 1972 Cal 502 (M.M. Ghosh vs. Sisubala Atta). 9. It was lastly contended by the learned Advocate for the petitioner that the decision reported in 1994 (1) CLJ 106 (Subir Ranjan Mondal vs. Sitanath Mukherjee) should be reconsidered. In the written argument certain points have been raised by the learned advocate for the petitioner against the correctness of the aforesaid decision. I have carefully considered the said reasons given in the written argument and after going through the said reasons I am of the view that there is no necessity to change the views expressed in 1994 (1) CLJ 106 . That apart there is also no necessity to reconsider the said decision for the purpose of deciding this case. I have carefully considered the said reasons given in the written argument and after going through the said reasons I am of the view that there is no necessity to change the views expressed in 1994 (1) CLJ 106 . That apart there is also no necessity to reconsider the said decision for the purpose of deciding this case. I find from the judgment of the courts below that the application for condonation of delay in filing the pre-emption application was considered on merits and it was found on such consideration that delay could not be condoned. That is to say the petitioner could not prove sufficient cause for condonation of such delay in filing the application for premption under s. 8 of the Act. It is now well settled that the 'sufficient cause' is always a question of fact. In the present case both the courts concurrently found that the petitioner could not show sufficient cause for condonation of delay gn consideration of the materials on record and on appreciation of evidence. Such a finding of fact on the question of condonation cannot be interfered with in the exercise of my discretionary power under s. 115 of the Code of Civil Procedure, until and unless perversity in the said order is shown. The learned advocate appearing for the petitioner could not show that there was any perversity in the orders passed by the Courts below. Accordingly, there is no need to interfere with such finding of fact in the exercise of his power under s. 115 of the Code of Civil Procedure. Such being the position it is therefore, not necessary to go into the details regarding the submissions of the learned advocate for the petitioner that application under s.5 of the Limitation Act can be filed in a proceeding under s.8 of the Act and to reconsider the decision reported in 1994 (1) CLJ 196 (Subir Ranjan Mondal vs. Sitanath Mukherjee.) 10. For the reasons aforesaid there is no merit in this revisional application. 11. The revisional application is thus rejected. 12. There will be no order as to costs. Application rejected.