JUDGMENT R. L. Khurana, J.-This appeal has been directed by the plaintiff against the judgment and decree dated 14-8-1989 of the Additional District Judge (1) Kangra, at Dharamshala whereby the judgment and decree dated 25 11-1985 of the Senior Sub-Judge, Kangra at Dharamshala was set aside and the suit of the plaintiff was dismissed. 2. The plaintiff is a Co-operative Society. It filed a suit for recovery of Rs. 3,912 (Rs. 3,497 on account of principal and Rs. 385 on account of interest from November, 1980 to August 31, 1982 at the rate of 6% per annum and Rs. 30 on account of notice charges) According to the plaintiff, the defendant purchased ghee on credit. The plaintiff is maintaining regular account in which all the payments made by the defendant from time to time are being entered In the month of June 1978, a sum of Rs. 3,597 was due from the defendant, A notice dated 25-12-1978 was served upon the defendant calling upon him to make the payment of outstanding amount. The defendant in November 198u paid a sum of Rs 100 thereby leaving a balance of Rs. 3,497. The said amount has not been paid by the defendant inspite of repeated demands and registered notice. The plaintiff is entitled to interest on the outstanding amount at the rate of 6% per annum as also a sum of Rs. 30 towards notice charges. 3. The defendant resisted the suit. He denied having purchased ghee from the plaintiff or having made part payment from time to time towards the costs of such ghee. The defendant specifically denied having paid a sum of Rs 100 in November 1980. An objection, inter alia, that the suit is barred by time was also raised. 4. On the pleadings of the parties, the trial Court framed as many as 8 issues. The trial Court came to the conclusion that ghee was purchased by the defendant on credit from the plaintiff Part payments were made by the defendant from time to time and last of such part payment of Rs. 100 was made on 3-11-1980 The suit was found to be within time. Vide judgment and decree dated 25 11-1985, the suit of the plaintiff for a sum of Rs 3,912 was decreed with costs 5. 100 was made on 3-11-1980 The suit was found to be within time. Vide judgment and decree dated 25 11-1985, the suit of the plaintiff for a sum of Rs 3,912 was decreed with costs 5. The defendant carried an appeal against the judgment and decree of the trial Court before the Additional District Judge (!) Kangra at Dharamshala The said appeal was allowed vide judgment and decree dated 14-8-1989 and the judgment and decree passed by the trial Court was set aside, The first appellate Court while allowing the appeal came to the conclusion that the suit of the plaintiff was barred by time, 6. The present second appeal was admitted on the short question of law whether Ex P-7 and P-8 would amount to an acknowledgement to extend period of limitation. 7. I have heard the learned Counsel for the parties and have gone through the record of the case. 8. There is no dispute that the present suit is governed by Article 14 of the Limitation Act. Under the said Article, the period of limitation for a suit for recovery of price of goods sold and delivered, where no fixed period of credit is agreed upon, is three years from the date of the delivery of the goods 9. As per plaintiffs case, 50 tins of ghee were sold to the defendant on credit on 19-44978 vide Ex. P-10 for a sum of Rs. 7,597. A sum of Rs 4,100 is alleged to have been paid by the defendant in three instalments. The last of the instalment being of Rs-100 was made on 3-11-1980. As per Article 14 taking the starting point of limitation from the date of sale and delivery of ghee, that is, 19-4-1978, the present suit filed on 510 1982, on the fact of it, is barred by time. 10. The case of the plaintiff is that the period of limitation prescribed under Article 14, Limitation Act, 1963 stood extended under section 19, Limitation Act, 1963 in view of Ex P-7 and Ex. P-8 whereby the defendant made part payment of Rs 100 and had acknowledged such part payment. The defendant has disputed part payment of Rs. 100 having made on 3-11-1980 and the acknowledgement thereof vide Ex P 8, 11. P-8 whereby the defendant made part payment of Rs 100 and had acknowledged such part payment. The defendant has disputed part payment of Rs. 100 having made on 3-11-1980 and the acknowledgement thereof vide Ex P 8, 11. Section 19, Limitation Act, 1963 which corresponds to section 20 of the Limitation Act, 1908 insofar as it is material for the purpose of present case reads:— "Where payment on account of a debt or of interest on a legacy is made before the expiration of the prescribed period by the person liable to pay the debt or legacy or by his agent duly authorised in this behalf, a fresh period of limitation shall be computed from the time when the payment was made : Provided that save in the case of payment of interest made before the 1st day of January 1928, an acknowledgement of the payment appears in the handwriting of, or in a writing signed by, the person making the payment." 12. The bare reading of the above provision shows that in order to attract the operation of this section, two essential conditions are:— (i) the payment must be made within the prescribed period of limitation ; and (ii) such payment must be acknowledged by some form of writing either in the handwriting of payer himself or signed by him. 13. The scope of section 20, Limitation Act, 1908 which corresponds to section 19, Limitation Act, 1963 came up for consideration before the Honble Apex Court in Sant Lal Mahton v. Kamla Prasad and others, AIR 1951 SC 477, wherein it was held in the following terms :— "It is the payment which really extends the period of limitation under section 20, Limitation Act ; but the payment has got to be proved in a particular way and for reasons of policy the legislature insists on a written or signed acknowledgement as the only proof of payment and excludes oral testimony. Unless, therefore, there is acknowledgement in the required form the payment by itself is of no avail................However, while the section requires that payment should be made within the period of limitation it does not require that the acknowledgement should also be made within that period. To interpret the proviso in that way would be to import into it certain words which do not occur there" 14. To interpret the proviso in that way would be to import into it certain words which do not occur there" 14. The Honble Apex Court further held that while it is not necessary that the written acknowledgement should be made prior to expiry of period of limitation, it is essential that such acknowledgement, whether made before or after the period of limitation, must be in existence prior to the institution of the suit. 15. In the said case, before the Honble^ Apex Court, though there was evidence showing part payment towards the debt, there was no written acknowledgement in support of such part payment by the debtor. In the written statement filed by the debtor, he had admitted and acknowledged the part payment having been made by him The Honble Apex Court came to the conclusion that such acknowledgement in the written statement having been made after the institution of the suit was of no consequence and would not extend the period of limitation under section 20 Limitation Act, 1908 16. In Syed Jalaluddin Hasan Quadri v. M/s Tarapharmacy represented by Us Managing Partner, Tarachand Agarwal, AIR 1966 AP 136, it was held that in order to save limitation under section 19, Limitation Act, 1963 by payment of some money towards the transaction, the payment ought to have been made in writing or under the signature of debtor. Mere payment recorded by the creditor in the account would not attract section 19, Limitation Act, 1963 17. In A. Ramavel v. M/s. Pandyan Automobiles Pvt. Ltd , AIR 1973 Mad 339, where part payment towards the debt was shown to have been made by cheque drawn by brother-in-law of the debtor, while dealing with the scope of section 20, Limitation Act, 1908 it was held: — "In order to give a fresh start of limitation under section 20, the payment should have been acknowledged in writing by the person making the payment. If the payment towards the debt was made by the debtor himself, the writing required is the writing of the debtor. But if the debtor chooses to pay the amount towards the debt through his authorised agent, then, the acknowledgement in writing must be by the agent who actually paid the amount towards the debt. If the payment towards the debt was made by the debtor himself, the writing required is the writing of the debtor. But if the debtor chooses to pay the amount towards the debt through his authorised agent, then, the acknowledgement in writing must be by the agent who actually paid the amount towards the debt. But, in this case, the payment was made by the debtor himself, but the cheque was drawn by V K Jagannathan, who is stated to be the brother in-law of the debtor. It is true, if the cheque had been drawn by the defendant himself in favour of the plaintiff and that payment was accepted by the plaintiff, that cheque would amount to an acknowledgement in writing which would give a fresh period of limitation. But, in this case, the cheque was not issued by the defendant (debtor), but it was drawn by V. K. Jagannathan. The payment was actually made by the defendant Therefore, section 20 is not complied with in order to get a fresh period of limitation Section 20 is a special provision which enables the creditor to get a fresh period of limitation when there is an acknowledgement in writing by the debtor. In my opinion, the conditions laid down in this section will have to be strictly complied with and there is no question of an extension of that principle to any other category of acknowledgement. The acknowledgement, in this case, is not in conformity with the provisions of section 20 and therefore the plaintiff will not be entitled to a fresh period of limitation from the date of that payment." 18. Similar view has been taken by the High Court of Allahabad in Maqsoon Khan v. Lala Balwant Prasad, AIR 1982 All 41 19. In the present case, the defendant is shown to have made part payment of Rs. 100 towards the principal debt on 3-11-1980 vide receipt copy of which is Ex P-7. Ex P-8 is alleged to be the endorsement signed by the defendant in token of having been made said payment of Rs. 100 on 3-11-1980. The defendant, as stated above, has denied having made payment of Rs. 100 vide Ex P-7, He has also denied his signature on the alleged acknowledgement Ex. P-8. 20. PW R-l Suriit Singh is the Manager of plaintiff Society. 100 on 3-11-1980. The defendant, as stated above, has denied having made payment of Rs. 100 vide Ex P-7, He has also denied his signature on the alleged acknowledgement Ex. P-8. 20. PW R-l Suriit Singh is the Manager of plaintiff Society. He has stated that a sum of Rs, 100 was paid by the defendant vide receipt Ex. P-7 So far as endorsement Ex. P-8 is concerned, he has merely stated that the same is the photo copy of the acknowledgement. Neither the counter-foil of the receipt Ex P-7 nor the original of Ex. P-8 has been brought on the record of the present case. PW I has not even stated that the acknowledgement, copy of which is Ex. P-8 was signed by the defendant in his presence. The defendant has specifically denied his signatures on the acknowledgement Ex. P-8. No other evidence has been led on behalf of the plaintiff to show that the acknowledgement Ex P-8 was signed by the defendant 21. In order to claim the benefit of extension of period of limitation under section 19, Limitation Act, 1963, the onus was heavily on the plaintiff to prove the acknowledgement of part payment having been made by the defendant. Even if it be assumed that a sum of Rs. 100 was paid into the accounts of the plaintiff, there is nothing on the record to show that such part payment of Rs. 100 was made by the defendant himself There is nothing in Ex. P-7 to show as to from whom the amount was received; The said receipt has been issued in the name of defendant firm. Was the payment made by defendant Bal Krishan personally or through some authorised agent is not brought out on the record of the case. 22. In the absence of written acknowledgement as required under section 19, Limitation Act, 1963 the receipt Ex. P-7 and the entry showing the payment of Ks, 100 in the books of account of the plaintiff would not extend the period of limitation under section 19, Limitation Act, 1963. The suit of the plaintiff, therefore, was rightly held to be barred by time by the first appellate Court. 23. For the foregoing reasons, there is no merit in the present appeal and the same is accordingly dismissed leaving the parties to bear their own costs. Appeal dismissed.