N. N. BHATTACHARJEE, J. ( 1 ) THE petitioner has challenged the order dated 19th January, 1985 passed by the learned Judge, Seventh Industrial Tribunal, W. B. in case No. 12 of 1980 under section 33 (2) (b) Industrial Disputes Act. The facts of the case are as follows : ( 2 ) IN October 1974 the petitioner Ganesh Ch. Saha was appointed as a security guard by the Divisional Manager (Personnel), Indian Tourism Development Corporation and was posted at Airport Hotel, Dum Dum, Calcutta. In the year 1979 the petitioner was selected and given a substantive appointment in the post of Security Inspector by the respondent No. 2, the General Manager. Hotel Airport Ashok and since then till his dismissal the petitioner has been working as the Security Inspector under respondent No. 2. ( 3 ) IT is petitioner's case that Sri Ashok Mukherjee, the General Secretary of the Union recognised by the management, in conspiracy with the Security Officer of the Airport Hotel, cooked up a story containing allegations against the petitioner on the basis of which the petitioner was suspended from service on and from 28th June, 1980 and thereafter a chargesheet was issued an 30th June, 1980. The charges were (i) Causing commotion in and around his quarter within the Hotel premises; (ii) Threatening his superior i. e. the Security Officer: (iii) Threatening Sri Ashok Mukherjee, the General Secretary of Union: (iv) Mala fide, false and baseless allegations against employees of the Establishment with a view to hide his own misconduct; (v) Lowering down the prestige and reputation of the Hotel; (vi) Leaving his work and work puce unauthorisedly at about 1. 51 hours on 26/27th June, 1980 and remaining unauthorisedly absent on 27th June, 1980; ( 4 ) ON 28th April, 1981, the petitioner was again chargesheeted for the following offences :- (a) Causing commotion in and around the quarter within Hotel premises: (b) Leaving Station i. e. staff quarter No. 3. Hotel Airport Ashok, Calcutta-59 without permission of the General Manager, and (c) Theft and dishonesty in connection with Hotel property. ( 5 ) AS the reply to the charge-sheets were unsatisfactory, the management decided to hold enquires into the charges. An outsider was appointed as tile Enquiry Officer. Hotel Airport Ashok, Calcutta-59 without permission of the General Manager, and (c) Theft and dishonesty in connection with Hotel property. ( 5 ) AS the reply to the charge-sheets were unsatisfactory, the management decided to hold enquires into the charges. An outsider was appointed as tile Enquiry Officer. At the conclusion of the enquiry, the Enquiry Officer found the petitioner workman guilty of the charges framed in the first charge-sheet and submitted his report on 28th November, 1982. In respect of the second charge-sheet, the Enquiry Officer also found the petitioner workman guilty of the charges and submitted his report on 19th January, 1983. The General Manager of the Hotel having concurred with the findings and reports of the Enquiry Officer issued a second show-cause notice intimating the proposed punishment of dismissal, to which the petitioner workman submitted his reply. The General Manager considered the reply and found nothing to differ from the proposed punishment of dismissal. Accordingly the dismissal order was passed w. e. f. 11th April, 1983. One month's wages was remitted by Money Order along with the order of dismissal which was communicated by Registered Post. As there was already an industrial dispute pending between the company and its workman before the Industrial Tribunal for adjudication, the employer company by an application under section 33 (2) (b) of the Industrial disputes Act sought for approval of the same Tribunal of the action taken by the Manager. ( 6 ) THE petitioner workman contested the application by filing a written statement and denying all the material allegations of the respondent company. ( 6 ) THE petitioner workman contested the application by filing a written statement and denying all the material allegations of the respondent company. The grounds of objection were that there was violation of the principle of natural Justice in holding the enquiry, that the Enquiry Officer proceeded with the enquiry with a biased mind, that his findings are not based on evidence or materials on record, that the petitioner was not afforded an opportunity to defend himself by engaging a lawyer, that the charges brought against him were false, perverse, fabricated and baseless, that in the absence of the petitioner, Sri Ashok Mukherjee forcibly brought his wife to the office of the Security Officer Sri R. P. Mukherjee and compelled her to lodge a complaint against him and also compelled her to sign on a few blank papers, that on returning home from Calcutta the petitioner coming to know of the said facts from his wife immediately went to the office of the Security Officer and protested and accordingly he could join his night shift duty only at about 1. 51 a. m. , that he left his duty under a bona fide apprehension of danger to his life and limb, that although he became sick the Security Officer refused to accept his leave application, that the story of theft by him was totally baseless and false inasmuch as the Stock Register does not show any deficit, that although the evidences adduced by the management fell far short of the required standard of proof the Enquiry Officer mechanically and without application of his mind submitted his report slating that charges against him had been proved, that the Enquiry officer travelled beyond the charges which would show a closed mind, that the disciplinary authority issued the second show-cause notice mechanically, that examination of the Enquiry Officer before the Tribunal established that the Enquiry Officer was a prosecutor and a Judge rolled into one etc. ( 7 ) IT appears that the learned Tribunal Judge after elaborately discussing the evidences on record came to the finding that no case had been established before him that the management was guilty of victimisation or unfair labour practice or that the principle of natural justice was not followed in conducting the enquiry and that being so the Tribunal was not required to enter into the merits of the case, as a prima facie case was sufficiently made out. In the opinion of the Tribunal while considering the question of approval to a proposed order of dismissal the Tribunal is not to lift the veil and hold an exhaustive enquiry, however in all consideration the Tribunal came to the conclusion that the proceedings did not disclose any biased mind on the part of the Enquiry Officer who was an outsider and that the proceeding was not otherwise vitiated. As to the dental to the workman to take help of a lawyer, the Tribunal held that since the workman was allowed to take help of a defence assistant-there being no provision for engaging a lawyer in the domestic enquiry, the enquiry proceeding on that score could not be apprehended as vitiated and invalid. The Tribunal concluded that the circumstances and evidences before the Enquiry Officer were such that no inference could be drawn that there was no evidence or any basis of the report of the Enquiry officer or that the report was perverse and violative of natural justice. Accordingly, the learned Tribunal Judge found no reason to disallow the petition of the company under section 33 (2) (b) of the I. D. Act. The approval sought for was granted. ( 8 ) BEING aggrieved and dissatisfied with the said finding and order the workman petitioner has come up with the present writ application. ( 9 ) THE only question that falls for consideration is whether the approval that was given by the Tribunal under section 33 (2) (b) of the I. D. Act to the punishment of dismissal that was imposed upon the writ petitioner employee suffers from perversity or error of law on the face of it. ( 10 ) SECTION 33 (2) (b) is an exception to section 33 which lays down that condition of service shall remain unchanged during pendency of a conciliation proceeding or any proceeding before an Industrial Tribunal. ( 10 ) SECTION 33 (2) (b) is an exception to section 33 which lays down that condition of service shall remain unchanged during pendency of a conciliation proceeding or any proceeding before an Industrial Tribunal. The exception provides that during the pendency of any such proceeding in respect of an industrial dispute, the employer may in accordance with the standing orders applicable to a workman concerned in such dispute or where there are no such standing orders, in that event in accordance with the terms of the contract, express or implied, between him and the workman, discharge or punish the workman by dismissal or otherwise for any misconduct not connected with the dispute. The proviso lays down that such discharge or dismissal shall not be effective unless wages for one month has been paid to the workman and an application has been made by the employer to the authority before which the proceeding is pending for approval of the action taken by the employer. In other words with the approval of the Tribunal before whom the proceeding is pending the employer can pass an order of discharge or dismissal upon a workman for any misconduct not connected with the dispute after paying him wages for one month. ( 11 ) IN the instant case a dispute not connected with the misconduct for which the dismissal order was passed was pending and the respondent employer after obtaining the approval and paying one month's wage effected the order of dismissal upon the writ petitioner workman. Section 33 (2) (b) is an independent provisions and does not control Section 2a of section 10 of the Industrial Disputes Act. This means that inspite of the application having been made before the Tribunal for approval or an approval having been accorded for imposition of the proposed punishment of dismissal, the employee whose service has been terminated may raise an Industrial dispute in his own individual capacity, as also the Union to which tile workman belongs may raise such an industrial dispute regarding dismissal of the workman. ( 12 ) IN the instant case, the writ petitioner workman did not prefer any appeal against the order of dismissal. Nor raised an industrial dispute individually under section 2a or through the Union under section 10 of the Act. ( 12 ) IN the instant case, the writ petitioner workman did not prefer any appeal against the order of dismissal. Nor raised an industrial dispute individually under section 2a or through the Union under section 10 of the Act. It is a settled principle of law that the approval that is contemplated under section 33 (2) (b) of the Act is to be accorded on a prima facie satisfaction of the Tribunal which is only to see whether the evidences before the Enquiry Officer was sufficient to draw an inference that the alleged misconduct was brought home to the employee or that there was a basis of the report of the Enquiry Officer or that the report of the Enquiry Officer is not manifestly perverse and violative of the principles of natural justice. Again, when the approval that has been given is challenged in the writ jurisdiction of the High Court, the High Court does not act as a Court of Appeal or Court of revision but while reviewing the order of approval that has been given by the Tribunal, the High Court is to ensure that there is no perversity or error of law on the part of tile Tribunal in according approval to the proposed punishment of dismissal. ( 13 ) I have gone through the evidences recorded in the domestic enquiry as also the report of the Enquiry Officer and the impugned order of the Tribunal. In my view there is no perversity either in the appreciation of evidence on the part of the Enquiry Officer or any perversity in the impugned order of the Tribunal in according the approval. No error of law on the face of the record is also glaring either in the report of the Enquiry Officer or in the order of the Tribunal in according the approval. The employee has not raised any industrial dispute under section 2a or section 10 of the Act individually or through the union and as a result in the limited scope of reviewing the impugned order of the Tribunal, this Court cannot go beyond reviewing the prima facie satisfaction of the Tribunal. ( 14 ) MR. Amal Kr. The employee has not raised any industrial dispute under section 2a or section 10 of the Act individually or through the union and as a result in the limited scope of reviewing the impugned order of the Tribunal, this Court cannot go beyond reviewing the prima facie satisfaction of the Tribunal. ( 14 ) MR. Amal Kr. Sen, learned Advocate, appearing for the writ petitioner has challenged the order of dismissal on various grounds including the ground of proportionality of punishment, of the dismissal order having been passed by an authority not being the appointing authority, of the charge-sheet having been given with a closed mind, of the Enquiry Officer being not free from bias etc. In this connection Mr. Sea has referred to the decisions reported in AIR 1992 SC 417 (EX. Naik Sardar v. Union of India), AIR 1975 SC 1265 (Omprakash Gupta Swadheen v. Union of India), AIR 1991 SC 79 [state Bank of India v. Bijoy Kr.), AIR 1972 SC 330 (M/s. Bareilly Electric Supply Company Ltd. v. The workmen), AIR 1983 SC 454 (Bhagatram v. H. P. and. Ors.) etc. ( 15 ) AS I have already pointed out, the scope of this Court in the circumstances of the case being limited, such questions regarding proportionality of the punishment or termination of service by an authority lower to rook than the appointing authority or the delinquent not being allowed to take help of a lawyer to defend him in the domestic enquiry etc. can hardly be gone into. Had the writ petitioner employee raised an industrial dispute, all these questions could have been thrashed out before the Tribunal. Even fresh evidences could have been recorded by the Tribunal. The Tribunal on a reference acts as the screen In determining justification or otherwise of the action taken by the employer. The Tribunal can in a reference case consider the question of punishment and may impose lesser punishment at its discretion. But the writ petitioner has not moved in that direction. That being so, in the writ petition all these points as Mr. Sen wanted me to consider can hardly be considered by me. The Tribunal can in a reference case consider the question of punishment and may impose lesser punishment at its discretion. But the writ petitioner has not moved in that direction. That being so, in the writ petition all these points as Mr. Sen wanted me to consider can hardly be considered by me. Suffice it to point out that the Tribunal has considered all relevant aspects and in its opinion there has been no violation of natural justice or perversity committed by the Enquiry Officer in submitting his report or that there is bias or closed mind on the part of the authority or the Enquiry Officer in drawing up the proceeding or submitting the report. The Tribunal found no justification to interfere with the action proposed by the Tribunal. This Court after carefully considering the report of the Enquiry Officer as also the impugned order of the Tribunal is of the view that as there is no perversity or error of law on face of either, this Court cannot and should not go into intricate questions of law and facts for the first lime pleaded. However, for ends of justice I have considered the submissions but in my view no cogent ground is made out to interfere with the impugned order of the Tribunal. Accordingly the writ application fails and is dismissed but in the circumstances without any cost. N. N. Bhattacharjee. J.- I agree. Application dismissed