JUDGMENT : A. Pasayat, J. - In this writ application challenge is to the order passed by the Assistant Commissioner of Sales Tax, Cuttack-II Range, Cuttack (in short, "the ACST") exercising suo motu revisional powers u/s 23(4)(e) of the Orissa Sales Tax Act, 1947 (in short "the Act") read with Rule 80 of the Orissa Sales Tax Rules, 1947 (in short, "the Rules"), setting aside an earlier assessment made by the Sales Tax Officer, Keonjhar Circle, for the assessment year, 1991-92. The said order came to be passed by the concerned authority with following observations : 1. Government have fixed purchase price of mahua flower at Rs. 3 per Kg. whereas assessment has been completed on the royalty value at Rs. 7.35 per quintal resulting in under-assessment. 2. Assessment has been completed on the royalty value of minor forest produces like tamarind, lack, gum, myrobalan and not on the purchase price of the said commodities resulting in under-assessment. 2. Actual purchase price in respect of mahua flower had not been quantified and assessment had been completed by taking royalty value at Rs. 7.35 per quintal. Assessment had also been completed by taking royalty value of minor forest produces like tamarind, lack, gum, myrobalan on the basis of royalty value and not on the actual purchase price. As a result of such assessment revenue's interest had been prejudiced. Assessment had been earlier completed u/s 12(4) of the Act for assessment year 1991-92 raising a demand of Rs. 12,836. As a result of Assistant Commissioner's order, extra demand raised was Rs. 50,41,118. 3. Notice was issued u/s 23(4)(a) of the Act with Rule 80 of the Rules on the ground that assessment made by the Sales Tax Officer was erroneous and prejudicial to the interest of the revenue, and needed revision. Petitioner (hereinafter referred to as "dealer") filed objection to the notice, inter alia, taking the stand that views on which notice was issued were contrary to law, as decided by this Court in P.R. Tata & Co. v. Sales Tax Officer, Koraput I Circle [1971] 27 STC 176. There was no appearance when the matter was finally taken up on February 2, 1996, and prayer for adjournment was rejected. The Assistant Commissioner relied on decision of this Court in Iqbal & Bros. v. State of Orissa, SJC No. 49 of 1986 decided on November 17, 1994. 4. v. Sales Tax Officer, Koraput I Circle [1971] 27 STC 176. There was no appearance when the matter was finally taken up on February 2, 1996, and prayer for adjournment was rejected. The Assistant Commissioner relied on decision of this Court in Iqbal & Bros. v. State of Orissa, SJC No. 49 of 1986 decided on November 17, 1994. 4. In support of the writ application, Mr. R.P. Kar, learned counsel for the petitioner submitted that the Assistant Commissioner of Sales Tax misconceived the entire issue and proceeded on erroneous premises. According to him, the letter of the Divisional Forest Officer, Saundargarh, dated November 23, 1994, copy of which is annexed as annexure 1 to the writ application, clearly shows that the dealer was the owner of property in terms of lease executed, and question of paying purchase price does not arise. The levy of tax on alleged purchase price is without any legal sanction. It is further submitted that due and proper opportunity was not granted to the petitioner to have its say. First date of appearance was posted to January 5, 1996. On the petitioner's prayer for adjournment it was adjourned to January 15, 1996. Again prayer for adjournment was made which was granted and date was fixed to January 23, 1996. The said date was declared a public holiday by the State Government. Admittedly there was no appearance either on January 24, 1996 or January 25, 1996. Intimation was given to appear on February 2, 1996. On that day a fresh prayer for adjournment was made which was denied. Mr. S.C. Lal, learned counsel for the Revenue on the other hand submitted that petitioner has an effective alternative statutory remedy in terms of Section 23(4)(c) and instead of availing that remedy, petitioner should not have rushed to this Court. It is his stand that ratio in P.R. Tata & Co.'s case [1971] 27 STC 176 (Ori) is distinguishable on facts and has no application to the facts of the present case. In any event, the petitioner having remained absent and not produced any materials to substantiate its stand, Assistant Commissioner of Sales Tax was left with no option but to rely on materials on record to pass impugned order after granting adequate opportunity which petitioner did not avail. 5. Normally where alternative remedy is provided by any statute, writ application is not to be entertained. 5. Normally where alternative remedy is provided by any statute, writ application is not to be entertained. This rule of exhausting statutory remedy is a rule of self imposed restriction. One of caution and is not a rule of law. It is a rule of policy, convenience and discussion and not of jurisdiction. In an appropriate case writ application can be maintained notwithstanding existence of an alternative remedy, as there is no absolute bar. This exception is normally extended (a) when the proceedings are taken before a forum under a provision of law, which is ultra vires, and (b) where the impugned order has been made in violation of the principles of natural justice. An order which is non est on account of violation of basic principles of natural justice need not be appealed from. Whether the alternative remedy is equally efficacious or adequate is a question of fact to be decided in each case. When the factual position is indisputable and what arises for consideration is in substance a question of interpretation, i.e., a question of law, and adjudication of that dispute would avoid multiplicity of proceedings, a writ application can be entertained not-withstanding existence of alternative remedy. Where factual disputes are involved, normal rule is to direct the party to avail statutory remedy, unless it is shown that the same is not efficacious. 6. Petitioner has an alternative remedy by way of appeal to the Commissioner in terms of Section 23(4)(c) of the Act which reads as follows :-- "23. Appeals and Revision.- 4(a) Subject to such rules as may be made and for reasons to be recorded in writing, the Commissioner may, upon application by a dealer (or person) or on his own motion revise any order made under this Act or the rules made thereunder by any person other than the Tribunal appointed under Sub-section (3) of Section 3 to assist him : Provided that the Commissioner shall not entertain any such application for revision if the dealer (or person) filing the same having a remedy by way of appeal under Sub-section (1) or Sub-section (3) did not avail of such remedy or the application is not filed within the prescribed period. (Explanation.--Any provision contained elsewhere in this Act which provides for determination of any specific matter shall not debar the Commissioner from determining such matter in exercise of the powers conferred upon him under this sub-section). (c) any dealer (or person) as the case may be, the State Government aggrieved by any order passed by the Commissioner on his own motion may, within sixty days from the date of receipt of such order, prefer an appeal. (i) If the order was passed by the Commissioner, to the High Court ; and (ii) If the order was passed by any authority subordinate to the Commissioner, to the Commissioner." It is not a case where there is not factual dispute involved. The statutory remedy provided is certainly efficacious. We find in the instant case, matter was decided ex parte. The Assistant Commissioner of Sales Tax has indicated three dates to substantiate his stand that prayer of adjournment was not to be accepted. The first date of appearance was January 5, 1996, second was January 15, 1996 and third was January 23, 1996. The last was declared as a public holiday. It is not number of adjournments granted, but reasonableness of time granted which is a determinative factor. Supposing in a case involving complex questions of fact or law, authority grants adjournment for a couple of days and goes on repeating it, it cannot be said to be grant of reasonable opportunity to a party who is likely to be affected by adjudication. In our considered opinion, the Assistant Commissioner of Sales Tax was not justified in holding that the petitioner did not deserve adjournment. However, that aspect can be considered by the appellate authority. 7. In the peculiar circumstances, we direct that on the petitioner filing an appeal within three weeks from today along with an application for condonation of delay, the Commissioner shall condone the delay and admit the appeal, if it is otherwise free from defects, for adjudication on merits. This Court by an interim order dated March 29, 1996 had stayed recovery of extra demand on payment 25 per cent thereof. It is stated that payment has been made. No further steps shall be taken for recovery of the balance amount, till disposal of the appeal to be filed by the petitioner. The writ application is disposed of accordingly. No costs. It is stated that payment has been made. No further steps shall be taken for recovery of the balance amount, till disposal of the appeal to be filed by the petitioner. The writ application is disposed of accordingly. No costs. Original of annexure 4 be returned to the petitioner on being substituted by attested copy thereof. A. Deb, J. 8. I agree.