C. K. THAKKER, J. ( 1 ) ). This appeal is filed against an order passed by the learned single Judge on February 20, 1996 dismissing Special Civil Application no. 10915 of 1995 filed against an order of suspension, dated December 16, 1995. ( 2 ) ). The case of the appellant is that he is serving with Gujarat Water Resources development Corporation Limited, first respondent herein (corporation for short) since last twenty years. In the year 1985, he was promoted to the post of Executive engineer (Mech. ). In July 1995, he was given additional charge of Superintending engineer (Mech.) but with mala fide intention and ulterior motive, it was withdrawn. The appellant then came to know that a decision was taken to transfer him from ahmedabad. As that action was illegal, the appellant challenged it by filing Special civil Application No. 5772 of 1995 and obtained interim relief of status quo. That petition was finally disposed of on December 11, 1995. Immediately thereafter on december 13, 1995, the appellant was transferred to Deesa. The appellant resumed charge at Deesa on the next day, i. e. , on December 14, 1995. However, with a view to punish the appellant, the Corporation passed an order on December 16, 1995 placing him under suspension, inter alia, alleging that the appellant has committed serious irregularities for which it was decided to initiate departmental proceedings. ( 3 ) ). Being aggrieved by the order of suspension, the appellant filed Special civil Application No. 10915 of 1995 which came up for hearing before the learned single Judge. Notice was issued, parties appeared and affidavits were filed. The learned single Judge after hearing the Counsel, was pleased to dismiss the petition holding that the impugned order of suspension could not be said to be contrary to law nor it required any interference in exercise of extraordinary jurisdiction under art. 226 of the Constitution of India. It is that order which is challenged by the appellant in the present appeal. ( 4 ) ). We have heard at length Mr. Girish Patel, learned Counsel for the appellant and Mr. Kamal Trivedi for M/s. Trivedi and Gupta, learned Counsel for respondent no. 1 on Caveat. Mr. Patel raised the following contentions : (i) Suspension was illegal and unlawful inasmuch as neither departmental proceedings were initiated nor contemplated against the appellant when the order was passed. We have heard at length Mr. Girish Patel, learned Counsel for the appellant and Mr. Kamal Trivedi for M/s. Trivedi and Gupta, learned Counsel for respondent no. 1 on Caveat. Mr. Patel raised the following contentions : (i) Suspension was illegal and unlawful inasmuch as neither departmental proceedings were initiated nor contemplated against the appellant when the order was passed. (ii) The order is mala fide and is made in colourable exercise of power by the first respondent. It has adversely and prejudicially affected chances of promotion of the appellant as also his service conditions. (iii) The order is without authority of law and could not have been passed in view of the fact that notice was issued by the Corporation on February 16, 1996 (after two months of the date of suspension) by which the appellant was called upon to explain certain circumstances. There was, therefore, no justification to take an action of suspension in December 1995. (iv) The Managing Director has no power, authority or jurisdiction to initiate departmental proceedings nor to pass an order of suspension. (v) Even if it is assumed that the Managing Director could have suspended the appellant, he had not reported the said fact forthwith to the Corporation and did not get the action approved as required by law. (vi) The impugned order is passed at the behest of a Minister. There is no bona fide exercise of power either by the Corporation or by Managing Director. (vii) Other Officers similarly situated and against whom serious allegations have been levelled, have not been placed under suspension. The impugned order is thus arbitrary, discriminatory, unreasonable and violative of Arts. 14, 16 and 19 of the Constitution. (viii) After alleged irregularities said to have been committed by the appellant, he was transferred. No order of suspension could have been passed thereafter. Both the actions, namely, transfer and suspension could not have been taken simultaneously. ( 5 ) ). Mr. Trivedi, learned Counsel for the first respondent, on the other hand, supported the order passed by the Managing Director of the Corporation. He submitted that taking into account seriousness of allegations levelled against the appellant, the Managing Director, who is the competent authority, was satisfied that the appellant should be placed under suspension and in bona fide exercise of power, he has passed the order. The order is preventive in nature and not punitive. He submitted that taking into account seriousness of allegations levelled against the appellant, the Managing Director, who is the competent authority, was satisfied that the appellant should be placed under suspension and in bona fide exercise of power, he has passed the order. The order is preventive in nature and not punitive. When departmental proceedings are contemplated against the appellant, it cannot be contended that no action can be taken. So far as allegations of mala fides are concerned, Mr. Trivedi submitted that the Minister concerned has not been joined as party respondent nor sufficient materials have been placed on record to satisfy this Court, even prima facie that the allegations have some force. Whether both the actions of transfer and suspension can be resorted to in a given case depends upon the facts and circumstances of each case. In the instant case, considering the allegations, the appellant was placed under suspension which is not illegal. He submitted that the learned single Judge having fully satisfied, dismissed the petition. The said order cannot be said to be contrary to law or otherwise unlawful. ( 6 ) ). Having heard the learned Counsels for both the sides and considering the rival contentions of the parties, we are of the opinion that no case is made out to interfere with the order passed by the learned single Judge. ( 7 ) ). So far as the impugned order is concerned, it is an order of suspension. The said order, according to the Corporation, has been passed in accordance with the provisions of the Rules framed by the Corporation and the appellant has been placed under suspension on allegation that serious financial irregularities have been committed by him. It was, therefore, decided to hold departmental inquiry against him and during the pendency of departmental proceedings, the impugned action is taken. ( 8 ) ). The first question, which arises for our consideration is, whether it is open to the Corporation to suspend an employee in contemplation of departmental proceedings. Rule 5 empowers the Board to place an employee under suspension "if a disciplinary proceeding against him is contemplated or is pending. " Mr. Patel conceded this position. He, however, contended that "contemplation" necessarily implies taking of decision regarding holding of departmental proceedings and only thereafter an action of suspension can be taken. In other words, according to Mr. Rule 5 empowers the Board to place an employee under suspension "if a disciplinary proceeding against him is contemplated or is pending. " Mr. Patel conceded this position. He, however, contended that "contemplation" necessarily implies taking of decision regarding holding of departmental proceedings and only thereafter an action of suspension can be taken. In other words, according to Mr. Patel, even if departmental proceedings might not have been actually initiated or started by issuing charge-sheet and/or by supplying statement of allegations, nonetheless, they must have been in contemplation. According to the Counsel, contemplation of departmental proceedings must precede suspension and not viceversa. Mr. Patel contended that in the instant case, the Corporation first decided to suspend the appellant and action was taken on December 16, 1995 and thereafter it decided to initiate departmental proceedings. For that purpose, necessary material was collected, show-cause notice was issued and order of suspension was sought to be justified by referring to the Rule, which enabled the Corporation to place an employee under suspension. ( 9 ) ). For this purpose, Mr. Patel relied on several facts. He submitted that before the impugned action was taken, the appellant was attempted to be transferred illegally. Being aggrieved by the said action, the appellant approached this Court by filing special Civil Application No. 5772 of 1995. In those proceedings, the Court was not informed anything about so-called irregularities said to have been committed by him. An action of transfer was sought to be justified on merits. The Counsel contended that had there been sufficient material to place the appellant under suspension and the case was such that departmental proceedings were to be initiated against him, it ought to have been mentioned in affidavit-in-reply. It was strenuously argued that since ad-interim order of maintenance of status-quo was granted by this Court, the Corporation decided to place the appellant under suspension and only thereafter the action was taken. It was further stated by Mr. Patel that when letters Patent Appeal was filed against the order passed by the learned single Judge in previous petition, the Division Bench in Civil Application No. 2770 of 1995, made the following observations :"it is clarified that the interim order of status quo does not go beyond the original order of status quo granted by the learned single Judge and does not prevent the applicant - Corporation from taking any departmental action. We are not directing that any such action be taken. We only clarify the interim order. This Civil Application accordingly stands disposed of". Taking undue advantage of the above observations, submitted Mr. Patel, the impugned action is taken which is not preventive in nature, but punitive one and as it was taken without issuing notice, calling for explanation and affording opportunity of hearing, it is violative of the principles of natural justice and fair-play and requires to be quashed and set aside. ( 10 ) ). In this connection, reference was made by Mr. Patel to an English decision in Conway v. Wade, 1909 A. C. 506. Dealing with Sec. 3 of the Trade Disputes act, 1906 and interpreting the connotation "in contemplation or furtherance of a trade dispute", Lord Loreburn C. stated :"i think they mean that either a dispute is imminent and the act is done in expectation of and with a view to it, or that the dispute is already existing and the act is done in support of one side to it. In either case, the act must be genuinely done as described and the dispute must be a real thing imminent or existing". (emphasis supplied) ( 11 ) ). He also referred to a decision of the Supreme Court in Government of India v. Tarak Nath Ghosh, AIR 1971 SC 823 , wherein it was indicated by Their Lordships that merely because the order mentioned that disciplinary proceedings were contemplated against the employee it could not be said that the case had not reached the stage which called for an order of suspension. Disciplinary proceedings could be said to be started against an officer when complaint about his integrity or honesty was entertained, followed by a preliminary enquiry, culminating in the satisfaction of the Government that a prima facie case had been made out against him for framing of charges. When the order of suspension itself showed that the Government was of the view that a prima facie case for departmental proceedings had been made out, the fact that the order only mentioned that such proceedings were contemplated would not make any difference. ( 12 ) ). Our attention was also invited to a decision of the High Court of Allahabad in P. S. Dudiala v. Council of Scientific and Industries Research and Ors. , 1974 lic 1616. ( 12 ) ). Our attention was also invited to a decision of the High Court of Allahabad in P. S. Dudiala v. Council of Scientific and Industries Research and Ors. , 1974 lic 1616. Rule 10 (1) of the Central Civil Services (Classification, Control and appeal) Rules, 1965 empowered the authority to place a Government servant under suspension where a disciplinary proceeding against him was contemplated or was pending. Interpreting the rule and referring to a decision in P. R. Nayak v. Union of India, AIR 1972 SC 554 , the High Court observed : "there is also no force in the contention that an inquiry will be deemed to be contemplated only when it is pending. The word used between contemplated and pending in the said rule is or which separates one from the other. It simply means that suspension order can be passed if disciplinary inquiry is either contemplated or pending. " ( 13 ) ). So far as principle laid down in the above cases is concerned, there cannot be two opinions about it. In our view, however, the ratio laid down in the above cases does not help the appellant. On the contrary, it helps the case of the Corporation that it is not necessary that formal charge-sheet or statement of allegations must be issued to an employee. It is, no doubt, true that before taking an action of suspension, it is open to an employer to hold preliminary inquiry. But, in our opinion, it is not incumbent on an employer that in all cases preliminary inquiry must precede regular inquiry or such inquiry must be conducted before forming an opinion as to whether departmental proceedings should be initiated. It depends upon facts and circumstances of each case and in the light of attendant circumstances, an employer can take appropriate decision in accordance with law. ( 14 ) ). In Shyam Lal Yadav v. Smt. Kusum Dhawan, AIR 1979 SC 1247 , the supreme Court observed that an order of suspension should not be interfered with at interim stage paralysing autonomous power of the institution. ( 14 ) ). In Shyam Lal Yadav v. Smt. Kusum Dhawan, AIR 1979 SC 1247 , the supreme Court observed that an order of suspension should not be interfered with at interim stage paralysing autonomous power of the institution. It is true that if the order is without jurisdiction, it has to be quashed but if an employer has power to place an employee under suspension, a Court cannot interfere with such order on the ground that suspended employee would suffer hardship if the operation of the order is not stayed. ( 15 ) ). In P. K. Bansal, Commissioner of Police, Surat City v. R. G. Jadeja, [1993 (2)] xxxiv (2) GLR 983, a Division Bench of this Court held that while examining legality of an order of suspension, the Court is not concerned with sufficiency of evidence. Such matters must be left to the subjective satisfaction of the authority. The action of suspension is of course justiciable. Sufficiency of grounds or reasons, however, cannot be inquired into by a Court of law. A Court cannot substitute its own satisfaction for the satisfaction of the authority. It was further ruled that an authority cannot take into account extraneous or irrelevant grounds. There should be application of mind and the action should not be perverse, unfair, unjust or tainted with mala fides. Mr. Patel submitted that extraneous and irrelevant factors have been taken into consideration by the Corporation. According to him, since the appellant was the senior most Executive Engineer and was due for next promotional post of superintending Engineer for which he was eligible and the Corporation was compelled to consider his case for promotion, with a view to deprive him of legitimate benefits, the impugned action is taken against him. As the appellant had approached this Court against transfer and had obtained of status quo, the Corporation wanted to teach a lesson and with a view to punish him, the present order is passed. The action cannot be said to be bona fide and satisfaction said to have been arrived at by the Corporation cannot be said to be legal or lawful. No reasonable man, in the facts and circumstances of the case, could have arrived at such satisfaction. The action is totally perverse. ( 16 ) ). Mr. The action cannot be said to be bona fide and satisfaction said to have been arrived at by the Corporation cannot be said to be legal or lawful. No reasonable man, in the facts and circumstances of the case, could have arrived at such satisfaction. The action is totally perverse. ( 16 ) ). Mr. Patel also contended that preliminary inquiry may not precede in all cases, yet ordinarily before taking a drastic action of suspending an employee, it is incumbent on an employer to apply his mind to the allegations levelled against an employee. Normally, an employer should issue notice and call for an explanation from an employee. If the explanation is not satisfactory, an employee can be placed under suspension. In this case also, the said procedure was followed by the corporation. A show-cause notice was issued to the appellant. But instead of issuing show-cause notice before an action is taken, it was done after the appellant was placed under suspension. It was submitted that even the Corporation was satisfied that the action which was taken in December 1995 placing the appellant under suspension was not in accordance with law and with a view to fill in the gap and lacuna, a notice was issued subsequently in February, 1996. The Counsel therefore, submitted that on December 16, 1995, when the appellant was placed under suspension, even according to the Corporation, there was nothing against him. Neither departmental proceedings were initiated nor contemplated. It was only in february, 1996 that some materials saw the light of the day and hence notice was issued to the appellant and he was called upon to show cause as to why departmental proceedings should not be initiated against him. The appellant has no grievance against issuance of notice, but he can certainly contend before this Court that in view of issuance of notice in February, 1996, the action of suspending him in december, 1995 was arbitrary, unreasonable and it was taken without application of mind. The action was not in consonance with law and requires interference by this Court. ( 17 ) ). We do not see any substance in this argument as well. Looking to earlier petition also, it is quite clear that there were certain allegations against the appellant. In that petition, an affidavit was filed on behalf of the Corporation as also on behalf of the Government. ( 17 ) ). We do not see any substance in this argument as well. Looking to earlier petition also, it is quite clear that there were certain allegations against the appellant. In that petition, an affidavit was filed on behalf of the Corporation as also on behalf of the Government. In the counter-affidavit of the Government, the appellant was described as "corrupt" officer. We may hasten to add that we are not expressing any opinion regarding correctness or otherwise of this allegations. The fact, however, remains that even at that stage, clean chit was not given to the appellant. In our opinion, when the controversy before the Court was regarding transfer of the appellant, it was not necessary either for the first respondent or for the second respondent to highlight so-called irregularities said to have been committed by the appellant. The inquiry was limited and if at that stage nothing was mentioned regarding departmental inquiry, it cannot be said that no action can now be taken. In fact, when the matter was before a Division Bench, it was stated on behalf of the Corporation that the disposal of the petition should not come in the way of the corporation in taking appropriate proceedings and specific observations were made to that effect by the Division Bench. We do not uphold the contention of Mr. Patel that those observations were invited by the Corporation only with a view to suspend the appellant at a subsequent stage. From the facts and circumstances of the case, we are satisfied that disciplinary proceedings were in contemplation. A statement was made in the light of those facts and observations were made by the Division bench. ( 18 ) ). In the facts and circumstances before us, there is no doubt in our minds that though departmental proceedings were not initiated and pending against the appellant, they were in contemplation and as rules empowered the Corporation to place an employee under suspension, the action placing the appellant under suspension cannot be said to be without authority of law or in absence of the power. The said contention, therefore, does not detain us further. ( 19 ) ). It was then submitted that Managing Director is not the disciplinary authority and he cannot pass an order of suspension against the appellant. In our opinion, this contention also has no force. The said contention, therefore, does not detain us further. ( 19 ) ). It was then submitted that Managing Director is not the disciplinary authority and he cannot pass an order of suspension against the appellant. In our opinion, this contention also has no force. In affidavit-in-reply filed on behalf of the Corporation, it was asserted that the Managing Director is the appointing authority and he is fully empowered to place the appellant under suspension in accordance with rules. The above assertion is sought to be supported by some orders passed by the Managing Director annexed to the affidavit-in-reply. No doubt, Mr. Patel argued that office order No. 882 of 1995 supports the case of the appellant inasmuch as, according to Mr. Patel, looking to reference in that order, it is clear that the decision was taken by the Personnel Committee and it was merely conveyed by the Managing Director. In our opinion, the submission is not well founded. Looking to the order, it is clear that the decision was taken by the managing Director pursuant to the meeting of the Personnel Committee. But the order was passed by the Managing Director. Normally, when a question of consideration of an officer for promotion arises, the committee would consider it in the light of performance of respective candidates. The order was, however, passed by the Managing Director. Moreover, in the instant case, no appointment order of the appellant is placed on record from which it can be said that the appointing authority of the appellant was not Managing Director. Finally, as per settled law, suspension is not dismissal, removal or reduction in rank and in absence of any rule or regulation, it is not always incumbent that an action of suspension also can be taken only by the appointing authority. It, therefore, cannot be said that an order of suspension which was made by the Managing Director of the Corporation is without authority of law or without jurisdiction. ( 20 ) ). It was also contended that the impugned action is taken at the instance of the "concerned minister". The said minister has been joined as party respondent eonomine. No name of "concerned minister" is disclosed. Sufficient particulars and/ or materials have not been placed on record to connect the said minister at whose behest the action of suspension is taken against the appellant. The said minister has been joined as party respondent eonomine. No name of "concerned minister" is disclosed. Sufficient particulars and/ or materials have not been placed on record to connect the said minister at whose behest the action of suspension is taken against the appellant. In absence of the minister concerned as party respondent and in absence of sufficient particulars, the learned single Judge did not think it fit to uphold the contention of mala fide and we see no infirmity in it. . ( 21 ) ). It was further argued that similarly situated persons against whom departmental proceedings are pending or contemplated and against whom allegations have been levelled have not been placed under suspension. Thus, the impugned order of suspension is arbitrary, unreasonable and violative of Arts. 14, 16 and 19 of the Constitution of India. ( 22 ) ). We are afraid we cannot uphold the contention of Mr. Patel. Whether an employee should or should not be placed under suspension during pendency or in contemplation of inquiry depends upon facts and circumstances of each case and no rule of universal application can be laid down. Again, the provisions enshrined in art. 14 of the Constitution cannot be pressed in service to perpetuate illegality. That is not the sweep of Art. 14. ( 23 ) ). In Lakshman Kumajibhai Barot v. Harishchandra Singh, Commissioner of police, Ahmedabad, [1979] XX (2) GLR 563, a police officer was placed under suspension pending outcome of criminal proceedings and also of departmental enquiry. That action was challenged by the petitioner inter alia on the ground that in similar cases, such action was not taken by the authorities. Reliance was placed on Art. 14 of the Constitution. Repelling the contention and negativing the argument, p. D. Desai, J. (as His Lordship then was) observed :"it is difficult to comprehend, under such circumstances, how the order of suspension can be challenged on the ground of violation of Art. 14 by reference to some other distinct cases of different Police Officers. One more thing. Merely because the authority has failed to suspend a person who ought to have been suspended in the facts and circumstances of one case, it cannot be precluded from exercising the power of suspension in another like case, although suspension might be justified on the facts of that case, by invoking Art. 14. One more thing. Merely because the authority has failed to suspend a person who ought to have been suspended in the facts and circumstances of one case, it cannot be precluded from exercising the power of suspension in another like case, although suspension might be justified on the facts of that case, by invoking Art. 14. One or two or even series of cases where power of suspension sought to have been exercised but has erroneously not been exercised cannot be relied upon in order to claim the protection of Art. 14 in a subsequent case where the power might have been reasonably and bona fide exercised on legitimate grounds. That truly is not the sweep of Art. 14". ( 24 ) ). Reference may also be made to a decision of this Court in Ramkrishna Bus transport and Ors. v. State of Gujarat and Ors. , [1994 (2)] XXXV (2) GLR 1371. In that case, legality and validity of an action of detaining a vehicle en-route by transport authorities was challenged inter alia on the ground that in other similar cases, the authorities had not detained vehicles and hence the action taken against the petitioner was violative of Art. 14 of the Constitution. Negativing the argument and following L. K. Barot, one of us (C. K. Thakker, j.) observed :"if one operator plies his vehicles in violation of statutory provisions, other operators relying upon Art. 14 of the Constitution of India cannot be allowed to commit breach of law. The Court cannot countenance such plea and permit other operators also to violate law by invoking equality clause enshrined in art. 14 of the Constitution. That is not the sweep of Art. 14. " ( 25 ) ). We approve the above observations. ( 26 ) ). In the instant case, allegations have been levelled against the appellant and he is placed under suspension. Unless the said action is unlawful or contrary to law, it cannot be interfered with. The learned single Judge found that in the light of facts and attendant circumstances, action of suspension cannot be said to be vulnerable. In our opinion, there is no infirmity in the said finding. The contention, therefore, requires to be rejected. ( 27 ) ). Mr. Patel, submitted that even on merits, the action of suspension was uncalled for particularly when the appellant was already transferred. In our opinion, there is no infirmity in the said finding. The contention, therefore, requires to be rejected. ( 27 ) ). Mr. Patel, submitted that even on merits, the action of suspension was uncalled for particularly when the appellant was already transferred. According to him, at the most the allegations are of negligence and/or of carelessness. The appellant has not committed any financial irregularity. Looking to the averments in the affidavit-in-reply, however, it appears that the allegations have been made regarding financial irregularities also. At one stage in the past, in an affidavit of the State Government, the appellant was described as "corrupt" officer. We are not entering into the correctness or otherwise thereof, but in view of such allegations, it cannot be said that an action of suspending the appellant is arbitrary or unreasonable. Even that contention, therefore, did not detain us more and is rejected. ( 28 ) ). Mr. Patel argued that no opportunity of hearing was afforded to the appellant before the impugned action is taken. The learned single Judge, in our view, rightly held that the action is preventive and not punitive one. Hence, before taking such action, it was not necessary on the part of the authorities to issue notice, call for explanation or afford opportunity of hearing. The said contention also does not carry the case of the appellant any further. ( 29 ) ). The Managing Director is competent authority, who has appointed the appellant. He had power to place the appellant under suspension. The said action, therefore, cannot be faulted. It was, therefore, not incumbent on him to send a report "forthwith" to the Corporation. As the action is merely preventive, it cannot be said that prejudice has been caused to the appellant. As no punishment was imposed by the impugned order, compliance with the principle of natural justice was also not necessary. So far as chances of promotion are concerned, it is settled law that it cannot be said to be "a condition of service" and no notice and/or hearing can be insisted upon. ( 30 ) ). We, therefore do not see any ground to interfere with the order passed by the learned single Judge and the appeal requires to be dismissed. ( 31 ) ). Finally, Mr. Patel submitted that an enquiry may take sufficient long time which may cause serious prejudice to the appellant. ( 30 ) ). We, therefore do not see any ground to interfere with the order passed by the learned single Judge and the appeal requires to be dismissed. ( 31 ) ). Finally, Mr. Patel submitted that an enquiry may take sufficient long time which may cause serious prejudice to the appellant. In our opinion, the grievance is not well founded. While disposing the petition, the learned single Judge has observed that according to the Corporation, the Statement of Allegations was ready and could have been supplied to the appellant, but in the due deference to the Court as the matter was pending, it was not served upon him. It would be served to the appellant. In the light of the said statement, the learned single Judge directed the corporation to conclude the enquiry against the appellant within four months from the date of the order. In our opinion, the said period cannot be said to be unduly long. Hence, even that part of the order cannot be said to be improper. ( 32 ) ). For all these reasons, we do not find substance in any of the contentions raised by the learned Counsel for the appellant and the appeal requires to be dismissed and is accordingly dismissed. No costs. .