R. DAYAL, J. The only point for decision in these writ petitions is whether it is open to the Public Service Commission to lay down in the advertisement inviting applications for preliminary examination for selec tion for the posts under the Combined State/upper Subordinate Service that every application shall be contained in one envelope and if more than one application form are contained in one envelope, they shall all be liable to be rejected and where applications more than one were sent in one envelope and were rejected for that reason, does the rejection amount to denial of equal opportunity guaranteed under Article 16 of the Constitution of India ? 2. By means of an advertisement published in "weekly newspaper Rojgar Samachar dated 31-12-1994-6- 1-1995, the U. P. Public Service Com mission invited applications for a preliminary for the posts coming under the Combined State/upper Subordinate Services, inter alia providing : "application complete in all respects must reach the Secretary, (Deptt. No. A-l/e-1/94-95), Public Service Commission, 10, Kasturba Gandhi Marg, Allahabad, U. P. 211018 either by registered post or by hand upto 5. 00p. m. on or before February 13, 1995. In the condition of being more than one application form in one envelope or being application forms of more than one advertise ment in one envelope all application forms will be rejected. " 3. It is not disputed that the petitioners did not comply with this term of the advertisement inasmuch as they sent two or more application forms in one envelope. Accordingly, their applications were rejected. Some of them made representations and again sent their forms but they were not accepted for the reason that they were received after the prescribed date, i. e. 13-2-1995. The petitioners have raised different pleas in their respective petitions to challenge the rejection of their applications. It is apparent that even if any plea in any petition is accepted all the petitioners shall be entitled to relief. Some of the petitioners have taken the plea that in the examinations of 1991, 1992 and 1993, on similar facts, more than one application form sent in one envelope were accepted. Some have also taken the plea that Public Service Commissions in the States of Rajasthan and Himachal Pradesh accept more than one application in a single envelope. Some of the petitioners have taken the plea that in the examinations of 1991, 1992 and 1993, on similar facts, more than one application form sent in one envelope were accepted. Some have also taken the plea that Public Service Commissions in the States of Rajasthan and Himachal Pradesh accept more than one application in a single envelope. One plea raised is that more than one application forms were sent in one envelope due to ignorance. Another plea is that the petitioners are poor persons being unemployed without earning anything and it is, therefore, vital for their survival to spare money. However, their common plea is that the rule of respondent Commission barring two or more applica tion forms in one envelope is totally illegal, arbitrary, unjust and violative of the fundamental rights guaranteed under Articles 14, 16, 21 and 39 of the Constitution of India. The petitioners have prayed for quashing the order of the respondent rejecting their representations, a declaration that the condition imposed in the advertisement regarding each application being in a separate envelope is null, void and unconstitutional and also a mandamus to the Commission to entertain the application forms of the petitioners. 4. Comprehensive counter-affidavit has been filed by the Commission through its Section Officer and later also by its Secretary. The stand of the respondent Commission is that since the Commission has already taken a decision that only one application form should be sent in one envelope and that decision was published in the advertisement, the application forms sent by the petitioners were rightly rejected. According to the Commission the "purpose of sending two application forms in one envelope is to get roll number next to each other as the envelopes are opened and roll numbers are allotted accordingly. If there are two applications in one envelope they will get roll number next to each other. The Commission in order to check unfair means and mal-practices took a decision and advertised in the advertisement that each and every candidate should send one application form in one envelope as it is the only method by which there is a postal record or a record at the counter of the Commission that application of a candidate has been received by the Commission. If more than one applica tion is sent in one envelope then Commission does not have any postal record with regard to other candidates and any candidate can stand up at any point of time and say that he has sent his application in one envelope alongwith some other candidates which has been lost by the Commission will not be in a position to prove it as there is no postal record or any other record with the Commission. Further it will lead to other mal-practice as well. The Commission restricted sending one application in one envelope due to the aforesaid reasons as well as to check unfair means and copying in the preliminary examination because if two known candidates sit in the preliminary examination next to each other then there is every chance of copying as the preliminary examination is an objective type of examination and the candidates sitting next to each other may share amongst themselves in copying serial number of the correct answer of the question. . . . . . Similar terms and conditions have been mentioned in the Combined State/upper Subordinate Service (Preliminary) Examination 1995. " It would thus appear that the Commission took two pleas in justification of requiring each candidate to put one application form in a single envelope, one being to avoid or minimize the possibility of two known persons getting seats in close proximity, to minimize the possibility of copying or similar mal-practice and, the other being to have authentic record of every application being received within the prescribed period. An attempt has been made to counter the first plea in the rejoinder affidavit filed in writ petition No. 3494 of 1996 relating to Hans Raj Singh where it is said that the Commission has already taken a decision on 14-12- 1992 that all application forms whether received by ordinary post, registered post or at the counter should be inter mixed every day or every week, so that application forms deposited at one time may not get consecutive enrolment numbers. 5. We have heard Sri R. G. Padia, Sri S. K. Mehrotra, Sri K. K. Roy, Sri Yar Mohammad, Sri S. Pandey, Sri S. K. Choudhary and Sri R. P. Yadav for Sri H. N. Singh, Advocates, on behalf of the petitioners and Sri V. M. Sahai, Advocate, on behalf of the respondent-Commission. 6. 5. We have heard Sri R. G. Padia, Sri S. K. Mehrotra, Sri K. K. Roy, Sri Yar Mohammad, Sri S. Pandey, Sri S. K. Choudhary and Sri R. P. Yadav for Sri H. N. Singh, Advocates, on behalf of the petitioners and Sri V. M. Sahai, Advocate, on behalf of the respondent-Commission. 6. It is submitted on behalf of the petitioners that the requirement in the advertisement that one envelope shall contain not more than one application /orm is arbitrary and violates the fundamental right of equality of opportunity in State employment enshrined in Article 16 of the Constitu tion, for that requirement is not likely to achieve any of the objectives which were intended to be achieved and further that even if some inconve nience is to be caused to the Commission by accepting more than one appli cation form in one envelope, the inconvenience would be only slight and in order to save itself from that slight inconvenience there can be no justifica tion for the Commission to refuse to give opportunity to the petitioners to compete in the examination, particularly when in the previous years more than one application form were accepted in one envelope. In support of their arguments the learned counsel have referred to Indian Council of Legal Aid Advise v. Bar Council of India, 1995 (1) SCC 732 and D. S. Nakara v. Union of India, AIR 1983 SC 130 . 7. It needs be mentioned at the very outset that though a plea has been taken by some of the petitioners that in the previous years, application forms more than one in number were accepted in one envelope, no advertisement of any previous year has been put on record to show that any previous advertisement also stipulated such requirement. The mere mention in the petition that in similar circumstances applications had been accept ed in the previous years does not amount to taking a specific plea in the previous years also the requirement in question was also stipulated. Furthermore, even if such a requirement hid been stipulated in the grievous years also and despite such requirement, application forms had been accepted in disregard of that requirement, it would be a case where application forms were wrongly accepted. Wrong acceptance in the previous years would not justify a mandamus to repeat a wrongful act ir later years. Furthermore, even if such a requirement hid been stipulated in the grievous years also and despite such requirement, application forms had been accepted in disregard of that requirement, it would be a case where application forms were wrongly accepted. Wrong acceptance in the previous years would not justify a mandamus to repeat a wrongful act ir later years. As observed in Ramana Dayaram Shetty v. The International Airport Authority of India, AIR 1979 SC 1628 it is a well settled rule of administrative law that an executive authority must be rigorously held to the standards by which it professes its actions to be judged and it must scrupulously observe those standards on pain of invalidation of an act in violation of them. There, sealed tenders in the prescribed for n were invited from registered IInd Class Hoteliers having at least 5 years, experience for putting up and tuning IInd Class restaurant and two snack at the Airport for a period of 4 years. It was held that on a proper construction, what the relevant paragraph of the notice required was that only a person funning a registered IInd Class hotel or restaurant and having a least 5 years experience as such should be eligible to submit a tender. The 4th respondent had represented that it had considerable experience and was given the contract even though that respondent did not fulfil the required eligibility criterion. It was held that having regard to the constitutional mandate of Article 14 as also the judicially evolved rule of administrative law the 1st respondent was not entitled to act arbitrarily in accepting the tender of the 4th respondent but was bound to conform to the standard or norm laid down in the notice inviting tenders which required that only a person running a registered IInd class hotel or restaurant and having at least five years experience should be eligible to submit tender. Similarly, in the instant case, unless the requirement in the advertisement insisting for only ore application in one envelope is held to be arbitrary and violative of Articles 14 and 16 of the Constitution, the Commission did not have any option except to reject the applications which were not in conformity with the requirement. Similarly, in the instant case, unless the requirement in the advertisement insisting for only ore application in one envelope is held to be arbitrary and violative of Articles 14 and 16 of the Constitution, the Commission did not have any option except to reject the applications which were not in conformity with the requirement. The requirement was an objective one and not a subjec tive one and, therefore, all the applications which did not conform to that requirement were liable to be rejected and some of them could not be accepted on the ground that some of the petitioners were poor persons and needed to save money or were close relations and therefore, sent the applications in one envelope without intending to have enrolment numbers in consecutive numbers or for any other like reason. 8. Thus, the only point for decision is whether this requirement of having only one application in one envelope is arbitrary resulting in viola tion of the fundamental right of equality guaranteed under Articles 14 and 16. The Commission has pleaded that the objective behind the requirement was to minimise the chances of mal-practices by ensuring that no two or more candidates known to each other were allowed by design lo have conse cutive enrolment numbers which would help them to have scats in close proximity. It is submitted on behalf of the petitioners that fairness could be ensured by the Commission by ensuring strict vigilance and also my inter mixing the applications before allotting enrolment numbers and, in fact, intermixing was required to be done by the Commission as per its own decision referred earlier. On the other hand, it has been suggested by the learned counsel for the Commission that intermixing is done of the envelopes and not of the applications after taking out the same from the envelopes, since if intermixing is done of the applications, the applications would get torn and I am aged as they have photographs of the candidates affixed thereon. Whatever may be the actual practice in this regard, the fact can not be ignored that the Commission decided to insist upon this requirement with the laudable objective of minimising malpractices and ensuring fair ness in the competition. Whatever may be the actual practice in this regard, the fact can not be ignored that the Commission decided to insist upon this requirement with the laudable objective of minimising malpractices and ensuring fair ness in the competition. The question as to how the chances of malprac tices are minimised is basically a question of policy which is to be left to be decided by the authority concerned and the court would substitute its decision for the decision of the authority. The court is concerned only with the question whether the decision taken by the Commission was such as could not be said to have been intended to achieve the professed laudable objective. We do not see any reason to hold that the purpose behind the insistence of this requirement was not the one which, the Commission has pleaded, was intended to be achieved. 9, The other reason given by the Commission is not less important. The Commission has taken the stand that if more applications than one are accepted in one envelope, there will be no record of the applications received except one in each envelope with the result that if any candidate would later say that he or she had sent his or her application alongwith the application of some other candidate, the Commission would be without any record to be able to find out whether, in fact, it was so. This requirement is also intended to minimise the chances of any interpolation of any applica tions received after the due date on account of the connivance or under hand dealing on the part of any official of the Commission. Steps taken to promote admistrative efficiency cannot be shot down on the ground of pro fessed arbitrariness. It is not open to the petitioners to contend that this objective could be achieved in any other manner or that this requirement would ensure only slight convenience to the Commission at the expense of the candidates. 10. Steps taken to promote admistrative efficiency cannot be shot down on the ground of pro fessed arbitrariness. It is not open to the petitioners to contend that this objective could be achieved in any other manner or that this requirement would ensure only slight convenience to the Commission at the expense of the candidates. 10. In Indian Council of Legal Aid and Advice v. Bar Council of India 1995 (1) SCC 732 the question for decision was as to the legality or validity of Rule 9 in Chapter HI of Part VI of the Bar Council of India Rules, according to which, a person who has completed the age of 45 years on the date on which he submits his application for his enrolment as an Advocate to the State Bar Council shall not be enrolled as an Advocate. The rule was held to be violative of the principle of equality enshrined in Article 14 of the Constitution. The Court observed : "13. The next question, is, is the rule reasonable or arbitrary and unreasonable ? The rationale for the rule, as stated earlier, is to maintain the dignity and purity of the profession by keep ing out those who retire from various Government, quasi-Government and other institutions since they on being enrolled as advocates use their past contacts to canvass for cases and thereby bring the profession into disrepute and also pollute the minds of young fresh entrants to the profession. Thus the object of the rule is clearly to shut the doors of the profession for those who seek entry into the profession after complet ing the age of 45 years. In the first place, there is no reliable statistical or other material placed on record in support of the inference that ex-government or quasi-government servants or like indulge in undesirable activity of the type maintained after entering the profession. Secondly, the rule does not debar only such persons from entry into the profession but those who have completed 45 years of age on the date of seeking enrolment. Thirdly, those who were enrolled as advocates while they were young and had later taken up some job in any Government or quasi-Government or similar institutions and had kept the sanad in abeyance are not debarred from reviving their sanads even after they have completed 45 years of age. Thirdly, those who were enrolled as advocates while they were young and had later taken up some job in any Government or quasi-Government or similar institutions and had kept the sanad in abeyance are not debarred from reviving their sanads even after they have completed 45 years of age. There may be large number of persons who initially entered the profession but latter took up jobs or entered any other gainful occupation who revert to practise at a later date even after they have crossed the age of 45 years and under the impugned rule they are not debarred from practising. Therefore, in the first place there is no dependable material in support of the rationale on which the rule is founded and secondly the rule is discriminatory as it debars one group of persons who have crossed the age of 45 years from enrolment while allowing another group to revive and continue practise even after crossing the age of 45 years, The rule, is our view, therefore, is clearly discriminatory. Thirdly, it is unreasonable and arbitrary as the choice of the age of 45 years is made keeping only a certain group in mind ignoring the vast majority of other persons who were in the service of Government or quasi-Government or similar institu tions at any point of time. Thus, in our view the impugned rule violates the principle of equality enshrined in Article 14 of the Constitution. " 11. Relying upon this authority it is submitted on behalf of the peti tioners that there is no. reliable statistical or other material placed on record in support of the plea of the Commission that in the past there were any malpractices in such examinations to prevent which insistence of one application in one envelope was justified and further what there is nothing to show that the objectives which were sought to be achieved by this requirement could not be achieved in any other manner. In our view, this authority does not support these submissions. There the court was concerned with the question as to whether debarring of a person from being enrolled as an Advocate merely because he had completed the age of 45 years was not inconsistent with the principle of equality enshrined in Article 14 and also under Articles 19 (1) (g) and 21 of the Constitution and Section 24 of the Advocates Act, 1961. The court held the rule to be dis criminatory as it debarred one group of persons who had crossed the age of 45 years from enrolment while allowing another group to revive and continue practice even after crossing the age of 45 years. In the instant case, there is no discrimination against anybody and all the applications which did not conform to the relevant term of advertisement are liable to be rejected. Furthermore, disability of the petitioners from competing in the examination has resulted on account of their failure to comply with the term of advertisement which they could easily imply, and not on account of any absolute bar which could have been placed on them, for which they could have no remedy. 12. Reliance has also been placed on behalf of the petitioners on D. S. Nakaras case (supra) in support of their submission that it is for the respondent to show that the advertisement was intended to achieve some laudable objective and was not arbitrary and it is not for the peti tioners to show that it is arbitrary. In that case the court observed that the fundamental principle is that Article 14 forbids class legislation but permits reasonable classification for the purpose of legislation which classification must satisfy the twin tests of classification being founded on an intelligible differentia which distinguishes persons or things that are grouped together from these that are left out of the and that differentia must have a rationale nexus to the object sought to be achieved by the statute in question and, therefore, the State would have to affirmatively satisfy the Court that the twin tests have been satisfied. This authority in no manner supports the submission made on behalf of the peti tioners. In a case where the State raises the defence of reasonable classifica tion, it is apparent that the State would have to satisfy the court about the twin tests referred above. However,- where no such plea is raised on behalf of the State, there is no question of the State being required to satisfy these twin tests as there would be no occasion to satisfy the twin tests. However,- where no such plea is raised on behalf of the State, there is no question of the State being required to satisfy these twin tests as there would be no occasion to satisfy the twin tests. Merely because this authority lays down that the State is required in a case where it takes the plea of reasonable classification to satisfy about the twin tests does not imply that this authority lays down that it is not for the peti tioners to satisfy that there was no arbitrariness on the part of the State. There is presumption about constitutionality of an act on the part of the State and if any person challenges the validity of that act on the ground of arbitrariness it is for the person pleading arbitrariness to satisfy the Court about arbitrariness. Furthermore, the respondent has been able to satisfy the court that the term in the advertisement did not suffer from arbitrariness. 13. We are, therefore, of the view that the requirement in the adver tisement that one envelope should contain only one application and the applications which do not conform with the requirement shall be liable to be rejected was intended to serve the twin objective of minimising the chances of malpractices and to ensure fairness in the competitive examination and also ensure authentic record of the applications received in order to avoid needless controversies as to whether some applications about which there is no record were also received and also to avoid the chances of interpolations of any applications which might be received subsequent to the last date after which the applications could not be received in terms of the advertise ment. This could be fulfilled easily by the petitioners and is not arbitrary. The rejection of applications for not complying with the requirement did not amount to violation of any fundamental right enshrined in Article 14, 16, 19 or 21 of the Constitution of India and, therefore, all the applications rightly rejected by the respondent-Commission. 14. It was also submitted on behalf of the petitioners that this is a hard case where the petitioners are being denied the opportunity of com petitive examination and, therefore, the court may allow the petitioners as a special case to compete even if the writ petitions are found to be lacking in merit. 14. It was also submitted on behalf of the petitioners that this is a hard case where the petitioners are being denied the opportunity of com petitive examination and, therefore, the court may allow the petitioners as a special case to compete even if the writ petitions are found to be lacking in merit. We are of the view that even if in a case where the petitioner establishes his case about violation of a fundamental right, or he any other right may not, having regard to the peculiar facts of the case, be allowed by relief, as was done in Ramanas case. However, where the petitioners are found to have failed to establish any case about violation of any funda mental right or any other right, there can be no question of granting any relief. Where the petitions fail, the petitioners cannot succeed. 15- In the result, all the writ petitions are dismissed. However, in the circumstances of the case, there shall be no order as to costs. Petitions dismissed. .