R. K. PATRA, J. ( 1 ) THIS appeal at the instance of Sanjaya Dom (hereinafter referred to as 'appellant') is directed against the judgement and order of the learned Additional Sessions Judge, Rourkela convicting him under Section 302, I. P. C. and sentencing him to undergo imprisonment for life. ( 2 ) THE appellant along with one Pagla @ Ranjit Dom and Kankad Dom stood charged under Sections384/34, I. P. C. for intentionally putting the deceased Niranjan Singh and his wife Ramabati Singh (P. W. 10) in fear of causing bodily injury to them and thereby dishonestly inducing them to deliver Rs. 20/- and some fire wood and under Sections302/34, I. P. C. for committing murder intentionally causing the death of said Niranjan Singh in furtherance of their common intention. The learned Additional Sessions Judge acquitted the appellant and the aforesaid two co-accused persons of the charge under Sections384/34, I. P. C. The above named two co-accused persons, namely, Pagla alias Ranjit Dom and Kankad Dom were also acquitted of the charge under Sections 302/34, I. P. C. It is the appellant who alone has been found guilty under Section 302, I. P. C. simplicitor and has been convicted thereunder. ( 3 ) THE prosecution case, briefly stated, is that Niranjan Singh (hereinafter referred to as 'the deceased') with his family members was staying in his 'jhumpudi' at Kahulpali since 8 years within the jurisdiction of Plantsite (Rourkela) police station prior to the occurrence which took place on 28-2-1991. It was the day of Holi festival. In the evening of that day the appellant and his co-accused persons (since acquitted) collected some fire wood and subscription of Rs. 20/- from the deceased for the purpose of bonfire to celebrate the Holi. At about 11 p. m. in the night while the deceased was taking food, his wife (P. W. 10) heard some sound. She came out and found that the appellant and the co-accused persons were taking away her fire wood. Seeing this, she called her husband who came out and scolded them saying that although he subscribed money and fire-wood to them, they were not satisfied with that and were stealing his article by exhibiting 'dadagiri'. At this, the appellant dealt blows to the deceased and the other two co-accused persons after getting sticks from the fire place also started assaulting him. At this, the appellant dealt blows to the deceased and the other two co-accused persons after getting sticks from the fire place also started assaulting him. The deceased Niranjan continued to abuse them. The appellant, however, went away to his house saying that he would bring some article and returned immediately with a knife and with that knife stabbed on the belly of the deceased. As a result of the stabbing, some portions from inside the belly came out. The deceased went inside the house holding the belly and fell down. The accused persons seeing this ran away. After a short while the deceased expired. The widow (P. W. 10) immediately rushed to the house of one Arun Babu where her eldest daughter was working as a maid servant. She narrated the incident to her daughter as well as to Jibrael Tirkey (P. W. 2) and requested the latter to inform the matter at the local police station. Getting the information from P. W. 2, the police came to the spot where the widow (P. W. 10) lodged the F. I. R. (Ext. 5 ). The police took up investigation and submitted charge sheet which has ultimately ended in the conviction of the appellant as indicated hereinbefore. ( 4 ) THE plea of the appellant and his co-accused persons was one of denial. ( 5 ) PROSECUTION examined 15 witnesses to prove the charges. P. W. 10 (widow of the deceased) is the sole eye witness to the occurrence. P. W. 15 is the doctor who conducted post-mortem examination on the dead body of the deceased. ( 6 ) ON the basis of the evidence adduced in the case, the learned Additional Sessions Judge held that the offence of extortion punishable under Section 384, I. P. C. has not been established. He accordingly acquitted the appellant as well as his co-accused persons of the said charge. He has also acquitted the two co-accused persons of the charge under Sections302/34 I. P. C. but found the appellant guilty under Section 302, I. P. C. simpliciter. ( 7 ) THERE is no dispute with regard to the fact that the deceased met with homicidal death. He has also acquitted the two co-accused persons of the charge under Sections302/34 I. P. C. but found the appellant guilty under Section 302, I. P. C. simpliciter. ( 7 ) THERE is no dispute with regard to the fact that the deceased met with homicidal death. The doctor (P. W. 15) who conducted the post-mortem examination on the dead body found the following external injuries :i) An incised wound obliquely present over lateral part of proximal phalanx of right index finger of size 1/2" x 1/8" x skin deep and ante mortem in nature. ii) One incised wound of lower margin of left ear extending up till the left ear lobule and the part below it was missing, of length 2 c. m. and ante-mortem in nature. iii) A part of blood stained intestinal loop was coming out from an incised stab wound in the left lower abdomen. A clean cut incised inverted wedgo shaped stab wound of 1" length when stretched, but the length was smaller and there was a gaping when it was relaxed, margin was clean cut and present below the umbilicus in the left side of the abdomen 21/2" above symphyis pubis. It was directed slightly obliquely backward and downward towards right. The wound was of abdominal depth. "according to him the cause of death was shock and syncope due to massive internal haemorrhage from the above noted injuries. ( 8 ) THE first question that arises for consideration is that the two co-accused persons having been acquitted of the charge under Sections302/34, I. P. C. whether the appellant alone can be convicted under Section 302, I. P. C. simpliciter. The charge that was framed against the appellant and his co-accused persons was that in furtherance of their common intention they committed murder intentionally causing the death of the deceased. The clear and specific case of the prosecution is that the appellant and the two co-accused persons (since acquitted) took part in the commission of the offence. A Bench of this Court (in which one of us i. e. R. K. Patra, J. was a member) recently had the occasion to consider this question in Khagapati Gouda v. State, (1996) 10 OCR 488 . A Bench of this Court (in which one of us i. e. R. K. Patra, J. was a member) recently had the occasion to consider this question in Khagapati Gouda v. State, (1996) 10 OCR 488 . It has been held therein that the co-accused having been acquitted the element of sharing common intention with him disappears and in such situation the prosecution is obliged to prove the exact nature of injuries caused by the assailant and whether those injuries were of the character which would bring the case within Section 302, I. P. C. In view of the aforesaid, let us therefore proceed to examine the evidence on record to find out what offence in law has the appellant committed. As already indicated. P. W. 10, the widow of the deceased, is the solitary eye witness to the occurrence. She stated that the occurrence took place on the day of Holi festival. She deposed that in the evening of that day the appellant and the co-accused persons came to their house and asked to contribute fire wood and some subscription for bonfire to celebrate the holi festival. She gave them some fire wood and contributed Rs. 20/- for the celebration. At about 11 to 11. 30 p. m. in the night when she and her husband were taking food she found the accused persons were stealing the fire wood. Seeing it, her husband objected saying that on their demand fire wood and an amount of Rs. 20/- were given but the accused persons were not satisfied with that and were stealing their fire wood by showing 'dadagiri'. At this, the appellant gave push to her husband and the other two accused persons assaulted with 'falies'. During this time, the appellant went to his house saying to wait so that he would bring 'something'. He immediately came back with a knife and with it stabbed on the belly of her husband as a result of which some portions from inside the belly came out. Her husband, ran into the house holding his belly and fell down and soon thereafter he died. In the F. I. R. lodged by her immediately after the occurrence, she has implicated the appellant as the assailant to have stabbed the deceased on his belly with the knife. Nothing was brought out in her evidence to discredit her sworn testimony. Her husband, ran into the house holding his belly and fell down and soon thereafter he died. In the F. I. R. lodged by her immediately after the occurrence, she has implicated the appellant as the assailant to have stabbed the deceased on his belly with the knife. Nothing was brought out in her evidence to discredit her sworn testimony. There is no exaggeration or development of the prosecution story in her evidence. There is no evidence that she or her family members had enmity with the appellant. She stood the test of cross-examination boldly and on perusal of her evidence we are satisfied that her evidence is cogent, consistent and reliable and does not suffer from any serious infirmity. In the circumstances, we have no hesitation to hold that it was the appellant who stabbed the deceased on his belly. Injury No. (iii) as found and opined by the doctor was possible by one stab by a knife of similar type like that of M. O. 1. ( 9 ) IT was contended by the learned counsel that as the appellant gave only one blow, the offence committed by him is culpable homicide not amounting to murder which is punishable under Section 304, Part II, I. P. C. In this context, he placed reliance on the decisions of this Court in Narasingha Bisoi v. State, 1986 (2) OLR 313, Bamde Pradhan v. State of Orissa, (1987) 63 CLT , Hemanta Kumar Das v. State, (1993) 75 CLT 671, Gapa Bagarty v. State, (1994) 77 CLT 300 and judgement of the Supreme Court in Surinder Kumar v. Union Territory, Chandigarh, AIR 1989 SC 1094 : (1989 Cri LJ 883 ). The learned counsel for the State on the other hand relying on the judgement of his Court in Dama Santa v. The State, 1981 CLR 239 : (1982 Cri LJ 1160) (Ori) and judgement of the Supreme Court in Mannam Balaswamy v. The State of Andhra Pradesh, AIR 1980 SC 448 contended that the appellant has rightly been convicted under Section 302, I. P. C. It was argued by him that the offence committed by the appellant comes within the ambit of clause "thirdly" of Section 300, I. P. C. ( 10 ) IN view of the rival contentions, let us examine the case law cited and relied upon by the learned counsel for the appellant. In Narasingha Bisoi, (1986 (2) OLR 313) (supra) this Court found that the accused had no intention of causing the murder of the deceased nor was there any ill-feeling or enmity between them and the quarrel ensued without pre-meditation and in the heat of passion the accused gave one blow on the neck by a knife. In the circumstance of the case, the Court held that the accused could not be imputed with the intention to cause the death or the intention to cause that particular injury which proved fatal. Consequently, the conviction of the accused under Section 302, I. P. C. was modified to one under Section 304, Part II I. P. C. In Bamdev Pradhan, ( (1987) 63 Cut LT 302) (supra) the accused in a fit of anger being enraged at the grave and sudden provocation given by his wife caused the bodily injury and accordingly it was held that the act constituted culpable homicide not amounting to murder. In Hemanta Kumar Das ( (1993) 75 CLT 671) (supra) this Court altered the conviction of the accused under Section 302, I. P. C. to one under Section 304, Part II, I. P. C. , on the finding that the accused had no intention to cause the death of his wife by throttling. In Gapa Bagarty, ( (1994) 77 CLT 300) (supra), the conviction of the accused under Section 304, Part I, I. P. C. was altered to one under Section 304, Part II, I. P. C. on the finding that he in a fit of anger picked up a stone and threw it at the deceased which hit him at the left side of his head and the said act was sudden and impulsive without any premeditation or intention to kill the deceased. In Surinder Kumar (1989 Cri LJ 883) (supra), the apex Court altered the conviction of the appellant from Section 302, I. P. C. to one under Section 304, Part I, I. P. C. by extending the benefit of the Exception 4 to Section 300, I. P. C. What had happened in that case was that P. W. 2 and his deceased brother had heated arguments with the appellant in regard to the return of the kitchen. In course of the heated exchange, P. W. 2 uttered filthy abuse in the presence of the appellant's sister. In course of the heated exchange, P. W. 2 uttered filthy abuse in the presence of the appellant's sister. As a consequence, the appellant got engaged, went into the kitchen and returned with a knife with which he inflicted a blow on the neck of P. W. 2 and in the melee he inflicted three knife blows to the deceased (brother of P. W. 2), one on the shoulder, the other on the elbow and the third on the chest as a result whereof he collapsed and later died while on the way to the hospital. The Court found that in case of quarrel between P. W. 2 and the appellant regarding the possession of premises, the deceased (being the brother of P. W. 2) must have intervened on the side of his brother P. W. 2 and in the course of scuffle he received injuries one of which proved fatal. In the circumstances, the benefit of Exception 4 to Section 300 was extended to the appellant. ( 11 ) WE state that it cannot be laid down as a general proposition of law that when only one blow is inflicted by an assailant, it would fall short of an offence under Section 302, I. P. C. Each case has to be decided on the facts and circumstances peculiar to it. In a given case the assailant can be attributed with the knowledge that the injury inflicted by him was likely to cause death. In such situation, the intention of the assailant, the kind of weapon used, the part of the body on which the blow was inflicted, the amount of force applied and the circumstances attended upon the death have to be examined. As already discussed, in the case at hand, the deceased was first assaulted by the appellant and his co-accused persons and the appellant went to his house saying that he would bring something and within a short time he returned with a knife and stabbed with the said knife on the belly of the deceased. As a result of such assault, some portions from inside the belly came out and the deceased within no time. This is, therefore, not a case to say that the act was done by the appellant in a heat of passion. As a result of such assault, some portions from inside the belly came out and the deceased within no time. This is, therefore, not a case to say that the act was done by the appellant in a heat of passion. It cannot also be said that the appellant had not taken any undue advantage nor can it be concluded that he did not act in a cruel manner. The very fact that the appellant went to his house and came to the spot with a knife and with it he inflicted blow on the belly of the deceased clearly suggests that it was done with the intention of causing bodily injury to the deceased and the bodily injury intended to be inflicted was sufficient in the ordinary course of nature to cause death. The offence thus clearly comes within the ambit of clause "thirdly" of Section 300, I. P. C. It is true that the doctor P. W. 15 has not specifically stated that injury No. (iii) as found by him was sufficient in the ordinary course of nature to cause death. Absence of such statement by the doctor does not preclude the jurisdiction of the Court to look into the nature of the injury found on the body of the deceased and infer from it that it was done with the intention of causing bodily injury to the deceased and the bodily injury intended to be inflicted was sufficient in the ordinary course of nature to cause death. For the reasons mentioned above, we are clearly of the opinion that the offence committed by the appellant comes within clause "thirdly" of Section 300, I. P. C. and he has been rightly convicted under Section 302, I. P. C. ( 12 ) IN the result, we do not find any merit in this appeal which is accordingly dismissed. ( 13 ) C. R. PAL, J. , I agree. Appeal dismissed. .