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1996 DIGILAW 183 (PAT)

Shiv Pd. Sah v. Addl. Collector

1996-03-20

RADHA MOHAN PRASAD

body1996
Judgment R. M. Prasad, J. 1. This writ application is directed against the order dt.28.6.84 passed by the Addl. Collector, Siwan in minimum Wages Appeal No.47/84-85, contained in annexure-2, whereby and whereunder he has allowed the appeal of the employer after setting aside the order of the circle Officer holding the employer liable for payment of Rs.1732.50 paise as minimum wages to the petitioner. The appeal has been allowed solely on the ground that the claim of the petitioner was barred by limitation. 2. In short, the relevent facts are that the petitioner is an agricultural labour claiming to have worked in the field of respondent no.3 since more than ten years. As the respondent no.3 refused to pay his minimum wages for the period 24.7.80 to 21.10.80 the petitioner filed an application before the Circle Officer, Andar, Siwan, bihar, respondent no.2 under Sec.20 of the Minimum Wages Act (hereafter referred to as the act ). The Circle Officer after considering the entire materials on record, on 24.5.82 directed for payment of the aforementioned amount being minimum wages to the petitioner. A true copy of the order has ben annexed as Annexure-1. The employer being aggrieved by the said order preferred the aforementioned appeal which has been allowed by the impugned order. 3. Mr. Dwivedi, learned counsel appearing for the petitioner submitted that from bare perusal of the impugned order it would be evident that the claim of the petitioner was filed quite within the limitation prescribed under first proviso to Sub-Section 2 of section 20 of the Act. Further, it is submitted that under the second proviso the authority has been vested with the power to even condone the delay on sufficient cause being made out by the applicant. It is submitted that the application in regard to claim for the period 24.7.80 to 2.8.80 might be beyond the period of six months but for the remaining period it was quite within six months, as the application, admittedly, was filed on 3.2.81. It has also been submitted by the learned counsel for the petitioner that even for the aforesaid period a petition for condonation of delay was filed on behalf of the petitioner and tha circle Officer allowed his claim though without specifically passing an order corth doning the delay. It has also been submitted by the learned counsel for the petitioner that even for the aforesaid period a petition for condonation of delay was filed on behalf of the petitioner and tha circle Officer allowed his claim though without specifically passing an order corth doning the delay. According to him, even in the absence of any express order condoning delay if the petition is considered on merit the presumption is that the delay was considered and condoned. In support of his contention learned counsel has relied uporr decisions in the case of Srichand Sao vs. Indradeo Pd. and Ors. reported in 1975 bbcj 203 (D. B.) and in the case of Banwari Lal Newatia vs. Secretary to Govt. oft india and anr. reported in 1983 BLJ 54 (D. B.)Further, learned counsel submitted that, in any case, the application in regard to the claim for the period 3.8.80 to 21.10.80 was quite within the limitation prescribed under the first proviso to Sub-section 2 of Section 20 of the Act and, thus, the impugned order is bad and illegal to that extent. 4. Learned State Counsel has not been able to dispute the fact that the application in regard to the claim of the petitioner for the period 2.8.80 to 21.10.80 was quite within the prescribed limitation. In regard to the claim of the petitioner for the period 24.7.80 to 2.8.80, the learned State Counsel submitted that in the absence of any specific order condoning the delay the claim of the petitioner for the said period cannot be granted. 5. The first proviso to Sub-section 2 of section 20 of the Act provides that every application by the employer shall be presented within six months from the date on which the minimum wages (or other amount) became payable and its second proviso provides that any application may be admitted after the said period of six months when the application satisfies the authority with sufficient case for not making the application within such period. 6. It is not disputed that an application for condoning delay for the period 24.7.80 to 2.8.80 was filed and the Circle Officer allowed the claim for the said period also besides for the period 2.8.80 to 21.10.80. 6. It is not disputed that an application for condoning delay for the period 24.7.80 to 2.8.80 was filed and the Circle Officer allowed the claim for the said period also besides for the period 2.8.80 to 21.10.80. It is well settled that even if a. petition is barred by limitation and there is provision for condoning the same and a petition is filed for the said purpose and the authority or the court considers the claim/grievance and dispose it of on merit, it will be presumed that the delay in making an application is condoned after considering the petition for condonation of delay. The principle laid down in the aforementioned cases referred to by the learned counsel for the petitioner are complete answer for the said proposition. 7. From the order of the appellate court it appears that on 20.10.80 the Labour inspector had initially approached the Circle officer for payment of the dues of the petitioner towards minimum wages which was quite within six months from the date on which the minimum wages was payable. It is submitted that the said fact was mentioned in the petition for condonation of delay. In my opinion, the appellate court in the facts and circumstances aforementioned was not justified in rejecting the claim of the petitioner only on the ground of limitation. Accordingly, the impugned order is set-aside. In the result, the writ application is allowed but without cost.