JUDGMENT S.K. Mookherjee, J. : These two Second Appeals are directed against Title Appeals No. 773 and 974 of 1978, arising out of Title Suit No. 334 on 1970 and Title Suit No. 5 of 1973. The Suits and the Appeals, in the Courts below, were heard analogously and the Second Appeals also were heard analogously by me. 2. The common dispute in the Suits relates to a Debuttar property at Baduria. Suit No. 334 of 1970 is, inter alia, for declaration of shebaitship of the plaintiffs, who are respondents in the present Second Appeals, and for permanent injunction restraining the defendant No. 1 from acting as the priest and entering into the temple. The other Suit, namely, Title Suit No. 5 of 1973, had been instituted in representative character, inter alia, with prayer that the Debuttar in dispute was a public Debuttar, being managed by a Mandir Committee, and that the plaintiffs, in the earlier instituted Suit, were not the shebaits of the deities, defendant No.1, Gobinda was such shebait. In the latter Suit there was a prayer for permanent injunction, restraining the plaintiffs in the earlier Suit, who were impleaded as defendants in the latter Suit, from creating obstruction to the shebapuja of the deities by Gobinda. 3. The Trial Court, by its judgements and decrees, dismissed the earlier Suit and decreed the latter Suit. In First Appeals, arising out of the said suits both the decrees of the Trial Court had been reversed. 4. The instant Second Appeals have been preferred against such decrees of reversal. 5. The sole question, on determination of which the fate of the present Second Appeals depends, is about the nature of the Debuttar in dispute, namely, whether it is a private or a public Debuttar. Different judicial pronouncements, including those by this High Court, the privy Council as also of the Apex Court of the country, have laid down different criteria, on the application of which to the facts of each particular case such a question is required to' be answered, though the decisions have unequivocally expressed that there cannot be any straight jacket formula but totality of circumstances have to be taken into consideration for arriving at the correct conclusion about the nature of the debuttar in question in each particular case. 6. 6. In the case of Deoki Nandan vs. Murlidhar and Ors., reported in AIR 1957 SC 133 , the nature and character of the beneficiaries have been accepted as tests for determining whether the Debuttar is a public or a private one. In the case of a private Debuttar, specific Individuals, who are ascertainable, are the beneficiaries, whereas in the case of a public Debuttar, such beneficiaries are neither specific nor ascertainable but comprise general public. In a simpler form the same can be found out by finding out the intention of the founder as to whether specified individuals or the general public or any specified portion thereof has the right of worshipping the deity or idol the second criterion, which has been judicially accepted, is the manner of vesting of the management of the Debuttar in a body of strangers or in one in the family. In the former case, it can be presumed that the right of worship was intended to be made available to the strangers or to the general public and thus the character of the Debuttar would be of a public nature. Thirdly, the place of installation of the idol has also been stated to be a guiding factor, particularly, in the context of absence of any temple in the locality or near about in the matter of ascertainment of the intention of the founder. Temporary restrictions or regulations of the user by public do not take away or interfere with the character of the Debuttar as a public one but are taken as normal incidents of such Debuttar. In the case of the Bihar State Board of Religious Trust (Patna) vs. Mahanth Sri Bishweswar Das, reported in AIR 1971 SC 2057 , the Apex Court has clarified that the determination of the character of Debuttar, on the application of the aforesaid criteria, has to be made on appreciation of the effect of such criteria in the facts and circumstances of every particular case. The pre-dominating endeavour of the Court should be to find out the intention of the founder. The pre-dominating endeavour of the Court should be to find out the intention of the founder. There may be cases, where, mere free access of the members of public into the temple for worship and for attending festivals celebrated therein, may not immediately lead to the conclusion of the debuttar being a public one nor the installation of the idol permanently in a temple, constructed away from the residential quaters, can be said to be- such conclusive fact of the Debuttar being a public one. The touchstone, in determining the nature of the endowment in the case of existence of the facts of the above nature, is the nature and extent of right, which the strangers or public have or has relating to the endowment, though the process of deciphering such right bristles with difficulties when the document, creating the endowment, is not available to Court. The above tests were reiterated and accepted in the case of Parichchan Das vs. The Bihar State Board of Religious Trust and Ors., reported in AIR 1980 SC 514 , which also distinguished on facts, the case of Bihar Trust Board Religious Trust, Patna, (supra) taking note of one of the important factual features in the distinguished case to the effect that the properties were always recorded in the names of the Mahants as proprietors and not in the names of the deities and that the said properties, along with additions thereto, were dealt with be such Mahants through deeds of sales, mortgage, leases etc. 7. In the instant case, the Court of Appeal below has affirmed the factual finding made by the learned Munsiff that the endowment in question is a private one of the respondents' family, secondly, that the plaintiffs/respondents became negligent in the matter of management of the endowment but had not been removed from shebaitship by any competent Court; that Gobinda Lal, the appellant in the present appeals, had been appointed by the plaintiffs as priest of the deity and as such there was relationship of master and servant between the plaintiffs/respondents and the appellant Gobinda Lal; thirdly, the origin of the dedication is not known. 8. 8. The learned Munsiff dismissed the suit by the respondents upon a finding that the plaintiffs/respondents, as shebaits, did not carry out any of their duties with regard on the management of the Debuttar estate or sebapuja of the deity and upon such finding reached a conclusion that the plaintiffs/ respondents lost their status of shebait by their acts and conducts. The second finding of the learned Munsiff, namely, that the priest Gobinda Lal had been maintaining the Debuttar properties, and, therefore, he was entitled to be declared as shebait, had been upset by the Appeal Court on the ground of the same being erroneous in law inasmuch as the adverse findings against the plaintiffs/respondents could not be said to have automatically terminated their shebaitship until they were removed from the same by a competent Court of law. The Court of Appeal below further reversed the finding of the Trial Court that Gobinda Lal Banerjee, the admitted priest, was not guilty of any improper act by holding that the denial of Gobinda Lal of the plaintiffs/ respondents' shebaiti character was itself a improper act sufficient to constitute a ground for granting a declaration in favour of the plaintiffs/respondents in addition to an admitted position that the Gobinda Lal Banerjee had not been attending to sebapuja properly. Moreover, the status of shebaitship of Gobinda Lal, declared by the learned Munsiff, was found by the Court of Appeal below to be a relief granted beyond the pleadings. 9. It is well settled that the above findings are mixed questions of fact and law (vide AIR 1957 SC 133 -para 4). The principles, on the application of which the propriety of such findings is to be tested, have been summarised by me in the foregoing part of this judgement. In my view, the application of the said principles to the facts of the present case leaves no room for doubt that the conclusions of the Court of Appeal below, which is the final Court of facts, do not call for any interference in second appeal and no substantial error of law can be said to exist so far as such findings are concerned. From the side of the appellants feebly it was sought to be argued that a shebait, who ceases to manage the property and carry on the worship of the idol, forfeits his right to the office, by placing reliance upon the decision in the case of Bhuban Mohan Koley vs. Narendar Nath Konowar, reported in 35 CWN 478, in which case the suit was for such a declaration and thus the Court, upon a finding of existence of such facts of the said case but did not lay down a broad proposition that the right of shebaitship would stand automatically forfeited in case negligence on the part of the shebait was found unless the facts could be said to establish a relinquishment of such right. In the instant case, neither a plea of relinquishment has been taken nor a declaration for removal of the shebait has been made. On the contrary, the declaration that has been prayed for, in a representative capacity, is that the endowment in question is a public Debuttar and that the plaintiffsl respondents are not the shebaits of the deity but the defendant Gobinda Lal is the shebait of the deity. 10. For the reasons as aforesaid, I am of the view that the appeals do not have any merit and I, accordingly, dismiss the same. The judgement and decree of the Court of Appeal below, in both the appeals,' are affirmed. In the facts of the case each party will bear his own cost. Appeals dismissed.