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1996 DIGILAW 184 (MAD)

K. Ramadoss v. S. Vaidyanathasamy

1996-02-13

S.S.SUBRAMANI

body1996
Judgment :- 1. Tenant in R.C.O.P. No. 51 of 1986, on the file of the Rent Controller (District Munsifs Court), Vellore, is the revision petitioner. After revision was filed, landlord (respondent) died, and his legal representative has been impleaded as additional respondent. 2. Landlord sought eviction of the petitioner herein on the ground that the demised premises is required by him bona fide for his own occupation. It is a non-residential building. Landlord wanted the same for his own use, namely, for conducting a hotel business. It has come out in evidence that the landlord is running hotel business, and his son (second respondent herein) is also associated in the business. 3. Both the Authorities below held that the claim of the landlord is bona fide and ordered eviction. They were satisfied that the claim by the landlord was not a pretext for eviction. 4. In Revision, learned counsel for the revision petitioner would urge that after the death of the landlord, it cannot be said that the cause of action survives and, therefore, according to him, eviction ordered by the Authorities below cannot stand. According to the learned counsel, when the landlord says that he wants to start a business, the question whether the son or his legal representative also had the same intention, is a matter which gives out a different cause of action and, therefore, the present action cannot continue. He also wanted that the findings of the Authorities below should be set aside, taking into consideration the subsequent event. 5. Learned counsel for the respondent/landlord disputed the said legal position and said that under the relevant provisions of the Rent Control Act, a legal representative can continue the proceeding and get the benefit of order of eviction. 6. S. 27 of the Tamil nadu Buildings (Lease and Rent Control) Act says thus: “27. Proceedings by or against legal representatives — (1) Any applications made, appeal preferred, or proceeding taken, under this Act by or against any person, may in the event of his death, be continued by or against his legal representatives. 2. Where any application, appeal or other proceeding could have been made, preferred or taken, under this Act by or against any person, such application, appeal or other proceeding may, in the event of his death, be made, preferred or taken by or against his legal representatives.” 7. 2. Where any application, appeal or other proceeding could have been made, preferred or taken, under this Act by or against any person, such application, appeal or other proceeding may, in the event of his death, be made, preferred or taken by or against his legal representatives.” 7. In view of the statutory provision, proceedings already taken could be continued by the legal representatives, and the wordings are also so clear that the benefit of the eviction also goes to the legal representative. 8. In this connection, it may also be noted that before this Act namely, Tamil Nadu Buildings (Lease and Rent Control) Act was passed, there was Madras House Rent Control Order, 1945. In that order, there was no similar provision, and in those circumstances, there was a decision of this Court reported in 1947-II-M.L.J. 419 = 60-L.W. 713 ( Dr. Muhammed Ibrahim v. Rahiman Khan and others ) that the legal representative cannot continue the proceeding initiated by his purchaser. Similar question came for consideration before this Court and the decision rendered thereon has been reported in 1972-II M.L.J. 21 (Short Notes) ( Salima Bi v. Mallika Begam ). That was a case where the landlords (Joint Owners) prayed for eviction of the tenant on the, ground of their bona fide requirement for their personal occupation. It was held that the death of one will not affect the continuance of the petition by the other owner. 9. In this connection, it may also be noted that when the landlord was alive, he filed C.M.P. No. 5017 of 1991 to have the Revision disposed of at an early date. Unfortunately, the Revision could not be taken before his death. In that affidavit, in paragraph 2, he has stated thus:— “.I respectfully beg to submit that catering has been my profession ever since 1944 and I am running two catering units in Katpadi Railway Junction of Southern Railway and I am also supplying foodstuffs to passengers commuting through Railways. My son is assisting me in my business and it cannot be denied that I have the necessary expertise and where-withal to start a hotel of my own in my premises. 10. Learned counsel for the respondents submitted that even after the death of the first respondent, the second respondent is continuing the same business, and requires the demised premises. My son is assisting me in my business and it cannot be denied that I have the necessary expertise and where-withal to start a hotel of my own in my premises. 10. Learned counsel for the respondents submitted that even after the death of the first respondent, the second respondent is continuing the same business, and requires the demised premises. Learned counsel for the petitioner (tenant) was not in a position to counter the same. It is more or less conceded that the son is now continuing the business which was in the name of his father originally, and now he is a licensee for running the hotel mentioned in C.M.P. No., 5017 of 1991. In this connection, it is also worthwhile to consider the decision reported in 1978-(1)-R.C.J. 489 ( Balthur Raja Saheb v. Noor Mohamed and others ), where, a learned Judge of the Karnataka High Court said that when a decree is obtained for eviction, the benefit of the decree goes to the estate and really the question of survival of cause of action does not arise. It was held in that case thus:— “Here the deceased plaintiff had already obtained a decree for eviction of the tenant from the suit premises. The decree was confirmed by the learned District Judge. It is the tenant who has come up in revision before the High Court and it is during the pendency of this revision petition, that the landlord died. That being so, it becomes obvious that the Legal Representatives, who are none else than the widow and the sons of the deceased, are entitled to defend the benefit that has accrued to the estate and the present revision petition which constituted a challenge to the benefit, can be resisted by the legal representatives. The question of survival of cause of action, as such, does not arise in cases like the present one. That being so, it is held that there is no substance in the plea raised by the learned counsel for the revision petitioner, that the legal representatives of the deceased landlord cannot defend the benefit accrued to the estate of the deceased landlord during his lifetime. 11. In 1972-II-M.L.J. 231 = 85-L.W. 280 (R. Govindaraj v. N.G. Venkateswaran, legal representative of deceased Ganapathi Iyer), it was held thus: “An eviction petition was filed by the landlord for additional accommodation for the purpose of his business. 11. In 1972-II-M.L.J. 231 = 85-L.W. 280 (R. Govindaraj v. N.G. Venkateswaran, legal representative of deceased Ganapathi Iyer), it was held thus: “An eviction petition was filed by the landlord for additional accommodation for the purpose of his business. Even subsequent to the demise of the landlord, who preferred the eviction petition, his business continued, and his legal representatives were entitled to carry on business. The purpose for which the additional accommodation was asked for was still mere and cannot be said to have been lost after the demise of the person who filed the eviction petition. Not only that. Even before an order for evi ction was passed by the Appellate Authority, the respondent herein was brought on record after the notice. It was in the presence of the respondent the order of eviction was passed, after hearing both the parties. Absolutely no objection was taken throughout to the effect that the order of eviction cannot be passed since the right was a personal right of the eviction petitioner. The eviction order cannot be questioned. 12. In (1990)-2-S.C.C. 431 (Pokhraj Jain v. Padma Kashyap and another), their Lordships said that the Maxim actio personalis mortur cum persona did not apply to Rent Control Acts. Following an early decision of the same Court reported in (1976)-4-S.C.C. 417 ( Shantilal Thakordas v. Chamanlal Maganlal Telwala ), in paragraph 6, their Lordships have held thus: “Maxim of actio personalis mortur cum persona cannot apply, either, on principle or on facts. In Official Liquidator, Supreme Bank Ltd. v. P.A. Tendolkar , this Court while discussing applicability of the maxim held, “whatever view one may take of the justice of the principle it was clear that it would not be applicable to actions based on contract or where tortfeasors estate had benefitted from a wrong done. Its applicability was generally confined to actions for damages for defamation, seduction inducing a spouse to remain apart from the other and adultery”. Its applicability was generally confined to actions for damages for defamation, seduction inducing a spouse to remain apart from the other and adultery”. In Phool Rani v. Naubat Rai Alrluwalia , (1973)-1-SCC-688 a decision which was relied by petitioner in support of submission that an application filed for eviction or a tenant on bona fide need lapses on the death of landlord and it could not be continued by his legal, representatives, overruled in Shatilal Ihajordas v. Chamanlal Maganlal Telwala , it was observed that doctrine of actio personalis mortur cum persona did not apply to Rent Control Act.” 13. The benefit of eviction ensures to the benefit of the estate and the requirement of the landlord continues even after his death. Learned counsel for the petitioner did not seriously argue about the, correctness of the concurrent findings entered by the Authorities below. 14. The Civil Revision Petition is without merits and the same is, therefore, dismissed. No costs.