Judgment B. L. Yadava, J. 1. -whether Rule 4 of the Bihar Motor Vehicles Taxation rules, 1994 (compendiously "the rules") is arbitrary and violative of article 14 of the Constituion of India and confers unguided power to impose penalty for non-payment of the motor vehicles tax; and whether this Rule was beyond the rule-making power under section 31 of the Bihar Motor Vehicles taxation Act, 1994 (compendiously "the act"), are short, but significant questions for our determination in the aforesaid two anaalogous writ petitions (hereinafter referred to as the first and second writ petition), preferred by the owners of the Motor Vehicles under articles 226/227 of the Constitution of india, with the prayer to declare Rule 4 of the Rules to be ultra vires and to direct the respondents to refund the amount of penalty imposed. 2. The hub of the dispute shorn of all its ramification is that petitioner no.1 of the first writ petition is owner of Bus No. BR-19-4049 and has paid tax n the vehicle up to 28-2-1994, but could not deposit the tax for the period since 1-3-1994 to 30-11-1994 due to illness of his wife, and the taxes for the aforesaid period, i. e.1.3.1994 to 30-11-1994 was accepted only on payment of penalty of Rs.35,720/-. The tax token is annexed and filed as Annexure-1. The amount of tax was only Rs.9082/- but the penalty was Rs.25730/- and Rs.9090/- which was imposed under Rule 4 of the Rules on account of delay. 3. Petitioner No.2 has paid motor vehicle tax up to 31-12-1993 within time. Thereafter taxes for the period 1-1-1994 to 30-9- 1994 was realised along with penalty to the tune of Rs.40,950/s whereas the actual taxes were only Rs.13,650. In this way 200% penalty under rule 4 of the Rules was imposed. The tax could not be paid in time as the mother of petitioner No.2 was also under treatment and she was taken to bombay. On this account the delay in payment of tax was caused. 4. It is convenient to have relevant provisions of the Act and similar provisions in para materia. In view of the provisions of Sec.6 of the Bihar and Orissa Motor Vehicles Taxation act, 1930 (compendiously "the Taxation act of 1930") road tax was imposed on every motor vehicle. On this account the delay in payment of tax was caused. 4. It is convenient to have relevant provisions of the Act and similar provisions in para materia. In view of the provisions of Sec.6 of the Bihar and Orissa Motor Vehicles Taxation act, 1930 (compendiously "the Taxation act of 1930") road tax was imposed on every motor vehicle. Thereafter Bihar passengers and Goods Tax Act, 1961 was enacted by which taxes were levied on the passengers on consigners of goods to be carried by public Service vehicles. By inserting Sec.6 (1-A)in Taxation Act of 1930, an additional tax was imposed on public Service vehicles, and the passengers and goods Tax Act, 1961 was repealed. The taxation Rules of 1930 were framed under Sec.14 of the Taxation Act of 1930. Rule 3-B was inserted in the rules in the year 1966. On 8-1-1979 in view of Rule 3-B penalty to the extent of Rs.50% of the amount of tax was imposed. The Taxation Act of 1930 was however repealed by the Bihar Motor vehicle Taxation Ordinance (Bihar Ordinance No.2 of 1994) which was promulgated in continuation of the earlier Ordinance No.25 of 1993 which was promulgated on 24-11-1993. By section 31 of this Ordinance and also under the same sections of the Act the state Government was conferred with the power to make rules to carry out the purpose of the Act. Under Section 32 (1) of the Act the Bihar and Orissa motor Vehicles Act, 1930 was repealed. Sub-section (2) of Sec.32 posits that notwithstanding such repeal any notification, rule, regulation, order or notice issued or any appointment or declaration made or exemption granted or any confiscation made or any penalty or fine imposed, any forfeiture, cancellation or any other things done or any other action taken under the said Act, shall so far as it is not inconsistent with the provisions of this Ordinance (which was repealed by the Act) he deemed to have been issued, made, granted, done or taken under the Ordinance. Sub-section (3) of Sec.32 of the Act provides that any penalty payable under any of the provisions of the repealed ordinance (or the Act) may be recovered; and sub-section (4) provides that even though certain matters were mentioned under sub-sections (1) to (3), but it shall not be held to prejudice or affect the general application of Sec.6 of the General Clauses Act, 1897. Under Sec.31 of the Ordinance or the Act, the Bihar Motor vehicles Taxation Rules, 1994 were framed by the State Government and the same was published in the Bihar gazette (Extraordinary) dated 17-1-1994. Under Rule 4 the due date of payment and penalty for non-payment of taxes in time has been incorporated. Sec.23 of the Ordinance and also the Act confers power on the State government to prescribe the penalty and its rate, in case the Tax was not paid in time. 5. Certain relevant provisions of the Act may be noticed. Sec.5 of the Act enacts levy of tax. It was to the effect that every owner of a registered motor vehicle shall pay tax on such vehicle at the rate specified in schedule-I, and sub-section (2) of Sec.5 provides that every owner of a registered motop vehicle shall pay additional motor vehicles tax on such vehicle at the rate specified in schedule-II. Sub-section (3) authorises the State Government to increase the rate of tax specified in the Schedules. Sec.7 of the Act provides payment of tax on the personalised vehicles. It makes the provision for payment of the personalised vehicle for the whole life of the vehicles, at the time of registration. Sec.23 of the Act is very material. It enacts liability to pay the penalty for non-payment of tax in time. It provides payment of penalty in respect of the vehicles other than the personalised vehicles. Sec.31 of the act, as stated earlier, contains rule-making power and Sec.32 is in respect of the repeal and savings. 6. A counter-affidavit by Shri mahabir Sahu, Section Officer of the transport Department of the State government has been filed, denying the averments made in the writ petitions and also the amendment made therein. It has been averred in paragraph 2 of the said counter-affidavit that Sections 23 and 28 of the Act and Rule 4 of the bihar Motor Vehicles Taxation Rules, 1994, are valid and not violative of article 14 of the Constitution. It has been stated that under Entry-57 of List-II of the Seventh Schedule of the Constitution, Rules have been framed and taxes have been imposed. As the petitioners failed to pay the tax in respect of their vehicle under Sec.7 (3) of the Act, hence the penalty in terms of the provisions of the Act and the Rules was imposed. It has been stated that under Entry-57 of List-II of the Seventh Schedule of the Constitution, Rules have been framed and taxes have been imposed. As the petitioners failed to pay the tax in respect of their vehicle under Sec.7 (3) of the Act, hence the penalty in terms of the provisions of the Act and the Rules was imposed. Further, Rule 4 of the Rules has been framed in public interest. The motor vehicle tax is required to be paid in advance and in case the vehicle becomes incapable of use due to the disability caused by mechanical breakdown or litigation or due to other causes prescribed by the State Government for a period of more than one month and in that event the owner of the vehicle must furnish details to the Taxing Officer along with an undertaking, specifying the period during which the motor vehicle is to be kept and in that event exemption can be granted under section 19 of the Act, and in case the tax has been paid in excess under Sec.18, refund can be made, in case the vehicle becomes incapable of use and where the tax has been paid over the assessment made by the Taxing Officer or in case it was found that the vehicle was not subject to tax. The Bihar motor Vehicles Taxation Act, 1994, was enacted under Entry-57 of List-II (State list) of Seventh Schedule of the Constitution. Similarly, Rule 4 of the Rules has been framed to carry out the provisions of Sec.23 of the Act. This Rule 4 is not arbitrary nor violative of Article 14 of the Constitution nor beyond the rule-making power under Sec.31 of the Act nor it is beyond the delegated legislation. 7. The learned counsel for the petitioners strenuously contended that rule 4 of the Rules was violative of article 14 of the Constitution and it was arbitrary and beyond the rule-making power conferred under Sec.31 of the Act and it was beyond the delegated power. 8. 7. The learned counsel for the petitioners strenuously contended that rule 4 of the Rules was violative of article 14 of the Constitution and it was arbitrary and beyond the rule-making power conferred under Sec.31 of the Act and it was beyond the delegated power. 8. The learned counsel for the respondents, on the other hand, refuted the submissions made on behalf of the petitioner and urged that Rule 4 of the rules has been framed in view of the provisions of Sec.31 of the Act, and it was to carry out the provisions of section 23 of the Act, which has been couched in a language having very wide sweep. However, the Act itself was enacted under the legislative field under Entry 57 of List-II (State List) of 7th schedule of the Constitution. Entry 57 was, however, subject to Entry 35 of list-III, which may be quoted as under: "35. Mechanically propelled vehicles including the principles on which taxes on such vehicles are to be levied. " The entries in the Legislative list have to be interpreted in the widest possible sense including the consequential punitive measures. There was no inconsistency between Entry-57 of List-II (State List) and Entry 35 of List-Ill of the concurrent list. In this view of the matter the writ petition is devoid of merit and liable to be dismissed. 9. Having evaluated the submissions of the learned counsel for the parties the questions posed for our determination are as to whether Rule 4 of the Rules was arbitrary and violative of Article 14 of the Constitution, and whether it provided unguided power to impose penalty and whether the same was beyond the rule-making power. 10. Before actually grappling with the problems posed by the aforesaid questions it is useful to notice the elementary rules of interpretation of the Constitution and also the interpretation of the entries in the three lists. No doubt, the entries in the legislative list have to be interpreted in its widest sense including the consequential punitive measure even when there appears some inconsistency between the entry under the State List or concurrent list and that appearing under list I (Central List), in that event the doctrine of pith and substance has to be applied. Very often it becomes necessary to look into the history of the legislative entry. Very often it becomes necessary to look into the history of the legislative entry. To put it differently it is better to say that various entries found in the three Lists of 7th Schedule of the Constitution or demarcated fields of legislation and their limits have been expressly described in the entries mentioned in the said three lists. Every State including the State of bihar, is free and independent to legislate on the fields covered by the State list (List-II) or concurrent list (List-III) of the 7th Schedule of the Constitution. The provisions of the constitution may not be interpreted in a narrow and pedantic sense. 11. It goes without saying that under List-I only the Parliament can enact a legislation. Sometime difficulty may arise when there is some sort of inconsistency or conflict in List-I or in list-II. (See I. T. C. Ltd. V/s. State of Karnataka and others, 1985 Supp. SCC 476 at page 490 ). In the instant case we are concerned with entry-57 of List-II (State List), entry 57 of List I and entry 35 of List-III, entry 57 of List-II (State list) under which the Bihar State Legislation has enacted the Act, is quoted below : "57. Taxes on vehicles, whether mechanically propelled or not, suitable for use on roads, including tram cars subject to the provisions of entry 35 of List-III. " Entry 35 of List III (concurrent list) is as follows : "35. Mechanically propelled vehicles including the principles on which taxes on such vehicles are to be levied. " 12. No submission was advance on behalf of the petitioners that the Act itself was beyond the legislative competence of the State Legislature. What has been urged by the learned counsel for the petitioners is that Rule 4 of the rules was beyond the rule-making power contained under Sec.31 of the Act. Ex- Abundanti Cautela, Rule 4 of the Rules is extracted below : "4. Due date of payment and penalty for non-payment of taxes in time.- (1) For vehicles other than personalised vehicles the due date of payment of the tax shall be the date of expiry of the period for which the tax had been last paid. In cases where no such tax had previously been paid, the date of acquisition of the vehicle or the date when such tax is imposed by law shall be due date for tax payment. In cases where no such tax had previously been paid, the date of acquisition of the vehicle or the date when such tax is imposed by law shall be due date for tax payment. For payment of differential taxes under the provisions of Sec.8, the due date shall be within seven days from the date of alteration in the vehicle of the change in its use. (2) Where the tax for any period in respect of a vehicle has not been paid as required under the provisions of sub-rule (1)and continues to remain unpaid thereafter, the Taxing Officer may impose penalty in respect or such vehicles at the rate specified in the table. " 13. So far as the question in respect of the provisions of Rule 4 of the Rules being violative of Article 14 of the Constitution or having been framed in excess of the delegated legislation is concerned, the basic question in such matter is as to whether the Act was intra vires or was enacted beyond the legislative competence. In such matters where the Court has to decide the constitutionality of an Act, in that event it has to decide it only to that extent. The Court has first to determine if the legislature in enacting the impugned statute, has legislative competence according to the distribution of the legislative field, as indicated under different entries under List-I, List-II and List-III of the Seventh Schedule. The Court can also determine as to whether fundamental rights guaranteed under the Constitution have been in fringed. (See The State of Bombay V/s. R. M. D. Chimarbaugwala, AIR 1957 SC 699 at page 705 and A. S. Krishna V/s. State of Madras, AIR 1957 S. C.297.) 14. A reading of the aforesaid entries would indicate that in the matters of imposition of taxes on the vehicles, whether mechanically propelled or not, but suitable for use on roads, including tram-cars were under State List. But entry-57 of State list was subject to the provisions of entry-35 of List-Ill. In respect of List-III the State can also legislate. In the instant case there is no averment denying the fact that the vehicle tax including the penalty has been imposed on the vehicles used on the road, but the same is subject only to Entry-35 of list-III (concurrent list ). In respect of List-III the State can also legislate. In the instant case there is no averment denying the fact that the vehicle tax including the penalty has been imposed on the vehicles used on the road, but the same is subject only to Entry-35 of list-III (concurrent list ). Entry 35 also finds place in the concurrent list, meaning thereby that the State and the Parliament both can enact the Act and the rules. It cannot be said that the State cannot have legislative competence, in case, however, the Parliament wants to enact, it can also enact. There was no repugnancy or inconsistency under Article 246 of the Constitution. It arises only when in respect of List-I in seventh Schedule the Parliament has exclusive power to make laws with respect to any of the matters enumerated in List-I of the 7th schedule, but the State has enacted the law under any of the entries under List-I. But that is not the case here. The state Legislature has power to make laws with respect to any of the matters enumerated in List-II (State List) and also under List- HI in 7th Schedule (Concurrent List ). 15. In the instant case the State legislature has not enacted the Act under any of the Entries under List-I of the 7th Schedule, rather it has enacted under Entry 57 of the State List. The submissions of the learned counsel for the petitioners were that somewhat similar matters have been placed under entry-35 of List- III (concurrent list ). There is no doubt that the Parliament can also legislate under Entry 35 of List iii in the matters of mechanically propelled vehicles including the principles on which taxes on such vehicles are to be levied. But it cannot be said to be the occupied field, inasmuch as, the State Legislature can also enact under Entry 35. Nothing was pointed out as to how Entry 35 envisages concept of occupied field. The provisions of Articles 245, 246 and 254 of the constitution have to be read conjointly. Keeping in view that the constitution of the country is a fundamental law and a living document, hence it cannot be interpreted in a narrow pedantic sense, rather a liberal spirit should inspire those who are called upon to interpret the Constitution. I am trying to interpret with such wider principle in mind. Keeping in view that the constitution of the country is a fundamental law and a living document, hence it cannot be interpreted in a narrow pedantic sense, rather a liberal spirit should inspire those who are called upon to interpret the Constitution. I am trying to interpret with such wider principle in mind. It has also to be realised that so many difficulties which are encountered today, were not present in the mind of the founding fathers of the Constitution. Applications of the constitutional provisions have to be made to the actual facts and realities of life, and it is in such situation that it requires a judicial statesmanship. (See S. P Gupta V/s. Union of India, AIR 1982 S. C.149.) 16. In ascertaining the limits of the field of legislation the difficulty must be solved as far as possible in favour of the legislature by putting the most liberal construction upon the entry, so that it could have the widest amplitude. In such matters burden is on the petitioners to prove affirmatively of the invalidity of the legislation. With broad and liberal spirit one has to interpret the constitutional provisions and the entries in respect of the legislative fields. It has to be ascertained as to whether the Act is relatable to any entry in the relevant field. In the present case the Act was certainly relatable to Entry 57 of List-II (State list ). The provisions of Article 254 of the Constitution has been couched in a very wide language. Article 254 (1) of the Constitution provides for any provision repugnant to be made by the parliament which Parliament is competent to enact. In that event the law made by the Parliament shall prevail where it was caused before or after the law made by the Legislature. 17. In the instant case nothing has been pointed out as to what was the law enacted by the Parliament in view of Entry 35 of List-III (concurrent list ). In that event the law made by the Parliament shall prevail where it was caused before or after the law made by the Legislature. 17. In the instant case nothing has been pointed out as to what was the law enacted by the Parliament in view of Entry 35 of List-III (concurrent list ). Article 254 (2) of the Constitution provides that where a law made by the legislature of a State with respect to one of the matters enumerated in the concurrent List contains any provision repugnant to the provisions of an earlier law made by the Parliament or an existing law with respect to that matter, then the law so made by the Legislature of such State shall, if it has been reserved for the consideration of the president and has received his assent, must prevail in that State. Nothing was pointed out on behalf of the petitioners that there was any law already enacted by the Parliament in exercise of legislative field under Entry-35 of the Concurrent List or any entry under List I. Further, the provisions of the Act have not been assailed nor it has been urged that the State Legislature has no legislative competence to enact the Act, rather only Rule 4 of the Rules was assailed on the ground that it was violative of Article 14 of the Constitution and was arbitrary and beyond the rule-making power. 18. Section 23 of the Act was very much specific that if a tax payable in respect of a vehicle other than personalised vehicle has not been paid during the prescribed period, the person liable to pay such tax shall pay together with the arrears of tax, a penalty at the rates prescribed by the State Government. 19. There is no averment denying the fact that the petitioners have not paid tax on their vehicle suitable for use on road. In that event penalty has to be imposed and it is for the State legislature to prescribe the rate of penalty. Rule 4 of the Rules was enacted to carry out the objects and the provisions of Sec.23 of the Act. Against that order of imposition of penalty the petitioners have right to appeal under Sec.26 of the Act and right of revision under Sec.27 of the Act. Rule 4 of the Rules was enacted to carry out the objects and the provisions of Sec.23 of the Act. Against that order of imposition of penalty the petitioners have right to appeal under Sec.26 of the Act and right of revision under Sec.27 of the Act. It was for the petitioners, if so advised, to avail their alternative remedy, but they did not do so. Further, detailed provisions have been made under Sec.28 dealing with the penalties, but Sec.28 imposes penalty in terms of fine and also for simple imprisonment. 20. In Taxing Officer V/s. Ajit Singh, 1987 P. L. J. R.52 (S. C.) the Apex Court ruled that in case a person is found under an obligation to pay the tax legible under the Act and has committed default in payment of tax, the provisions of Sec.12-A will be immediately attracted and he would be liable to pay the prescribed penalty. Imposition of Additional Tax on public service motor vehicle has been held not to be arbitrary or unconstitutional. Ins uch matters the motor vehicles or the vehicles have to be given limited meaning, i. e. the motor vehicles using public roads only, The law declared by the apex Court applies on all fours to the present case. As the vehicles of the petitioners were using public road and the State has enacted Rule 4 of the rules to carry out the objects and provisions of section 23 of the Act and other similar provisions and penalty has been imposed on the petitioners. In that event it cannot be said that the state Legislature has exceeded its power of imposition of tax as provided under Entry 57 of List-II of the 7th schedule of the Constitution. (See Tata engineering and Locomotive Co. Ltd. V/s. State of Bihar, 1979 P. L. J. R.398.) 21. The tax including penalty has to be imposed on every vehicle at the rate specified in the Schedule, and in case it was done, as in the instant case, in that event it cannot be said that the provisions of Rule 4 of the Rules are violative of Article 14 of the Constitution or the previsions are arbitrary or beyond the rule-making power. (See tata Engineering of Locomotive Co. Ltd. V/s. State of Bihar, 1992 (2) P. L. J. R.142.) 22. (See tata Engineering of Locomotive Co. Ltd. V/s. State of Bihar, 1992 (2) P. L. J. R.142.) 22. It needs no emphasis that the constitutiton of India is possessed of all legal power and any power granted by the Constitution or any legislative field enacted under List-I (Central list), List-II (State List) and List-III (concurrent list) has to be construed liberally and not in a padantic manner and it has to be interpreted in a way so that the object of the power was effectively achieved. In the present case the object was to impose penalty on the owners of the vehicles used on road, who fail to pay tax within the time prescribed, in that event penalty has to be imposed. This was consistent with the Entry 57 of List-II (State List ). Entry 35 was also under concurrent list, wherein it cannot be said that the State has no power to legislate. 23. In Bihar Motor Transport federation V/s. State of Bihar, 1993 (1)B. L. J.137) it was held that the State legislature is competent to impose road tax and additional road tax on public service motor vehicles by necessary implication which follows that the state Legislature is also competent to enhance the rate of road tax or to impose levy of additional tax. Similarly, in my opinion, the State has also power to impose penalty and to frame Rule 4 to carry out the provisions and objects of section 23 of the Act. The rules were framed obviously under very comprehensive rule-making power under section 31 of the Act. Even though the legislature has delegated power to the state Government to frame rule, by no stretch of imagination it can be assumed that Rule 4 of the Rules is beyond the rule-making power or the same is inconsistent with the provisions of Sec.23 of the Act. 24. Even though the legislature has delegated power to the state Government to frame rule, by no stretch of imagination it can be assumed that Rule 4 of the Rules is beyond the rule-making power or the same is inconsistent with the provisions of Sec.23 of the Act. 24. Even at the cost of the petition it can be said that the Bihar Motor vehicles Taxation Rules, 1994, has been enacted under Sec.31 of the Act, and Rule 4 of the said Rules was enacted to carry out and implement the provisions of Sectiqn 23 of the Act Accordingly, there is no substance in the submissions of the learned counsel for the petitioners that the State Legislature has no power to frame Rule 4 of the Rules or the rules framed were beyond the rule-making power under section 31 of the Act. At the same time rule 4 of the Rules is not violative of article 14 of the Constitution nor it is arbitrary in any manner. 25. To sum up, Rule 4 of the Bihar motor Vehicles Taxation Rules, 1994, it is neither arbitrary nor violative of Article 14 of the Constitution. Rule 4 does not provide unguided power for non-payment of the tax on the motor vehicle used on the road, nor Rule 4 was beyond the rule-making power under Sec.31 of the Act, and Rule 4 was also not beyond the power of delegated legislation. 26. In view of the premises aforesaid, these analogous writ petitions are devoid of merits and they are accordingly, dismissed, but in the circumstances of the case there shall be no erder as to costs. Writ Petitions Dismissed.