N. K. BATABYAL, J. ( 1 ) THIS hearing arises out of an application u/sec. 482 Cr. P. C. for quashing the proceeding being G. R. Case No. 823/94 arising out of Kotwali P. S. Case No. 195/94 dated 27-5-94 u/s. 498 (A)/306 of I. P. C. ( 2 ) THE petitioner No. 1 is the husband of the victim housewife and petitioner's Nos. 3 and 4 are his parents and the petitioners Nos. 2 and 5 are the sisters of petitioner No. 1. As per F. I. R. , the petitioner No. 1 was married with Krishna, the victim house-wife on 15-8-77 in accordance with Hindu rites and customs. The petitioner's Nos. 2 to 5 being the in-laws of Krishna, compelled her to keep her ornaments with them. These ornaments were given to Krishna from her father's side at the time of her marriage. Krishna made a complaint to her husband against the conduct of the in-laws. As a result she was tortured by her husband and the in-laws and this torture went on for a long time. Krishna during the long period of torture from time to time visited her father's place and narrated her woes to the members of her father's family. They always persuaded her to go to her matrimonial home. According to the F. I. R. , on 23-5-94 an unknown gentleman reported that Krishna had taken an overdose of sleeping drug and was hospitalized in an unconscious state. On reaching the emergency Ward of the hospital, the de facto complainant, her paternal uncle came to know that Krishna had died with burn injuries at her matrimonial home and her dead body was kept in the morgue. The informant did not see anyone of her husband's family at the hospital. Next day, he came to know that the death of Krishna was due to the reasons as stated in the F. I. R. ( 3 ) IN the F. I. R. all the petitioners have been named. It has also been stated that they tortured Krishna in various ways for a long period of time. It is not stated specifically exactly when the torture started and upto what point of time it continued. But it has been stated that Krishna's death was due to the reasons as given in the F. I. R. ( 4 ) THE Id. advocate, Mr. It is not stated specifically exactly when the torture started and upto what point of time it continued. But it has been stated that Krishna's death was due to the reasons as given in the F. I. R. ( 4 ) THE Id. advocate, Mr. Sanyal appearing for the petitioners has made a strong plea that as the FIR does not disclose that a cognisable offence was committed, therefore, Police acted beyond jurisdiction in starting the FIR and taking out the case for investigation, this is an abuse of process of Law and has caused injustice to the petitioners. In support of his contention, the Id. advocate has relied upon the cases cited below. ( 5 ) THE first case cited is State of W. B. v. Swapan Kumar, AIR 1982 SC 949 : (1982 Cri LJ 819 ). In that case, it was held. , whether an offence has been disclosed or not must necessarily depend on the facts and circumstances of each particular case. If on a consideration of the relevant materials the Court is satisfied that an offence is disclosed, the Court will not interfere normally with the investigation of the offence and will allow investigation to be completed. An FIR which does not allege or disclose that the essential requirements of the penal provisions are prima facie satisfied, cannot form the foundation of a lawful investigation. An investigation can be quashed if no cognisable offence is disclosed by the FIR. It is surely not within the province of the police to investigate into an FIR which does not disclose the commission of a cognisable offence. ( 6 ) THE next case cited is R. R. Kapur v. State of Punjab, AIR 1960 SC 866 : (1960 Cri LJ 1239 ). In that case it was held, some of the categories of cases where the inherent jurisdiction to quash proceedings can and should be exercised are :- (I ). . . (II) when the allegations in the FIR or the complaint, even if they are taken in their face value and accepted in their entirety, do not constitute the offence alleged; in such cases, no question of appreciating evidence arises it is a matter merely of looking at the complaint or the FIR to decide whether the offence alleged is disclosed or not. ( 7 ) THE next case is Nagawwa v. Veeranna, AIR 1976 SC 1947 : (1976 Cri LJ 1533 ). In that case, it was held that in the following cases, an order of the Magistrate issuing process against the accused can be quashed or set aside : (I) where the allegations made in the complaint or the statement of witnesses recorded in support of the same taken at their face value make out absolutely no case against the accused or the complaint does not disclose the essential ingredients of an offence which is alleged against the accused; (II) where the allegations made in the complaint are patently absurd and inherently improbable so that no prudent man can ever reach a conclusion that there is sufficient ground for proceeding against the accused; (III) where the discretion exercised by the Magistrate in issuing process is capricious and arbitrary having been based on no evidence; (IV) where the complaint suffers from legal defect, such as, want of sanction etc. ( 8 ) THE next case relied upon is Sharda Prasad Sinha v. State of Bihar, AIR 1977 SC 1754 : (1977 Cri LJ 1146 ). In that case, it was held, it is now settled law that when the allegations set out in the complaint or the charge-sheet do not constitute offence, it is competent to the High Court exercising its inherent jurisdiction u/s. 482 of the Cr. P. C. to quash the order passed by the Magistrate taking cognizance of the offence. ( 9 ) THE same principles have been reiterated in State of U. P. v. R. K. Srivastava, AIR 1989 SC 2222 : (1989 Cri LJ 2301 ). ( 10 ) MR. Swapan Mallick, ld. advocate appearing on behalf of the State has submitted that if there is a prayer for quashing a criminal proceeding, the Magistrate has to consider not only the statements made in the body of the FIR but also the materials collected during investigation at that stage. ( 11 ) MR. Mallick, ld. State-advocate has in that connection, relied upon the principles laid down in Bhajanlal's case AIR 1992 SC 604 at p. 629 : (1992 Cri LJ 527 at pp. 551-52 ). Mr. ( 11 ) MR. Mallick, ld. State-advocate has in that connection, relied upon the principles laid down in Bhajanlal's case AIR 1992 SC 604 at p. 629 : (1992 Cri LJ 527 at pp. 551-52 ). Mr. Mallick has also submitted that in this case, Their Lordships considered AIR 1989 SC 2222 : (1989 Cri LJ 2301), AIR 1982 SC 949 : (1982 Cri LJ 819), AIR 1976 SC 1947 : (1976 Cri LJ 1533) and AIR 1960 SC 866 : (1960 Cri LJ 1239) REFERRED TO by Mr. Sanyal, ld. advocate for the petitioners, along with many other decisions of the apex Court. In para 108 at pp. 629 (of AIR) : (at pp. 551-52 of Cri LJ) of the reported judgment in Bhajanlal's case it has been stated as follows :"108. In the backdrop of the interpretation of the various relevant provisions of the Code under Chapter-XIV and of the principles of law enunciated by this Court in a series of decisions relating to the exercise of the extra-ordinary power under Art. 226 or the inherent powers u/s. 482 of the Code which we have extracted and reproduced above, we give the following categories of cases by way of illustration wherein such power could be exercised either to prevent abuse of the process of any Court or otherwise to secure the ends of justice, though it may not be possible to lay down any precise, clearly defined and sufficiently channelised and inflexible guidelines - or rigid formulae and to give an exhaustive list of - myriad kinds of cases wherein power should be exercised". 1. Where the allegations made in the First information Report or the complaint, even if they are taken at their face value and accepted in their entirety do not prima facie constitute any offence or make out a case against the accused. 2. Where the allegations in the First Information Report and other materials, if any, accompanying the FIR do not disclose a cognizable offence, justifying an investigation by Police of officers u/sec. 156 (1) of the Code except under an order of a Magistrate within the purview of Sec. 155 (2) of the Code. 3. Where the uncontroverted allegations made in the FIR or complaint and the evidence collected in support of the same do not disclose the commission of any offence and make out a case against the accused. 4. 156 (1) of the Code except under an order of a Magistrate within the purview of Sec. 155 (2) of the Code. 3. Where the uncontroverted allegations made in the FIR or complaint and the evidence collected in support of the same do not disclose the commission of any offence and make out a case against the accused. 4. Where, the allegations in the FIR, do not Constitute a cognizable offence but constitute only a non-cognizable offence, no investigation is permitted by a police officer without an order of a Magistrate as contemplated u/sec. 155 (2) of the Code. 5. Where there is an express legal bar engrafted in any of the provisions of the Code or the concerned Act (under which a criminal proceeding is instituted) to the institution and continuance of the proceedings and/or where there is a specific provision in the Code or the concerned Act, providing efficacious redress for the grievance of the aggrieved party. 6. Where the allegation made in the FIR or complaint are so absurd and inherently improbable on the basis of which no prudent person can ever reach a just conclusion that there is sufficient ground for proceeding against the accused. 7. Where a criminal proceeding is manifestly attended with mala fide and/or where the proceeding is maliciously instituted with an ulterior motive for wreaking vengeance on the accused and with a view to spite him due to private and personal grudge". ( 12 ) MR. Mallick has then REFERRED TO Janata Dal v. H. S. Chowdhury, AIR 1993 SC 892 : (1993 Cri LJ 600 ). In Para 135 at pp. 923 (of AIR : (at pp. 631 and 632 of Cri LJ) of the reported decision, it has been stated as follows :-"135. This inherent power conferred by S. 482 of the Code should not be exercised to stifle a legitimate prosecution. The High Court being the highest Court of a State should normally refrain from giving a premature decision in a case wherein the entire facts are extremely incomplete and hazy, more so when the evidence has not been collected and produced before the Court and the issues involved whether factual or legal are of great magnitude and cannot be seen in their true perspective without sufficient material. OF course, no hard and Fast rule can be laid down in regard to the cases in which the High Court will exercise its extraordinary jurisdiction of quashing the proceedings at any stage. This Court in State of Haryana v. Ch. Bhajan Lal, 1990 (3) Supp SCR 259 to which both of were parties have dealt with this question at length and enunciated the law listing out the circumstances under which the High Court can exercise its jurisdiction in quashing proceedings. We do not, therefore, think it necessary in the present case to extensively deal with the import and intendment of the powers under Ss. 397, 401 and 482 of the Code. " ( 13 ) HE has next REFERRED TO Rupam Deol Bajaj v. K. P. S. Gill, 1996 Cri LJ 381 : (1995 AIR SCW 4100 ). In that case, the order of the High Court quashing the FIR and complaint was set aside as illegal in the absence of a finding that the allegations made in the FIR were absurd or inherently improbable. ( 14 ) FROM a consideration of the decisions cited above, it appears that Bhajanlal's case (supra) did not lay down any cut and dry principle as stated by Mr. Mallick. In that decision in para 108 quoted above the law on the point has been restated in lucid language. The first category of cases discussed in para 108 clearly states that where the allegations made in the FIR or the complaint. even if they are taken at their face value and accepted in their entirety do not prima facie constitute any offence or make out a case against the accused, the power under S. 482, Cr. P. C. can be exercised to prevent the abuse of the process of law. Mr. Sanyal, ld. advocate for the petitioners has tried strenuously to highlight this aspect of the matter. This Court finds that the contention of Mr. Sanyal, ld. advocate should be accepted and that of Mr. Mallick cannot be entertained as laying down the correct position of law. ( 15 ) NOW let us apply this principle to the facts as disclosed in the FIR. There is an allegation that the petitioners tortured Krishna as she protested when her gold ornaments received as dowry were taken away. advocate should be accepted and that of Mr. Mallick cannot be entertained as laying down the correct position of law. ( 15 ) NOW let us apply this principle to the facts as disclosed in the FIR. There is an allegation that the petitioners tortured Krishna as she protested when her gold ornaments received as dowry were taken away. The incident of torture started sometime after marriage which took place 17 years ago and continued till when nobody knows. During this period, she came to her father's place from time to time and narrated her woes. Then she became a victim of burning in the house of her husband. She succumbed to her injuries. It has not been stated in the FIR that the petitioners caused her death by burning. In the FIR the cause of death has been ascribed to torture and burning. But regarding burning, there is no allegation of commission of any offence. But regarding torture, there are allegations, though general and he time span is not precise. But the allegations of fact are not highly improbable nor do these constitute an incredible story. So it cannot be said that this is a case coming with in any of the categories mentioned above where the Court should exercise its jurisdiction u/sec. 482, Cr. P. C. The revisional application accordingly fails and is dismissed. Revision dismissed.