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1996 DIGILAW 186 (HP)

SUBHASH CHAND v. STATE OF HIMACHAL PRADESH

1996-09-27

KAMLESH SHARMA, M.SRINIVASAN

body1996
JUDGMENT M. Srinivasan, C. J.—There is no merit whatever in the criminal revision. Two contentions are urged. The first point framed by learned Additional Sessions Judge (I) Kangra at Dharamshala has been answered by him in the negative while setting out the findings and, therefore the remaining part of the entire judgment is not warranted as the learned Judge bad given a negative answer to Point No. 1. It is quite evident from reading the judgment that it is only a slip of tongue or hand by which the finding on point No. 1 is shown in negative. In the judgment, when he has framed the point whether the impugned judgment is legal and factually sustainable and it is found after discussing the entire evidence that the judgment is unassailable, the extract of the findings given in paragraph II as against point No. 1 in the negative is certainly a mistake and it cannot be taken advantage of by the petitioner herein. It is really surprising that such an argument is advanced at the stage of revision petition before this Court. 2. As regards arguments on the merits of the decision of the Additional Sessions Judge, several contentions are raised by learned Counsel for the petitioner and are dealt with hereunder, 3. The first contention is that all the witnesses of the prosecution are closely related and therefore, interested witnesses and their evidence should not have been accepted, there is no merit in this contention If the evidence is in no manner discrepant and if the evidence can be accented without any further corroboration from a stranger or a third party the court is entitled to accept the same. The Judicial Magistrate (I) Dharamshala, who has seen the witnesses in the witness box as well as the Additional Sessions Judge, after perusing the entire evidence have come to the conclusion that their evidence is acceptable and no infirmity has been pointed out by learned Counsel for the petitioner herein in the reasoning so as to reject the same. Hence I do not find any merit in this contention. 4. Hence I do not find any merit in this contention. 4. Secondly, it is contended that it is brought out in the evidence of the Doctor, who has been examined as PW 2, that when he examined the victim, namely, Kehar Singh, he found that the said person had consumed liquor earlier but the Doctor had stated that the patient was not under the influence of liquor when he examined him. It is also brought out in the evidence that son of Kehar Singh, the complainant had given certain quantity of Rum to him after he got injured by the beating. It is contended that if he had not consumed liquor before the beating that could not have been found out when the Doctor examined him, It is argued that when the Doctor examined the patient he found that the patient must have consumed the liquor on the prior day. That itself shows that the patient must have been under the influence of the liquor at the time of the incident. It is further contended that on account of consumption of liquor Kehar Singh could have fallen down and got injured himself, but a specific suggestion was put to the Doctor on that aspect of the matter that the injuries might have been caused by fall. The Doctor has denied the same and has given the reasoning that all the injuries are in the front part of the body and that could not have been caused on account of fall after consumption of liquor by the patient. Hence the contention put forward on behalf of the accused cannot be accepted. Both the courts have considered this question whether the injured had consumed the liquor and was under the influence liquor and also the defence put forward by the accused that the injuries might have been caused by a fall and come to the conclusion that there is no warrant to accept the case of the accused, 5. Thirdly, it is argued that it is in the evidence of the witnesses of the prosecution that the accused were beating the victim for about half an hour and if that version is true he would have suffered more injuries on his person than what was found on the body. Thirdly, it is argued that it is in the evidence of the witnesses of the prosecution that the accused were beating the victim for about half an hour and if that version is true he would have suffered more injuries on his person than what was found on the body. The Courts below have considered the same and come to the conclusion that while mentioning the duration the witnesses might have given some exaggerated version of the exact time during which the incident occurred. The view taken by the Courts below is correct and I do not find any justification to reject the same. 6. The next contention is that there were independent witnesses available none of whom was examined to establish the case of the prosecution. It is surprising that such a contention is put forward before this Court by the accused, when, according to him, no such incident took place. What is argued is that it took place in the house of the complainant and there were nearby houses where other independent witnesses could have been present and they could have been examined by the prosecution. There is no question of examining those persons who were actually not present. The witnesses who were present were examined. There is nothing on record to show that some body else was present and he was omitted to be examined. 7. According to learned Counsel, the whole of the prosecution case is improbable. According to him, the marriage of the brother of the accused had taken place on that date and, therefore, on that date, there is no probability of the accused going to the house of the complainant and beating Kehar Singh, as alleged by him. It is also contended that the motive for such beatings is said to be that some cattle belonging to the complainant had grazed in the field of the accused. Learned Counsel contends that on such a flimsy pretext no person will attack another person and cause injuries to him. In my view, human nature is such that one cannot say what would prick him and anger him to beat a person. Even one small incident is sufficient to bring about a grave crime. But in this case, the record shows that consistent evidence was adduced by several prosecution witnesses, which is accepted by the courts below. In my view, human nature is such that one cannot say what would prick him and anger him to beat a person. Even one small incident is sufficient to bring about a grave crime. But in this case, the record shows that consistent evidence was adduced by several prosecution witnesses, which is accepted by the courts below. The evidence positively makes out that the accused is guilty of the offence. 8. The next contention is that in this case common intention has not been proved. But I do not find any mention of section 34, I. P. C. either in the F. I. R. or in the judgments of the Courts below. What is argued is that they have jointly inflicted the injuries and therefore, the court would have invoked section 34, I. P. C There is no basis for the contention. Just because all the accused were charged with the offence of causing injuries to the victim, it does not mean that section 34, I. P. C, was invoked. 9. It is pointed out that while two of the accused were let out on probation, the petitioner alone was not released on Probation, As against the petitioner the Judicial Magistrate has stated that the report of the Probation Officer, Kangra, at Dharamshala, showed that the character and antecedents of the petitioner were not goad. In support of the said point, the Probation Officer had attached certificates of the President of the village, who had stated that the character of the convict was not satisfactory and he was involved in many criminal cases, which are still pending in various courts. It is also stated by the Magistrate that a criminal case is pending before his Court also against the said convict Subhash Chand. It is contended that section 54 of the Indian Evidence Act, excludes any evidence of bad character unless it is one of the issues in the case. It is argued that for the purpose of refusing probation the court cannot rely upon the alleged bad character of the accused. I am unable to accept this contention. The very purpose of the Probation of Offenders Act is to see whether after the Court found a person to be guilty on the basis of evidence on record, he should be let off on probation so that he would become a normal man by rectifying himself. I am unable to accept this contention. The very purpose of the Probation of Offenders Act is to see whether after the Court found a person to be guilty on the basis of evidence on record, he should be let off on probation so that he would become a normal man by rectifying himself. Section 3 of the Probation of Offenders Act provides that when a person is found guilty of having committed an offence punishable under the sections mentioned herein and no previous conviction is proved against him and the Court, by which the person is found guilty is of the opinion that, having regard to the circumstances of the case including the nature of the offence and the character of the offender, it is expedient so to do, then, notwithstanding anything contained in any other law for the time being in force, the court may, instead of sentencing him to any punishment or releasing him on probation of good conduct under section 4, release him after due admonition. Thus section 3 carves out an exception to the provisions of Indian Evidence Act and it expressly excludes all other laws as there is non-obstante clause in section 3. That section specifically requires the Court to take into account the various circumstances of the case including the nature of the offence and character of the offender and if it is found expedient, to release the accused on probation. It is entirely the discretion vested with the concerned Magistrate and the Magistrate has to exercise such discretion taking into account the various factors mentioned in section 3 of the Probation of Offenders Act. In this case, the Magistrate concerned has taken into account not only the report of the Probation Officer but also the fact that a criminal case was already pending before his Court against the petitioner herein In such circumstances, it cannot be said that the Magistrate concerned has wrongly exercised his jurisdiction or failed to exercise jurisdiction conferred on him under section 3 of the Probation of Offenders Act Moreover, the appellate authority had again considered the matter and come to the conclusion that there was nothing wrong in the order of the Magistrate in refusing to release the petitioner herein on probation. 10. 10. Learned Counsel for the petitioner places reliance on section 7 of the Probation of Offenders Act, which provides that the report of the Probation Officer shall be treated as confidential. The proviso to section 7 empowers the Court if it so thinks fit to communicate the substance thereof to the offender and may give him an opportunity of producing such evidence as may be relevant to the matter stated in the report. Learned Counsel for the petitioner contends that the Magistrate failed to communicate the substance of the report to the petitioner herein. It is not a mandatory provision. It leaves to the opinion of the Court and only if the Court thinks it fit, it has to communicate the substance of the report to the accused. In this case, the Magistrate found it unnecessary in view of the fact that there is already another case pending before him against the same accused. 11. My attention is drawn by learned Counsel for the petitioner to two judgments of the Supreme Court. First of them is in Bir Singh v. The State of Uttar Pradesh, AIR 1978 SC 59 The Court held that it was not incumbent on the prosecution to examine each and every witness so as to multiply the number of witnesses and burden the record and that this rule, however, does not apply where the evidence of the eye-witnesses suffers from various infirmities and could be relied upon only if properly corroborated. In this case, as pointed out already, the evidence of the prosecution witnesses, who are eye-witnesses does not suffer from any infirmity and it does not require corroboration from any independent witness. Hence the said ruling of the Supreme Court will not apply. 12. The other ruling is in The State of Assam v. Bhelu Sheikh and others, AIR 1989 SC 1097. The Court was dealing with a murder case. Hence the said ruling of the Supreme Court will not apply. 12. The other ruling is in The State of Assam v. Bhelu Sheikh and others, AIR 1989 SC 1097. The Court was dealing with a murder case. The Court pointed out that where in a murder case, the evidence far from being of a compulsive nature was not free from infirmities and doubts and the prosecution evidence did not conclusively establish that deceased were in possession of the paddy field and they had raised the paddy crops and in spite of it they were forcibly sought to be dispossessed by the accused on the day in question and the evidence was not cogent and clear to show that it was the accused who had caused the injuries to the victims and it was not explained why no report was given to the police authorities till the Sub-Inspector himself came to the village or as to why no statement of one of the deceased was got recorded by the Magistrate even though he was alive for about nine days after the occurrence and the prosecution had not explained how two of the accused came to sustain injuries on their person, the conviction of the accused was not proper. 13. So many circumstances have been taken into account by the Supreme Court in disbelieving the case of the prosecution in a murder case. The observations relied upon by learned Counsel in that judgment occur in paragraph 11, which reads as follows : "As regards the attack on Dhansa Sheikh and Majibur Rahman, the prosecution has not examined any independent witness even though the occurrence had taken place in an open field in broad daylight. The only three witnesses to speak about the attack on the two victims are PW 8 Safurannessa, PW 9 Ragia Begum and PW 10 Subrat All who are the wife and daughter and son, respectively of Dhansa Sheikh. According to these witnesses. PW 9 Rag a Begum was on her way to a well to draw water and she was the first to see the attack on her father and brother. She is the said to have run home and informed her mother and brother about the attack and brought them to the paddy field. According to these witnesses. PW 9 Rag a Begum was on her way to a well to draw water and she was the first to see the attack on her father and brother. She is the said to have run home and informed her mother and brother about the attack and brought them to the paddy field. PW 8 Safurannessa has deposed that she saw the respondents attacking tier husband and son and even after she had reached the field and placed the head of her son on her lap, the respondents caused injuries to him This is obviously an exaggerated version. PW 10 Subrat Ali has deposed that he too saw the attack but since some of the respondents threatened to attack him with stones he ran away from the place. The High Court has entertained doubts about the veracity of the testimony of PWs 8 to 10 because of inherent infirmities in their evidence.” 14. As pointed out already, so many other factors have been taken into account not only by the High Court but also by the Supreme Court to disbelieve the evidence of the prosecution witnesses. It was not as if the Supreme Court laid down in that case that the evidence of the relatives cannot be believed at all. The Court only pointed out that in a case where the evidence of the prosecution witnesses suffers from several infirmities it cannot be accepted except with the corroboration of independent witnesses. The ruling does not help the petitioner herein in any manner. 15. In the result, the contentions urged by learned Counsel for the petitioner have no merit and hence rejected. The criminal revision petition is dismissed. Petition rejected.