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1996 DIGILAW 189 (KER)

Kerala Fisheries Corporation v. P. S. John

1996-04-10

J.B.KOSHY, K.SREEDHARAN, P.K.BALASUBRAMANYAN

body1996
Judgment :- Balasubramanyan, J. W. A. No. 76 of 1990 is filed by the Kerala Fisheries Corporation Lid., an institution specified under S.71 of the Revenue Recovery Act, hereinafter called 'the Act' as per Notification dt.19.12.1972 and W. A. No. 84 of 1990 is filed by the District Collector and the Tahsildar the authorities under the Act. Respondent No. I in the Writ Appeals, entered into an agreement with the Fisheries Corporation for purchase of fish from the fishermen under the control of the Corporation and to pay the price of the fish to the Corporation on the terms agreed upon by the parties. Though respondent No.1 collected the fish he did not pay the price, inspite of being called upon to do so. The Fisheries Corporation therefore, filled a suit O.S.223 of 1973 on the file of the Subordinate Judge's Court of Kottayam. The said suit was decreed in favour of the Corporation on 29.3.1974 providing for recovery of a sum of Rs. 41823.70 with 6% interest thereon from the date of suit and the costs of suit. The Fisheries Corporation did not execute the decree, but on 13.I.1986, applied to the District Collector for initiation of proceedings under the Revenue Recovery Act for recovery of the amounts due to it. On 17.3.1986, the Collector issued the certificate contemplated by S.69(3) of the Act. A demand notice was issued on 20.3.1986. A notice dt. 30.3.1986 proposing to attach the movables was issued to the defaulter which was received by him on 5.4.1986. Contending that the recovery of the amount was barred by limitation, respondents 1 and 2 filed O. P. 3149 of 1986 before this court praying for the issue of a writ of certiorari to quash the notices issued under S.34 and S.7 of the Act. The contention was that since the execution of the decree in O.S.223 of 1973 of the Subordinate Judge's Court of Kottayam was barred by limitation, no execution having been initiated prior to 29.3.1986, the Fisheries Corporation was disentitled to recover the amounts due under the said decree. The contention was that since the execution of the decree in O.S.223 of 1973 of the Subordinate Judge's Court of Kottayam was barred by limitation, no execution having been initiated prior to 29.3.1986, the Fisheries Corporation was disentitled to recover the amounts due under the said decree. This-was countered by the Fisheries Corporation and by the officials under the Act, by contending that the Revenue Recovery Act does not provide any time limit for initiation of proceedings for recovery of amounts due to the Government or to the institutions notified under S.71 of the Act, that in the case On hand, in any event, proceedings under the Act were initiated on 13.I.1986 well before 29.3.1996 on which date the execution of the decree would become barred under the Limitation Act, that the certificate under S.69(3) of the Act itself was issued by the Collector on 17.3.1986 and the notice of demand Ext. P2 under S.34 of the Act was itself issued on 20.3.1986 within 12 years of the decree in O. S.223 of 1973 and therefore, in any view of the matter, the proceeding initiated under the Act was in time and was valid. A learned Single Judge by the judgment under appeal, which is reported in P.S. John and another v. The District Collector and others (1989(2) KLT 831), look the view that since the notice of demand under S.7 of the Act was served on the defaulter only on 5.4.1986, beyond 12 years of the dale of the decree in O. S.223 of 1973, the proceedings under the Revenue Recovery Act could not be taken to be within 12 years of the decree and since the amount due to the Financial Corporation could not. be recovered in execution, in view of the relevant Article in the Limitation Act, 1963, initiation of proceedings under the Revenue Recovery Act has also to be held to be unsustainable. In that view, the learned Single Judge quashed (he proceedings under the Act. The learned Single Judge also relied on the decision in Nanu aril others v. State of Kerala (1987 (2) KLT 921) in support of his conclusion. The correctness of this "decision is questioned in these writ Appeals. v 2. In O. P. Nos. 10643 of 1989 and 2880 of. The learned Single Judge also relied on the decision in Nanu aril others v. State of Kerala (1987 (2) KLT 921) in support of his conclusion. The correctness of this "decision is questioned in these writ Appeals. v 2. In O. P. Nos. 10643 of 1989 and 2880 of. 1990, the petitioners therein challenge the initiation of proceedings under the Revenue Recovery Act on the irpleatlial Uienolice under the Act was served on them after the expiry of three years from the date fixed for repayment and consequently, initiation of proceedings are without jurisdiction. The amounts therein were due to the Kerala Financial Corporation, an institution notified under S.71 of the Act, and governed also by the Stale Financial Corporation Act. The Financial Corporation resisted the claim of the petitioners. The learned Single Judge before whom the Original Petitions came up for hearing, felt that the ratio of the decision in Nanu v. State (1987(2) KLT 921) may require reconsideration and referred the cases to a Division Bench. Since one of the questions involved in the said Original Petitions were also the same as the one involved in the Writ Appeals, those Original Petitions were also directed to be posted along with (he Writ Appeals. A Division Bench of tin's Court having heard (he Writ Appeals and the Original Petitions and considering the fact that the decision in Nanu v. Stale (1987(2) KLT921) was that of a Division Bench, referred the cases for being heard by the Full Bench and that is how these cases arc before us. 3. S.5 of the Act slates that whenever public revenue due on land is in arrear, such arrear together with the oilier sums referred to therein could be recovered by attachment and sale of the defaulter's movable properly, by attachment and sale of the defaulter's immovable property, by appointing an agent for the management of the defaulter's immovable property or by arrest of the defaulter and this detention in prison. What is stated is that when revenue due on land is in arrear, it could be recovered. What is stated is that when revenue due on land is in arrear, it could be recovered. S.68 of the Act which makes the provisions of the Act applicable to recovery of certain other dues to the Government uses expressions 'all sums due to the Government' and 'all moneys due from any person' and S.71 of the Act dealing with the power of the Government to declare the Act applicable to any institution speaks of a declarant ion that the provisions of the Act shall he applicable to recovery of 'amounts due' from any person. In the judgment under appeal, the learned judge interpreted the words 'recovery of amounts due occurring in S.71 as meaning "legally recoverable". The learned judge proceeds to state: "Whether an amount is legally recoverable depends upon the question whether the said amount can be recovered well within the time, the same could be recovered under the general law of limitation. If it is found that recovery of any amount is barred by the law of limitation, it is then difficult to sustain the plea that the Recovery Officers can still insist that the said amount was payable/ recoverable". A Division Bench of this Court in A. K. Nann and Others v. Slate of Kerala (1987 (2) KLT921) to which also the same learned judge was a party, overruled the view of another learned Single Judge to the effect that: "As long as the right is not extinguished and no period is prescribed for resorting to the proceedings for recovery under Act, the fact that a suit is barred will not disentitle the bank from resorting to steps in pursuance of the Notification, by proceeding under the provisions of the Revenue Recovery Act". and held that in the absence of a provision creating a substantive right to recover time barred debts, the Act providing for summary recovery does not avail, once the period prescribed for recovery under the Limitation Act has expired. In other words, the Division Bench held that if the Government or the institution coming under the Act cannot enforce the right through. a court in view of the provisions of the Limitation Act, the Government or the Institution cannot have the right to invoke (he provisions of the Revenue Recovery Act to recover the amounts due to them. In other words, the Division Bench held that if the Government or the institution coming under the Act cannot enforce the right through. a court in view of the provisions of the Limitation Act, the Government or the Institution cannot have the right to invoke (he provisions of the Revenue Recovery Act to recover the amounts due to them. The court proceeded on the basis that the Revenue Recovery act did not create new liabilities or confer new rights but merely created a summary procedure for recovery of existing liabilities and proceeded to slate that when the recovery of a sum was barred by the provisions of the Limitation Act, the same could not be recovered through the machinery of the Revenue Recovery Act. This Court referred to the decision of the Privy Council in Hansraj v. Delmidiin M.S.T. Company (AIR 1933 PC 63) and the decision of the Supreme Court in New Delhi Municipality V. kuliiruni. (AIR 1976 SC 1637). This Court held that. the expression 'money due' in S.71 and S.68 of the act would have to he understood as 'money legally recoverable' and 'money becomes not legally recoverable' when a suit for recovery of the same is barred by limitation under the Limitation Act of 1963. Their Lordships distinguished the decision of another Division Bench of this Court in E. S. I. Corporation v. Ranidas Reddiar (1980 KLT 425) wherein this Court held: "The law of limitation is confined in its application to suits, appeals and applications and where a creditor does not seek to enforce a claim by resort to a suit, the law of limitation has no part to play. In other words, his rights if any other than the right to lake action in court continues to be operative". According to their Lordships, the said principle was not applicable to proceedings under the Revenue Recovery Act since it was merely a procedure for enforcing existing liabilities. Their Lordships also referred to the decision of this court in Official Liifttiihitor, Pillai Central Bank Lid. v. Aiigustliy (1986 (KLT 411). According to their Lordships, the said principle was not applicable to proceedings under the Revenue Recovery Act since it was merely a procedure for enforcing existing liabilities. Their Lordships also referred to the decision of this court in Official Liifttiihitor, Pillai Central Bank Lid. v. Aiigustliy (1986 (KLT 411). In that case, Raman Nair, J. (as he then was) stated thus: "The first is the elementary proposition that, except by the operation of provisions like S.28 of the Limitation Act 1908 -I shall for purposes of illustration refer to the more familiar provisions of that Act which have repeatedly come before the courts rather than to those of the new Act of 1963 - limitation does not extinguish the right but only bars the remedy. Here, the word, "right" is used to mean a primary or substantive right, and the proposition is true only if the word is understood in that limited sense. For a remedy is also a right in the wider sense of the word, a sanctioning or secondary right, a remedial or procedural right as it is often called and limitation does, undoubtedly extinguish such a right, though subject to the qualification already mentioned, leaving the substantive right unaffected. Of course, the remedy can be revived - re-created, would perhaps be the better word to use - by a law for the purpose, just as any other right, including a substantive right, can be so created. But in so far as the particular remedial right to which it applies is concerned, limitation undoubtedly extinguishes the right. It is, however, important to remember dial, limitation extinguishes only the particular remedial right which is its victim and that since it leaves the substantive right unaffected, that right can still be enforced in oilier ways, if oilier ways are available, not. merely indirectly by the enforcement of a lien, or by obtaining a fresh promise, or by reason of payment notwithstanding the bar being safe from recall, but also in a positive and direct manner. Thus, it might well be dial there is more than one legal remedy available for the enforcement of the substantive right". With respect, we feel that the passage quoted above cannot be said to support the proposition enunciated in Namt's case. Thus, it might well be dial there is more than one legal remedy available for the enforcement of the substantive right". With respect, we feel that the passage quoted above cannot be said to support the proposition enunciated in Namt's case. The question whether the provisions of the Limitation Act, 1963 would also govern the proceedings under the Revenue Recovery Act was not discussed by the Division Bench. This aspect was noticed in the decision Hari Kumaran Nair v. K.S.F.E. (1993(2) KLT 463) wherein it was pointed out that the Limitation Act as such could not be applied when a person does not approach the Civil Court for relief either by way of a suit or by way of an application. The two decisions relied on by the Division Bench in Nann 's case now require to be noticed. In Hansraj Gupta v. Dehrailun M. S. T Company (AIR. 1933 PC 63) their Lord ships held that a claim against a company in liquidation was not made by the presentation of a plaint and hence is not a suit instituted within the meaning of S.3 of the Limitation Act. Their Lordships also held that an application under S.186 of the Companies Act, 1913 made by the Liquidator within three years from the date of winding up order could not be dismissed by reason of S.3 of the Limitation Act as it is either an application made within time or it is an application made for which no period of limitation is prescribed. Their Lordships proceeded to observe that the expression 'any money due' in S.186 of the Companies Act must be confined to money clue and recoverable in a suit by the Company and they do not include any monies which at the date of the application under S.186 of the Act, could not have been so recovered. Their Lordships proceeded to observe that the expression 'any money due' in S.186 of the Companies Act must be confined to money clue and recoverable in a suit by the Company and they do not include any monies which at the date of the application under S.186 of the Act, could not have been so recovered. In that case the application by the Liquidator though under a special enactment was to the court and what was held was if on the date the application was made, the company in liquidation could not have recovered the money by way of a suit, the same could not be recovered by the Liquidator through an application under S.186 of the Companies Act, With respect, we feel mat the application under S.186 of the Companies Act being one made to a court, the Limitation Act applied and only debts alive on the date of the application could be recovered. It must also be observed that their Lordships noticed that the procedure under S.186 of the Companies Act was one providing for a summary, proceeding against the debtor - contributories to avoid proceedings in different courts. and to permit a single proceeding in the winding up court. Every defence was as open to the person sought to be charged as it would have been if a suit had been filed. In other words, an application under S.186 of was treated, a kin to a suit to be instituted by the company and was considered only as a special summary mode provided for recovery through the winding up court in the place of filing suits against various debtors in various courts. It could be seen that their Lordships noted that whether in view of the particular terms of the Limitation Act such a situation could arise in India, depended upon the meaning to be attributed to the words 'money due' and proceeded to stale that the law of India was the same as in England, and the words 'money due' must be combined in their Lordships judgment to money due and recoverable in a suit by the company and they do not include any moneys which on the day the application was made under S.186 of the Companies Act, could not have been so recovered. 5. 5. With respect we feel mat Privy Council considered the proceeding under S.186 of the Companies Act, 1913 as a summary mode of recovery and not as an alternate mode available to the company for recovery of the amounts due to it. A perusal of the Companies Act, 1913 shows that the application under S.186 of that Act had to be made to. the Court. The court was defined by that Act to mean a court having jurisdiction under that Act.. The Rules under that Act defined Court to mean the District Court. The various Rules also affirm this position. It is therefore, clear that an application under S.186 of that Act lay to a court and obviously in such a situation, the provisions of the Limitation Act would be attracted. 6. The other decision relied on is New Delhi Municipal Committee v. Kalunim (AIR 1976 SC 1637). In that decision, following the decision of the Privy Council Hansraj Gupta's case two learned judges of the Supreme Court held that under the Public Premises (Eviction of Unauthorised Occupants) Act, 1958 the 'Estate Officer' who could recover the arrears of rent payable in respect of any public premises, could not recover the rent in arrears if it was time barred. Their Lordships observed that S.7 of the Public Premises Act only provided a special procedure for realisation of rent in arrears and did not constitute a source or foundation for a right to claim rent otherwise time haired. During the course of the judgment, their Lordships noticed that "a creditor whose suit is barred by limitation, if he has any oilier legal remedy permitting him to enforce his claim, would be free to avail of it". Observing that the question in every case would depend upon whether the particular enactment would create a right to recover arrears of rent without any limitation of time and interpreting the words 'payable' as 'legally recoverable' their Lordships held that the barred rent could not be recovered by the Estate Officer. We may notice here, the Constitution Bench decision of the Supreme Court in Bombay Dyeing & Manufacturing Co. Ltd. v. State of Bombay (AIR 1958 SC 328). We may notice here, the Constitution Bench decision of the Supreme Court in Bombay Dyeing & Manufacturing Co. Ltd. v. State of Bombay (AIR 1958 SC 328). Considering the question whether a debt which is time barred could be the subject of transfer and if it could be, how it could benefit the transferee, the court speaking through Venkatarama Aiyar, J. observed: "Now, it is (lie settled law of this country that the Statute of Limitation only bars the remedy but does not extinguish the debt". Proceeding further, His Lordship observed: "It has been already maintained that when a debt becomes time-barred„ it does not become extinguished but only unenforceable in a Court of law. Indeed, it is on that footing that there can be a statutory transfer of the debts due to the employees, and that is how the Board gets title to them. If men a debt subsists even after it is barred by limitation, the employer does not get, in law, a discharge there from. The modes in which an obligation under a contract becomes discharged fire well-defined, and the bar of limitation is not one of them". The Supreme Court had to consider the scope of the expression'entire amount of rent due' in the decision in K. G: U. Trust v. Shri Ram Chandraji Maiuhr (AIR 1978 SC 287). Relying on the decision in Bombay Dyeing case referred to above, approving the Full Bench decision of the Patna High Court and following the decision of the Allahabad High Court, the Supreme Court held that the expression would include in the context of the U. P. Rent Control Act, rent which had become time-barred. 7. We may also notice the decision of the Supreme Court in Punjab National Bank v. Surendra Prasad Sinha (AIR 1992 SC 1815). In that case, towards a debt barred by limitation as against the principal debtor, the bank adjusted the proceeds of Fixed deposit receipts from a depositor who had stood as guarantor for the debt, that had 4 become time barred. The bank was sought to be prosecuted by the guarantor for offences under Ss.409,109 & 114 of the Indian Penal Code. The bank was sought to be prosecuted by the guarantor for offences under Ss.409,109 & 114 of the Indian Penal Code. The argument on behalf of the guarantor was that the debt had become barred as against the principal debtor and even though he had stood as guarantor for the loan, once the debt had become barred as against the principal debtor, amount due under the fixed deposit receipt could not be appropriated by the bank towards the liability which could not be enforced in view of S.3 of the Indian Limitation Act, 1963. Their Lordships held as follows: "The rules of limitation are not meant to destroy the rights of parties. S, 3 of the Limitation Act 36 of 1963, for short "the Act" only bars the remedy, but does not destroy the right which the remedy relates to. The right to the debt continues to exist notwithstanding the remedy is barred by the limitation. Only exception in which the remedy also becomes haired by limitation if the right is destroyed. For example, under S.27 of qic act suit for possession of any property becoming barred by limitation, the right to property itself is destroyed. Except in such cases _which are specially provided under the right to which remedy relates in other ease the right subsists. Though the right to enforce the debt by judicial process is barred under S.3 read with the relevant Article in the Schedule,' the right to debt remains. The time barred debt does not cease to exist by reason of S.3. That right can be exercised in any other manner than by means of a suit. The debt is not extinguished, but the remedy to enforce .the liability is destroyed. What S.3 refers is only to the remedy but not to the right of the creditors. Such debt continues to subsist so long as it is not paid. It is not obligatory to file a suit to recover the debt." (emphasis supplied) In Wharton's Law Lexicon, the meaning of the word 'due' is given as: "anything owing. That which one contracts to pay or perform to another; that which law or justice requires to be paid or done. It should be observed that a debt is said to be due the instant it has existence as a debt; it may be payable at a future lime." 8. That which one contracts to pay or perform to another; that which law or justice requires to be paid or done. It should be observed that a debt is said to be due the instant it has existence as a debt; it may be payable at a future lime." 8. In Nairn's case, we feel, that the scope of the expression 'amounts due' was not fully appreciated while applying the decision in Kaluram (AIR 1976 SC 1637) which related to the interpretation of the expression 'payable'. In our view, Section 71 of the Act having used the words 'amounts due' to any of the institutions notified under that Section, the institutions so notified would be entitled to recover all amounts due irrespective of whether the said amounts could be recovered through a court in view of Sec. 3 of the Limitation Act, 1963 or not. The creditors whose rights have not become extinguished have been given the right of recovering the moneys due to them without approaching the civil court and that is clearly w» the object of enabling them to recover the amounts due to me from their debtors so that the public interest could he served and the public purpose for which these institutions have been created further carried forward. The argument that the Revenue Recovery Act does not confer any new right, in the creditor and is only procedural, may not affect the position as above, since what the Revenue Recovery Act has done is to give the creditor another mode of recovering the amounts due to it without approaching the civil court. In that context, it could he even treated as conferring a right on the creditor to recover the amounts due to him without recourse to the ordinary civil courts. The right in the creditor, as is clear from the various decisions referred to, continues notwithstanding the fact that his right of recovery through a civil court stands barred by limitation. It is therefore not necessary to create a new right in him to recover the amounts. All that is necessary is to provide a alternate mode of recovery of an amount owned by a debtor and that is what has been conferred on the creditor by the Revenue Recovery Act and without providing for any period of limitation regarding such recovery. 9. All that is necessary is to provide a alternate mode of recovery of an amount owned by a debtor and that is what has been conferred on the creditor by the Revenue Recovery Act and without providing for any period of limitation regarding such recovery. 9. The Indian Limitation Act, 1963 was enacted with effect from I.I.1964 with a view to consolidate and amend the law for the filing of suits and other proceedings and for purposes connected therewith. The 1963 Act replaced the Limitation Act of 1908. The 1908 Act had a preamble. But a preamble was dispensed with when the 1963 Act was enacted. The long title was altered. The dispensing with the preamble and the alteration in the long title led to an argument that the effect of the same was to make the Limitation Act of 1963 applicable even to proceedings before Labour Courts. The argument based on the absence of the preamble and the alteration of the long title was rejected by the Supreme Court in Atliani Municipality v. Labour Court, Hnbli (AIR 1969 SC 1335). The Supreme Court observed thus:- "In the long title, thus, the words Bother proceedings' have been added, but we do not think that this addition necessarily implies that the Limitation Act is intended to govern proceedings before any authority whether executive or quasi judicial, when, earlier, the old Act was intended to govern proceedings before civil courts only. It is also true that the preamble had existed in the old Limitation Alcoa" 1908 has been omitted in the new Act of 1963. The omission of the preamble does not. however, indicate that there was any intention of the legislature to change the purposes for which the Limitation Act has been enforced. The question still remains whether this alteration can be held to be intended to cover petitions by a petitioner to authorities other than courts. We are unable to find any provision in the new Limitation Act which would justify holding that these charges in definition were intended to make the Limitation Act applicable to proceedings before bodies oilier than courts". The question still remains whether this alteration can be held to be intended to cover petitions by a petitioner to authorities other than courts. We are unable to find any provision in the new Limitation Act which would justify holding that these charges in definition were intended to make the Limitation Act applicable to proceedings before bodies oilier than courts". In Nilliycmanil v. L I.C. of India (AIR 1970 SC 209) dealing with the question of the applicability of Art.137 and S.4 and 5 of the Limitation Act to applications under S.33C(2) of the Industrial Disputes Act, the Supreme Court has observed as follows: "In our view Art.137 only contemplates application to courts. In the Third Division of the Schedule to the Limitation Act, 1963, all the other applications mentioned in the various Articles are applications filed in a court. Further, S.4 of the Limitation Act, 1963, provides for the contingency when the prescribed period for any application expires on a holiday and the only contingency contemplated is "when the court is closed'. Again, under S.5 it is only a court which is enabled to admit an application sailor the prescribed period has expired if the court is satisfied Unit the applicant had sufficient cause for not preferring the application. It seems to us that the scheme of the Indian Limitation Act is that it only deals with applications to courts and that the Labour Court is not a court within the Indian Limitation Act, 1963". The decision in A'. 5. E.B. v. T.P.K. (1976 KLT 810) also supports this view. Their Lordships speaking on the scope of An. 137 of the Limitation Act, 1963 held: "any other application under Art.137 could be petition or any' application under any Act. But it has to he an application to a court for the reason that Ss.4 & 5 of the 1963 limitation Act speak of prescribed period when court is closed and speaks of prescribed period if an applicant or the appellant satisfies the court that he has sufficient cause for not making the appeal or making the application during such period". Their Lordships held that Art.137 of the Limitation Act is applicable to an application under S.16 of the Indian Telegraph Act on the ground that the application was being made to the District Court and consequently such a petition was an application falling within the scope of Art.137 of the Limitation Act, The view has been reiterated by the Supreme Court in the decision filed before the Railway Claims Tribunal under S.16 of the Indian Railways Act. S.17(I)(C) of the Limitation Act 1963 was sought to be relied on to gel over the bar under S.78-B of that Act. The plea based on S.17(I)(C) of the Limitation Act was rejected by the Supreme Court in the following words: "S.17(I)(C) of the Limitation Act, 1963 would apply only to a suit instituted or an application made in that behalf in the civil suit. The Tribunal is the creature of the Statute. Therefore, it is not a civil court nor the Limitation Act has application, even though it may be held that the petitioner discovered the mistake committed in paying over charges' and the limitation is not saved by operation of S.17 (I) (C) of the Limitation Act". 10. Relying on the decision of the Supreme Court in Gopalan v. Aboobacker (1995(2) KLT 205) it was contended mat by virtue of S.29(2) of the Limitation Act, the provisions of that Act would he applicable to all authorities and even to initiation of proceedings under the Revenue Recovery Act. S.29(2) of the Limitation Act applies only when a special law or local law prescribes a period of limitation different from the one prescribed by the Limitation Act and the proceedings are before a court under the Code of Civil Procedure or constituted by the special enactment as slated in Gopalan v. Aboobacker (1995 (2) KLT 205). The Supreme Court has clearly staled that for importing the machinery of the provisions containing S.4 to 24 of the Limitation Act two requirements have to be satisfied by the authority invoking the said provision. The two requirements are: (I) There must he a provision for period of limitation under any special or local law in connection with any suit, appeal or application and (ii) the said prescription of period of limitation under such special or local law should be different from the period prescribed by the Schedule to the Limitation Act. The two requirements are: (I) There must he a provision for period of limitation under any special or local law in connection with any suit, appeal or application and (ii) the said prescription of period of limitation under such special or local law should be different from the period prescribed by the Schedule to the Limitation Act. The view expressed herein only extends the Limitation Act to appeals to courts constitute by special or the local law and a period is fixed for filing them by the special or local law. It does not lay down that, the Limitation Act would apply to proceedings before each and every authority. It is also not possible to accept the contention that even if the special or local law does not provide a period of limitation at all, by invoking S.29(2) of the Limitation Act, S.4 to 24 of the Act or the Act itself could be made-applicable. The observation to the effect that if a period is prescribed by a special or local 1 aw in respect of an appeal, but there is no provision in the Limitation Act in respect of such an appeal, still S.29(2) of the Limitation Act would be attracted cannot help the respondents to contend that S.29 of the Limitation Act would be applicable even to a case where the local law or the special law does not provide a period of limitation. We do not see anything in the decision in Gopalan's case which would militate against the decisions of the Supreme Court referred to earlier, to the effect that the Limitation Act has application only to courts. At best, what Gopalan's case lays down is that for S.29(2) of the Limitation Act to apply, the court need not necessarily be a court constituted under the Code of Civil Procedure, but could even be a court constituted under a Special enactment. Gopalan's case also indicate that the provisions of S.4 to 24 of the Limitation Act were applied to an Appellate Court constituted under the Kerala Buildings (Lease and Rent Control) Act, on a finding that the Appellate Authority constituted by S.18 of the Rent Control Act, was not 'persona designata' but was a court. This reasoning also, in our view, supports the conclusion that the provisions of the Limitation Act could be applied only to proceedings before the court. This reasoning also, in our view, supports the conclusion that the provisions of the Limitation Act could be applied only to proceedings before the court. The recent decision of the Supreme Court in Officer on Special Duly v. Shah Manilal Chamhdal (TT 1996(2) SC 278) holding that the Limitation Act has no application to proceedings before the Collector under the Land Acquisition Act also fortifies the above position. 11. It was then argued that even if the Limitation Act could not be applied to proceedings before authorities other man Courts, that could still be applied in view of the fact that the Collector acting under the Revenue Recovery Act was a Court. It was contended that there was a decision making power conferred on the Collector under the Act and consequently, the Collector under the Act could be treated as a 'Court' and in any event as a 'Revenue Court'. S.34(2) of the Act was relied on in support of the contention that on an objection by the defaulter, an adjudication by the Collector was contemplated. The proceedings under the Act for the sale of the attached immovable property and for the entertaining of claims to attached immovable properties, and the power to order arrest were referred to, contend that the 'Collector' under the Act would be a court thereby attracting the applicability of the Limitation Act, 1963. The decision of the Supreme Court in Slate of Tamilnadu v. Venkaiuswamy (AIR 1995 SC 21) was relied on in support. That decision was rendered on an appeal against the decision of the Madras High Court in Venkalaswaniy v. State of Tamilnadu reported in AIR 1981 Mad. 318. It must be noticed that the only question that was argued in that case before the High Court of Madras was that S.52A of the Tamil nadu Revenue Recovery Act, corresponding to S.71 of the Kerala Act, was unconstitutional since it was ultra vires the powers of the Stale legislature. In upholding that argument, the attempt made by the Advocate General to bring the said Act within the purview of Entry 3 of List 11 of Seventh Schedule to the Constitution by relying on a decision of the Calcutta High Court in Mukerji and another v. Union of India (AIR 1964 Cal. In upholding that argument, the attempt made by the Advocate General to bring the said Act within the purview of Entry 3 of List 11 of Seventh Schedule to the Constitution by relying on a decision of the Calcutta High Court in Mukerji and another v. Union of India (AIR 1964 Cal. 165) was repelled by the Division Bench of the High Court of Madras-'by noticing the difference in (he Bengal Public Demands Recovery Act and the Madras Act and holding that on the Scheme of the Madras Act, the authority constituted under the Act could not be considered to be a court and consequently, the Act could not be brought within the ambit of Entry 3 of List II of the Seventh Schedule to the Constitution. In appeal, the Supreme Court held that the Act could be sustained even with reference to Entry 3 of List II of the Seventh Schedule to the Constitution or the corresponding Entry, Entry 11-A in List III of the 7th Schedule to the Constitution. In Para. 14 of the judgment of the Supreme Court, their Lordships observed that the 'Collector' exercises powers under the Act, which is an Act of the Stale Legislature and is invested with the power to decide the controversy between the Stale and the defaulter. There was the existence of the lis between the State and the defaulter. There is an assertion and denial. The dispute involves the rights and obligations of parties which are decided by the Collector. The conclusion that could be drawn was that the Collector under the Act was a Revenue court and once it was held that the Collector was a Revenue Court, there was no difficulty in holding that S.52A of the Act was enacted by the State legislature under Entry 11-A, List III of the 7th Schedule to the Constitution. Their Lordships went on to hold that the Legislature was also competent under Entry 30 of the Stale list to enact that Section, since it would be a legislation relating to money lending and money lenders, the view taken by the Kerala High Court in David v. Kerala Financial Corporation (1988(I) KLT 585). It was contended with reference to the decision in S.G. V. Sainili Lid. v. Maliabir Sugar Mills (P)Ltd (AIR 1982SC 119) that even if the 'Collector' was treated as a Revenue Court, the Limitation Act would apply. 12. It was contended with reference to the decision in S.G. V. Sainili Lid. v. Maliabir Sugar Mills (P)Ltd (AIR 1982SC 119) that even if the 'Collector' was treated as a Revenue Court, the Limitation Act would apply. 12. In the context of these decisions it becomes necessary to consider the relevant provisions of the Kerala Revenue Recovery Act to find out whether the authority constituted under the Kerala Act exercises only adjudicatory power and could be found to be a 'court' in the strict sense or a Revenue Court. We have also to remember that what was involved in the decision in Stale of Tamilnadu v. Venkataswamy (AIR 1995 SC 21) was the interpretation of a legislative entry in the Seventh Schedule to the Constitution, which of course had to be interpreted in the widest manner possible. 13. The Kerala Revenue Recovery Act, 1968, came into force on 15.12.1968 as an Act to consolidate and amend the laws relating to the recovery of arrears of Public reenacting the State of Kerala. S.2(a) of the Act defines 'arrears of public revenue due on land' as meaning any portion of any kist or instalment of such revenue not paid on the day on which it falls due. S.2(c) of the Act defines the 'Collector' as meaning the District Collector or any other officer appointed by the Government to exercise the powers and conferring on him the functions of a Collector under the Act. S.20) of the Act defines 'public revenue due on land' as meaning the land re venue charged on the land and including all other taxes, fees and cesses on land whether charged on land or not and all cesses or other dues payable to the Government on account of water used for purpose of irrigation. S.5 of the Act gives the power to the Collector to recover the arrears of public revenue due on land by the modes referred to in that Section. S.7 requires the Collector to furnish the person employed to make the attachment of movable properties, a demand in writing signed by him containing the name of the defaulter, the amount of arrears of public revenue due on land for which the attachment is to be made, the date on which such arrear fell due and such other particulars that may be prescribed. The person employed to make the attachment is to serve and demand on the defaulter and if the defaulter fails to remit the amount, make the attachment construing the demand in writing given to him by the Collector as the authority for making the attachment. At the stage of S.7, it is clear that no enquiry by the Collector with notice to the defaulter is contemplated.. The Collector is only expected to issue demand in writing to the authorised officer to proceed to demand the amount from the defaulter, and to attach the movables on the failure of the defaulter to pay. Ss.8 to 18 provide for acceptance of 'the tender of arrear by the defaulter and the procedure to be followed for sale of the movables attached an the failure of the defaulter to pay the amount demanded under S.7 of the Act. Ss.19 to 27 deals with attachment of specific assets referred to in those sections. Ss.28 and 29 deal with claims to properly attached. S.30 confers jurisdiction on the civil court to restore possession to the officer who had effected the attachment when the attached property was taken away clandestinely or forcibly from him. S.31 confers power on the officer making the attachment for centering ling house etc. and S.32 provides for removal of property from the apartments of women. S.33 provides for punishment for entering the apartment of women contrary to the terms of S.32 of the Act. S.34 of the Act lays down the procedure for attachment and sale of immovable property. That section also contemplates the causing of service of written demand on the defaulter before the Collector proceeds to attach the immovable property of the defaulter. Sub-section 2 of S.34 states that if within the time prescribed under subsection 1 of the defaulter objects to the claim of arrears wholly or in part, the Collector or the authorised officer as the case may be was to enquire into the objection and record a decision before proceeding to attach the immovable property of the defaulter. S.35 provides that the immovable property of the defaulter could be attached when the defaulter neglected to pay the amount due in terms of the written demand served on him. S.36 provides for the mode of attachment and Ss.37 to 41 provide for the custody of the property attached and the appointing of an agent to manage the property. S.35 provides that the immovable property of the defaulter could be attached when the defaulter neglected to pay the amount due in terms of the written demand served on him. S.36 provides for the mode of attachment and Ss.37 to 41 provide for the custody of the property attached and the appointing of an agent to manage the property. Ss.42 to 51 provide for the procedure to be followed for sale and S.51 provides for the case where a tender of arrears is made before the sale. S.52 of Act provides for an application to set aside the sale of immovable properly on deposit of the amounts due and S.53 of the Act provides for an application, to set aside the sale on the ground of material irregularity in publishing or conducting the sale. Ss.54 to 64 deal with the procedure to be followed regarding the delivery of possession and the mode of conducting the sale. Ss.65 and 66 provide for arrest and the procedure in case of arrest. S.67 of the Act refers to the mode of enforcing payment by sureties. S.68 of the Act provides for the application of the Act to recovery of certain other dues to the Government including amounts due on account of quit rent or revenue other than public revenue due on land, all moneys due under a written agreement, all specific pecuniary penalties to which that, person renders himself liable under the agreement, all sums declared by any other law for I he time being in force to be recoverable as arrear of public revenue due on land or land revenue and all fees and other dues payable by any person to the Government. S.69 provides the procedure for recovery when the defaulter or his surety resided outside the District and for recovery of dues other than public revenue due on land. S.70 provides that when proceedings are taken under the Revenue Recovery Act against any person for recovery of any sum of money due from him, that person may, at any time before the commencement of the sale of any property attached, pay the amount claimed and at the same lime deliver a protest signed by himself or his authorised agent to the officer issuing the demand or conducting the sale, who thereupon, was to drop further proceedings for recovery of the money. S.70(2) of the Act provides mat if the amount was paid under protest under sub-S.1 of S.70, if the same was received by an officer other than the one who issued the demand, dial officer was to forward the same to the officer who had issued the demand. The protest was also to be forwarded to the. officer who issued the demand in case the officer who collected the money was someone other than the officer who issued the demand. The officer issuing the demand or officer at whose instance the proceedings were initiated was to enquire into .the protest and pause appropriate orders. If the protest was accepted, the officer disposing of the protest was to immediately order the refund of the whole or part of the money paid under protest and was to initiate fresh proceedings for the realisation of the amount if any due. Sub-s.3 of S.70 provides that subject to sub-s.4 of that Section, the person who was making the payment under protest had the right to institute a suit for recovery of the whole or part of the sum paid by him under sub-section 2 of S.70. Sub-s.4 of S.70 states that no suit under sub-s.3 shall be instituted if the law under which the amount paid under protest was due, provided a remedy whether by way of appeal or revision or oilier proceedings, to the person who paid such amount, before exhausting such remedy. In other words, if that person had an alternative remedy by way of appeal or revision or other proceeding, he could not institute the suit contemplated by sub-section 3 of S.70 of the Act before exhausting such remedy. S.71 of the Act enabled the Government by Notification in the Gazette if it was satisfied that it was necessary to do so in public interest, to declare that the provisions of the Act should be applicable to the recovery of amounts due from any person or class of persons to any specified institution or any class or classes of institutions. Once a Notification was thus issued, upon the issuance of such Notification, all the provisions of the Act were applicable to the recovery. S.72 bars the jurisdiction of civil court save where fraud was alleged. S.73 provides for delegation of power by the Collector. Ss.74 to 78 provide for the modes of service of notice. Once a Notification was thus issued, upon the issuance of such Notification, all the provisions of the Act were applicable to the recovery. S.72 bars the jurisdiction of civil court save where fraud was alleged. S.73 provides for delegation of power by the Collector. Ss.74 to 78 provide for the modes of service of notice. S.79 of the Act provides that no civil court shall take into consideration or decide any question as to the rate of public revenue due on land payable to the Government, or as to the amount of assessment fixed or to be thereafter fixed on the portions of a divided field. S. HO provides for attachment of salaries and debts due to defaulters and S.81. saves the right of suit provided that the suit was instituted within ninety days from the time when the cause of action arose. S.82 bars any suit except as provided by the Act. S.83 of the Act confers a power of Revision on the Board of Revenue and the Government in respect of any proceeding taken by the Collector or the authorised officer under the Act. The Government has the power of revision over a decision taken by the Board of Revenue under S.83(1) of the Act. S.84 interdicts certain persons from bidding at the revenue sales and S.85 provides a penalty for fraudulent conveyance of properly to prevent attachment or for forcibly taking away the properly attached. S.86 of the Act confers the power on the Government to make Rules to carry out the purposes of the Act. S.87 of the Act repeals the Madras Revenue Recovery Act, 1864 and the Travancore-Cochin Revenue Recovery Act, 1951. There is no provision in the Act prescribing a period of limitation for initiation of proceedings under the Act. 14. According to counsel for the respondents S.34(2) of the Act confers an adjudicatory power of the Collector and contemplates an adjudication by him on the objections of the defaulter. This provision coupled with the right of the Collector to sell the properties attached, to entertain and adjudicate on the claims to the attached property by third parties, right to order arrest of a defaulter, constitute the Collector or a court and consequently, the Limitation Act, 1963 could be applied to him. This provision coupled with the right of the Collector to sell the properties attached, to entertain and adjudicate on the claims to the attached property by third parties, right to order arrest of a defaulter, constitute the Collector or a court and consequently, the Limitation Act, 1963 could be applied to him. It is also contended that in any event, the Collector would be a 'Revenue Court' and even in that event, the provisions of the Limitation Act would per se apply to him. Learned Advocate General on the other hand submitted that the Collector's role under the Act is very limited. He relied on S.68 of the Act in that connection. S.68 of the Act enables the Government to apply the Act for recovery of various sums other than arrears of revenue due on land. He also pointed out with reference to S.69(2) and 69(3) of the Act, that when any amount is recoverable under the Act, -the officer charged with realisation had only to forward to the Collector of the District in which the demand arose, a written requisition in the prescribed form duly verified and signed by him and on receipt of the requisition, the District Collector on being satisfied that the demand was recoverable under the Act,' was to sign a certificate to that effect in the prescribed form specifying the amount of demand, the account on which it was due and the name of" the defaulter and was to cause the certificate to be filed in his office. This according to him shows that when the institutions notified under S.71 of the Act make requisitions for recovery under the Act,' there is no adjudication contemplated by the Collector before issuing the certificate contemplated under S.69 (3) of the Act and all that the Collector has to do is to satisfy himself that the demand was one recoverable under the Act by virtue of the Notification under S.71 of. the Act and the authority making the demand was the competent authority. He derived support for this position from the scheme of S.70 of the Act. It contemplates only a payment under protest and not an objection to recovery. the Act and the authority making the demand was the competent authority. He derived support for this position from the scheme of S.70 of the Act. It contemplates only a payment under protest and not an objection to recovery. S.70 (2) of the Act provides that when a payment is made under protest, the Collector is not to enquire into the protest but is only bound to send to the officer at whose instance, the steps were initiated, the amount collected and the protest made, leaving it to that officer, to consider and dispose of the objections made by the person paying the amount under protest. Only while dealing with claims to the attached property or considering, the arrest of the defaulter under S.65 of the Act, the power to adjudicate is specifically conferred on the Collector, by the Act. There is also a right of suit conferred by S.70(3) of the Act, in the person from whom the amount is recovered. Considering the respective arguments, on the scheme of the Act, we find that before issue of the certificate or the notice of demand before actually attaching the properties of the defaulter, no enquiry or adjudication of any dispute between the defaulter on the one hand and the requisitioning authority or the Government on the other is contemplated by the Act. Since no adjudication is involved before taking action under the Act, we are of the view that the Collector under the Kerala Act is not acting as a court, as contended by the respondents. 15. We also consider that an Act like the Revenue Recovery Act is also enacted in public interest. The public interest is that monies borrowed from the Government and the institutions should be returned by the borrowers so that they can be made available to others for the purpose intended. 15. We also consider that an Act like the Revenue Recovery Act is also enacted in public interest. The public interest is that monies borrowed from the Government and the institutions should be returned by the borrowers so that they can be made available to others for the purpose intended. Not to permit "property grabbers, lax-evaders, bank-loan-dodgers and other unscrupulous persons from all walks of life" (See Cliengal Varaya Naidit v. Jfigannalli, AIR 1994 SC 953) to appropriate the amounts borrowed from institutions or Government for themselves, leading even to the closing down of the Institutions and to make it available to other enlerprenucrs is the need of a developing nation and it is with that object in view that a special law is enacted to facilitate the speedy recovery of amounts due, by making it possible to recover the dues without approaching the courts. This enactment was brought forward about a century after the Limitation Act was introduced and the Legislature was aware of the working of that law. If the legislature in its wisdom thought that in respect of amounts due to the Stale and other instrumentalities, and consequently to the public, no period of limitation need be fixed, is it in public interest to import into that law, the strict rules of limitation as enshrined in the Limitation Act? We think not. Public Policy cannot remain constant. It has to undergo modification according to the need of the limes. When Stale is making available loans to its citizens directly and through various other public agencies with a view to industrial development and to achieve it, deems it necessary to provide for recovery of the amounts lent without reference to any bar of time, it cannot certainly be said to he opposed to any public policy that might he embodied in the Limitation act. Even if it does conflict with the Limitation Act the policy behind the Act, we think that that policy must give way to the need to generate, and rotate the capital for development, the need of a growing nation. Permitting dishonest borrowers to keep the money borrowed, cannot certainly facilitate the economic development envisaged by the Slate. In our march towards the dawn of the Twenty First Century, all round economic development is a must. Permitting dishonest borrowers to keep the money borrowed, cannot certainly facilitate the economic development envisaged by the Slate. In our march towards the dawn of the Twenty First Century, all round economic development is a must. We see no warrant for importing the provisions of the Limitation Act into the Revenue Recovery Act considering the public interest involved in making that law. We cannot also ignore the various means adopted by dishonest borrowers from the institutions to see to it that steps for recovery arc not taken in time by the institutions. 16. When there is nothing in the Revenue Recovery act which warrants the application of the Limitation act to proceedings under that Act, we do not think that, we could import the Limitation Act into the Revenue Recovery Act by analogy. This position is clear from the' decision in A.S.K. Krisluuippd v. C. V. V. (AIR 1964 SC 227) wherein their Lordships held: The Limitation act is a consolidating and impending Statute relating to the. limitation of suits, appeals certain types of applications to courts and must therefore be regarded as an exhaustive code. It is a piece of adjective or procedural law and not of subjective law. Rules of procedures, whatever they may he, are to be applied only to mailers to which they are made /applicable by the Legislature expressly or by necessary implication. They cannot be expended by analogy or reference to proceedings which they do not expressly apply or could be said to apply by necessary implication. It would, therefore, not be correct to apply any of the provisions of the Limitation Act to matters which do not strictly fall within the purview of those provisions. Thus, for instance, the period of period of limitation for various kinds of .suits, appeals and applications are prescribed in the First Schedule. A proceeding which does not fall under any of the Articles in that Schedule could not be said to be haired by time on the analogy of a matter which is governed by a particular Article. For the same reasons, the provisions of Ss.3 to 28 of the Limitation Act, cannot be applied to institutions which fall outside their purview. A proceeding which does not fall under any of the Articles in that Schedule could not be said to be haired by time on the analogy of a matter which is governed by a particular Article. For the same reasons, the provisions of Ss.3 to 28 of the Limitation Act, cannot be applied to institutions which fall outside their purview. These provisions do not adumbrate any general principles of substantive law nor do they confer any substantive rights on litigants and, therefore, cannot he permitted to have greater application than what is explicit or implicit in them. 17. It was argued on the basis of the decision in Tilok Ciaul Moll Cluiiul v. B. Munslii (AIR 1970 SC 898) that the Limitation Act reflects a public policy and the court should normally act on the analogy of the statutes of limitation even in respect of claims arising under other laws. In Tilok Chand's case the question that arose for consideration was whether petition filed under Art.32 of the Constitution with an allegation of the breach of the fundamental rights of a petitioner could be entertained after a long lapse of time. In that case, the petitioner had allowed the decision of the High Court against him to become final and had approached the Supreme Court about 11 years alter the judgment of the High Court on the contention that his fundamental rights have been violated and he is entitled to seek relief on that basis, at any time. The court by a majority held that the application filed after considerable lapse of time could not be entertained and the court would act on the analogy of the Limitation Act to consider whether the relief can be granted. Their Lordships observed that the statutes of Limitation, are founded on principles of public policy and the court acts on the analogy of the statutes of limitation even in respect of a claim under Art.32 of the Constitution, though such a claim is not the subject of any express statutory bar of limitation. Their Lordships observed that the statutes of Limitation, are founded on principles of public policy and the court acts on the analogy of the statutes of limitation even in respect of a claim under Art.32 of the Constitution, though such a claim is not the subject of any express statutory bar of limitation. It is the contention before us that the -right to recover a debt due to the Government or other individuals are provided for in the Limitation Act, 1963 and the periods prescribed therein reflect a public policy and gives an indication of what the Parliament had thought to be a reasonable period for recovery of debts due to the Government or to other institutions or individuals and that public policy should inform the Court in considering whether a debt recovery of which is barred by limitation in an action through court, should be permitted to be recovered by invoking the Revenue Recovery Act, 18. It is first to be noted that except in the cases provided for by S.27 of the Limitation Act, 1963, there is no extinguishment of a right in respect of a debt provided for by the Limitation Act. It is no doubt true that the Limitation Act relics a public policy and operates as a statute of repose and on the basis that the interests of the Slate require that there should be a limit to litigation. It cannot be said that the Legislature was not aware of this principle which it enacted the Revenue Recovery Act providing for an alternate right to the Government and to the institutions notified under S.71 of that Act to recover the amounts due from their debtors. Recovery of public money with a view to advance public weal is also an important facet of public policy. 19. Assuming that the provisions of the Limitation Act can be applied to proceedings under the Revenue Recovery Act or the policy underlying that Act is to be applied for initialing proceedings under the Revenue Recovery act, the question is what is the period of limitation within which the proceedings under that Act should be initiated. As regards the amounts due to the Government it is obvious that the recovery would be governed by Art.112 of the Limitation act providing for a period of 30 years from the starling point of limitation. As regards the amounts due to the Government it is obvious that the recovery would be governed by Art.112 of the Limitation act providing for a period of 30 years from the starling point of limitation. The question is what would be the position of an institution brought in by the declaration notified under S.71 of the Act. S.71 indicates that it is on the satisfaction of the Government that it was necessary to do so in public interest that the declaration contemplated by S.71 of the Act could be notified. The institutions declared by Notification under S.71 of the Act thus far, also give a clear indication that the Notification under S.71 of the Act is issued only in respect of institutions that arc public institutions and most of them arc instrumentalities of the State. S.71 of the Act itself indicate that the Notification itself is to he issued in public interest. Therefore, by a fiction, the amounts due to the institution notified under the Section is treated on a par with the amounts due to the Government in terms of S.68 of the Act. By giving full play to the fiction so created, we think that under the Act, the period of limitation prescribed for recovery of the debts to those institutions notified under S.71 of the Act would also be 30 years as provided under Art.112 of the Limitation Act. It is no doubt true that Art, 112 of the Limitation Act, 1963, would not by itself apply to such institutions and applies only to the Governments. But in our view, by the issuance of the Notification under S.71, the Act, by a fiction treats the amounts due to those institutions on a par with the amounts due to the Government. Approached from that angle we are of the view, that in respect of the institutions notified under S.71 of the Act, the period available for recovery of amounts due to those institutions under the Act would also 30 years from the date when the cause of action arises for recovery. 20. On the facts obtaining in W. A. Nos. 76 and 84 of 1990, it is argued on behalf of the appellants that a decree was obtained by the Fisheries Corporation on 29.3.1974 for the recovery of a sum of Rs. 41823.70 with interest. 20. On the facts obtaining in W. A. Nos. 76 and 84 of 1990, it is argued on behalf of the appellants that a decree was obtained by the Fisheries Corporation on 29.3.1974 for the recovery of a sum of Rs. 41823.70 with interest. Before the expiry of 12 years from that dale, the Corporation made a requisition on 13.I.1986 to the District Collector to recover the amount under the Revenue Recovery Act. The District Collector issued the certificate under Section 69(3) of the Acton 17.3.1986, again within 12 years of the date of the decree. The certificate was issued to the Tahsildar who in turn issued notice dt. 20.3.1986 under Section 7 and 34 of the Act on respondents 1 and 2. The respondents 1 and 2 claimed that they had received the notice dt. 20.3.1986 under Section 7 and 34 of the Revenue Recovery Act only on 5.4.1986, a dale which fall beyond the period of 12 years from the date of the decree. In the judgment under appeal, the learned judge accepted the contention that as far as respondents 1 and 2 are concerned, proceedings must be taken to be initiated only on 5.4.1986. This finding by the learned judge is seriously assailed by the Advocate General who submits that since the proceedings were initialed well within 12 years of the decree and even the notices under Section 7 and 34 addressed to the respondents were issued within 12 years of the decrees, on the facts, it could not be held that the proceedings under the Revenue Recovery Act were initiated only after 12 years of the decree. According to him the execution of the decree was not barred on the day the Fisheries Corporation sought the initiation of proceedings under the Revenue Recovery Act and the necessary certificates was issued by the Collector under that Act. This contention of the learned Advocate General is met by counsel for the respondents by contending that having obtained a decree from the civil court, the Fisheries Corporation ought to have executed the decree through I he civil court and could not have initiated proceedings under the Revenue Recovery Act. Having elected one remedy they were stopped from pursuing another. This contention on behalf of the respondents cannot be accepted in view of the Division Bench decision of this court in Canara Bank v. Thankappan (1989 (2) K.L.T. 74). Having elected one remedy they were stopped from pursuing another. This contention on behalf of the respondents cannot be accepted in view of the Division Bench decision of this court in Canara Bank v. Thankappan (1989 (2) K.L.T. 74). The Division Bench held that the two remedies available are not mutually exclusive and consequently the principle of election cannot apply. Though learned counsel for the respondent attempted to challenge the decision of the Division Bench, we do not see any substance in the challenge and we are in agreement with the view expressed therein. This argument therefore cannot avail the respondents in this case. The only other submission on behalf of the respondents is that as far as the respondents are concerned the proceed! ng commenced only on receipt of notice under S.7 or under S.34 of the Act and since the notices though dt. 20.3.1986 were received only on 5.4.1986, the recovery of the amount due under the decree must be deemed to be barred by limitation. We are not in a position to agree with this submission.. The proceedings have been initiated well within 12 years of the necessary certificate under the Act within 12 years of the decree. So long as the execution had not become barred the amount due under the decree was an 'amount due' within the meaning of Section 71 of the Act. Even while the amount remained due, the Fisheries Corporal ion initialed proceedings for recovery under the Act and District Collector himself issued the decree. Even the notice under Section 7 and 34 of the Act was issued within 12 years of the decree.- The fact that the notice was served on respondents 1 and 2 about 6 days after the expiry of 12 years from the date of decree would not make the proceedings initialed one for recovery of amount which has become barred by limitation. On the facts therefore even if all the contentions of the respondents are upheld this would be a case where it will have to be held that the revenue recovery proceedings were initialed at a time when the amounts continued to be legally recoverable even from the angle of the Limitation Act, 1963. 21. On the facts therefore even if all the contentions of the respondents are upheld this would be a case where it will have to be held that the revenue recovery proceedings were initialed at a time when the amounts continued to be legally recoverable even from the angle of the Limitation Act, 1963. 21. The petitioners in the Original Petitions borrowed amounts from the Kerala Financial Corporation, an institution to which the Revenue Recovery Act applies by virtue of the Notification issued under section 71 of the act. Under the loan agreement dt. 21.2.1976 the petitioners borrowed certain amounts from the Financial Corporation. The amounts not being repaid in full the Corporation issued a notice dt. 26.2.1981 cal ling upon the petitioners to pay off the entire balance amount within ten days of receipt of that notice. The last instalment under the loan transaction was to be paid on 10.5.1979. The notice dt.26.2.1981 was followed up by the sale of the vehicle which was hypothecated and for the balance a notice was issued under Section 34 of the Act. It is seen that the petitioners on receipt of these notices filed a suit O.S.147 of 1986 before the Munsiffs Court,Calicut seeking a permanent prohibitory injunction restraining the Financial Corporation from enforcing the notice dt.I.2.1986. His pointed out on behalf of (lie Financial Corporation that the averments in the plaint in that suit were identical to the contentions raised in the Original Petition. That suit was dismissed for default on 15.6.1988. The petitioners do not seem to have made any attempt to get the said suit restored in terms of Order 9 Rule 9 of the Code of Civil Procedure. Obviously, a second suit for that purpose by them would be hit by that Rule. It is thereafter I hat the petitioners have approached this court with the Original Petition by invoking Article 226 of the Constitution. Considering that the jurisdiction under Article 226 of the Constitution is discretionary, this aspect would dissuade this court from exercising is jurisdiction under Article 226 of the Constitution in favour of the petitioners. 22. It is thereafter I hat the petitioners have approached this court with the Original Petition by invoking Article 226 of the Constitution. Considering that the jurisdiction under Article 226 of the Constitution is discretionary, this aspect would dissuade this court from exercising is jurisdiction under Article 226 of the Constitution in favour of the petitioners. 22. Learned counsel for the petitioners contended that the notice dt.I.2.1986 having been issued more than three years after the last instalment fell due, the claims was hatred by the limitation under the Limitation Act, and the Financial Corporation is not entitled to proceed against the petitioners for recovery under the Revenue Recovery Act. In answer, the Financial Corporation, in addition to adopting the arguments of learned Advocate General, has also relied on Section 32-G of the State Financial Corporations Act, 1951 to point out that even under that Act there is a right in the Financial Corporation to recover the amounts through the machinery provided by the Revenue Recovery Act of the Stale. He also brought to our notice Section 46-B of that Act to point out that the provisions of that Act would have overriding effect. 23. The petitioners in O.P. 2880 of 1990 are only partners of the firm of which the petitioners in O.P. 10643 of 1989 arc also partners. The transaction being the same, no separate arguments were addressed in the said Original Petition. 24. In the light of our conclusions in the earlier part of this judgment, the contention of the petitioners that the recovery under the Revenue Recovery Act is barred by limitation, js not sustainable. Section 32-G of the State Financial Corporations Act enables the Corporation to recover its dues by resort to proceedings under the Revenue Recovery Act. The Corporal ion is also a notified institution under Section 71 of the Act. By virtue of Section 46-B of the State Financial Corporations Act, that Act would override the provisions of the Limitation Act which is, the general law. The Corporal ion is also a notified institution under Section 71 of the Act. By virtue of Section 46-B of the State Financial Corporations Act, that Act would override the provisions of the Limitation Act which is, the general law. In considering whether the Sick Industrial Companies Special Provisions) Act, 1985 won Id prevail over the Slate Financial Corporations Act, 1951 in the light of Section 46-B of the Act, the Supreme Court relied on the non-obstante clause occurring in the Sick Industrial Companies Special Provisions) Act, 1985 to hold (hat since that Act was the ladler Act, the non-obstante clause therein would prevail over the non-obstante clause in Section 46-B of the Stale Financial Corporations Act, The reasoning in Maharashtra Tubes Ltd. v. S.I.I. Corporation of Maharashtra (1993(2) S.C.C. 144) in our view lends support to the contention of counsel for the Financial Corporation that the provisions of the Slate Financial Corporations Act would prevail over the Limitation Act, 1963 and in view of section 32-G of that Act, the amount can be recovered now by recourse to the Revenue Recovery Act. In the light of our conclusions as above, Writ Appeals 76 and 84 of 1990 are allowed and O.P. 3149 of 1986 is dismissed. O.P. Nos. 10643 of 1989 and 2880 of 1990 are dismissed. Considering the circumstances, we direct the parties to suffer their respective costs.