(1) SPECIAL leave granted. (2) ACTING on a press report (Jansatta) dated 5-5-1995 the High Court in suo motu exercise of its jurisdiction under Article 226 of the Constitution directed that a certain road be constructed during the financial year in question in any case before the next financial year runs out. This is purported to have been done in enforcement of the fundamental rights under Article 21 of the Constitution. The High Court stated that although construction of all the roads mentioned in the petition is necessary, it directed the State to complete at least the important ones among them and particularly, Link Road from Bhakhality to Majhar. It further directed that adequate funds be provided for this purpose by the State Government for completion of this road and other roads so that the long-standing demand of the people of the area is met. It is this order of the High Court which is put in challenge before us under Article 136 of the Constitution. (3) WE have heard the learned counsel for the State Government, none appearing on behalf of the original petitioner, namely, the High Court. We find it extremely difficult to uphold the decision of the High Court. While it may be true that it is necessary to lay the communication network, that necessity can be fulfilled only on the basis of the availability of funds. Besides the priorities would have to be determined by the State Government and only thereafter allocation of funds for each project could be met. Any interference of this nature would require diversion of funds carefully allocated on the basis of priority requirements and thereby disturb the programme of development chalked out by the State Government. Budgetary allocations are made on the basis of the tax recovered from the inhabitants of the State and their capacity to pay the tax and, therefore, development programmes have to be phased out and this has to be done on determination of priorities. It is not proper, therefore, to allow one particular area to benefit by a court order because if others come to court for similar reliefs it would totally disrupt the priorities and bring about chaos. We, therefore, cannot allow the order of the High Court to stand. It is not proper, therefore, to allow one particular area to benefit by a court order because if others come to court for similar reliefs it would totally disrupt the priorities and bring about chaos. We, therefore, cannot allow the order of the High Court to stand. We had granted an interim order against the enforcement of this order and we now affirm it by allowing this appeal and setting aside the impugned order of the High Court dated 12-1-1996. No costs.