SATSANG SABHA, AKHARA BAZAR, KULLU v. KARTAR KAUR — 1996 DIGILAW 190 (HP)

JUDGMENT R.L. Khurana, J.: The present revision petition has been directed against the order dated January 5, 1991, of the Rent Controller (Senior sub Judge), Kullu, allowing the objections of the respondent, under section 47, Code of Civil Procedure, and dismissing the execution petition of the petitioner. 2. The petitioner is the owner of the tenanted premises, while the respondent is the tenant in respect thereof. The parties are hereinafter referred to as the "Landlord" and tenant, respectively hereinafter 3. The landlord on January 4,1989, filed a petition for the eviction of the tenant under Section 14 of the Himachal Pradesh Urban Rent Control Act, on the ground of non-payment of rent for the period November 1984 to July 1988 at the rate of Rs. 20/- per month. The said petition was allowed by the Rent Controller on March 12, 1990 and an order of ejectment of the tenant from the tenanted premises came to be passed. It was stipulated that the eviction petition shall be deemed to have been dismissed if the tenant pays/deposit the arrears of rent alongwith costs assessed at Rs. 75/- and interest at the rate of 9% per annum on or before April 11, 1990, that is, within 30 days from the date of passing of the ejectment order. 4. On the failure of the tenant to pay/deposit the arrears of rent, costs and interest in terms of the ejectment order dated March 12, 1990, the landlord on June 12,1990, applied for the enforcement of the said order dated March 12,1990, by moving an execution application before the learned Rent Controller. Such application came to be registered as Education petition No. 43/x of 1990 on the files of the Rent Controller. 5. In response to the notice served upon him, the tenant put in appearance and preferred objections, under Section 47, Code of Civil Procedure. It was averred that the ejectment order dated march 12, 1990, was not executable inasmuch as the entire arrears of rent, costs and interest stood paid in terms of the conditions imposed in the order. 5. In response to the notice served upon him, the tenant put in appearance and preferred objections, under Section 47, Code of Civil Procedure. It was averred that the ejectment order dated march 12, 1990, was not executable inasmuch as the entire arrears of rent, costs and interest stood paid in terms of the conditions imposed in the order. The relevant pleadings in this regard as are set out in para 10 of the objection petition dated July 27, 1990, read: “……….True facts are that the petitioner had filed eviction petition on the ground of non-payment of rent and in which the learned Rent Controller Kullu vide order dated 12.10.90, had passed conditional order for the eviction of the respondent on the ground of non-payment of rent to the effect that the respondent is liable to pay rent of Rs. 900/- plus cost of Rs.75/- and interest at the rate of 9% per annum and as such the respondent should deposit the said amount of RS.900/- plus cost of Rs.75/- and interest at the rate of 9% per annum within a period of one month i.e. on or before 12.4.90, otherwise the respondent is liable to be evicted. However, in case if the aforesaid amount is paid or deposited within the said period, then the order for eviction is not legally enforceable. That after arranging necessary money, the respondent on 9.4.90, moved application before the Rent Controller with a prayer that she may be allowed and permitted to deposit a sum of Rs.1300/- towards the aforesaid arrears of rent, costs and interest. Though the amount to be deposited by the respondent was less than Rs. 1300/- but in order to avoid any future complication, she intended to deposit Rs.1300/-, which application was allowed by the learned Rent Controller Kullu and the respondent was directed to deposit the said sum in the Govt. Treasury, but the ministerial staff including the employees of the Treasury office, had observed strike with effect from 26.3.1990 to 15.4.1990, and as a result of which the challan filed by the respondent were not passed by the treasury, without which the money could not be deposited. Treasury, but the ministerial staff including the employees of the Treasury office, had observed strike with effect from 26.3.1990 to 15.4.1990, and as a result of which the challan filed by the respondent were not passed by the treasury, without which the money could not be deposited. Thereafter, the respondent taking further steps, sent the aforesaid amount of Rs.1300/- to the respondent through two money orders dated 9.4.90, i.e. well in time, but the aforesaid money orders were not received by the petitioner, who refused to accept the said payment and the money orders were returned to the respondent and thereafter the respondent deposited the said sum of Rs.1300/- in the court on 18.4.90, vide treasury challan No.23. Thus by moving application for deposit and by sending the money orders and money through money orders and by making subsequent deposit the respondent has fully complied with the order and therefore, the eviction order is not executable, because the conditional order for paying or depositing the arrears plus cost and interest have been fully complied with by the respondent. Photo copies of the money orders receipt, etc. are enclosed herewith." The owner while resisting the objections preferred by the tenant, infer alia, averred: This para of reply is denied and hence not correct. In reply to this para it is submitted that the story put by the respondent for not depositing or making the payment of rs.1300/- to the petitioner within the stipulated date is a concocted one and has no legs to stand. In fact the respondent has not stand. In fact the respondent has not sent the money to the petitioner through money order and nor the same has been received by the petitioner or delivered to the petitioner before 12.4.90 i.e. date before which the amount was to be paid or deposited in the court and as such the respondent has committed the breach and is liable to be evicted from the premises in dispute. Even according to her own averments, she did not deposit the amount in time." 6. The learned Rent Controller came to the conclusion that the tenant had remitted the arrears of rent, costs and interest to the owner by Money-order on April 9,1990, well within the stipulated period, which the owner had refused to accept on its having been tendered to him. The learned Rent Controller came to the conclusion that the tenant had remitted the arrears of rent, costs and interest to the owner by Money-order on April 9,1990, well within the stipulated period, which the owner had refused to accept on its having been tendered to him. Therefore, the tenant could not be evicted from the tenanted premises in execution of the order dated March 12, 1990. The objections filed by the tenant were accordingly allowed and execution petition being Ex.1 No.43/x of 1990 was ordered to be dismissed. 7. Feeling aggrieved by the impugned order dated January 5, 1991, of the learned Rent Controller, the owner has come up before this court by way of the present revision petition. It is contended that the learned Rent Controller has erred in coming to the conclusion that the amount was tendered by the tenant by Money-order and that the same was refused by the owner. The amount was deposited in Court on April 18, 1990 by the tenant after the lapse of the statutory period of 30 days. Such period could not have been extended by the Rent Controller. The amount tendered even otherwise fell short of the amount due. Therefore, the tenant is liable to be evicted in execution of the order of ejectment dated March 12, 1990. 8. The learned counsel for the tenant, on the other hand, has supported the impugned order on the grounds and for the reasons stated therein. 9. It is the admitted case of the parties payment of rent, was passed against the tenant on March 12, 1990, wherein it was stipulated that on the tenant paying the arrears of rent, amount of costs and interest at the rate of 9% per annum within 30 days from the date of the order, that is, on or before Aril 11, 1990, the eviction petition filed by the owner shall be deemed to have been dismissed. 10. The case of the tenant is that she on April 9, 1990 had moved an application before the Rent controller seeking permission to deposit the arrears of rent. Though the application was allowed, the amount could not be deposited in the Government Treasury, since the officials of the treasury were on strike during the period March 27, 1990 to April 15,1990. Though the application was allowed, the amount could not be deposited in the Government Treasury, since the officials of the treasury were on strike during the period March 27, 1990 to April 15,1990. The arrears of rent, amount of costs and interest, were, thus, remitted to the owner per two Money-orders for Rs.1000/- and Rs.300/-, respectively on April 9, 1990. Both these Money-orders were received back by the tenant on having been refused by the owner. The amount of Rs.1300/-representing the arrears of rent, costs and interest was, therefore, deposited with the Government Treasury on April 18, 1990. 11. As stated above, the owner has denied that the amount was remitted to him by Money-orders and that he refused to accept the same on having been tendered to him. The deposit of the amount by the tenant on April 18, 1990, has not been denied. 12. Section 14(2), Himachal Pradesh Urban Rent Control Act, 1987, insofar as it is material for the purpose of the present case, reads: “A Landlord who seeks to evict his tenant shall apply to the Controller for a direction in that behalf. The deposit of the amount by the tenant on April 18, 1990, has not been denied. 12. Section 14(2), Himachal Pradesh Urban Rent Control Act, 1987, insofar as it is material for the purpose of the present case, reads: “A Landlord who seeks to evict his tenant shall apply to the Controller for a direction in that behalf. If the Controller, after giving the tenant a reasonable opportunity of showing cause against the applicant, is satisfied – (i) that the tenant has not paid or tendered the rent due from him in respect of the building or rented land within fifteen days after the expiry of the time fixed in the agreement of tenancy with his landlord or in the absence of any such agreement by the last day of the month following that for which the rent is payable: Provided that if the tenant on the first hearing of the application for ejectment after due service pays or tenders the arrears of rent and interest at the rate of 9 per cent per annum on such arrears together with the cost of application assessed by the Controller, paid or tendered the rent within the time aforesaid: Provided further that if the arrears pertain to the period prior to the appointed day, the rate of interest shall be calculated at the rate of 6 per cent per annum: Provided further that the tenant against whom the Controller has made an order for eviction on the ground of non-payment of rent due from him, shall not be evicted as a result of his order, if the tenant pays the amount due within a period of 30 days from the date of order;..." 13. In the present case, an order of ejectment of the tenant on the ground of non-payment of rent, as stated above, was passed on March 12, 1990. Therefore, under the second proviso to Section 14(2) (i), quoted above, in order to avoid eviction in execution of the order dated March 12, 1990, the tenant has to prove that the amount due from him was paid within a period of 30 days from the date of order dated march 12, 1990. 14. Therefore, under the second proviso to Section 14(2) (i), quoted above, in order to avoid eviction in execution of the order dated March 12, 1990, the tenant has to prove that the amount due from him was paid within a period of 30 days from the date of order dated march 12, 1990. 14. Arrears of rent, amount of costs and interest have to be paid or tendered by the tenant within the prescribed period as laid down by the statute, failing which a landlord is entitled to seek eviction of the tenant. 15. The words tender and pay have not been defined under the Himachal Pradesh Urban Rent Control Act. 16. In Sheo Ram v. Thabar (AIR 1951 Punjab 309), the word tender has been defined to be offer of lawful money which must be actually produced to the creditor by producing and showing the amount to the creditor or to the person to whom the money is to be paid. A mere offer to pay does not constitute a valid tender. The law insists upon an actual, present physical offer. 17. The word pay has been defined in Parmeshri v. Atti, (1957 PLR 318) to mean to give money or other equivalent in return for something or in discharge of an obligation. 18. Under the law, it is the duty of the tenant to pay rent in cash to the landlord, though it is open to the landlord to accept rent paid by cheque or remitted through post. In other words, in the absence of an agreement, whether express or implied, to the contrary, rent has to be paid/tendered by the tenant to the landlord in cash. 19. In the present case, there is nothing on the record to show that at any time in the past the tenant had been remitting the rent to the owner by Money-order and the owner had been accepting the rent so remitted. Therefore, it cannot be said that there was an implied agreement between the parties for payment of rent by Money-order. Admittedly, there is no express agreement in this regard between the parties. The owner, therefore, was not bound to accept the rent sent to him by Money-order by the tenant. 20. Assuming that rent could be validly remitted by the tenant through Money-order, then the same is done at the risk of the tenant. Admittedly, there is no express agreement in this regard between the parties. The owner, therefore, was not bound to accept the rent sent to him by Money-order by the tenant. 20. Assuming that rent could be validly remitted by the tenant through Money-order, then the same is done at the risk of the tenant. He is required to exercise due care so as to see that the rent reaches the landlord on or before the due date. The rule of law is that post office is normally the agent of the remitter and any person who chooses to use the agency of the post office for remitting the arrears of rent does so at his own risk. 21. Section 44 of the Indian post Office Act, 1898, provides: "power for remitter to recall money order or alter name of payee.- (1) Subject to such conditions as the Central Government may, by rules made under Section 43, prescribe be in respect of the levy of additional rates of commission or fees or any other matters, a person remitting money through the Post office by means of money order may require that the amount of the order, if not paid to the payee, be repaid to him or be paid to such person other than the original payee as he may direct. (2) If neither the payee nor the remitter of a money order can be found, and if within the period of one year from the date of the issue of the order no claim is made by such payee or remitter, the amount of such order shall not be claimable from the Government." 22. Under the above provisions, the person remitting money through Money-order can, at any time, till the amount is paid to the payee, require that the amount of the Money-order be repaid to him or be paid to such person other than the original payee. In other words, the control over that money, till that money is actually paid to the payee mentioned in the Money-order, remains with the remitter. Therefore, the post office will be deemed to be the agent of the remitter. (See: Union of India and another v. Divisional Engineer, Telephones, 1981(2) RCR 323). 23. Exts. In other words, the control over that money, till that money is actually paid to the payee mentioned in the Money-order, remains with the remitter. Therefore, the post office will be deemed to be the agent of the remitter. (See: Union of India and another v. Divisional Engineer, Telephones, 1981(2) RCR 323). 23. Exts. OW 3/C and OW 3/D are the two postal receipts showing the remittance of Rs.300/- and Rs.1000/- respectively to the owner by Money-orders on April 9, 1990, while Exts. OW 3/A and OW 3/B are the portions of the Money-orders containing the endorsements that the payee had refused to accept the Money-orders. These endorsements are under the date-line of April 16, 1990. 24. In the absence of any other evidence to the contrary, it will have to be presumed from the date of the endorsements that the Money-orders reached the owner on April 16, 1990, that is, after the expiry of the period of 30 days as prescribed under the second proviso to Section 14(2) (i) of the Himachal Pradesh Urban Rent Control Act, 1987. Therefore, the owner, assuming that he refused to accept the same, was justified in refusing to accept the rent remitted to him, since the same was tendered to him after the expiry of the stipulated period. 25. In Moti Lal Khanna v. Abdul Jalil, Advocate, (1977 RCJ 776), by an order dated January 28,1975, the Rent Controller had allowed the tenant to make payment or deposit of rent etc. within one month. The amount of arrears was remitted by the tenant through Money-order on 26th or 27th February, 1975. The Money-order reached the landlord after the expiry of the period of the month. It was held by the Delhi High Court: "....the rule of law is what the post Office is normally the agent of the remitter and any person who chooses to use the agency of the Post office for remitting money does so at his own risk. The Money-order reached the landlord after the expiry of the period of the month. It was held by the Delhi High Court: "....the rule of law is what the post Office is normally the agent of the remitter and any person who chooses to use the agency of the Post office for remitting money does so at his own risk. However, in case the payee either expressly or impliedly requests the remission by money order, he may constitute the Post Office as his own agent or in some circumstances the Post Office may property be treated as the agent of both the rent control authorities have fond that the post office was the agent of the appellant and there was nothing on record to show that the respondent had authorised the remission of the amount by money. The decision of the rent authorities below is legally correct. The direction in the matter for eviction was to pay or deposit the amount and there was no express direction or remission by money order nor is there any evidence or material on record to show that the respondent expressly or impliedly requested remission of the amount ordered by the order of eviction to be sent to him by money-order. As such, it is not possible to sustain the submission of the counsel for the appellant in the instant case, the Post Office may be treated as the agency of the respondent or the agent of both. The appellant having obtained an order on 28th January, 1975 to pay the amount within the period of one month case to delay the making of the payment till the last minute and chose rather dubious method by sending through money order, although it was easy for him to deposit with the Controller which he did later on. There is no evidence on record to show that the amount of money order was tendered to the respondent on the 27th or 28th February, 1975, within the stipulated time. In the absence of any such evidence the finding of the Tribunal cannot be said to suffer from any legal infirmity and must be affirmed." 26. There is no evidence on record to show that the amount of money order was tendered to the respondent on the 27th or 28th February, 1975, within the stipulated time. In the absence of any such evidence the finding of the Tribunal cannot be said to suffer from any legal infirmity and must be affirmed." 26. A Division Bench of Allahabad High Court in Govind Rao v. Kanhalya Lal (1972 RCR 28), has also held that keeping in view the provisions of Section 44 of the Indian Post Office Act, 1898, the post office, in the case of Money-order, is an agent of the remitter and continues to be so until termination of that agency which takes place when money remitted by the remitter has been handed over to the payee. It was further held that it is not sufficient for the tenant to prove that he had sent the remittance before the expiry of the stipulated period but the tenant must further establish that the remittance reached the landlord before expiry of the said stipulated period. 27. The above decision was approved and followed by another Division Bench of the Allahabad high Court in Rahat Hussain v. Mst. Husain Fatima Bibi (Second Appeal No. 2928 of 1968, decided on 4.11.1971). 28. A Full Bench of the Allanabad High Court In Bhikhalal and others v. Munnalal (AIR 1974 Allahabad 366), drew a distinction by holding that where the tenant had an implied authority from the landlord to pay the amount by means of a Money-order, the payment by the tenant to the post office is payment to the landlord unless by subsequent action, under Section 44 of the Indian Post Office Act, the remitter cancels the Money-order. To the similar effect, it has been held by the Madhya Pradesh High Court in Vishnudyal v. Anjori Bai (1980 (2) RCJ 298). 29. There is nothing on the record of the present case to show that the tenant had an express or implied authority to remit the arrears of rent etc. by Money-order. Therefore, post office will be deemed to be the agent of the tenant and the rent would be deemed to have been tendered to the owner on April 16, 1990, when the Money-orders reached him and he refused to accept the same. 30. by Money-order. Therefore, post office will be deemed to be the agent of the tenant and the rent would be deemed to have been tendered to the owner on April 16, 1990, when the Money-orders reached him and he refused to accept the same. 30. The learned counsel for the tenant has contended that the tenant cannot beheld responsible for postal delay and that when the amount is shown to have been remitted through Money-order within the stipulated time, the tender would not become invalid if the Money order reaches the landlord after the expiry of the stipulated period. In support of his contention, the learned counsel has placed reliance on the ratio laid down by the Honble apex court in Smt Priya Bala Ghosh and others v. Bajranglal Singhania and another (1992 (1) RCR 313). 31. In the case relied upon by the learned counsel for the tenant, the apex court was dealing with a case under Sections 11(i) (d) and 13 (1) of the Bihar Buildings (Lease, Rent and Eviction) Act, 1947. Section 11 (1) (d) of the said Act provides that where the amount of two months rent lawfully payable by the tenant due from him is in arrears by not having been paid by the last day of the month next following that, for which the rent is payable or by not having been validly remitted or deposited in accordance with Section 13(1). The tenant would be liable to evidence. Section 13(1) of the said Bihar Act further provides that when a landlord refuses to accept any rent lawfully payable to him by the tenant in respect of any building, the tenant may remit such rent and continue to remit any subsequent rent which becomes due in respect of such building, by postal money-order to the landlord. 32. The tenant, in the case before the apex court, was thus having a statutory right and/or authority for the remittande of rent by postal money-order. In the present case, there is no such statutory right or authority, with the tenant. The Himachal Pradesh Urban Rent Control Act nowhere has provided for the remittance of rent by the tenant through postal money-order. Therefore, the rule laid down by the apex court is not applicable to the facts of the present case. 33. In the present case, there is no such statutory right or authority, with the tenant. The Himachal Pradesh Urban Rent Control Act nowhere has provided for the remittance of rent by the tenant through postal money-order. Therefore, the rule laid down by the apex court is not applicable to the facts of the present case. 33. Considering the facts and circumstances of the case, therefore, it can be safely concluded that the tender of arrears of rent etc. by the tenant cannot be said to have been validly made. 34. Admittedly, the arrears of rent etc. came to be deposited in the court by the tenant on April 18, 1990, that is, after the expiry of the period prescribed under the law. According to the tenant, the amount could not be deposited earlier since the officials of the treasury office were on strike during the period 26.3.1990 to 15.4.1990. The tenant examined PW-1 Relu Ram a Senior Assistant in the office of Treasury office, Kullu, to prove this fact. Though this official has stated that thee was a pen-down strike in the treasury office from 27.3.1990 to 15.4.1990, there is nothing in his statement that no business could be transacted due to strike. He has admitted hat during this period the Treasury office was on duty. Besides, their Account officers were also detailed for duty. The register with regard to civil court deposits pertaining to the alleged period of strike was neither summoned by the tenant or brought by PW-1 to show absence of any business transaction during this period. The tenant, while appearing as PW-3 has also nowhere stated that inspite of efforts having due to such pendown strike. She has merely stated that the Treasury office was closed due to strike on 9.4.1990. 35. The evidence coming on record does not establish that the tenant could not deposit the amount for the reasons beyond her control. Even otherwise, under the law the Rent Controller has no power to extend the statutory period of 30 days as laid down under the second proviso Section 14(2) (i), HP. Urban Rent Control Act. 36. In K.N. Trading Company v. Masonic Fraternity of Shimla, (ILR (1982) HP 279), while dealing with the scope of Section 14(2)(i), has held: "This section gives various opportunities to a tenant to pay the arrears of rent. Urban Rent Control Act. 36. In K.N. Trading Company v. Masonic Fraternity of Shimla, (ILR (1982) HP 279), while dealing with the scope of Section 14(2)(i), has held: "This section gives various opportunities to a tenant to pay the arrears of rent. The second proviso gives a last chance to the tenant to pay up the amount due from him. This he can avail even after the order of eviction has been passed. The period during which he can deposit the dues is fixed. It is 30 days from the date of the order. He can save the eviction only if he pays the amount due within the prescribed period in terms of the aforementioned proviso. The Period can neither be enlarged nor abridged by the court. There is no provision condonation of the delay in depositing the rent. Since the time is fixed by law there is no question of anyone misleading the tenant about the same." 37. The above ratio has since been approved by the Honble Apex Court in Madan Mohan and another v. Krishan Kumar Sood (1993 (1) SU 651). 38. Since the amount came to be deposited on April 18,1990, that is, after the expiry of the statutory period of 30 days as laid down under the law, the delay therefore cannot be condoned and the tenant cannot derive the benefit of second proviso to Section 14(2)(i). 39. There is yet another aspect of the case. Admittedly, a sum of Rs. 1300/-was deposited by the tenant representing arrears of rent for the period November 1984 to July 1988, amount of costs of Rs.75/-, as assessed by the court and interest at the rate of 9% per annum. Under the second proviso to Section 14(2)(i) HP Urban Rent Control Act, the tenant is obliged to deposit the amount due within a period of 30 days from the date of the ejectment order passed against him not the ground of non-payment of rent. 40. The Honble apex Court in Madan Mohans case (supra) had the occasion to deal with the meaning of the word amount due occurring in the Second proviso to Section 14(2)(i). 40. The Honble apex Court in Madan Mohans case (supra) had the occasion to deal with the meaning of the word amount due occurring in the Second proviso to Section 14(2)(i). It was held: “It will be noticed that there is no provision in the Act for giving powers to the controller to direct payment or deposit of pendente lite rent for each month during the pendency of the petition for eviction of the tenant. First proviso to sub-section (2) of Section 14 shows that in order to show payment or valid tender as contemplated by clause (i) of sub-section (2) of Section 14 by a tenant in default, he has to pay on the first date of hearing the arrears of rent alongwith interest and costs of the application which are to be assessed by the controller. Surely where a tenant does not avail of the first opportunity and contest the eviction petition on the ground of non-payment or arrears of rent and fails to show that he was not in default and court finds that the ground has been made out, an order of eviction has to follow. Therefore, it does not sand to reason that such a tenant who contests a claim and fails to avoid order of eviction can still avoid it by merely paying the rent due till the date of the filing of the application for ejectment. The third proviso to clause (i) of sub-section (2) of Section 14 should also receive an interpretation which will safeguard the rights of the land lord and tenant. The amount due occurring in the third proviso in the context will mean the amount due on and upto the date of the order of eviction. It will take into account not merely the arrears of rent which gave cause of action to file a petition for eviction but also include the rent which accumulated during the pendency of eviction petition as well. If the tenant has been paying the rent during the pendency of the eviction petition to the landlord, the amount due will be only arrears which have not been paid, the landlord, as per the scheme of the Section, cannot be worse off vis-a-vis a tenant who was good enough to deposit in court the arrears of rent together with interest and costs on the first date of hearing. If the interpretation given by the High Court is accepted the result would be that the tenant will be better off by avoiding to pay the arrears of rent with interest and costs on the first date of hearing and prefer suffering order of ejectment after contest and then merely after the amount due as mentioned in the application for ejectment to avoid eviction. This could not be the intention of the legislature.” 41. The arrears of rent, in the present case, were not deposited as were due upto the date of the order. They were deposited only for the period upto July, 19988. Therefore, the tender of rent etc. made by the tenant on April 18,1990 by way of deposit in court also cannot be held to be valid and he is, as such, not entitled to the benefit of the provision as contained in the second proviso to section 14(2) (i), HP. Urban Rent Control Act. 42. Consequently, the present petition is allowed. The impugned order dated January 5, 1991, of the learned Rent Controller is set aside and the objection petition filed by the tenant under Section 47, Code of Civil Procedure, is dismissed. The rent Controller shall proceed with the execution application No. 43-x/1990 in accordance with law. Parties are directed to appear before the learned Rent Controller, Kullu, on 29th October, 1996. The records be returned forthwith, so as to re ach the court below well before the date fixed. 43. The tenant to pay costs of these proceedings to the landlord, which are quantified at Rs. 1100/-.