JUDGMENT : Dipak Misra, J. - The correctness of the order passed by the learned Civil Judge (Sr. Division), First Court, Cuttack, in Miscellaneous Case No. 11 of 1996, arising out of T. S. No. 18 of 1996, refusing to restrain the opposite party therein from encashing the bank guarantee involved in the suit is called in question by the plaintiff-appellant in this appeal. 2. The essential facts which need narration for the present appeal are as follows : The appellant-plaintiff, a proprietorship concern, was appointed as a consignee agent by respondent No. 1-defendant No. 1-company for their product, namely, sunflower refined oil for the entire State of Orissa with effect from September 3, 1994. In pursuance of the agreement for such appointment the plaintiff deposited the security deposit and furnished a bank guarantee, bearing No. 95-96/1, for an amount of Rs. 4 lakhs for one year commencing from April 28, 1995. As averred by the plaintiff, it was his responsibility to provide proper storage for the product and to assist in the process of sale and distribution of the same, but the responsibility of sale was on the staff of defendant No. 1. After the commencement of the transaction the plaintiff used to duly deposit the amount for the quantity of stocks received from defendant No. 1. However, after the product was launched in the market it was found that "Sunfit" brand of sunflower refined oil was not able to compete with the other products, the personnel deployed by defendant No. 1 to look after the sales and distribution were not diligent in promoting the product in the market and the faulty policy of the said defendant was responsible for deterioration in the sale position. In spite of suggestions by the plaintiff on a number of occasions, defendant No. 1 remained unresponsive and maintained a sphinx-like silence. While the sale was constantly deteriorating and the plaintiff was incurring huge expenditure and there was no reimbursement by defendant No. 1, contrary to all anticipations, the said defendant despatched further stock valued at Rs. 14,40,905.20 on four instalments, out of which more than Rs. 9,15,000 was sold by the end of December, 1995. On December 31, 1995, the plaintiff intimated defendant No. 1 regarding the surplus stock in its hands and made some suggestions for disposal of the same. 14,40,905.20 on four instalments, out of which more than Rs. 9,15,000 was sold by the end of December, 1995. On December 31, 1995, the plaintiff intimated defendant No. 1 regarding the surplus stock in its hands and made some suggestions for disposal of the same. While the plaintiff was conducting himself in a completely bona fide manner expecting proper response from defendant No. 1, the said defendant in its turn, without caring for the suggestion of the appellant, in a callous manner, moved defendant No. 2, the State Bank of India, for encashment of the bank guarantee on the ground that there has been non-payment of dues. 3. On the basis of this factual dispute the plaintiff instituted the suit, inter alia, contending that steps were being taken to encash the bank guarantee without prior intimation to the plaintiff, and without taking recourse to the arbitration clause incorporated in the agreement to adjudicate the disputes. On the basis of these averments, the plaintiff has prayed in the suit to call for the agreement and to refer the dispute to an arbitrator. Along with the suit a petition was filed for restraining opposite parties Nos. 1 and 2 therein from encashing the bank guarantee pending disposal of the suit which was registered as a miscellaneous case. In the miscellaneous case, the averments of the plaint have been reiterated and it has been further stated that taking steps for encashment of the bank guarantee by opposite party No. 1 therein is a perpetration of fraud as the attempt is to get the entire value of the marketable products by encashing the bank guarantee and leave the petitioner with the said marketable stock. The existence of an arbitration clause has been emphasised and an offer has been made for handing over the stock. The application for injunction was resisted by opposite party No. 1 on the grounds that the suit being not maintainable, due to lack of territorial jurisdiction, any relief by way of temporary injunction is impermissible, and the bank guarantee being irrevocable and unconditional, prayer for restraint on encashment of the same is not ordinarily entertainable by courts of law. The application for injunction was resisted by opposite party No. 1 on the grounds that the suit being not maintainable, due to lack of territorial jurisdiction, any relief by way of temporary injunction is impermissible, and the bank guarantee being irrevocable and unconditional, prayer for restraint on encashment of the same is not ordinarily entertainable by courts of law. Further grounds of resistance are that the existence of an arbitration clause for adjudication of disputes is not a condition precedent for encashment of the bank guarantee and there is no foundation establishing an injury which is of irretrievable nature to enable the petitioner for obtainment of the order of injunction, as prayed for. The factual allegations in the application for injunction are also controverted in detail. 4. Opposite party No. 2, the State Bank of India, represented by its branch manager, Jeypore branch, chose not to contest the application. 5. The learned trial judge on perusal of the averments and the conditions of the bank guarantee has held that the payment had to be made by the bank and there is no justification either in fact or in law to grant the relief of injunction restraining opposite party No. 1 from encashing the bank guarantee. Impugning the said order of rejection the plaintiff-appellant has approached this court in the present appeal. 6. Mr. B. P. Das, learned counsel for the appellant, assailing the order passed by the court below has submitted that encashment of the bank guarantee would cause irreparable loss to the appellant as he cannot recover the said amount if it is permitted to be encashed. His further contention is that the finding of the court below that the bank guarantee is unconditional is not correct and such finding has been arrived at without appreciating the terms and conditions of the bank guarantee in their proper perspective. It is also submitted that the bank guarantee has been brought into existence by practising fraud, and goes to the very root of the transaction vitiating the same and, therefore, not restraining defendant No. 1 from encashing the said bank guarantee would amount to denial of equitable relief to which the plaintiff is entitled. 7. Refuting the aforesaid submissions of Mr. B. P. Das, Mr. 7. Refuting the aforesaid submissions of Mr. B. P. Das, Mr. A. N. Mishra, learned counsel for respondent No. 1, has contended that in the absence of any pleading whatsoever in the plaint it is not open to the plaintiff to advance the contention with regard to fraud. Developing his submission he has canvassed that mere mentioning of the word "fraud" in the application for injunction is not sufficient as law requires fraud to be specifically pleaded indicating the manner of fraud. In the absence of proper pleadings Mr. Mishra submits that the contention of Mr. Das is absolutely misconceived. The second submission of learned counsel for the respondent is that the finding of the court below with regard to the nature of the bank guarantee cannot be found fault with inasmuch as scrutiny of the terms and the conditions of the bank guarantee makes it unequivocally and irrefragably clear that the guarantee in question is an unconditional one sans any condition. Replying to the submissions in relation to the existence of the arbitration clause he has canvassed that adjudication by arbitration cannot be regarded as a condition precedent for the purpose of encashment of a bank guarantee as encashment of a bank guarantee stands apart from the arbitration clause and has no nexus with it, and, therefore, pendency of a suit u/s 20 of the Arbitration Act does not entitle the plaintiff ipso facto to seek for an order of injunction in relation to encashment of the bank guarantee and obtain the same. 8. The rival contentions advanced at the Bar require careful consideration. Before addressing myself to answer the contentions raised by learned counsel in specific manner it is appropriate to deal with the law relating to grant of injunction in respect of and in relation to encashment of the bank guarantee. It can be stated with certitude that a bank guarantee is used as an important mechanism in the modern world of trade and commerce both inside the country as well as in the sphere of international financial transactions. Sometimes a commercial transaction in its entirety depends upon furnishing of a bank guarantee or a letter of credit. An order of injunction relating to the realm of encashment of bank guarantee has to be guided by different rigorous yardsticks and parameters. This aspect was highlighted by the apex court in Tarapore and Co. Vs. Sometimes a commercial transaction in its entirety depends upon furnishing of a bank guarantee or a letter of credit. An order of injunction relating to the realm of encashment of bank guarantee has to be guided by different rigorous yardsticks and parameters. This aspect was highlighted by the apex court in Tarapore and Co. Vs. V/O Tractoroexport and Another 896, wherein it observed as follows: "An irrevocable letter of credit has a definite implication. It is a mechanism of great importance in international trade. Any interference with that mechanism is bound to have serious repercussions on the international trade of this country. Except under very exceptional circumstances, the courts should not interfere with that mechanism." 9. In that case their Lordships further expressed in the following terms: "The letter of credit is independent of and unqualified by the contract of sale or underlying transaction. The autonomy of an irrevocable letter of credit is entitled to protection. As a rule courts refrain from interfering with that autonomy." (quoted from the placitum) 10. The matter also engaged the attention of the apex court again in the case of United Commercial Bank Vs. Bank of India and Others, wherein it ruled as follows (page 206): ". . . the rule is well established that a bank issuing or confirming a letter of credit is not concerned with the underlying contract between the buyer and seller. Duties of a bank under a letter of credit are created by the document itself, but in any case it has the power and is subject to the limitations which are given or imposed by it, in the absence of the appropriate provisions in the letter of credit." 11. In the aforesaid decision, the apex court observed that the difficulty to be faced by the parties are really of no concern of courts and that is the risk they chose to take while entering into this kind of transaction. 12. Again, in the case of Maharashtra State Electricity Board, Bombay Vs. Official Liquidator, High Court, Ernakulam and Another the apex court expressed the view that the bank has to honour the bank guarantee which it had undertaken to pay without any demur under the guarantee. 13. In the case of Centax (India) Ltd. Vs. Vinmar Impex Inc. and Others, their Lordships referring to the case of United Commercial Bank Vs. Official Liquidator, High Court, Ernakulam and Another the apex court expressed the view that the bank has to honour the bank guarantee which it had undertaken to pay without any demur under the guarantee. 13. In the case of Centax (India) Ltd. Vs. Vinmar Impex Inc. and Others, their Lordships referring to the case of United Commercial Bank Vs. Bank of India and Others, expressed thus (page 702) : ". . . commitments of banks must be allowed to be honoured free from interference by the courts. Otherwise, trust in international commerce would be irreparably damaged." 14. Approving the view taken earlier by the apex court, Sabyasachi Mukharji, J. (as his Lordship then was) in the case of U.P. Cooperative Federation Ltd. Vs. Singh Consultants and Engineers (P) Ltd., laid down the guidelines in the matter of grant of injunction in respect of the bank guarantee and expressed in unequivocal terms thus (page 297) : "... I reiterate that commitments of banks must be honoured free from interference by the courts. Otherwise, trust in commerce internal and international, would be irreparably damaged. It is only in exceptional cases, that is to say, in cases of fraud or in case of apprehension of irretrievable injustice that the court should interfere." 15. His Lordship had earlier observed in the said case as follows (page 295) : "I am, however, of the opinion that these observations must be strictly considered in the light of the principles enunciated. It is not the decision that there should be a prima facie case. In order to restrain the operation either of irrevocable letter of credit or of confirmed letter of credit or of the bank guarantee, there should be serious dispute and there should be a good prima facie case of fraud and special equities in the form of preventing irretrievable injustice between the parties. Otherwise, the very purpose of bank guarantees would be negatived and the fabric of trading operations would get jeopardised." 16. The aforesaid view was reiterated by the Supreme Court in General Electric Technical Services Company Inc. Vs. M/s. Punj Sons (P) Ltd. and another, wherein their Lordships, after referring to the case of U.P. Cooperative Federation Ltd. Vs. Singh Consultants and Engineers (P) Ltd., held as fol lows (page 649) : "If the documentary credits are irrevocable and independent, the bank must pay when demand is made. Vs. M/s. Punj Sons (P) Ltd. and another, wherein their Lordships, after referring to the case of U.P. Cooperative Federation Ltd. Vs. Singh Consultants and Engineers (P) Ltd., held as fol lows (page 649) : "If the documentary credits are irrevocable and independent, the bank must pay when demand is made. Since bank pledges its own credit involving its reputation, it has no defence except in the case of fraud. The bank's obligation of course should not be extended to protect the unscrupulous party, that is, the party who is responsible for the fraud. But the banker must be sure of his ground before declining to pay. The nature of fraud that the courts talk about is fraud of an 'egregious nature as to vitiate the entire underlying transaction'. It is fraud of the beneficiary, not the fraud of somebody else." 17. A similar view was expressed in the case of Svenska Handelsbanken Vs. M/s. Indian Charge Chrome and others, wherein their Lordships ruled thus : "In law relating to bank guarantees, a party seeking injunction from encashing of the bank guarantee by the suppliers has to show prima facie case of established fraud and an irretrievable injury, i.e., where the plaintiff has no adequate remedy at law, and the allegations of irreparable harm are not speculative, but genuine and immediate, and the plaintiff will suffer irreparable harm if the requested relief is not granted." (quoted from the placitum) Recently, the apex court has expressed its view in the case of Hindustan Steel Workers Construction Ltd. Vs. G.S. Atwal and Co. (Engineers) Pvt. Ltd., in the following terms (headnote of AIR) : "Where a bank unconditionally agreed to pay to party to whom guarantee was given to pay on demand sums specified therein and amount specified was to be paid without demur and without requiring creditor, beneficiary, to invoke legal remedy and there was a specific provision that beneficiary was to be sole judge as to whether party furnishing guarantee has committed breach of contract and as to extent of loss and damages and decision of the beneficiary as to amount was final and binding, the order of court restraining beneficiary from enforcing guarantee till disposal of proceedings pending before arbitrator as to disputes between beneficiary and party furnishing guarantee was illegal and without jurisdiction." 18. From the principles enunciated by the various decisions, as referred to above, it becomes crystal clear that in exceptional cases the court can interfere in the matter of encashment of a bank guarantee taking into consideration the concept of fraud as understood, and on consideration of the scope of irretrievable injury and the special equities in favour of the party seeking the relief of injunction. Another aspect which has to be appreciated is the nature of the guarantee. The pendency of a dispute or reference to arbitration is of no consequence for grant of injunction in respect of the bank guarantee. In this connection, I may refer to a Bench decision of this court in the case of National Aluminium Co. Ltd. Vs. R.S. Builders (India) Ltd. and Others, wherein the court stated thus (page 385) : "A bank guarantee has to satisfy the conditions laid down therein before a bank can be called upon to make payment as per the guarantee. If the terms of the bank guarantee be unconditional, the bank has to pay without demur. The payment of a bank guarantee cannot be made subject to the claims and counter-claims arising out of the main contract between the parties. If a bank guarantee were to state that payment shall be made notwithstanding any dispute between the parties, the bank would be obliged to do so. To determine whether a bank guarantee is conditional or unconditional, it is the document of the guarantee which is to be scanned." 19. Referring to the ratio of the decision in its proper perspective it is beamingly clear that pendency of the proceeding before the arbitrator or existence of an arbitration clause for adjudication of the dispute is not the sine qua non for invoking the bank guarantees. As observed by the apex court in Hindustan Steel Works Construction Ltd. v. G. S. Atwal and Co. (Engineers) Pvt. Ltd. [1996] 85 CompCas 270 the owner is the sole judge in regard to his claim for encashment of bank guarantee. Further adjudication of claims is to be done in future time and that cannot govern the encashment of bank guarantee in praesenti. 20. The Delhi High Court in National Building Construction Corporation Ltd. Vs. (Engineers) Pvt. Ltd. [1996] 85 CompCas 270 the owner is the sole judge in regard to his claim for encashment of bank guarantee. Further adjudication of claims is to be done in future time and that cannot govern the encashment of bank guarantee in praesenti. 20. The Delhi High Court in National Building Construction Corporation Ltd. Vs. State Bank of Patiala taking into consideration the nature of bank guarantee, expressed thus (page 94) : "It is a well settled principle of law that the bank cannot be interdicted from encashing the bank guarantee because that is an independent contract between the beneficiary and the bank, the enforcement of which depends upon the terms and conditions of the bank guarantee. The bank is least concerned with the relation between the parties under the original contract nor with the question whether the guarantee has been invoked rightly or wrongly nor the bank can question the decision of the beneficiary -regarding the outstanding amount." 21. In the aforesaid decision reference was made to the case of General Electric Technical Services Company Inc. Vs. M/s. Punj Sons (P) Ltd. and another, wherein it was expressed by the apex court that the bank is really not concerned with the outstanding amount payable by the beneficiary and the owner is the sole judge. 22. Applying the ratio of the aforesaid decisions to the instant case it can be safely concluded that the contention that the defendant without invoking the arbitration clause for adjudication of the dispute has taken steps for encashment of the bank guarantee is totally devoid of merit. 23. With regard to the practice of fraud as stipulated by the apex court in General Electric Technical Services Company Inc. Vs. M/s. Punj Sons (P) Ltd. and another, it has to be a fraud underlying the transaction and the bank has to scan, I would not detain myself for long to address this question of practice of fraud inasmuch as there is really no allegation of fraud in the plaint. In the application for injunction the word "fraud" has been used and as it appears the same has been associated with the encashment of the bank guarantee without taking recourse to adjudicatory measure. There is no averment regarding the specific nature or manner of fraud. In the application for injunction the word "fraud" has been used and as it appears the same has been associated with the encashment of the bank guarantee without taking recourse to adjudicatory measure. There is no averment regarding the specific nature or manner of fraud. It is well settled in law that fraud has to be pleaded in a proper manner and has to be established. The courts have gone to the extent of laying down that if a particular type of fraud has been pleaded, the same has to be proved and another kind of fraud cannot be introduced by way of oral evidence. In the absence of any specific and definite assertion it is difficult, nay impossible, to accept the plea of practice of fraud. It is well settled in law that if a suit is based on fraud, the allegations of fraud must be clear, definite and specific. General allegations of fraud unaccompanied by particulars are insufficient for establishment of fraud. A plea of fraud has to be raised in the pleadings and pleadings are to be precise. Use of words like "fraud" or "deceit" would not be sufficient. In this connection, I may refer to the decisions in Tom Boevey Barrett v. African Products Ltd. AIR 1928 PC 261 ; AIR 1937 146 (Privy Council); Bishundeo Narain and Another Vs. Seogeni Rai and Jagernath, ; Musa Dei v. Labanya Bewa [1986] 1 OLR 598 ; and Surendranath Kanungo v. Kalinga Industries Ltd. [1992] 34 OJD 369 Civil. 24. In the instant case, the allegations are absent. In any case, the nature of fraud as has been understood in a case of this category is totally absent in the present case. In view of this finding the contention of the appellant on this score has to fail. 25. The contention that the bank guarantee in question is a conditional bank guarantee has no force. For better and proper appreciation the relevant clause of the bank guarantee is reproduced below : "This guarantee is issued with the condition that the liability of the bank under the guarantee is limited to a maximum of Rs. 25. The contention that the bank guarantee in question is a conditional bank guarantee has no force. For better and proper appreciation the relevant clause of the bank guarantee is reproduced below : "This guarantee is issued with the condition that the liability of the bank under the guarantee is limited to a maximum of Rs. 4 lakhs and the guarantee shall remain in full force up to April 28, 1996 (date of expiry), and cannot be invoked otherwise than by a written demand or claim under this guarantee served on the bank on or before June 28, 1996 (last date of claim)." 26. It has also been stipulated in the bank guarantee that the bank shall pay without any demur or protest and without reference to the first party and without examination of the legal relationship. The aforementioned terms and conditions of the bank guarantee do not make it a conditional one as learned counsel wants to put it. The conditions inherent in the bank guarantee are the time, period and a written demand. Once a written demand is made within the stipulated period as provided therein the conditions are satisfied and the bank cannot but honour the demand of encashment. No condition is attached with regard to adjudication, determination or "found due" which can in certain cases make a bank guarantee conditional. In the absence of any stipulation of this nature in the bank guarantee, I am of the considered view that the bank guarantee is indubitably an unconditional one and is liable for encashment on a demand being made. 27. Now, let me address with regard to existence of special equity. On perusal of the plaint and the application for injunction I am unable to persuade myself that there exists any ground for making out a case for special equity. Special equity in its broad connotative sense would engulf equities of such nature which cannot be ignored or deferred for adjudication because such procrastination or deferment would cause irretrievable injury to the parties seeking injunction. That apart, a case of special equity cannot be segregated from other requirements. It has to have inherent, intrinsic and unsegregable connection with other requirements for grant of injunction. That apart, a case of special equity cannot be segregated from other requirements. It has to have inherent, intrinsic and unsegregable connection with other requirements for grant of injunction. It admits of no doubt that in very exceptional cases indictment by the court may be essential in the matter of encashment of bank guarantee and the grounds which are required for such interference are cumulative. In the case at hand, I am of the firm view that no case has been made out to bring it within the ambit or scope of the case of special equity. 28. In view of my preceding analysis, I am of the considered view that the order passed by the Civil Judge {Sr. Division) does not suffer from any infirmity and is in a way absolutely infallible and I do not find any reason to interfere. 29. The miscellaneous appeal is accordingly dismissed. However, there shall be no order as to costs. Final Result : Dismissed