Judgment B. L. Yadav, J. 1. In respect of the interpretation of Rule 106 of the Bihar excise Rules (compendiously the Rules framed under Sec.89 of the Bihar excise Act (compendiously the Act,)there was conflict of the opinion between the two Division Bench decisions of the Court. The first Division Bench decision was rendered in C. W. J. C. No.6118 of 1993, followed in C. W. J. C. No.1587 of 1994 ; whereas the contrary view in Division Bench decision was rendered in C. W. J. C. No.64% of 1994. As there was conflict of the opinion in these Division Bench decisions, hence the matter was referred to a larger bench. This is how this matter has been placed before this Full Bench. As these petitions involve similar questions for determination hence they are being disposed of by a common judgment. 2. The present writ petitions were filed under Articles 226/227 of the constitution of India and the prayers is for issuance of a direction in the nature of mandamus, directing the respondents not to charge the licence fee for the period during which the petitioner was not granted any licence nor any business was carried out for that period, in other words it was to make proportionate reduction in the licence fee and to refund to the petitioners the excess amount paid. 3. In these writ petitions the questions involved are as to whether the petitioners are entitled to proportionate reduction and consequential refund in the licence fee paid in connection with the settlement of the wholesale licence of Indian made foreign liquor under Rule 106 of the rules. In other words whether the respondents can compel the petitioners to pay the licence fee for the period for which no licence was issued and in that period no business was made. Even though the licence was granted for a limited period i. e.8.10.1994 to 31.3.1995, but the respondents are trying to charge licence fee. for whose of the financial year, i. e.1.4.1994 to 31.3.1995. The licence was granted only for five months and 23 days, but the licence fee was charged for 12 months, i. e. from 1.4.1994 to 31.3.1995, which was arbitrary, unreasonable beyond the authority in law and manifestly erroneous. 4. The facts of these petitions lie in a narrow compass and they are these. The licence was granted only for five months and 23 days, but the licence fee was charged for 12 months, i. e. from 1.4.1994 to 31.3.1995, which was arbitrary, unreasonable beyond the authority in law and manifestly erroneous. 4. The facts of these petitions lie in a narrow compass and they are these. In pursuance of the advertisement dated 12-9-1994 (Annexure-1) issued by the Deputy Commissioner (Excise), ranchi (Respondent No.3) for settlement of sale licence of India made foreign liquor for the remaining period, the petitioners applied for the same for the remaining period of 1994-95. The petitioners in C. W. ,j. C. No.296 of 1995 (R) complied with the conditions and made requisite deposit for a sum of Rs.1,50,000/- (vide Annexure- 2 ). licence was granted in Form I (licence for sale of foreign liquor to the trade) (vide annexure-2/a ). It was specifically mentioned in the licence itself that the licence was being granted for a limited period from 3-10-1994 till 31-3-1995 in c. W. J. C. No.296 (R) and from 31-1-1995 to 31-3-1995 in C. W. J. C. No.678 of 1995 (R ). 5. A counter affidavit was filed on behalf of the respondents with the averments that the petitioners have to pay licence fee for the entire period. As per the privilege conferred on them, there would be no justification under the law for proportionate reduction of the licence fee or refund of the same to the petitioners. 6. The learned counsel for the petitioners contended that in the advertisement itself (Annexure-1) it was made evident that for the remaining period of 1994-95 the licence was sought to be granted and the applications were invited from the intending licensee in pursuance of the provisions of Rule 106 of the Rules framed under the Act. Rule 106 was framed under the rule- making power under sub-sections (7), (8) and (9) of section 90 of the Act. By the amendment dated 25-4-1990 rule 106 of the Rules was substituted under which wholesale licence fee of rs.1,50,000/- was imposed and this amount and other amount required was to be paid by the petitioners in both these petitions. In the advertisement itself it was made explicit that the applications were invited for the remaining period of 1994-95 only. By the amendment dated 25-4-1990 rule 106 of the Rules was substituted under which wholesale licence fee of rs.1,50,000/- was imposed and this amount and other amount required was to be paid by the petitioners in both these petitions. In the advertisement itself it was made explicit that the applications were invited for the remaining period of 1994-95 only. As the licence was granted only for a period of 5 months 23 days, as stated in paragraph-27 of the writ petition, hence there must have been made proportionate reduction in the licence fee or in the matter of parting with the special privilege but the respondents acted illegally or with material irregularity in the exercise of their jurisdiction. 7. The learned counsel for the respondents refuted the submissions of the learned counsel for the petitioners and contended that composite fee was charged for the year 1994-95 (1.4.1994 to 31.3.1995) and there was no propriety for refund of the amount, as rule 106 does not make any such provision. The order of the Division bench dated 24.8.1993 passed in c. W. J. C. No.6118/93 was not correct as followed in C. W. J. C. No.1587 of 1994, having allowed the relief for refund of the licence fee for the period for which neither any licence was granted nor the licensee had done any business. The correct view has been taken in C. W. J. C. No.64% of 1994, where this prayer was refused. 8. Having scrutinised the submissions of the learned counsel for the parties the following questions fall for our consideration : (a) Whether the petitioners are entitled to proportionate reduction in the licence fee paid in connection with settlement of the wholesale licence of india made foreign liquor; (b) Whether the respondents can compel the petitioners to pay the licence fee for the period during which no licence was issued nor any business was done in that period and (c) Whether the respondents could charge the licence fee for the whole of the financial year (1-4-1994)to 31-3-1995) when the licence was granted for a limited period (from 8-10-94 to 31-3-1995 ). 9. Before grappling with the questions posed it is convenient to refer certain provisions of the Act. Section 22 of the Act posits grant of exclusive privilege of manufacture and sale of country liquor or intoxicating drugs or denatured spirit or any other intoxicants. 9. Before grappling with the questions posed it is convenient to refer certain provisions of the Act. Section 22 of the Act posits grant of exclusive privilege of manufacture and sale of country liquor or intoxicating drugs or denatured spirit or any other intoxicants. Sec.27 enacts the power to impose duty on import, export, transport and manufacture. Sec.28 ways of levying such duty. Sec.29 provides for payment of certain consideration to the State Government in lieu of grant of exclusive privilege under Sec.22 of the Act. These sections may be read conjointly, which deal with modus of payment of levy duty in respect of the country liquor, etc. 10. In Excise Commissioner, U. P. V/s. Ram Kumar (AIR 1976 S. C.2237) it was held by the Apex Court that the duty or licence fee can be imposed on the basis of the parting with the privilege by the State under the rules of contract. liability of the petitioners to make payment of licence fee emanates primarily from the terms and conditions of grant of licence (Excise Contract ). (See Parma Lal V/s. State of rajasthan, AIR 1975 S. C.2008 and nashinvar etc. V/s. State of M. P, AIR 1975 SC 360 ). 11. A perusal of the advertisement (Annexure-1) makes it pellucid that it was made explicit by the Deputy commissioner (Excise) Ranchi (Respondent no.3) -that the licence itself would be granted for the remaining period of 1994-95 (and not for the whole period ). Intendment of the authority granting licence was explicit with cannot be deemed to be implicit. These petitioners offered and actually paid the licence fee with the understanding that it was only for a part of the whole period during which the licence would be granted and would transact business. 12. In case the submissions of the learned counsel for the respondents were accepted that the petitioners have to make payment for the whole period (1-4-1994 to 31-3-1995) and not for the remaining period only, in that event that would amount as if the material thing was concealed by the State government in the advertisement (Annexure-1) and the State of Bihar having sole authority to grant privilege in view of Sections 22, 27, 28 and 29 of the Act, cannot be assumed to conceal the material terms from the advertisement. 13. 13. In the American Jurisprudence (2nd) Vol.37, paragraph 144, page 196 it has been stated as follows : "unquestionable the concealment of material facts that one is, under the circumstances, bound to disclose may constitute actionable fraud. Indeed one of the fundamental tenants of Anglo-American law of Fraud is that fraud may be committed by suppression of truth (SUPPRESSIO VERI) as well as by suggestion of falsehood (SUGGESTTO FALSI ). (See strong V/s. Repide, 213 U. S.419 ; Tylar V/s. Savage, 143 U. S.79 ; Griswold V/s. Hazard, 141 SC 260 ). It is, therefore, equally competent for a court to relieve against fraud whether it is committed by suppression of the truth-that is by concealment-or by suggestion of falsehood. The Chancellors developed the doctrine that disclosure was the duty of one standing in a trust or confidential relations to another and that suppressio veri may be equally fraudulent as suggestio falsi. (See crosby V/s. Buchanan, 23 Wall (U. S.) 420, smith V/s. Richards, 13 Pet (U. S.) 26 ; 10 L. Ed.42, page 197)". 14. In Lazarus Estates Ltd. V/s. Beasley, (1956) 1 All E. R.341, it was observed by Denning l. J. as follows : "no Court in this land will allow a person to keep an advantage which he has obtained by fraud. No judgment of Court, no order of Minister can be allowed to stand if lt has been obtalned by fraud. Fraud unravels everythlng. The Court ls careful not to flnd fraud unless lt ls dlstlnctly pleaded and proved, but once lt ls proved lt vltlated the judgments, contracts and all transactlons whatsoever. " (See Admlnlstratlve Law (flfth edltlon) by H. W. R. Wade, page 228 ; halsburys Laws of England, Vol. l, (Fourth Edlt), Chapter deallng wlth admlnlstratlve law, para 88 ; ln De smlths Judlclal Revlew of Admlnlstratlve actlons, (Fourth Edltlon), page 408 ; Reglna V/s. Secretary of State for the home Department (1982) W. l. R.405 ). 15. Ln that vlew of the matter lt cannot be assumed that the State would be elther maklng concealment of the materlal fact or would be suggestlng falsehood. 16. No doubt, the provlslon of the proportlonate reductlon of the llcence fee or refund of the amount pald ln excess that the perlod for whlch the petltloners were granted llcence ls not very clear under the provlslons of the act and the Rules. 16. No doubt, the provlslon of the proportlonate reductlon of the llcence fee or refund of the amount pald ln excess that the perlod for whlch the petltloners were granted llcence ls not very clear under the provlslons of the act and the Rules. But ln such matters there ls a latln Maxlm "neque leges NEQUE SENATUS/consulta lta SCRlbl POSSUNT UT omnls CASUS QUl QUANDOQUE ln SEDlrlunt COMPREHENDAN turesed SUFFlclt EAQUAE plae-RUMQUE ACCldunet conti-NERI", whlch connotes that nelther laws nor acts of Parllament can be so wrltten as to lnclude all actual or posslble cases; it ls sufflclent if they provlde for those thlngs whlch frequently or ordlnarlly happen, (see morgans Legal Maxims ). 17. In the present case also the question posed before the Full Bench does not appear to be transparent in mind of the leglslature whlle enactlng the provisions of the Act and the Rules. 18. In Jurlsprudence by R. W. M. Dias (Fourth Edition) page 214 lt has been stated : "the line between creation and adaptation is a thing one, and the fact that Judges do make law has been avowed by Judges as well as writers. But there is a difference between judicial and legislative creativity" allen put the matter thus : "the creative power of the Court is limited by existing legal material at their command. They find the material and shape it. The legislature may manufacture entirely new material. This is approximately true, the difficulty being the sense in which a judge may be thought to use "existing legal material" when he decides a case purely out of a sense of justice. " ( See Allens Law in the Making, p.310, Pounds lnterpretation of Legal History, p.127, Cardona on the Nature of the Judicial Process, p.166 ). 19. In South Pacific Co. V/s. Jensen, 244 U. S.205 (1917) Lord Reid observed as follows: "if we are to extend the law, it must be the development and application of fundamental principles. We cannot introduce arbitrary conditions or limitations: that must be left to legisiation. " 20. It would not be inapt to refer to certain relevant matters in ancient india, written in Sanskrit Literature. Thousand years B. C. much advanced system of reasons jurisprudence and interpretation of statutes existed pointed out. They indicate how rich our Ancient indian Jurisprudence written in sanskrit has been. " 20. It would not be inapt to refer to certain relevant matters in ancient india, written in Sanskrit Literature. Thousand years B. C. much advanced system of reasons jurisprudence and interpretation of statutes existed pointed out. They indicate how rich our Ancient indian Jurisprudence written in sanskrit has been. In the matters of arriving at a correct decision and to reach justice even when very satisfactory statement of law either statutory or otherwise is not available it has been stated that in such matter a Judge has to proceed and go on making efforts by parity of reasoning, just like when churning of Great Ocean was being made to find out Nectar (3np), but in fact it was poison which came out nevertheless Devtas etc. did not feel nervous or frustrated but they went on making efforts and ultimately Nectar came out. The relevant Sanskrit Shlock is as follows;Again it has been stated that in so many cases where satisfactory law on the subject is not available-Covering the problem faced by the Court, in that event if a Judge tries to solve the problem by referring to the letters of the statute in that event he would not do justice with the case rather there would be deterioration of religlous and judiclal system. That Shlok Brihaspati Smiriti 21. In a baffling situation, as in the present case, in my humble opinion how lnterpretation has to be made is only by parity of reasoning or by rule of natural discretion. For this purpose it is better to make reference to the statement of law, as stated in Allens Law in the Making page 272 : "the Judge himself addresses his task in much the same way as a counsel. This decision is given in the form of a structure of logic, in which he may use any material which he considers adrem. Even pure unofficial practice may be prayed in aid a precedence Eastern (1937) 1 K. B. at page 287 ). If the matter is covered by the clear and unambiguous provision of a statute, his task is simplified. In a great many case no statute is applicable and even if it is applicable, it is frequently the be reverse of clear and unambiguous. If the matter is covered by the clear and unambiguous provision of a statute, his task is simplified. In a great many case no statute is applicable and even if it is applicable, it is frequently the be reverse of clear and unambiguous. The Judge must then proceed as Bacon laid down long ago either by parity of reasoning, (i. e. VEL PER as in 53) or by use of example (as in 54) or by rules of natural reason and discretion (as in 55 ). The method of his reasoning may take innumerable forms and no rule of law limits and controls those powers provided that they achieve a logical conclusion. It would be course be grossly inaccurate to say that a Judge who has to decide whether a wild duck is a bird of carrem is bound by the evidence of literature, yet he will not hesitate to turn to literature if it assists him in determining whether Cokes statements of law on this point be correct or not (vide Parker, J. in fitzlberding Ltd V/s. Purcell, (1908) 2 Ch.139. In Orbit Trust (1943), Ch.144, 151) ; in conkery V/s. Carpenter, (1951) 1 K. B.102. " 22. The American Supreme Court in Atkinson V/s. Sinclair Refinning Co. , 370 U. S.248 : 8 L. Ed.2nd 262, observed as follows: "other problems will lie in the penumbra of express statutory mandates. Some will lack express statutory sanction but will be solved by looking at the policy of the legisation and fashioning a remedy that will effectuate that policy. The range of judicial inventiveness will be determined by the nature of the problem, (see Textile Workers V/s. Lincoln Mills, 353 U. S.451 : 1 L. Ed.2nd 972)". 23. It ls not a correct concept of justice that any person including the petitioners can be compelled to pay more licence fee for the whole of the year 1994-95, when in fact they were granted licence only for a limited period and had done business during that period only. In C. W. J. C. No.296 of 1995 (R) licence was granted for only 3-10-1994 to 31-3-1995 (vide Annexure-2/a)and similar was the position in other writ petition. In such delicate situation the Court has to look into the welfare of the people as expressed in the Latin Maxim "salus POPULI suprema LEX, which means the welfare of the people is the supreme law. In such delicate situation the Court has to look into the welfare of the people as expressed in the Latin Maxim "salus POPULI suprema LEX, which means the welfare of the people is the supreme law. In Pritampal V/s. State of M. P. , (J. T.1992 (2) S. C.41) it was observed by their Lordships of the Apex Court that the welfare of the people is the supreme law, and this can be achieved only when justice is administered lawfully, judicially and without fear or favour and without being hampered and thwarted and this cannot be effective unless respect for it is maintained. 24. What the institutes of Justinian DE JUSTITIA ET JURE IN liber PRIMUS TITI said JUSTITIA est CONSTANS ET PERPETUA voluntus JUSP SUUM CUIQUE tribuendi means justice is the consent and perpetual wish to render every one his due. 25. Ex ABUNDANTI cautela, the Rule 106 of Rules ls extracted: "106. The fee for a licence for the sale of foreign liquor to the trade shall be fixed in each case by the Commissioner on the recommendation of the Collector and shall not be less than Rs. (36) per annum payable in advance. A trade licensee shall sell only to licensed dealers, troops or military bodies and not to the public. " There was some amendment about mode of payment but substantially the provision is that the fee for licence for sale of lndia made foreign liquor shall be fixed by the Commissioner (Excise ). But it was never provided under this rule that even if a person obtains licence for the sale of foreign liquor for a shorter period. Then the whole year never-theless the fee has to be paid for whole year. 26. In my opinion, in view of the discussions made above, the concept of justice has been that it must be in accordance with law and to make available every person his due, it has to be ascertained keeping in view so many factors. In the present context it cannot be the concept of justice that in case the petitioners have paid more amount of licence fee for the limited period, in that event excess amount paid that actual payable for the period for which licence was granted, cannot be refunded to them. 27. In the present context it cannot be the concept of justice that in case the petitioners have paid more amount of licence fee for the limited period, in that event excess amount paid that actual payable for the period for which licence was granted, cannot be refunded to them. 27. In view of the discussions made above, the Division Bench of this court in C. W. J. C. No.6118/93 correctly allowed the writ-petition and directed the respondents to refund the licence fee which the petitioners have deposited for a period for which neither licence was granted nor petitioners did business. The same view was correctly followed in C. W. J. C. No.1587/94. I am in agreement with that view. But the view taken by other division Bench in C. W. J. C. No.6496/94 decided on 25-11-1994 does not lay down correct law and it was held that neither proportionate reduction can be made nor the refund. Consequently that decision (in C. W. J. C. No.6496/94)is overruled. Resultantly these two present writ petitions succeed and the same are allowed. The respondents are dlrected to proportionately reduce the licence fee for the period for which neither licence was granted nor they did any business and the excess amount has to be refunded by 15th May, 1996. In the circumstances of the case, however, there shall be no order as to costs. Radha Mohan Prasad, J.-I have the privilege of going through the judgment of brothers B. L. Yadav, J. I regret, l am unable to agree with the judgment of brother Yadav. 28. In short, the facts giving rise to these writ applicatlons are that there were advertisements published lnviting applications for the settlement of wholesale license of lndia made foreign liquor. The said licences were to be settled for the remaining period of financial year on payment of licence-fee of rs.1,50,000/- Pursuant to the said advertisements the willing persons lncluding the petitioners of the two writ applications made applications and they having been found fit were granted licences. The petitioners thereafter deposited a sum of Rs.1,50,000/- as licence fee through Treasury Challan wlthout making any protest and were issued license in Excise Form No.1 for the remaining period. A photo copy of the license has been annexed as annexure 2a to the C. W. J. C. No.296/95 (R) and annexure 5 to the C. W. J. C. No.678/95 (R ). 29. A photo copy of the license has been annexed as annexure 2a to the C. W. J. C. No.296/95 (R) and annexure 5 to the C. W. J. C. No.678/95 (R ). 29. In the said licenses it was clearly mentioned that they were authorised to sell portable foreign liquor to licensed dealers at Radium road, Ranchi from 3-10-94 till 31st march, 95 in the first case and in the second case at Gumla from 31-1-95 till 31st March, 95 on the conditions mentioned therein and the general conditions applicable to all Excise Licensees annexed thereto. One of the conditions mentioned therein was that the petitioners should pay to Government in advance a fee of Rs.1,50,000/- into treasury/sub-treasury, which they deposited without any protest, however, it appears that later, in advice they filed the present writ applications in which for the first time it was alleged that the action of the respondents is completely arbitrary, unreasonable and visits the petitioners with civil consequences besides that the same is not equitable and that the respondents can not charge any licence fee for the period the petitioners have not done any business. As the petitioners had already deposited a sum of Rs.1,50,000/- which according to them was by way of advance, they claimed for the proportionate refund/adjustment of the license fee is 1995-96, as according to them, the respondents can charge license fee only for the remaining period, for which the licenses were granted. 30. A counter affidavit has been filed on behalf of the respondents, in which it is stated that the writ petitions are barred by the principle of estoppel and walver, inasmuch, as the question raised therein have already been decided and adjudicated upon by this court in an earlier wrlt petition, the reference of which has been made in the aforementioned judgment of learned brother B. L. Yadav, J. It is further contended that the trade in the intoxicants stand on a different footing which can be regulated in a manner different from other trade and thereof exclusive provision has been judicially evolved. It is thus, contended that the fee so charged is in conslderation of special benefit or privilege granted which the petitioners would not have been able to enjoy, unless obtained the wholesale license. 31. It is thus, contended that the fee so charged is in conslderation of special benefit or privilege granted which the petitioners would not have been able to enjoy, unless obtained the wholesale license. 31. According to the respondents, having known the implication on the aforesaid settlement the terms and conditions thereof, for the remaining period 1994-95 the petitioners took the settlement wililngly paying the prescribed fee and as such they are estopped from challenglng the quantum of prescribed fee for the wholesale license. It is stated that in case of retail vend of country liquor the fees to different shops vary according to the potentiality of shop and competitive bids, while in case of a wholesale trade licensee of lndia made foreign liquor the fee is fixed and the licensee may sell the liquor to the retailers of other district too, such as, in the case of the petitioner of the first case, he being the wholesale dealer of Ranchi district has also made sale of liquor in the other districts like Gumla, Lohardagga districts. In the case of retail vend of country liquor the scope is strictly limited to the counter sale only. 32. Further, it is stated that according to Rule 106 the prescribed license fee payabl in lump sum was rs.1,50,000 in advance for the said license and there is no provision of proportionate license fee in the Act or rules thereof. According to the respondents, as a matter of fact, the license fee prescribed in Rule 106 is the consideration money which the State is entitled to charge for parting with the privileges and in absence of any provision for proportionate fee they were entitled to settle the license in accordance with Rule 106 at the prescribed license fee of Rs.1,50,000/-for the licences in question. it is also stated that the India-made foreign liquor is not an essential commodity and there is no retail price fixation from the government. All rights in regard to sale of intoxicants vests in the State and it is open to the State to part with those rights for a consideration, as is stipulated in rule 106 irrespective of the period for which the privilege is granted. 33. Before considering the submissions made by the learned Counsel for the parties I wish to refer to certain provisions dealing with the grant of license. 33. Before considering the submissions made by the learned Counsel for the parties I wish to refer to certain provisions dealing with the grant of license. Sec.20 of the Bihar Excise act, 1915 (hereinafter referred to the act) provides that no intoxicant and no portion of the hemp plant from which an intoxicaint drug can be manufactured or produced shall be sold except under the authority and subject to the terms and conditions of a licence granted in that behalf by the Collector. There are certain proviso attached to the section, with which we are not concerned in the present case. 34. Section 38 of the Act deals with the fees for terms, conditions and form of, and duration of, licenses, permits and passes. 35. Section 39 of the Act deals with the power of the Board to reduce fee and vests power in the Board to order a reduction of the amount of fees payable at any time during the period for which any license has been granted during the unexpired portion of the grant. 36. Section 89 deals with the power of the State Government to make rules and under Clause (e) of sub-section (2) of the said provision to make the rules for regulating the periods for which licensed for the wholesale or retail vend of any intoxicant may be granted and the number of such licenses which may be granted for any local area. 37. Section 90 vests power in the board to make rules and under sub-section (7) of the said provision the Board has been vested with the power to make rules for prescribing the scale of fees or manner of fixing the fees payable in respect of any exclusive privilege granted under Sec.22 or any license, permit or pass granted under this Act, or in respect of the storing of any intoxicant. 38. Section 43 deals with withdrawal of licenses and section 44 deals with surrender of licenses. 39. Rule 44 of 1919 Rules framed by the State Government provides for duration and number of licenses to be granted. According to the said provision, licenses for the wholesale or retail vend of excisable articles may be granted for one year from 1st April to 3st March. But under sub-rule (2) if any license is granted during the course of financial year, it can be granted only upto 31st March, next following. 40. According to the said provision, licenses for the wholesale or retail vend of excisable articles may be granted for one year from 1st April to 3st March. But under sub-rule (2) if any license is granted during the course of financial year, it can be granted only upto 31st March, next following. 40. Rules 120 to 121 of the Rules framed under Sec.90 provides different fees in respect of different licences and the relevant rule is Rule 106 which has been substituted by notification dated 27th March, 1987 contained in annexure-4 read with the one contalned in annexure 5 whereby and whereunder a sum of Rs.1,50,000 per annum has been prescribed as the fees for license for the deposit of foreign liquor in the Bonded Warehouse and for sale of foreign liquor to the trade. The said provision has been made effective from 1-4-1990. 41. Learned Counsel appearing for the petitioners submitted that as in the advertisements itself there was clear stipulation that the licenses in question were to be granted only for the remaining period of the financial year 1994-95, the respondents authorities were not justified in realising the license fee for the whole of the year and the petitioners thus, are entitled for proportionate reduction/adjustment in the license fee. 42. According to the learned State counsel under the scheme of the Act and Rules the license is to be ordinarily granted for one year on prescribed fee, but from the various provisions of the act and the Rules it is clear that the legislators were clear in their mind that there would not be any question of remission for grant of exclusive privilege irrespective of the period inasmuch, as in, the absence of any provision on proportionate license fee in the Act, the law does not sanction for parting with the said privilege on any lesser fee than the prescribed one. 43. Further, it was submitted by him that the State has the exclusive privilege to deal with manufacture and sale of the liquor in question and the petitioners had no fundamental rights to get the said exclusive privilege. Thus, according to the State Counsel, the state is entitled for charging the fee for parting with the said privilege. 43. Further, it was submitted by him that the State has the exclusive privilege to deal with manufacture and sale of the liquor in question and the petitioners had no fundamental rights to get the said exclusive privilege. Thus, according to the State Counsel, the state is entitled for charging the fee for parting with the said privilege. It was also submitted by the learned Counsel for the State that in the present writ application the petitioners were fully aware of the period for which the exclusive privilege was to be granted and also the conditions that they had to pay a license fee of Rs.1,50,000 for the said period and accordingly they entered into the contract by depositing the money without making any protest and thereby got licenses for the same. As such the petitioners are estopped from challenging the quantum of the fee deposited by them for grant of exclusive privilege for specified period. 44. In reply, the learned Counsel for the petitioners did not dispute that the petitioners had no fundamental right, but it was submitted by them that if the authorities act in discriminatory or in unreasonable manner, then one can certainly enforce it and argue before this Court violation of Article 14 of the Constitution. It was also submitted by them that the use of the words per annum payable in advance in rule 106 leaves no room for doubt that the prescribed license fee is for the whole of the year and if the license is granted for any lesser part of the year, then the fee is to be charged after making proportionate reduction. I am unable to agree with this submission of the learned Counsel for the petitioner 45. It is true that Rule 100 prescribes the license fee payable in advance per annum, but in my opinion, that cannot be interpreted to mean that the said license fee could only be charged if the license is granted for the whole year and in case of any lesser period a proportionate reduction is to be made in the fee. According to blacks Law Dictionary the expression per annum means by the year ; annually ; "yearly and the word annually means. . . . According to blacks Law Dictionary the expression per annum means by the year ; annually ; "yearly and the word annually means. . . . yearly or once a year but does not in itself signify what time in year and also means accruing within space of a year; relating to or covering the event or affairs of a year; once a year, without signifying what time in year. 46. Thus, from the above, it is clear that the words per annum used in rule 106 only denotes the minimum fee prescribed therein to be charged for the event relating to or covering the event or affairs of a year and cannot be interpreted to mean that there can be any reduction made in the prescribed fee if the State Government parts with its exclusive privilege only for a period of the year and not for the whole year. Under Rule 44 of the 1919 Rules a license for the wholesale or retail vend of excisable articles is to be ordinarily granted for one year from 1st April to 31st March, but sub-rule (2) of the said rules makes it clear that a license can also be granted during the course of financial year, but only upto 31st March next following and under rule 106 the prescribed license fee is Rs.1,50,000/-per annum for fees for license for the deposit of foreign liquor in the Bonded warehouse and for sale of foreign liquor to the trade without making any exception or provision for payment of proportionate license fee to be charged annually. 47. From the above there cannot be any doubt that the authority is vested with power to grant license even during the course of financial year, but only up to 31st March, next following and the license fee prescribed for the same is fixed. The learned Counsel for the petitioners has not been able to point out any provision ln the Act or the Rules, under which the authority has been vested with the power to grant any remission or order for refund at the initial grant of exclusive privilege. The learned Counsel for the petitioners has not been able to point out any provision ln the Act or the Rules, under which the authority has been vested with the power to grant any remission or order for refund at the initial grant of exclusive privilege. The provisions regarding remission or refund are contained only in sections 39, 43 and 44 of the Act which can only be granted in case of any subsequent exigency intervening, such as, for unexpired portion of the grant or in the cases of withdrawal of licenses and/or surrender of licenses and not at the initlal grant, inasmuch as the said provisions have no application where the grant itself is given under certain conditions. 48. The Supreme Court in the case of State of U. P. V/s. Sheopat Rai, reported in A. I. R.1994 S. C.813, held that the term license fee or fixed fee used in the contest of U. P. Excise Act, the Ordinance read with the preamble and the excise (Amendment) Rules is the amount of consideration receivable by the State Government for parting with the exclusive privilege or right in dealing with liquor or drugs including the exclusive privilege of vending foreign liquor in favour of a private party under a license (contract ). 49. In the case of Excise Commissioner, u. P. V/s. Ram Kumar, reported in a. I. R.1976 S. C.2237, it was held by the Apex Court that the duty of license fee can be imposed on the basis of the parting with the privilege by the State under the rules of contract and that liability to make payment of license fee emanates primarily from the terms and conditions of grant of license (Excise contract ). A reference in this regard is also invited to the decision of the supreme Court in the case of. Raw Lal v. State of Rajasthan, reported in A. I. R.1975 S. C.2008 and Nasirwar etc. V/s. State of M. P. , reported in A. I. R.1975 s. C.360. 50. A reference in this regard is also invited to the decision of the supreme Court in the case of. Raw Lal v. State of Rajasthan, reported in A. I. R.1975 S. C.2008 and Nasirwar etc. V/s. State of M. P. , reported in A. I. R.1975 s. C.360. 50. In the present writ applications there was clear stipulation made in the advertisements as well as in the licenses shall be granted only for the remaining period and for which the required fee would be Rs.1,50,000/- In my opinion, the petitioners having accepted the said conditions and entering into the contract and also having taken benefit therefrom, cannot now be heard to say that the said conditions were unconscionable. It is neither the case of the petitioners, nor there is any pleading on the basis of which it can be held that the license fee charged from them were unreasonable, excessive and/or not right or reasonable. 51. With due respect I am unable to agree with brother B. L. Yadav, J. That if the petitioners have to make payment for the whole period and not for the remaining period only that would amount as if the material thing was concealed by the State Government in the advertisements. In fact, everything was made clear in the advertisement and further at the time of grant of the licenses they were accepted by the petitioners, who also availed the benefit flowing therefrom. It is well- accepted principle that a party cannot both approbate and re-approbate. He cannot, to use the words of Honeyman, J and smith Beker (1873-8 CP 350) at the same time blow hot and cold. He cannot say at one time that the transactions is valid and thereby obtain some advantage to which he could only be entitled on the finding that it is valid and at another say it is void for the purpose of securing some further advantage. 52. The State or its officers never forced the petitioners to take the license and/or enter into such a contract for taking a license. The petitioner had the option not to make an application or to get the position clarified in regard to license fee before taking the privilege, if it was not suitable or profitable to them. 52. The State or its officers never forced the petitioners to take the license and/or enter into such a contract for taking a license. The petitioner had the option not to make an application or to get the position clarified in regard to license fee before taking the privilege, if it was not suitable or profitable to them. But having taken advantage of the completed transaction they cannot now turn around and say that the State or its officers were not entitled for realising the aforementioned fee from them. 53. I am also unable to agree with brother B. L. Yadav, J that the petitioners have been compelled to pay more license fee for the whole year 1994-95. The license was granted for a particular period and for which the fee was charged from them and they paid it willingly without raising any objection. In my opinion, there is no question of the petitioners having paid more amount of license fees for the limited period. The petitioners entered into a contract with the State for parting its exclusive privilege under certain conditions and on payment of a flxed amount of license fees according to the terms of the contract. Thus, I am unable to agree with the view of brother B. L. Yadav, J that there was any excess payment of amount than the actual amount payable for the period by the petitioners was made, for which they are entitled for relief from this Court in order to do justice to them. 54. Accordingly, l do not flnd any merit in the writ-petitions, and the same are dismissed, but without costs. Narayan Roy, J.-I have gone through the judgments of brethren B. L. Yadav, J, and Radha Mohan Prasad, J. I regret my inability to agree with the judgment of brother B. L. Yadav, J. However, I am in full agreement with the operative part of the judgment rendered by brother Radha Mohan prasad, J. , but at the same time I am tempted to say something of my own. 55. The short facts in both these writ applications are as under. There were advertisements published in the newspapers inviting applications for settlement of wholesale licences of India made foreign liquor. The said licences where to be settled for the remaining period of the financial year on payment of licence fee of rs.1,50,000/-. 55. The short facts in both these writ applications are as under. There were advertisements published in the newspapers inviting applications for settlement of wholesale licences of India made foreign liquor. The said licences where to be settled for the remaining period of the financial year on payment of licence fee of rs.1,50,000/-. Pursuant to the advertisements aforementioned, the petitioners, along with other willing persons filed applications. The State authorities on scrutiny selected them and they were granted licences. The petitioners thereafter deposited the licence, fee through Treasury Challan and pursuant thereof licence in Excise form No.1 for the remaining period was issued to them. After having obtained the licences the petitioners filed the present writ applications alleging therein that the action of the respondents was completely arbitrary, unreasonable and the same was not equltable as the respondents could not have charged licence fee for the period the petitioners had not done any business and the petitioners, therefore, prayed for proportionate refund/adjustment of the licence fee in 1995-96. The respondents filed their counter-affidavit and prayed for dismissal of the writ applications on the ground that the licence fee was realised for whole of the financial year and since it was the exclusive privilege of the State to part with the liquor vend, petitioners had no right to ask for proportionate refund or adjustment. It was aiso contended in the counter-affidavit that there was a clear stipulation in the advertisement directing the willing persons to deposit the license fee for the financial year amounting to Rs.1,50,000/- and as such the petitioners could not have prayed for proportionate refund or adjustment. 56. The provisions of law under the Bihar Excise Act, 1915 and the rules thereunder have already been noticed by brother Radha Mohan prasad, J. in his dissenting judgment and as such l need not repeat the same. " 57. According to Rule 106 of the bihar Excise Rules, the prescribed license fee payable in lump sum was rs.1,50,000/- in advance for the said license and there is" ho provision of proportionate llcense fee in the Act or rules thereof. " 57. According to Rule 106 of the bihar Excise Rules, the prescribed license fee payable in lump sum was rs.1,50,000/- in advance for the said license and there is" ho provision of proportionate llcense fee in the Act or rules thereof. The license fee prescribed in Rule 106 is the consideration money, which the State is entitled to charge for parting with the privileges and in absence of any provision for proportionate fee the State appears to be entitled to settle the license in accordance with Rule 106 at the prescribed license fee. It would be pertinent to mention here that all rights in regard to sale of intoxicants vests in the state and it is the exclusive privilege of the State and it is open to the State to part with those rights for a valuable consideration as is stipulated in Rule 106, irrespective of the period for which the privilege is granted. The action of the state Government, therefore, cannot be said to be arbitrary, unreasonable and violative of Articles 19 (l) (g) and 14 of the Constitution of india. 58. The decision rendered by the supreme Court in the case of Har shankar and others V/s. The Deputy Excise and Taxation Commissioner and others, air 1975 Supreme Court 1121, is the authorlty on the point. The Apex Court in Har Shankars case (Supra) has held that since rights in regard to intoxicants belong to the State, it is open to the government to part with those rights for a consideration. It has further been held that citizens cannot have any fundamental right to trade or carry on business in the properties or rights belonging to the government, nor can there be any infringement of Article 14, if the Government tries to get the best available price for its valuable rights. 59. In Krishna Kumar Narula v, state of Jammu and Kashmir, Alr 1967 supreme Court 1368, the Apex Court has observed: "we, therefore, hold that dealing in liquor is business and a citizen has a right to do business in that commodity; but the State can make a law imposing reasonable restrictions on the said right, in public interests. " In the said case it was also observed : "the fact that the Government was the seller does not change the legal position once its exclusive right to deal with those privileges is conceded. " In the said case it was also observed : "the fact that the Government was the seller does not change the legal position once its exclusive right to deal with those privileges is conceded. If the Government is the exclusive owner of those privileges, reliance on Article 19 (1) (g) or Article 14 becomes irrelevant. Citizens cannot have any fundamental right to trade or carry on business in the properties or rights belonging to the Government nor can there be any infringement of Article 14, if the Government tries to get the best available price for its valuable rights". 60. The ratio laid down in the case of Excise Commissioner, U. P. V/s. Ram kumar, reported in A. l. R.1976 supreme Court 2237, has already been noticed by brother Radha Mohan prasad, J. , in his judgment and that is the settled law on the point that license fee can be imposed on the basis of the parting with the privilege by the State under the Rules of contract and that liability to make payment of license fee manages primarily from the terms and conditions of grant of license. 61. In the advertisements there were clear stipulations with regard to the conditions of grant of license and the license fee accordingly was charged from the willing persons for whole of the financial year. The petitioners pursuant to the advertisements entered into a contract with the State for parting with its exclusive privilege under certain conditions and on payment of fixed amount of license fee according to the terms of the contract. In that view of the matter there is no question of excess payment of amount that the actual amount payable for the period by the petitioners. 62. For the reasons aforementioned and in view of the legal propositions noticed above, I find no merit in these two writ applications and the same are, accordingly, dismissed without costs. Petitions dismissed.